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Abstract 
 
The concept of metamemory proposes that supplementary to typically measured memory 
abilities, memory monitoring and control processes are used to optimise learning. Accurate 
memory monitoring appears to be underpinned by a range of cognitive, and possibly 
affective, contributions. In populations with these deficits, metamemory has been shown to 
be impaired. In Multiple Sclerosis (MS), only a limited metamemory literature exists, 
surprising given that MS is a leading cause of disability among people of working age, and 
cognitive and mood disorder is common. 
 
Using structural equation modelling, this study of 100 people with MS explored factors 
contributing to performance on episodic Judgment of Learning, Retrospective Confidence 
and Feeling of Knowing. Given its negative influence on cognitive domains in MS, the 
impact of information processing deficits on metamemory was also investigated. Finally, 
memory self-report, a frequently used clinical indicator of memory functioning, was 
assessed. 
 
Findings suggest that memory complaint is associated with mood, and is unrelated to 
tested memory. Second, Retrospective Confidence Judgments were predictive of memory 
performance, even in the presence of memory impairment. Third, an unusual finding of 
maintained underconfidence at delay was observed in the Judgment of Learning task. 
Finally, Feeling of Knowing judgments related to executive, but not to memory ability. A 
novel finding in respect of this judgment was of processing speed relating negatively to 
accuracy, in the context of executive dysfunction. This suggests that some top-down 
direction of processing resources may be a factor in supporting accuracy, rather than the 
speed at which information is processed. Of all the task-based judgments, accuracy in this 
judgment was the only one with a reliable association with mood. Faster processing speed, 
executive dysfunction and least depression symptomatology related to low accuracy, 
perhaps typifying a profile of disinhibition seen in MS, characterised by poorly constrained 
processing and apparently elevated mood. 
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  1 
 
Structure of the Thesis. 
 
In Chapter 1 Literature Review, the context of the study is presented. In people with 
neurological illness, the relationships between neuropsychological impairment and 
learning are considered. Learning ability, especially when self-regulated, is both a method 
and an aim in neurological rehabilitation. A review of one common neurological disease, 
Multiple Sclerosis (MS), focusing on neuropsychological and affective consequences is 
then presented.  The aim is to identify the key areas of deficit potentially impacting on 
learning ability. The relationships between cognitive and affective deficits in MS are then 
considered in respect of awareness and management of cognitive abilities. Specifically, the 
review focuses on the accurate monitoring of memory abilities, or metamemory. Accurate 
monitoring of memory is proposed to be a key component of learning, because it facilitates 
appropriate learning-oriented behaviours (Prigatano, 1999).  
 
The theoretical underpinning of metamemory is then reviewed, focusing on the 
mechanisms for how a range of monitoring decisions might be made; affect-based, using 
memory-experiences or using inference. The measurement of metamemory from the point 
of view of self-efficacy, or subjective report of memory is first considered. A second 
measurement approach focusing on accuracy drawn from specific memory tasks, or ‘on-
line’ metamemory judgment (Toglia & Kirk, 2000) is reviewed. Both approaches are 
addressed because clinical practice may orient towards the former, and research literature 
the latter.  
 
The chapter ends by drawing together the literature on metamemory in neurological 
populations, then to metamemory in Multiple Sclerosis. From the review, a number of 
objectives are developed, from which the study then proceeds by proposing a number of a 
priori models of cognitive and affective contributions to four metamemory judgments. 
These latent variable models investigate factors that are proposed to contribute to accuracy 
in metamnemonic judgments.  
 
In Chapter 2, Development of Methods, the selection of relevant measures for proposed 
cognitive, affective and metamemory variables for the study is considered, based on 
psychometric properties of instruments and on their appropriateness to the sample. Chapter 
3, Development of Statistical Methods, presents a review of the selected method of 
 
 
  2 
 
analysis, structural equation modelling. The chapter outlines the two steps involved in the 
approach. First, the investigation of each proposed latent variable using confirmatory 
factor analysis is outlined; this is called the measurement model because it reflects the 
testing of assumptions about selected tests’ factorial coherence. The second step, termed 
the structural model, which is used to investigate relationships between latent variables, is 
summarised. 
 
Chapter 4, Methods, outlines the major ethical issues in the study, the recruitment of the 
sample, and the procedures involved in collecting the data for the study. This chapter also 
considers statistical methods relating to data screening, transformation and missing data 
handling. 
 
There are three results chapters, each of which will be presented with an initial discussion 
of findings. Chapter 5 Sample Performance outlines the demographics of the sample and 
performance on the range of measures used. The aims in analysing this data are, in part, to 
assess the features of the sample against known samples of community dwelling people 
with MS in the UK, so an assessment of generalisability can be made. This chapter also 
presents the results on the range of measures used, which will contribute to the assessment 
of subsequent results. 
 
Chapter 6, The Measurement Models presents the results of confirmatory factor analyses 
for each of the proposed latent variables to be used in final modelling, relating this to a 
discussion of both statistical and conceptual issues raised. The results of this analysis will 
contribute to the final set of results; presented in Chapter 7, The Structural Models. This 
chapter will present results of testing each of the a priori models of subjective memory 
appraisal, retrospective confidence, judgment of learning and feeling of knowing. There 
are two components to these models’ results - identifying the latent contributions for each 
of the metamnemonic judgments for the sample, and a consideration of how these 
contributions fit with proposed models of these metamemory judgments. 
 
Chapter 8, Discussion, will address the objectives of the study by drawing together the 
results with relevant published evidence - performance data on individual measures, 
factorial structure of tests used in this and other samples, and performance of the sample 
on metamemory tasks in respect of other neurological and non-neurological samples. 
 
 
  3 
 
Clinical implications of the study’s findings will be explored and implications for further 
research to answer remaining, or emerging questions, will be addressed. These conclusions 
will also consider issues of measurement and analysis. The overall structure of the study is 
outlined in figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1. Structure of the thesis; SEM = Structural Equation Modelling 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
 
This chapter focuses on the clinical context for the study; the repercussions of 
neuropsychological impairment for both learning and rehabilitation success for people with 
Multiple Sclerosis (MS).  The introduction lays out some of the issues relating to how 
requisite learning ability is perhaps assumed in rehabilitation, rather than specifically 
planned for. The relevance of this to MS patient groups is considered. An outline of MS is 
then presented considering the pathology, diagnosis, symptoms and treatment of the 
disease. The main focus for the review of both symptoms and treatment relates to 
neuropsychological impairment. The process of rehabilitation is considered in respect of 
approaches that consider adequate awareness, monitoring and control of learning and 
memory, leading to a consideration of the topic of metamemory. The metamemory 
literature is reviewed to outline key concepts, models and methods of study, then 
considered in relation to performance of neurologically impaired groups in this domain. 
Finally, studies of metamemory in MS are appraised in order to derive the aims for the 
study. 
   
1.1 Introduction. 
The development of National Service Frameworks (NSF) by the United Kingdom 
Department of Health over the last decade were an attempt to improve healthcare service 
delivery, with different frameworks addressing topics such as older people, mental health 
and long term conditions (Great Britain. Department of Health, 1999, 2001, 2005). The 
NSF for long-term conditions, whose target audience ranged from NHS Trust chief 
executives to voluntary organisations, sets out a number of ‘quality requirements’ to best 
support people with long-term, mainly neurological, conditions (Great Britain. Department 
of Health, 2005:3). 
 
Two key areas emphasised in the NSF and related documents are symptom self-
management and the provision of specialist rehabilitation (Great Britain. Department of 
Health, 2005). About half of the NSF quality requirements focus on rehabilitation 
interventions and disease self-management - ranging from early interventions to 
vocationally-focused and community-based rehabilitation, all with aim of supporting 
independent living (Department of Health, 2005:5). Self-management was supported 
through the development of Expert Patient Programmes (Great Britain. Department of 
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Health, 2001) by which the experience-derived knowledge of people in managing chronic 
diseases is used as a resource for other people with chronic diseases.  
 
Despite some concerns that Expert Patient Programmes do not reach those who need it 
most, an analysis from the UK suggested that, in part, it achieved a key aim in 
acknowledging the experience of living with chronic illness, providing some 
empowerment to patients (Wilson, Kendall & Brooks, 2007; Lorig et al., 2005), though 
additional benefits in disease self-management have not been consistently found (Rogers et 
al., 2008).  
 
One limitation of such programmes appears to be that those who benefit most, as might 
also be the case in rehabilitation more generally, are ‘systematically organised’ people who 
already have intent towards learning, autonomy or ‘involvement’ (Wilson, Kendall & 
Brooks, 2007:430). These are frequently those who also benefit from rehabilitation based 
on working assumptions that learning processes are the same for people with neurological 
disease, including those with cognitive impairment (Prigatano, 1999; Glisky & Glisky, 
2002). Patient groups with this orientation, or ability, are likely to be in possession of 
generally intact neuropsychological functions or lacking the negative impact of mood 
disorder, maladjustment or reduced awareness (Prigatano, 1999). 
 
Links between pathology and learning impairments are often not considered adequately in 
relation to key learning-related factors such as speed of learning, motivation or 
generalisability of learning (Prigatano, 1999; Toglia & Kirk, 2000; Krakauer, 2006). One 
reason for the failure to adequately consider learning propensity fully may be that models 
of motor skill acquisition are more dominant in rehabilitation, perhaps reflecting the 
availability of methods of identifying functional plasticity in this domain (Winstein, Wing 
& Whitall, 2003). As such, a focus on repetition and performance of specific task 
components is often maintained, rather than one that focuses on abilities to self-regulate 
learning and develop task competency. 
 
Capacity to learn is a fundamental requirement of rehabilitation, and the capacity to learn 
itself is built on a number of factors - motivational, cognitive, affective, personal and 
environmental (Wade, 1997). More specifically, in considering people with neurological 
illness affecting the central nervous system, mood disorder and neuropsychological 
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functions are key intrinsic factors in learning ability (Diamond et al., 1996; Asikainen, 
Kaste & Sarna, 1998; Ownsworth & McKenna, 2004). Rehabilitation interventions often 
assume that patients are, or are capable of, ‘monitoring their understanding’ as a good 
learner does (Perfect & Schwartz, 2002:7; Fiszdon, et al., 2006). Because learning is often 
inadequately considered in the design of rehabilitation interventions, those who learn in a 
manner not impacted greatly by disease process may benefit when routine, intuitive 
assumptions about how learning occurs, is applied and is maintained (Galski, et al., 1993; 
Wilson, 1997; Cicerone et al., 2000). These assumptions are often seen in action in clinical 
practice where, for example, repetition blocks of a task component are carried out, with the 
supposition that this leads to generalisable learning (Toglia, 1991; Hanlon, 1996; Lincoln, 
et al., 2002). The efficacy of this approach is often supported in the research base by 
screening out people with neuropsychological impairment or those who cannot engage in 
goal-setting, itself potentially a surrogate for cognitive abilities or requisite awareness of 
deficits (Toglia & Kirk, 2000; Fischer, Gauggel & Trexler, 2004).  
 
‘A theory of rehabilitation without a model of learning is a vehicle without an engine’ 
        (Baddeley, 1993:235).  
 
In rehabilitation contexts, the identification of potential for learning, the ability to 
generalise new learning, and the appraisal that successful learning has occurred, are key 
factors (Toglia, 1991, 1998a; Fiszdon et al., 2006). Learning is different from performance, 
the latter, perhaps misguidedly, sometimes the focus of rehabilitation efforts (Winstein, 
Wing & Whitall, 2003). The distinction between the two rests on the persistence, 
permanence and transfer of a ‘skill’ to different tasks or environments (Hanlon, 1996; 
Toglia, 1998b; Winstein, Wing & Whitall, 2003); improved performance may achieve 
none of these. 
 
Learners are those who show benefit from training of some kind, improving or refining 
performance over repeated exposure to a task, and generalising this to different contexts 
(Toglia, 1998b). A complication in some domains of rehabilitation, such as in neurological 
populations, is that the learning process itself may be compromised by neuropsychological 
deficit, reduced awareness or the individuals beliefs about how the disease impacts ability 
(Pohl, Winstein & Onla-Or, 1997; Prigatano, 1999; Toglia & Kirk, 2000; Boyd, et al., 
2007). This means that in considering learning and its application, the impairments caused 
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by a neurological illness are important. The extent and type of neuropsychological 
dysfunction, mood disorder, the impact of reaction to the disease (including implicit beliefs 
about ability) and motivation may all be relevant factors. Each may have an impact in 
creating an evaluative bias. A potential result is that learning behaviours based on such 
distorted evaluations, are themselves inappropriate (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). 
The clinical entity of Multiple Sclerosis (MS) is one such neurological illness; 
neuropsychological, motor, sensory and affective disturbance is common (Compston, et 
al., 2006). In the author’s clinical experience, management of sensory and motor 
disabilities caused by the illness is often emphasised at the expense of the impact of 
neuropsychological impairment, the latter potentially having a greater impact on learning 
ability. This imbalance is evident in the MS rehabilitation research base (O’Brien, et al., 
2008), and in proposals that this cognitive impairment, along with fatigue and low mood, 
are often neglected aspects of the illness (Minden, 2000; Thomas, et al., 2006). Studies 
focusing on rehabilitation efficacy, where anything more than mild cognitive impairment 
can be a criterion for exclusion perhaps underscore this bias (Patti et al., 2002; Khan, et al., 
2008). At the same time, MS-focused Cochrane reviews of the effectiveness of vocational 
rehabilitation (Khan, Ng & Turner-Stokes, 2009), psychological therapies (Thomas, et al., 
2006), occupational therapy (Steultjens et al., 2003) and multidisciplinary rehabilitation 
(Khan, et al., 2008) underline the negative impact of cognitive deficits in MS on 
rehabilitation outcome.  
Generally, cognitive impairment in MS can present as a somewhat hidden disability, in 
comparison to the sensory and motor impairments associated with the disease. The deficits 
in learning associated with cognitive impairment often become obvious only when 
increasing learning demands are made on patients in the rehabilitation, vocational or home 
environments (Khan, Ng & Turner-Stokes, 2009). Suggestions for further studies in the 
field attest to its importance, and perhaps, neglect. 
It may be that there is an imbalance in consideration of two key factors in rehabilitation - 
what needs treatment and how is it to be treated (Wilson, 1997, 2002). Neuropsychological 
impairment may confer additional complexity to the how of treatment; a distortion in the 
learning processes itself. While there is a focus on generating high-quality interventional 
studies of rehabilitation efficacy, there also remains a need to examine the underlying issue 
of learning processes themselves, how they are impaired, and how interventions could be 
tailored as a result.  Inclusion of people who do have limiting cognitive impairment would 
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be one step; focusing on why treatment might fail, as a way of calibrating how the 
intervention is delivered, another. 
A common experience, for example, in working with people with memory disorders is the 
failure of an external aid, such as a diary, to compensate for difficulties. Problems typically 
arise when there are differing perceptions (e.g. between patient and therapist) regarding 
memory ability (Prigatano, 1999), or where there are other neuropsychological deficits at 
the root of memory complaint or failure, meaning that effective diary use fails. A third 
element is where there are in fact no significant memory problems; instead a poorly 
investigated complaint of memory disorder, which actually signposts a mood disorder 
(Middleton et. al., 2006; Marrie et. al., 2005).  
A poorly delivered intervention in this situation might reflect not accounting for problems 
with the accurate appraisal of memory ability, mood disorder, difficulties with the 
complexity of the task, or a mix of all three.  It is common clinical problems such as these, 
with people with Multiple Sclerosis, which the author is keen to investigate further. 
Interventions that do not work may not be ineffective interventions, just poorly directed. 
Rehabilitation efforts aimed at optimising learning typically benefit from being supported 
by interventions to improve patients' accurate appraisal and management of their memory 
(Prigatano, 1999). Awareness of memory difficulties may be positively related to outcomes 
of cognitive rehabilitation in Alzheimer’s disease (Clare et al., 2004) and may be an 
important basis for instituting compensatory strategies, which reduce disability (Wilson & 
Moffat, 1992). An analogue is the importance of accurately monitored learning, directing 
study approaches in educational settings (Hacker, et al., 2000; Hacker, Bol & Keener, 
2008) 
 
One area, which focuses on this appraisal and management of cognition generally, is that 
of metacognition (Perfect & Schwartz, 2002; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). In part borne of 
educational contexts, metacognition emphasises the monitoring and management of one’s 
own ongoing cognitive performance, including learning (Flavell, 1979; Dunlosky & 
Metcalfe, 2009). It is of interest in this study, because of its importance to the 
consideration of self-directed learning. Its basis in subjective reflection, offers the potential 
for approaches that manipulate those subjective judgments, optimising resulting cognitive 
behaviours. Poor learners, in effect, could become better learners, not just by improving on 
specific cognitive demands such as recall, but by optimising judgments about recall, that 
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lead to effective memory-related strategies and behaviours (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; 
Metcalfe & Finn, 2008).  
 
Given the strong relationship between memory and learning, and the occurrence of 
complaints about memory, as well as frank memory deficits in people with MS, the focus 
of this study will be on metamemory; the monitoring and management of memory 
processes (Flavell, 1979; Nelson & Narens, 1990; Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008a). Beatty 
(2004) suggests that the memory deficits in MS have good potential for rehabilitation in 
large proportions of those who have them, and an accurate appraisal of memory 
(metamemory) may be an important first step (Moulin, 2002).  
 
To this end, memory monitoring in MS has been investigated in a small number of studies 
(Beatty & Monson, 1991; Scarrabelotti & Carroll, 1998; 1999; Randolph, Arnett & 
Higginson, 2001; Randolph Arnett & Freske, 2004; Phillips & Stuifbergen, 2006; Julian 
Merluzzi & Mohr, 2007). Of these, two specifically focus on the factors associated with 
accuracy of appraisal (Beatty & Monson, 1991; Randolph Arnett & Freske, 2004). The 
implication of findings for rehabilitation planning, is that clinicians need to understand that 
inaccurate appraisal of memory performance (e.g. the inaccurate report of a ‘poor’ or 
‘excellent’ memory) may be equally indicative of a cognitive deficit (in memory or other 
domain), an affective problem, or both. The active role of the rememberer, using ‘complex 
evaluative and decisional processes’ (Koriat, Goldsmith & Pansky, 2000:487) is also 
emphasised in this approach to memory performance, implicating factors that bias or 
attenuate evaluations, such as congruency with mood (Barclay, et al., 1991; Gotlib, 
Roberts & Gilboa, 1996) or executive abilities. 
 
In the author’s clinical experience, a specific and significant issue in managing cognitive 
deterioration (and its impact on everyday memory) is difficulty with monitoring 
performance in memory situations. Such difficulties in appraising the difficulty of to-be 
remembered information is one part of metamemory - monitoring processes - the other 
relates to the use of mechanisms to maximise functioning once an accurate monitoring 
judgment has been made, so-called control processes (Nelson et al., 1999). This clinical 
experience accords with an increasing interest in metacognitive abilities in people with 
Alzheimer’s Disease, (Moulin 2002) in normal ageing (Herzog, 2002; Souchay et al., 
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2007; Dunlosky and Metcalfe 2009)  and in people with various forms of brain damage 
(Shimamura and Squire 1986; Pannu and Kaszniak 2005). 
 
Mindful of the importance of learning for rehabilitation success, and the impact of 
learners’ beliefs, attitude, mood and neuropsychological status on learning oriented 
behaviours (Toglia & Kirk, 2000), this study aims to extend previous work on 
metamemory in people with MS. It will investigate the factors that contribute to accuracy 
across range of metamemory monitoring judgments and consider how findings concord 
with models of metamemory. Finally, it will consider how findings might specify 
rehabilitation options in this population. 
 
1.2 Multiple Sclerosis 
Multiple Sclerosis, an autoimmune disorder, is typically characterised by inflammatory 
demyelination, axonal loss and gliosis (El-Moslimany & Lublin, 2008). Demyelination, in 
the context of MS, involves the destruction of the fatty (lipid) wrapping around axons in 
the central nervous system (CNS; brain & spinal cord) through an inflammatory process. 
This fatty wrapping, called myelin, provides the ‘white’ in ‘white matter’ and functions to 
insulate and facilitate neural transmission in the CNS (Kandel, Schwartz & Jessell, 2000). 
Underlying axonal loss has been shown to occur also, probably secondary to the myelin 
loss (Bjartmar, Wujek & Trapp, 2003). A final pathological event, gliosis, is associated 
with plaque formation - where glial (CNS helper) cells form fibrous ‘scars’ after the 
neurodegenerative phase of demyelination and axonal damage has taken place (Coyle, 
2006). The development of lesions is common along the optic nerve, in white matter 
surrounding the ventricles of the brain, the brain stem, cerebellum and white matter of the 
spinal cord (Noseworthy et al., 2000). More recently, there is evidence that grey matter 
(neuronal cell bodies) is also affected by Multiple Sclerosis (Polman et al., 2006; Sanfilipo, 
et al., 2006). 
 
Multiple Sclerosis has a wide range of clinical expressions, depending both on the location 
of degenerative lesions, as well as the type of clinical course (Smith, Samkoff & 
Scheinberg, 1993; El-Moslimany & Lublin, 2008). A number of different clinical courses 
have been described: relapsing-remitting (RRMS), primary-progressive (PPMS), 
secondary-progressive (SPMS), progressive-relapsing and benign; the latter two being less 
often used (National Collaborating Centre for Chronic Conditions, 2004; El-Moslimany & 
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Lublin, 2008). Each of the three main subtypes has an associated clinical pattern; episodic 
worsening with remission (relapsing-remitting MS), progressive deterioration in function 
(primary-progressive MS), or a combination of the two courses (secondary-progressive 
MS; El-Moslimany & Lublin, 2008).  
 
Among the different courses of progression associated with the disease, the relapsing-
remitting type is the most common, comprising 75-80% of consecutive MS referrals in 
some studies (Oshinsky, Elfont & Lublin, 1998; Tullman et al., 2004). In general, about 
20% of all MS diagnoses are primarily progressive in that relapses are not a feature (Ebers, 
2001; Compston & Coles, 2002). Most people with relapsing-remitting MS will eventually 
go on to develop the secondary progressive course within a period of 10-25 years 
(Weinshenker et al., 1989; Noseworthy et al., 2000). 
 
Progressive-relapsing and relapsing-progressive MS subtypes are also discussed in the 
literature (Kremenchutzky et al., 1999; Tullman, et al., 2004). These subtypes represent a 
combined course of primary-progression with some relapses (Kremenchutzky et al., 1999 
suggest this be considered a primary progressive course), and a relapsing course with some 
progression, (considered a secondary progressive course; Kremenchutzky et al., 1999). 
Both the progressive-relapsing and relapsing-progressive descriptors attempt to capture the 
blurring between progressive and relapsing courses. There is some disagreement about 
their utility. Kremenchutzky et al., (1999) suggest they not be used, but at the same time 
recognise that 28% of people with a primary-progressive diagnosis do have relapses. 
Others suggest that the progressive-relapsing MS subtype is important because it has 
implications for drug treatment; a relapsing component to the disease course often being a 
requirement for the prescription of disease modifying drugs (Tullman, et al., 2004). 
 
Finally, benign MS is a classification often given to those people who have little 
progression, or little or no acquired disability over a long period after diagnosis, though 
there is variability in the definition (Noseworthy et al., 2000; Pittock & Rodriguez, 2008). 
Follow-up studies over 10 and 20 year periods suggest that low disability, at over 10 years 
after diagnosis, is a good predictor of future disability, with up to 72% of benign MS 
patients remaining low in disability in two studies (Sayao, Devonshire & Tremlett, 2007; 
Pittock & Rodriguez, 2008). However longer-term follow up, has suggested that only 15% 
may actually remain benign (Costelloe et al., 2008). 
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MS affects approximately twice as many women as men (Tomassini & Pozzilli, 2009), an 
unexplained phenomenon noted in other apparently autoimmune diseases (Compston & 
Coles, 2002). Recently there has been some suggestion that the incidence is increasing in 
women (Orton et al., 2006). There are also some gender differences in MS subtype and 
disability prognosis, with males tending to have poorer outcomes (Tomassini & Pozzilli, 
2009). Disease diagnosis peaks during the 3rd decade of life (Compston & Coles, 2002), 
with onset typically occurring between 2nd and 5th
 
 decade (Noseworthy, et al., 2000; Jacobs 
et al, 2000; Haussleiter, Brune & Juckel, 2009). While generally affecting adults, MS has 
also been diagnosed in children as young as 10-months old, though it is considered 
extremely rare before the age of 10 years; generally accepted onset is considered possible 
from 14-45years (Eraksoy, 1999), with between two and five percent of people 
experiencing their first clinical symptom before 16 years of age (Ness et al., 2007) 
1.2.1. Incidence and Prevalence of Multiple Sclerosis 
Multiple Sclerosis affects about 1 in 1000 people in the western world (Sadovnick & 
Ebers, 1993), with wide variations in prevalence relating to geographical location (Ebers, 
2008). Increases in prevalence in the UK are documented in a number of studies, ascribed 
in part to better case ascertainment and differing diagnostic criteria for a diagnosis of MS 
(probable, clinically definite, single clinically isolated syndromes etc.; Robertson et al., 
1996; Richards et al., 2002; Compston et al., 2006). The National Collaborating Centre for 
Chronic Conditions (2004) suggests an annual incidence of 3.5-6.6 new diagnoses, per 
100,000 in England and Wales, and a prevalence of between 100-120 people per 100,000 
(Richards et al., 2002; National Collaborating Centre for Chronic Conditions 2004). This 
equates to between 1,820 and 3,380 new diagnoses per year, and a population total of 
between 52,000 and 62,000 people with MS in England & Wales. Scotland has a higher 
prevalence than the rest of the UK (Shepherd & Summers, 1996), giving, in the UK as 
whole, estimations for the population of people with MS of about 85,000 (MS Trust, 
2008). Many UK studies’ findings regarding prevalence fit with these figures (Shepherd & 
Summers, 1996; Robertson et al., 1996; Ford et al., 1998). Estimates for the year 2000 
provided by Richards et al., (2002), suggested an incidence of 3.5-3.8 per 100,000 for 
England and Wales, and a prevalence of 92-104, per 100,000 people, for the south of 
England. 
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One prospective study, recording all incident cases of neurological disorders in 13 GP 
practices in London, UK, generated a sample of 100,230 people who were followed for the 
development of a neurological disorder over an 18-month period (MacDonald et al., 2000). 
The authors found an incidence of MS (calculated as number, per 100,000, per year) of 2 
(95% confidence interval was 2-3). 
 
1.2.2. The Economic Impact of Multiple Sclerosis. 
MS is the leading cause of chronic neurological disability among working-age people in 
developed countries (Haensch & Jörg, 2006). As a chronic illness, the costs of MS evolve 
over time, and secondary disability may increase health care consumption and reduce 
economic output (Richards et al., 2002). Total cost of MS for the UK, has been put at 
about £1.3- £1.5billion for 1994 (Holmes, Madgwick & Bates, 1995), three years prior to 
the licensing of disease modifying treatments, which have been proposed to cost £8,000 
per person, per year (Department of Health, 2002). 
 
A recent cost and quality of life study for the UK (Kobelt et al., 2006), with 80% of 
respondents between 40 and 69 years, found that the average age at diagnosis was 38.8 
years (standard deviation (SD) = 10 years) and mean age at first symptom was 32.2 years 
(SD = 10.4years); 28% were employed. Total mean cost per participant was estimated at 
£30,263 per year, with the cost of a relapse estimated at £1,164. These costings included 
medical, non-medical and societal costs directly attributable to MS.  
 
Costs may thus increase with disease severity, but some have proposed that more 
rehabilitative models of care have implications for potentially reducing costs and for 
increasing patient satisfaction (Rotstein et al., 2006). Such rehabilitative models of care are 
inferred in the National Service Framework guidelines, which aim to guide the 
development of improved self-management, rehabilitation, equity of access and 
coordinated service provision for people with chronic neurological disease (Department of 
Health, 2005).  
 
1.2.3. Causes of Multiple Sclerosis 
Despite increasing understanding of the mechanisms of damage caused by MS, the cause, 
or causes, of MS are unknown, with current theories proposing the interplay of genes and 
environment (Compston & Coles, 2002). Specific environmental agents may include 
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exposure to common viral agents, such as the Epstein-Barr virus (Ascherio & Munger 
2007a). Current investigations in part focus on the contribution of genetic susceptibilities, 
evidenced by the clustering of MS within families (Giovannoni & Ebers, 2007). 
Additionally, there is an assumption that such susceptibility becomes meaningful only in 
the context of environmental triggers, and the age of exposure to as yet unknown 
environmental factors (Poskanzer et al., 1976; Gale & Martyn, 1995). Geographical 
patterns in the prevalence of MS could be considered supportive of genes, environment, or 
both, as causative agents, though migration evidence suggests that risk declines when 
people migrate away from high prevalence areas, which might support an environmental 
trigger (Gale & Martyn, 1995; Ascherio & Munger, 2007b). Noseworthy et al., (2000:942) 
in an attempt to summarise the likely multi-factorial nature of MS, characterises it as ‘an 
immune-mediated disorder that occurs in genetically susceptible individuals’, with 
susceptibility relating to some environmental trigger. 
 
1.2.4. Diagnosis  
The main framework for diagnosis of MS is by means of clinical guidelines (e.g. 
McDonald criteria; McDonald et al., 2001) which propose that in order to diagnose 
Multiple Sclerosis, white matter disease should be disseminated in time (lesions appearing 
between 30 days to 3 months apart) and space (in different parts of the brain and spinal 
cord; McDonald et al, 2001; Poser & Brinar, 2001; Polman et al, 2005; Wingerchuk & 
Weinshenker, 2008). Many authors however suggest that taking a history, and making a 
good clinical examination, is sufficient to make a diagnosis in many instances (National 
Collaborating Centre for Chronic Conditions, 2004; Polman et al., 2005). 
 
In general, the guidelines for diagnosis are permutations of clinical signs (McDonald et al, 
2001), history given by patients (Poser & Brinar, 2001), MRI findings (brain and spinal 
cord) and evidence of the by-products of the assumed inflammatory demyelinating process 
in the cerebrospinal fluid (McDonald et al, 2001; Polman et al, 2005). In comparison with 
previous guidelines for diagnosis, the McDonald criteria reflect technical advances, and 
give an increased importance to MRI findings (Poser & Brinar, 2001). One of the proposed 
benefits of the increasing use of MRI to assist with diagnosis is to reduce the delay in 
providing a diagnosis to patients (National Collaborating Centre for Chronic Conditions, 
2004). This may be because it is effective at finding disseminated lesions (either in time or 
space), reflecting the most common mode of disease onset, relapsing-remitting MS. 
 
 
  16 
 
The guidelines also take account of differing clinical presentations, including the typical 
relapsing-remitting presentation, where time and space dissemination is key, and primary-
progressive presentation, where a one-year history of progression and relevant MRI 
findings is warranted. For the so-called monosymptomatic disease (alternatively termed 
clinically isolated syndrome), where dissemination in time and space may not, yet, be 
evident, both MRI and CSF findings are relevant. A ‘wait and see’ approach is often taken 
to see if a relapse occurs, potentially explaining the often-reported long wait for a 
diagnosis. Follow up MRI scans are recommended in such cases to monitor for 
dissemination (Polman et al., 2005; McHugh, Galvin & Murphy, 2008). The guidelines are 
also specific that a relapse should include neurological symptoms likely to be caused by 
demyelination, that it lasts over 24 hours, and that subjective report is corroborated by 
clinical signs (McDonald et al, 2001; Polman et al, 2005).  
 
1.3. Symptoms and effects 
Given that the demyelination can occur throughout the central nervous system, the 
symptoms of MS can be varied. There seem to be some proclivities during the course of 
the neurodegeneration however, with some symptoms being more common than others, 
and more common at different stages of the illness (Paty, 2000; Noseworthy et al., 2000; 
El-Moslimany & Lublin, 2008). An outline of the main categories of symptoms is 
presented now, with greater attention given to mood and cognitive symptoms, because 
these will be the focus of the study. 
 
1.3.1. Sensory dysfunction 
The most common symptoms of Multiple Sclerosis are disorders of sensory function (Paty, 
2000), which can include changes in the sensory experience, even with intact motor 
function (Paty, 2000). This might present as a general clumsiness or complaints of 
dropping things. Other sensory symptoms related to optic neuritis (inflammation and 
demyelination of optic tract) are blurring of vision, blindness, typically in the central field 
of vision, visual distortions, and changes in contrast sensitivity or colour vision (Ashworth, 
Aspinall & Mitchell, 1989). Visual disturbances are common in MS, affecting over 50% of 
people (Anderson & Cox, 1997) and sub-clinically potentially more (Lycke, Tollesson & 
Frisén, 2001). 
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Pain, or neuropathic pain, as a primary symptom, can be experienced as acute paroxysmal 
(transient, intense, pain symptoms), as burning sensations, or neuralgia along the 
trigeminal nerve distribution (Polman et al., 2006; El-Moslimany & Lublin, 2008). Chronic 
radiating pain along a specific nerve distribution (so called radicular pain) is not 
uncommon (Ramirez-Lassepas et al., 1992). In addition to the experience of disordered 
sensory experiences, sensory dysfunction may also impact on bladder and bowel control, 
where reduced sensory appreciation contributes to problems with continence.  
 
In general, sensory symptoms tend to be rapid in onset (Paty, 2000) and initially (early in a 
relapsing-remitting course), may resolve over a few days, or with a course of steroid 
treatment (Noseworthy et al., 2000). As the disease progresses, or as more relapses occur, 
some sensory symptoms may become permanent. 
 
1.3.2. Motor Dysfunction 
Disorders of motor function are also common; tremor, ataxia (incoordination), dysarthria 
(motor articulation problems), spasticity and weakness in muscles are frequently 
experienced (Calabresi, 2004). These motor disorders are not limited to the limbs, trunk or 
orofacial muscles and so can, for example, affect bladder function; increased bladder 
muscle tone can lead to emptying difficulties. For some, notably with more severe ataxic 
(cerebellar) disorders, motor control rather than muscle weakness or stiffness, can cause 
profound limitations, making head, limb, eye and trunk control so difficult that most 
aspects of activities of daily living are impaired (DeSouza & Bates 2004). 
 
Motor disorders of the eyes are also frequently encountered, typically, though not solely, 
relating to brainstem (cranial nerve) or visual tract demyelination. Eye muscle control - 
e.g. inter-nuclear opthalmoplegia, leading to conjugate gaze disorders, oculomotor palsies 
leading to diplopia (double vision), and poor control of saccadic eye movements are all 
seen (Noseworthy et al., 2000). Unlike sensory symptoms, motor disorders tend to evolve 
more slowly (Paty, 2000).  
 
1.3.3. Fatigue 
Fatigue is a third, and very common symptom of MS, experienced by over half of people 
with the disease (Bakshi et al., 2000; Krupp & Christodoulou, 2001). It is both one of the 
most commonly reported and top-rated worst symptoms of MS (Multiple Sclerosis 
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Society, 1997; Brañas et al., 2000). While the experience of fatigue may be contributed to 
by poor sleeping, depression, or as a side effect of medication, it is primarily seen as a 
symptom in itself. MS-related fatigue is a chronic ongoing problem, experienced daily in 
most people with MS (Freal, Kraft & Coryell, 1984; Brañas et al., 2000; Rammohan et al., 
2002).  
 
The primary experiences include the abrupt and severe ‘MS fatigue’ called lassitude 
(DeLuca, 2006; Schapiro, 2007). In addition, local fatigue, affecting specific muscle 
groups is common (Brañas et al., 2000; Schapiro, 2007). It is therefore considered 
qualitatively different from ‘normal’ fatigue and leads to a significant, frequently sudden, 
curtailment of function (Brañas et al., 2000). The causes of fatigue in MS are not fully 
understood, though there are likely to relate to structural (demyelination) and biochemical 
changes because of MS (Bakshi, 2003; Schapiro 2007). 
 
1.3.3. Autonomic Dysfunction 
Another cluster of symptoms relates to autonomic dysfunction, and includes aspects of 
bowel (gastric emptying) and bladder function (mainly detrusor muscle control). Sexual 
dysfunction (e.g. impotence, erectile and ejaculatory dysfunction in men, anorgasmia and 
reduced lubrication in women), as well as low blood pressure (orthostatic intolerance) are 
common results of autonomic dysfunction (Haensch & Jörg, 2006). 
 
1.4. Cognitive Dysfunction in Multiple Sclerosis 
Cognitive impairment is noted in up to 65%, of people with Multiple Sclerosis (Rao, et al., 
1991; Rao, 1995; Deloire et al., 2006), the proportion being in part dependent on the 
sample and MS subtype (Rao et al., 1991; Denney, Sworowski & Lynch, 2005). 
Progressive forms of MS display a greater proportion of cognitive impairment compared to 
relapsing-remitting course (Beatty, et al., 1989) meaning that samples, and how they are 
acquired, can differ in prevalence of impairment. 
 
In MS, there is a proclivity for white matter changes to be periventricular, within the deep 
white matter of the frontal lobes and around the corpus callosum. As a result, some 
similarities in cognitive profile have been noted among people with the disease (Brownell 
& Hughes, 1962; Hannay, et al., 2004). Broadly, the most common pattern of cognitive 
deficit is seen in two or three domains - attention/processing speed, memory and executive 
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functions (Fischer, 2001; Benedict et al., 2002; Hannay et al., 2004; Nocentini et al., 
2006).  
 
In respect of MS subtype, one study of patients with relapsing-remitting MS suggested 
about 39% had impairment in information processing and memory domains (Nocentini et 
al, 2006). For primary- and secondary-progressive MS, there is more severity of 
impairments as well as a higher incidence of impairment (Beatty et al., 1989; De 
Sonneville et al., 2002). One reason for this is likely to relate to the relapsing-remitting 
samples being younger, and perhaps more importantly, having less accrued disability or 
lesions, or having MS for a shorter time. Not all studies find relationships between 
cognitive abilities and disability; this may be, in part, because the main assessment of 
disability (the Expanded Disability Status Scale) is biased towards physical disability 
(Hoogervorst et al., 2001). Others suggest that there are relationships only between specific 
aspects of cognition (e.g. information processing abilities) and disease duration and 
disability (De Sonneville et al., 2002). 
 
Cognitive impairment has been likened to the presentation of subcortical dementia 
(Brassington & Marsh, 1998) where cognitive slowing, forgetfulness, reduced insight and 
depression are typical features. A different view, that of disconnection within brain 
structures, resulting in generalised rather than specific impairment is also proposed 
(Deloire et al., 2006). Both views implicate damage to the brain-wide subcortical networks 
that support attention and information processing (Brassington & Marsh, 1998). It is 
considered uncommon for so-called ‘cortical signs’ to appear (e.g. aphasia, apraxia, 
agnosia; Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004:244). Given the focus of the proposed study, 
outlined in the introduction, performance characteristics of samples of people with MS in 
the areas of information processing, memory and executive function are considered. 
 
1.4.1. Information Processing 
In the unimpaired human brain, despite massive capacity for parallel processing, there are 
major limitations on both in terms of speed (refractory periods between one process and its 
repetition) and capacity, or the number of parallel computations (Marois & Ivanoff, 2005). 
Reflecting this, information processing in MS has been investigated from the point of view 
of speeded performance (Gontkovsky & Beatty, 2006) and capacity (Archibald & Fisk, 
2000; McCarthy et al., 2005). 
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Relatedly, Chiaravalloti et al., (2003) and Archibald et al., (2004) question what the 
construct of information processing actually describes, not just in MS. Archibald et al., 
(2004:1562) consider information processing capacity as ‘cognitive speed, complex 
attention and working memory’.  In a study in people with chronic fatigue syndrome, 
Chiaravalloti et al., (2003) proposed that three elements, which they termed simple speed 
and reaction time, complex information processing speed and working memory ability 
could be separated. In MS samples too, information processing remains difficult to 
characterise, because of the relationships between it and working memory and executive 
abilities (Drew, Starkey & Isler, 2009). 
 
Nonetheless, information processing is a key and pervasive deficit in MS, regardless of 
disease subtype, or whether it is measured in intentional or automatic processing tasks 
(DeLuca et al., 2004; Denney, Sworowski & Lynch, 2005; Olivares et al., 2005; Sepulcre 
et al., 2006; Parmenter et al., 2007). A range of task manipulations to investigate both 
automatic and controlled processing abilities does however suggest that task complexity is 
positively associated with increased difficulties with more complex aspects of information 
processing (De Sonneville et al., 2002).  
 
Changes in information processing with normal ageing have been proposed to mediate 
performance on a range of more complex cognitive operations (e.g. Stokx & Gaillard, 
1986; Salthouse, 1996; Bunce & Macready, 2005). Conversely, reduced frontal or 
executive functions have also been offered as an explanation for cognitive ageing 
(Bugaiska et al., 2007). Both bottom-up and top down mechanisms are therefore proposed 
to explain cognitive limitations in ageing studies, with information processing abilities 
considered a bottom up influence. In MS, the focus has typically been on the widespread 
deficits in information processing, notable speed, as a key limiting factor in a range of 
cognitive operations (DeLuca et al., 2004). 
  
The true impact of these deficits might therefore be seen as performance decrements in 
attention-demanding, speeded, controlled cognitive processing (Schneider & Schiffrin 
1977; Grafman et al., 1991; Salthouse, 1996). Management strategies focusing on reducing 
time pressure maintains performance accuracy in MS, supporting the proposal that 
information processing acts as a mediator of performance in a range of cognitively 
demanding tasks (Salthouse, 1996; Demaree et al., 1999; MacNiven, et al., 2008). The 
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implications in more complex cognitive tasks are typically seen in a new learning 
decrement and impaired working memory performance (Archibald & Fisk, 2000; 
Chiaravalloti et al., 2003; Lengenfelder et al., 2006; Drew, Starkey & Isler, 2009). Many 
have suggested that speed of processing specifically is the main feature of this common 
deficit (Demaree et al., 1999; DeLuca et al., 2004; Goverover et al., 2007). Despite this, 
however, O’Brien et al., (2008:766) suggest that ‘a significant omission’ in the MS 
literature is its consideration. 
 
In summary, information-processing abilities are frequently impaired in MS and there 
appears to be an upward impact on other cognitive abilities. Performance across a range of 
processing tasks may be factorially separable into complex speeded information processing 
and working memory deficits, but which of these has primacy in mediating performance 
on learning tasks remains debated. There are limitations in the literature in terms of a 
shared understanding of the relationships between information processing capacity, speed, 
attention, working memory and new learning. While information processing may impact 
on memory performance in MS, especially in terms of acquisition processes, memory 
abilities themselves have been demonstrated to be impaired in up to 60% of people with 
MS (Rao et al., 1993; Brassington & Marsh, 1998). 
 
1.4.2. Memory 
As Brassington & Marsh (1998) discuss, memory is not a unitary function, so patterns of 
performance, or impairments in components of memory need to be considered. Memory 
may be impaired in respect of some of the processes associated with its functioning - 
acquisition, retention or retrieval as well as in terms of memory type - working memory, 
episodic or semantic memory (Cermak, 2000; Tulving & Craik, 2000)  
 
People with MS appear to have difficulties with the acquisition stage of new learning, so 
that while incremental learning takes place with repeated exposure to material, the learning 
curve is reduced in terms of amounts acquired at each stage (Rao et al., 1989; Diamond et 
al., 1997). Some have considered this a feature of reduced information processing capacity 
(Archibald & Fisk, 2000; Chiaravalloti et al., 2003; DeLuca et al., 2004), but the failure 
could also relate to poor encoding, ineffective strategy or organisation, unrelated to the 
speed of presentation (Arnett et al., 1997). 
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This latter acquisition impairment has been associated with contributions of the prefrontal 
cortex (Petrides, 2000), and executive abilities (Arnett et al., 1997; Canellopoulou & 
Richardson, 1998). Lezak, Howieson & Loring (2004:251) discuss this aspect of memory 
performance in MS; the ‘frontal’ nature of impairments meaning, people with MS tend to 
less often use strategic approaches to encode information. They use less semantic 
clustering as a strategy for organising to-be-remembered information (Raymond et al., 
1987; Arnett et al., 1997) or have difficulty with strategy use (Carroll, Gates & Roldan, 
1984). This is notable if the organisation into semantic categories is not obvious (Arnett et 
al., 1997), perhaps suggesting failures to consider the to be learned information.  
 
These problems with processes optimising memory performance, rather than doing the 
remembering itself, are considered to be executive, or at least frontal contributions to 
memory performance (Petrides, 2000). Frontal contributions might also be helpful in 
preventing spurious associations being learned in memory contexts (Gisiger, Kerszberg & 
Changeux, 2005), highlighting the important role in monitoring at both encoding and 
retrieval. At a more general level, active monitoring, in respect to goal state, is a 
consideration too (Van Overschelde, 2008). This perspective on memory performance 
might be considered to reflect the top-down directing of memory-oriented behaviour by 
executive processes. 
 
An alternative, or perhaps complimentary, explanation might be that this encoding process 
constitutes effortful or controlled, intentional processing. This could be constrained by the 
reduced information processing capacities common in MS. A number of permutations of 
acquisition failure could therefore exist; a processing speed deficit, ineffective strategy use, 
or failure in strategy use, because of limited processing resource. The debate about top-
down and bottom-up contributions to cognitive performance in the ageing literature may 
have something to offer, with caveats, in interpreting results in memory acquisition failures 
for this group (e.g. Bunce & Macready, 2005; Salthouse, 1996; 1991). Of particular 
interest in this study is whether similar conceptual findings - processing speed accounting 
for variance in memory performance - might also apply to metamemory. 
 
Retrieval is a second process relating to memory performance and can be impaired because 
information is forgotten, or because of impairments in retrieval processing (Laming, 2009). 
A key question in the MS literature is whether people with MS tend to forget more than 
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those without, once information has been learned (that is, by controlling for acquisition 
deficits; Diamond et al., 1997).  
 
In MS, while forgetting (measured by quantity retrieved) does take place at a higher rate 
than in control samples (Calabrese, 2006); acquisition deficits may be the more significant 
deficit (Diamond et al., 1997; Olivares et al., 2005). One difficulty with interpreting 
retrieval failures is whether a retrieval failure indicates true forgetting or, instead, failures 
at retrieving target items (Laming, 2009). On tests of recognition memory, which attempts 
to separate forgotten from failed to retrieve, people with MS can perform at a normal level 
(Rao et al., 1991), suggesting failure at retrieval, rather than forgetting, as the difficulty 
(Grafman, Rao & Litvan 1990; Calabrese, 2006). The implications of failure to retrieve, as 
opposed to forgetting, probably relate to the processes surrounding retrieval. These again 
implicate frontal functions, and include poor organisation at retrieval (Stuss et al., 1994; 
Petrides, 2000) or ineffective retrieval strategies, leading to self-interfering effects (Butters 
et al., 1986; Laming, 2009). 
 
In summarising memory abilities in MS, it is necessary to consider the type of memory 
that is typically assessed.  Most tests of memory require new learning trials, meaning that 
episodic memory has a greater research base (Beatty et al., 1988; Paul et al., 1997). 
Evidence has been discussed which suggests that acquisition failure does occur, but when 
mitigated, forgetting is less severe than might be perceived. Additionally, other processes 
supporting both acquisition and retrieval, implicating executive functions, may be 
impaired. As executive function can be impaired in MS, and given the focus of this study 
on memory monitoring, attention to performance in samples of people with MS is 
appropriate. 
 
1.4.3. Executive Function 
Executive functions are implicated in performance of tasks that are non-routine, novel, 
complex, or for which typically used schemas are unsuitable to generate appropriate 
behavioural routines (Norman & Shallice, 1986; Shallice & Burgess, 1991; 1993; Shallice, 
Burgess & Robertson, 1996; Godefroy, 2003). Disorders of executive function are 
associated with both frontal lobe damage, and disconnection (Burgess, 2000; Goldberg, 
2001). Executive function is an umbrella term for a range of cognitive operations serving 
ongoing goal-directed behaviours (Rabbitt, 1993), including generation of possible actions, 
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inhibition of others, selection and adaptation of plans. These goal-directed behaviours 
could include action, speech or reasoning (Fuster, 2002). While this definition might 
suggest that complex tasks are, by their nature, ‘executive’, Rabbitt (1997) cautions against 
this interpretation: 
 
‘The key distinction seems to be between situations in which the person must, for the first 
time, recognise, evaluate, and choose among a variety of alternative options and those in 
which a single effective behaviour sequence, which has been previously identified, and 
instantiated by practice, is run off without the need to propose and evaluate alternatives’ 
(Rabbitt, 1997:3) 
 
While the function of memory might be to make us independent of our immediate stimulus 
environment (Watkins, 1990), the function of executive abilities is to generate, initiate and 
control behaviours (real or imagined), independent of the external environment, that is, to 
anticipate (Goldman-Rakic, 1994; Okuda et al., 2003). In not being dependent on the 
external environment, there are options to adapt behaviours if the environment does not 
behave as expected. This flexibility requires the ability to adequately represent or 
characterise a problem, terminate or inhibit ongoing behaviours, adapt them or generate 
new plans in an attempt to control future environment or task possibilities, and be strategic 
about future behaviour (Shallice, Burgess & Robertson, 1996; Rabbitt, 1997). One 
approach to thinking about the mechanics of executive function is that of the Supervisory 
Attention System (SAS) proposed by Shallice (1988). The SAS is a system that is 
proposed to manage the selection of various action schemas to guide goal-directed 
behaviour through a process of monitoring and modulation of the cognitive system 
(Shallice, 1988). 
 
The range of behaviours associated with executive function include preparation 
(preparatory set, or planning; Fuster, 2002); inhibition (e.g. of internal drives, of 
inappropriate behavioural schemas, or reactions to task-irrelevant external stimuli; Fuster, 
2002; Godefroy, 2003); a problem detection, characterisation and solving ability (Shallice 
1988) and flexibility and strategic thinking to adapt to changes (Burgess, 1997). One view 
is that measures of fluid intelligence best capture executive performance (Duncan, Burgess 
& Emslie, 1995; Zook et al., 2004).  
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Performance of people with MS on tests of executive function suffers from the same 
limitations from which all tests of executive function suffer - limited ecological validity 
and task-impurity (Burgess, 1997). Measures of executive function typically correlate with 
other cognitive indices, such as memory (as in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; Burgess, 
1997) or visuospatial functioning (as in the Trail Making Test; Burgess, 1997:88). A third 
limitation relates to the potential for fractionation or dissociation of deficits in executive 
function (Miyake et al., 2000; Duncan et al., 1997), meaning that samples may perform 
differently on different tasks, because different dimensions are being tested.  
 
Executive dysfunction is commonly reported in people with MS (Arnett et al., 1997; 
Benedict et al, 2002; Clemmons et al., 2004; Wachowius et al., 2005). A range of different 
measures of executive function have been used, including rule-based card sorting tests 
(Beatty et al., 1989; Beatty & Monson, 1991; Rao et al., 1991; Benedict et al., 2001), 
which suggest that generating novel strategies (and dropping ineffective ones) might be a 
key executive skill (Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004; Calabrese, 2006).  
 
Other tasks proposed to load on planning aspects of executive function, include tower 
solution tasks (Tower of London, Tower of Hanoi; Zook et al., 2004); blocks or discs have 
to be moved across a set of pegs following various rules to create a specified pattern. 
Performance of samples of people with MS on such tasks has been investigated in a 
number of studies (Randolph, Arnett & Freske, 2004; Denney, Sworowski & Lynch, 
2005). These suggest that planning time (from presentation to first move) and execution 
time (time from first to last move) can be impaired, especially the latter. Of interest, the 
score (number of moves) for the tower task in Denney, Sworowski & Lynch, (2005) was 
similar for MS participants and controls, once groups were equated for age, gender, 
education, depression and fatigue. As was suggested in a previous study (Denney et al., 
2004), speeded performance was the limiting issue. This is of interest because it lends 
some support to the suggestion that there may be an underlying mediation of processing 
abilities, notably speed, on performance in this domain, if time is used as a measure 
(Demaree et al., 1999; Archibald & Fisk, 2000; Denney, Sworowski & Lynch, 2005). 
Using time to measure executive abilities is likely to be necessary to be sensitive to ability, 
but where processing-time and executive-time separate may be a challenge to discern. This 
revisits the possibility of information processing abilities serving a mediating role in such 
executive tasks, similar to that proposed in memory performance.  
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One cognitive skill, which relates strongly to both information processing and executive 
ability, is working memory (Baddeley, Hitch & Bower 1974; Baddeley, Della Sala & 
Robbins 1996). The inclusion of working memory tasks as indices of executive function is 
sometimes considered an issue of theoretical orientation (Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 
2004), possibly reflecting the different traditions in how working memory is researched in 
the United States (top-down, executive control focus) versus Europe (more bottom-up; 
Baddeley & Hitch, 2007:7). It can complicate the issue of what is meant by executive 
function (Zook et al., 2004). One example is the proposal that working memory, mental 
shifting and inhibition might be three key indicators of executive abilities (Pennington et 
al., 1996; Miyake et al., 2000). 
 
Statistical approaches may be one way of separating these conceptual domains. The use of 
confirmatory factor analyses or hierarchical regression models may be able to indicate 
where some dimensionality might exist in individual samples (Miyake et al., 2000; Zook et 
al., 2004). A benefit of this approach is that a measure’s construct validity is assessed 
based on the sample under study, and not from the typically unimpaired derivation sample. 
The difficulties with separating the concepts of executive function and working memory 
are reflected in the literature not just in terms of selection of measures. Neuroimaging 
evidence suggests shared anatomical substrates for working memory and executive 
functions (Bayliss et al., 2003). For this reason it is germane to consider how working 
memory relates to executive function. 
 
The concept of working memory developed most notably in the work of Baddeley & Hitch 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley 1996; Andrade, 2001a) and is presented as having 
both executive and non-executive elements (Baddeley & Hitch, 2001, 2007). It is proposed 
to include two processes - the ability to maintain information in mind (termed ‘on-line’) 
long enough to use it and the ability to manipulate that information so as to optimise it for 
use. Optimising might involve reorganisation based on features of the stimuli, such as 
semantic categorisation to better remember it (Andrade, 2001a; Daneman & Hannon, 
2007). The Baddeley & Hitch working memory model has an organising system, the 
central executive, which manages the operation of two ‘slave’ systems, each of which 
manages different modalities of stimuli (Baddeley & Hitch, 2007:14). The visuo-spatial 
sketchpad manages visual and spatial to-be-maintained information (e.g. in the use of 
imagery mnemonics) and the phonological loop manages auditory and language stimuli. 
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The functioning of working memory therefore requires ongoing attention or active 
maintenance (Miyake & Shah, 1999). The resources available to the active maintenance 
are limited and if they are not applied, or if they are interrupted by interference, the system 
can fail (Richardson, 1996). 
 
More recently, a third slave component was proposed in which a buffer mechanism 
operates with episodic memory to allow for integration of the ‘on-line’ store and long-term 
memory (Baddeley, 2000). The main proposed function of this buffer is as a workspace for 
the integration of incoming and stored memory to update, adjust or expand experience and 
for the use of stored knowledge to inform the organisation of information in working 
memory, e.g. for organising material semantically or into ‘higher order representations’ 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 2007:7). 
 
A co-ordinating role in the operation of the slave systems (phonological loop, visuospatial 
sketchpad and episodic buffer), is played by the central executive component of working 
memory, for example in updating the contents of working memory on a continuous basis 
(Lowe & Rabbitt, 1997; Brownell & Friedman, 2001). The links between working memory 
and executive function are based on strong associations between anatomical substrate in 
functional imaging studies (Bayliss et al., 2003; Oberauer et al., 2007) and in terms of the 
proposed function of the central executive component of working memory being to 
‘simultaneously maintain and process goal relevant information’ (Conway et al., 2007:3). 
 
Limited capacity is a feature of working memory, and this and its susceptibility to the 
effects of interference, has meant that as well as being considered an appropriate index of 
executive abilities, it has also been considered a route to indexing attention and processing 
abilities (Beatty, 1998; Fisk & Archibald, 2001; Baddeley & Hitch, 2007). As mentioned, 
the differentiation in part is based on the theoretical orientation of researchers. For 
example, in reviewing comprehensive cognitive assessment in MS, the Peyser et al., 
(1990) guidelines for a core battery for neuropsychological assessment suggest a domain 
of ‘information processing and working memory’ separate to an assessment of ‘reasoning 
and executive functions’. In developing their own minimal assessment guidelines Benedict 
and the consensus group on neuropsychological assessment in MS (Benedict et al., 2002) 
agreed that processing speed and working memory was an important sphere for 
assessment, separate from executive function. However in studies in the MS literature, 
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what are typically considered indices of working memory are used as surrogates for 
executive function (e.g. Letter Number Sequencing task in Randolph, Arnett & Freske, 
2004). 
 
Archibald & Fisk (2000) suggest that while working memory impairments might be seen 
in MS, unlike information processing, they are not a pervasive deficit. Their findings 
suggest that impairments in working memory may indicate a person having reached a 
threshold level of information processing deficit, as might be associated with greater levels 
of cognitive dysfunction, typical of secondary-progressive as opposed to relapsing-
remitting stage of the disease. 
 
The domains of memory, information processing and executive function have been found 
to be frequently impaired in MS samples and an intuitive association with compromised 
learning has been confirmed experimentally in MS (Demaree et al., 1999, Arnett 1999; 
Chiaravalloti et al., 2005; Goverover, Chiaravalotti & DeLuca, 2008).  However, only to a 
limited extent have these cognitive factors been investigated in respect of the monitoring of 
learning (Beatty & Monson, 1991). In addition, relevant non-cognitive factors might also 
impact on appraisals of ability (Conklin, Strunk & Fazio, 2009). As mood disorder is also 
common feature of MS, and may also be relevant to accurate memory appraisal (Randolph, 
Arnett & Freske, 2004; Julian, Merluzzi & Mohr, 2007), it is explored here. 
 
1.5. Affective Disorders in MS 
Mood disturbances in MS were noted by Charcot in 1879 (Talley, 2005) and it remains 
difficult to ascertain if they relate to psychosocial, reactive, iatrogenic or organic causes 
(Minden & Schiffer, 1993:40; Mohr & Cox, 2001; Surguladze, Keedwell & Phillips, 2003; 
Goldman Consensus Group, 2005; Gold & Irwin, 2006; El-Moslimany & Lublin, 2008). 
Two key affective disturbances are discussed in the literature, depression and euphoria. 
 
1.5.1. Depression 
Depression in MS is quite likely to contain both organic and psychosocial components 
(Ford & Naismith, 2006). An additional causative component may be iatrogenic; one listed 
potential side effect of some disease-modifying (e.g. interferon) treatments being 
depression (Ford and Naismith, 2006). Steroid treatments have also been associated with 
depression, as well as hypomania. One difficulty is dissociating the concurrent impact of a 
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relapse, for which they might be prescribed, on mood (LaRocca, 2000; Mohr & Cox, 2001; 
Patten & Metz, 2001, 2002). Studies seem to confirm incidence of depression is associated 
more with cerebral, compared to spinal, demyelination (Ford & Naismith, 2006), perhaps 
supporting an organic rather than reactive contribution. 
 
One caveat in associating disability type and depression in this way, is that studies may 
tend to recruit more acutely disabled (i.e. relapsing), than chronically disabled, participants 
(Minden & Schiffer, 1993). Other studies have shown that longer-standing illness might be 
associated with more successful adjustment, appearing to conflict with the suggestion that 
disability and depression might be correlated (Brooks and Matson, 1982). Overall, a direct 
relationship has not been consistently established between depression and type of disability 
e.g. motor versus sensory (Minden, Orav & Reich, 1987), type of MS (Minden, 2000), 
duration of symptoms, or cognitive function (Minden & Schiffer, 1990, 1991, 1993; Patten 
& Metz, 1997). More recent studies have suggested that depression is negatively related to 
cognitive impairment (Landro, Sletvold & Celius, 2000; Haase et al., 2004). 
 
Lifetime prevalence of major depression in people with MS ranges from 37% to 54% 
(Minden & Schiffer, 1993; Mohr & Cox, 2001; Feinstein, 2007). To some extent these 
findings may have been biased by the sample being current healthcare users (McGuigan & 
Hutchinson, 2006; Haussleiter, Brune & Juckel, 2009), and by the tools used to measure 
depression (e.g. Beck Depression Inventory 1st
 
 edition). Previous versions of the Beck 
Depression Inventory have been suggested to confound mood with other neurological 
symptoms, notably fatigue, in MS (Nyenhuis et al., 1995; Goldman Consensus Group, 
2005; Ford & Naismith, 2006: 263).  
In a large MS sample, Chwastiak et al., (2002) suggest that ‘clinically significant’ 
depression was present in 42% of respondents, high in comparison to other studies of 
prevalence in the general population (3-9%) or primary care patients (10-15%), and, some 
suggest, even other neurological samples (Schubert & Foliart, 1993). Point prevalence for 
major depression for MS-clinic samples was reported as 14% according to one review 
panel (Goldman Consensus Group, 2005). Yet one study, from outside North America, 
which attempted to control for sampling bias and using the revised Beck Depression 
Inventory II (BDI-II), reported a point prevalence of 28% for moderate or severe 
symptoms of depression (McGuigan & Hutchinson, 2006). The moderate to severe 
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depression symptom group had a shorter duration of illness, but similar levels of disability 
on the Kurtzke Expanded Disability Status Scale (EDSS: Kurtzke, 1983) to the non-
depressed or mild depressed members of the sample. This might offer some support for an 
adjustment-related process in determining current depression. 
 
Another study proposed that severity of illness, and not length of time of illness, was 
associated with depression (Chwastiak et al., 2002). Patten et al. (2003), in a population-
based sample, suggested an increased period prevalence (1 year) for people with MS, 
compared to those without MS or with other long-term conditions. In a number of studies, 
being younger (Chwastiak et al., 2002) and in some studies, being female (Ford & 
Naismith 2006; McGuigan & Hutchinson, 2006) was also associated with higher 
prevalence. In the UK, a postal survey of people with MS (Sollom & Kneebone, 2007), 
employing a widely used self-report tool for the assessment of depression (Centre of 
Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale, or CES-D) found moderate to severe depression 
(scores >16) in 60% of respondents. Minden’s (2000) suggestion that reliable predictors of 
depression in MS have not been identified appears generally true. 
 
In terms of measurement of depression, the tools and the samples used are limiting factors 
when attempting to generalise to the MS population as a whole (Haussleiter, Brune & 
Juckel, 2009). One point, consistently made in the literature, is the difference between 
people with MS endorsing high numbers of depressive symptoms, such as fatigue, with 
measures such as the BDI and CES-D, and an actual diagnosis of a depressive disorder, 
based on full psychiatric interview and assessment (McGuigan & Hutchinson, 2006; 
Sollom & Kneebone, 2007). An additional debate is whether commonly used self-report 
measures reflect physical disability symptoms and so called neurovegetative symptoms of 
depression (Nyenhuis et al., 1995; Randolph et al., 2000; Goldman Consensus Group, 
2005; Ford & Naismith, 2006:263). 
 
Additional confounds are fatigue (Ford & Naismith, 2006:266), notably mental fatigue 
(Schreurs, de Ridder & Bensing, 2002), though the direction of the effect seems to be that 
mood state informs fatigue perception, at least based on the work of Mohr, Hart & 
Goldberg, (2003) who treated depression, leading to reductions in reported global fatigue. 
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The implication of high levels of depressive symptomatology in this group of people is that 
it may bias reasoning about abilities (Conklin, Strunk & Fazio, 2009; Strunk & Adler, 
2009). More specifically, when asked to appraise aspects of their own ability or 
performance, some studies suggest that people, including those with MS, show a negative 
association between depressive symptoms and appraisals of cognitive ability (Randolph, 
Arnett & Freske, 2004; Julian Merluzzi & Mohr, 2007; Kit, Mateer & Graves, 2007). With 
more severe depression however, cognitive abilities may be impacted, as opposed to just 
underestimated (Diamond et al., 2008). 
 
1.5.2. Euphoria 
Another, apparently affective, disorder is MS-related euphoria or ‘euphoria sclerotica’ 
(Cottrell & Wilson, 1926:8). Historically, euphoria was considered a more common 
problem than depression, and understanding has shifted from it as a mood disorder to an 
understanding of it as frontal mediated disinhibition (Benedict et al., 2001). Minden & 
Schiffer, (1993) argue that the euphoria noted in some people with MS has a neurological 
basis. Unlike depression, is relates to disease severity and length, disability, a chronic 
progressive MS course, enlarged ventricles and more significant cognitive impairment 
(Surridge, 1969; Rabins, 1990; Minden & Schiffer, 1993; Fishman et al., 2004). The 
association between executive deficit and the often-described MS personality change has 
similarly been proposed to be an impairment of self-regulation (Benedict et al., 2001). The 
implied relationship between executive dysfunction and personality change is in the 
presentation of disorganisation, stubbornness, rigidity of behaviour and a tendency to 
poorly estimate performance or ability, that is to lack insight (Benedict et al., 2001; Lezak, 
Howieson & Loring, 2004).  
 
 
1.6. Treatment of Multiple Sclerosis 
All of the discussed symptoms associated to varying degrees with MS, present significant 
clinical challenges, aside from the daily living problems for the person themselves. 
Symptom management and treatment of MS falls into two broad categories: Medical 
management of symptoms, including modification of the disease process and second, 
attenuation of symptoms and disability, which includes neurological rehabilitation. 
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1.6.1. Medical Management 
Broadly, pharmacologic management is offered for symptom control, secondary 
complications and toward the disease pathology itself. Symptom management discussed 
first, focuses on pharmacologic interventions for the range of symptoms presented earlier.  
 
Probably the most commonly treated problems relate to disorders of a neuromuscular type 
- spasticity, stiffness, spasm, including paroxysmal spasm and associated pain (Calabresi, 
2004). Thus, medications that act as skeletal muscle relaxants such as Dantrolene Sodium 
(Dantrolene), Tizanidine (Zanaflex), Baclofen (Lioresal) and Gabapentin (Neurontin), are 
often prescribed (Schapiro, 2006; Bhatia, 1999; Joint Formulary Committee, 2009). All of 
these medications have fatigue-related side effects in higher doses (Calabresi, 2004). 
Additionally, they may cause muscle weakness or have such a systemic effect on muscle 
activity as to reduce function (Young, 2000).  
 
A second area of symptom management is in the management of fatigue. Within the 
context of depression, antidepressants may reduce the experience of fatigue (Schapiro, 
2006). However the lassitude discussed earlier may respond better to stimulant-like 
medications such as Modafinil (Provigil; Rammohan et al., 2002) or with off-label use of 
Amantadine (Cohen & Fisher, 1989; Calabresi, 2004). Studies supporting the efficacy of 
pharmacologic treatment for fatigue have been inconclusive (Stankoff et al., 2005), 
possibly because there is little consensus about the measurement of fatigue or 
understanding of its mechanisms (Pucci et al., 2007).  
 
While many medications are provided for the management of symptoms of multiple 
sclerosis, a number aim to directly influence the course of the disease. Generally they are 
derived, based on the presumed pathology of MS. Given that MS is, probably, an 
autoimmune inflammatory demyelinating disease, various treatments aim to attenuate the 
autoimmune and inflammatory component (e.g. steroids such as Prednisone, Prednisolone 
or Methylprednisolone). These medicines are typically used for acute relapses (Calabresi, 
2004; Leary, Porter & Thompson, 2005). The other medications in this category are 
considered disease-modifying because they may have a long-term effect on disease 
progression, such as in reducing the numbers of relapses (Compston et al., 2006). There 
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have been no studies of a truly long-term nature because the relative recency of their 
introduction (Association of British Neurologists, 2009) 
One set of disease modifying drugs is the interferons, two classes of which (Interferon 1-a 
and Interferon 1-b) are used to ‘induce the formation of neutralising antibodies’ 
(Noseworthy et al., 2000:948). They suppress the autoimmune response thought to 
contribute to MS. A second disease modifying medication, Glatiramer Acetate 
(Copaxone), is proposed to help demyelination because it has a similar set of polypeptides 
to those comprising myelin itself (Calabresi, 2004), leading to what has been termed a 
‘bystander’ suppression at the site of developing MS lesions (Chen et al., 2001). The 
proposed action is as a decoy to the inflammatory response against myelin (Miller et al., 
1997). The effect of the drug appears to be in reducing the frequency of relapse 
(Noseworthy et al., 2000). The interferons can be prescribed for people with clinically 
isolated syndrome (Kappos et al., 2006), relapsing-remitting MS and secondary 
progressive MS. Glatiramer Acetate being recommended only for relapsing-remitting MS  
 
It is in part because of these limitations on prescribing that MS disease subtype becomes an 
important issue. None of the above treatments is recommended for use in primary 
progressive MS, for which there is no proven disease modifying agent currently in use. 
However, anecdotal evidence suggests that there is some benefit to be gained from a 
medication called Naltrexone, in very low doses (Low Dose Naltrexone, or LDN; Gironi et 
al., 2008).  
 
One ongoing issue with these medications is their cost-effectiveness; one year’s treatment 
costs approximately £8,000 (Great Britain. Department of Health, 2002a). As a result of 
the National Institute of Clinical Excellence’s review of cost effectiveness (Great Britain. 
Department of Health, 2002b), a risk-sharing scheme was set up with the pharmaceutical 
industry in 2002 by which the cost of interferons and Copaxone (Glatiramer Acetate) to the 
NHS may reduce in the future if they fail to show the projected impact on quality-adjusted 
life years (Bogglid et al., 2009). Under this scheme, only people meeting criteria developed 
by the Association of British Neurologists, are considered appropriate for treatment, and 
are followed to assess long term cost effectiveness of the drugs (National Collaborating 
Centre for Chronic Conditions, 2004; Association of British Neurologists, 2009). Side 
effects of the interferons typically include flu-like symptoms, irritation at the injection 
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point, and can include exacerbation of mood disorder (Feinstein, O’Connor & Feinstein, 
2002). 
 
Pharmacologic management offers important avenues for the management of a range of 
MS symptoms, including neuromuscular problems, fatigue, continence, pain and acute 
relapses. Disease modifying therapies have been shown to be effective in reducing relapse 
rates. Because of their relative novelty (the first interferon for MS, Avonex, was licensed 
in the UK in 1997), benefits have not been established over truly long-term timescales, so 
their cost-effectiveness remains debated. Ultimately disease-modifying approaches are a 
tool to manage the disease, potentially reducing disability, or slowing the time course of 
disability accruement, rather than offering a cure. 
 
1.6.2. Rehabilitation  
Rehabilitation for people with progressive disease aims to optimise ability and potential, 
through symptom management and education (Wade, 1992; Wade & De Jong, 2000; 
Kesselring & Beer, 2005). The emphasis may vary at different stages of the disease, and 
with different people, ultimately aiming toward long-term adaptation to changes in ability, 
environment and roles, over the life span (Kesselring, 2004). Adaptation is core to many 
models of rehabilitation, especially those focused on performance and participation 
(Hagedorn, 2001; Foley, 2008). Adaptation can be both positive and negative, with some 
naturally occurring adaptations being considered maladaptive. For example, people with 
cognitive impairment may automatically reduce workload or limit social contacts because 
of the difficulties of maintaining those activities. For them, this could be a positive 
adjustment, or it could lead to reduced social contact and withdrawal, a negative 
adaptation, because of the impact on quality of life (Prigatano, 1999). 
 
Given the lack of curative treatments for MS, pharmacologic therapies are typically 
provided in conjunction with rehabilitative approaches to managing the effects of MS and 
resultant disability. The conjunction of physiotherapy and anti-spasticity medications to 
maximise mobility (DeSouza & Bates, 2004), or occupational therapy in conjunction with 
anti-fatigue medication for maximising performance in activities of daily living (LaRocca 
et al., 2006; Finlayson, Garcia & Cho, 2008), are examples of this multi-modal approach. 
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In rehabilitation, one underlying factor, often assumed, is sufficient cognitive ability to 
learn and remember, to tolerate the demands of, and contribute sufficient effort to, a 
rehabilitation programme or activity (Raskin & Mateer 1994). In samples of people with 
MS, cognitive impairment is negatively related to treatment outcome (Grasso et al., 2005), 
and more generally, neuropsychological impairment and low mood may contribute to poor 
coping ability in people with MS (Cox & Julian, 2005).  
 
The factors that predict rehabilitation outcomes in people with MS have been considered to 
only a limited extent (e.g. Rao, et al., 1991b
 
; Langdon & Thompson, 1999), with 
sometimes difficult to interpret results. Langdon & Thompson (1999) studied a sample of 
35 people with MS who were admitted for 3 weeks of goal-oriented neurorehabilitation. 
They reported that motor disability, (measured by the Functional Independence Measure, 
or FIM), verbal intelligence (measured by WAIS-R Vocabulary Test) and cerebellar 
function (measured by Kurtze Cerebellar Function Subscale), were the best predictors of 
FIM Motor scores on discharge.  
One consideration for this finding was that there was little evidence of widespread or 
severe cognitive impairment and there were ceiling performance issues with the FIM 
Cognitive scale, meaning that statistical associations with outcome were probably difficult 
to establish (Langdon and Thompson, 1999; Lawton et al., 2006). In general, the sample 
did not have significant cognitive impairment, perhaps making them more likely to be 
selected for neurorehabilitation in the first instance; this might be considered a tacit 
acceptance of the negative prognostic impact of neuropsychological impairment. As the 
authors consider, they may have ‘studied a highly motivated group’ (Langdon & 
Thompson, 1999:99). Implicit assessments of motivation and cognitive function may have 
therefore been clinical judgements made by the admitting team, leading to this study only 
focusing on the factors that suggest rehabilitation success in terms of motor function in 
people with MS who are motivated, can take part in goal setting and who do not have 
contributory impairments in learning and memory. 
 
Another study, demonstrating improvements in dexterity, balance and walking speed after 
three weeks of inpatient rehabilitation had exclusion criteria of people scoring less than 24 
on the Mini Mental State Exam (Vikman et al., 2008). As an assessment of cognitive 
ability, the MMSE has limited validity in subcortical disease, where the tested domains are 
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often grossly intact (Beatty & Goodkin, 1990; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1992), making the 
cut-off of cognitive ability difficult to interpret. An interesting finding from the study was 
the lack of improvement on activities of daily living (ADL) tasks, despite motor 
improvements, supporting the findings of another study, in which comparisons of people 
with MS who are classified as cognitively impaired, compared to those who are not, 
suggest globally poorer functioning in daily life for the cognitively impaired samples (Rao, 
et al., 1991b). Such ADL performance tends not to be, or is only weakly, correlated with 
physical disability (Rao, et al., 1991a). 
 
In respect of cognitive impairment and its management in rehabilitation, it has been noted 
that the: 
‘MS population has received relatively little attention with regard to effective 
rehabilitation of cognitive impairments. When reviewing texts of health 
professionals, such as occupational therapists and neuropsychologists, treatment 
related to cognitive symptoms of people with MS is scarcely mentioned’ (O’Brien et 
al., 2008:766).  
Some frequently used measures of MS-related disability may also be biased towards the 
physical effects of MS, rather than the cognitive effects (e.g. the EDSS; Richards et al., 
2002), either compounding the under-representation of cognitively impaired participants in 
outcome and rehabilitation evaluation studies, or contributing unknown effects to findings.  
 
In some studies of rehabilitation interventions, cognitive measures could be considered 
insufficient; such as the use of a single Likert-scored question about difficulties thinking 
and concentrating (Di Fabio et al., 1998). Both single-item measures of cognitive ability, 
and the subjective report measurement approach potentially undermine validity, generating 
results possibly reflecting mood states, as opposed to cognitive performance (Randolph, 
Arnett & Freske, 2004; Goverover, Chiaravalloti & DeLuca, 2005). 
 
A recent review of the evidence base for cognitive rehabilitation in MS (O’Brien et al., 
2008) proposed that the domain was in its infancy, but given the impact of cognitive 
impairment across the range of human activities, the treatment of these deficits by methods 
including strategies, compensatory methods and mnemonic approaches was important 
O’Brien et al., (2008) recommend that for learning and memory, techniques such as a story 
memory technique or self-generation of to-be-remembered information should be used. In 
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addition to memory-oriented treatment, executive function training, including activities 
that loaded on strategic thinking, demonstrated improvement in the study, both in 
relapsing-remitting and secondary progressive MS participants.  
 
An important derivation from this review is that memory rehabilitation may work for 
people with MS, notably when they focus on the use of strategic methods. Self-generation 
of to-be-remembered information is proposed to enhance encoding and therefore later 
recall, addressing both acquisition and retrieval processes (Goverover, Chiaravalotti & 
DeLuca, 2008). The paradigm requires that in some way the learner organises the to-be-
learned information, for example by drawing it, filling in the missing (to-be-remembered) 
word in a sentence, or generating the steps of a functional task (Mulligan & Lozito, 
2004:177). These approaches focus on the generation of the to-be-learned information 
alone. Findings from O’Brien et al., (2008), suggest that also generating the strategy itself, 
and not just the to-be-learned material, might be an additional important consideration; 
certainly it may have more ecological relevance, because strategy selection is often task 
specific (Delaney et al., 1998; Turley-Ames & Whitfield, 2003)  
 
Overall, evidence from people with MS not only implicates memory ability in such 
remediation approaches, as would be expected, but also executive function (Canellopoulou 
& Richardson, 1998). The role of executive function in the use of imagery mnemonics is 
proposed in both the selection and deployment of appropriate strategies, thereby reflecting 
metacognitive processes (Canellopoulou & Richardson, 1998). 
 
One difference between Canellopoulou & Richardson’s (1998) study and others, also using 
MS samples, suggesting that self-generation improves memory performance (Chiaravalloti 
& DeLuca, 2002; Goverover, Chiaravalloti & DeLuca, 2008), was the dual requirement to 
generate the strategy and its contents in the first study; this is likely to demand more 
effortful processing. In comparison, self generation for the content for a given strategy may 
be less cognitively demanding, not requiring for example the same attention to a tasks’ 
extrinsic qualities or to an assessment of internal memory strengths and weaknesses. In the 
studies these differences in given versus generated strategy perhaps give an insight into a 
continuum that highlights limitations in metacognitive control of memory in MS. 
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In the Canellopoulou & Richardson (1998) study, self-generation of mediators for a 
memory strategy (imagery mnemonics) was found not to assist later recall, whereas 
experimenter-provided imagery increased performance. In two other studies (Goverover, 
Chiaravalloti & DeLuca, 2008; Chiaravalloti & DeLuca, 2002), the self-generation of 
target words in sentences and of missing words in task instructions (e.g. making an 
omelette: ‘begin by beating the ____’) was the approach taken. Success of the approach in 
the latter two studies was proposed to relate to depth of encoding factors. Failure in the 
first was linked to limitations in the executive control of the demands of generating 
mediators for the strategy. It seems while the samples may have been able to generate 
specific pieces of to-be-remembered information, and benefit from this process, they may 
have difficulty generating material for the strategy itself.  
 
These findings may directly address an assumption made in many studies of memory 
rehabilitation, and rehabilitation in general. How tasks are often highly structured negates 
the need to successfully apply an organising principle of some sort, as might be required in 
many everyday memory tasks. The assumption is of a person with cognitive impairment 
being able to appraise for what memory situations strategies would be required, which 
strategies would be useful, and being able to generate useful strategy content (Moffat, 
1992; Wilson, 2000). Spontaneous use of strategies also implies there is sufficient 
awareness of its need (Prigatano, 1999). Given the significant strategic processing, in 
conjunction with the required awareness of task demands, findings that executive abilities 
are important appears appropriate. Perhaps each of these studies could have benefited from 
explicitly focusing on how the learner might identify the need for a strategy, what 
strategies might work given the task and their own cognitive style, and an error-checking 
mechanism to assess for success in strategy use. 
 
Generally, rehabilitation efforts aimed at optimising learning performance typically benefit 
from being supported by interventions to improve patients' accurate appraisal and 
management of their memory, or cognition in general (Naugle & Chelune, 1990; Giacino 
& Cicerone, 1998; Prigatano, 1999; Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Indeed, awareness of memory 
difficulties is positively related to outcomes of cognitive rehabilitation in Alzheimer’s 
Disease (Clare et al., 2004), and is the basis for instituting compensatory strategies, which 
can reduce disability (Wilson & Moffat, 1992; Kennedy, Carney, & Peters, 2003; 
Dunlosky et al., 2005). It is noted both from clinical experience, and the literature, that 
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those who have limited insight or understanding of their memory disability, tend to have 
the poorest outcome in the rehabilitation of memory (Wilson & Moffat, 1992; Prigatano, 
1999; Prigatano & Kime, 2003). Conversely, for those with poor memory but good insight, 
focusing on awareness as the intact ability, may be the optimal approach to take in the 
management of the memory disorder (Nelson et al., 1994; Clare et al, 2004; Kennedy & 
Yorkston, 2004). In effect, what a person ‘does with what they have, is more important 
than what they have’ (Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2004: cited in Kennedy, 2006).  
 
Awareness therefore, becomes an important issue in the process of self-regulated learning 
(Ownsworth et al., 2006; Souchay, 2007). An approach to considering awareness in people 
with brain injury outlined by Toglia & Kirk, (2000) may be a useful way of considering 
memory monitoring processes. Toglia & Kirk (2000:60), in their review of awareness in 
people with traumatic brain injury highlight three perspectives; metacognitive knowledge, 
emergent awareness and anticipatory awareness. The authors propose that metacognitive 
knowledge relates in part to stored perceptions about ability, including efficacy-related 
beliefs and related affective states. Emergent awareness, as the name suggests, develops 
during the experience of being involved in tasks, and anticipatory awareness relates to 
prior appraisal or development of a conceptual understanding of the task (Toglia & Kirk, 
2000). 
  
This underlines, in respect of memory functioning, the importance of being able to 
accurately appraise memory ability, the task as well as select and use appropriate strategies 
based on likely memory performance. This ability to take a supervisory stance, or meta-
stance, on memory functioning is part of what is termed Metamemory (Flavell, 1979). This 
involves the monitoring and control of memory operation (Nelson & Narens, 1990). 
Metamemory is viewed as a process of awareness, including knowledge about, monitoring 
and control of the operation of memory (Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1994; Schneider, 1998; 
Son & Schwartz, 2002; Van Overschelde, 2008; Koriat et al., 2008). 
 
1.7. Metamemory 
 
1.7.1. Defining Metamemory 
The memory-oriented processes of encoding and retrieval were previously discussed in 
relation to performance of people with MS. This approach to memory characterises ability 
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in terms of the amount of information acquired, retained and retrieved. Such a ‘quantity-
oriented’ (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996:491) type of assessment of memory, common in 
clinical environments, focuses in quantifying amounts of recall as the primary measure of 
ability (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Koriat, Goldsmith & Pansky, 2000; Delis & Kramer, 
2000). The assumption made is that good performance is an index of the functioning of a 
range of underlying processes, including those related to remembers’ conclusions about the 
correctness of their answers. However, in such a task where the number of items correctly 
retrieved is the indicator of memory ability, a person could output all possible or potential 
answers, and still achieve good memory scores, despite a high number of false positive 
answers (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Delis & Kramer, 2000). Consideration of the number 
of false positive answers does extend understanding of memory performance, because it 
reflects that one person sets low thresholds in their assessment of what they know, thus 
over-reporting (Goldsmith, Koriat & Pansky, 2005). Reporting of high numbers of false 
positives suggests that there are additional subject-controlled mechanisms involved in 
retrieval (Petrides, 2000; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). 
 
The work of Bartlett (1995) and Loftus (Loftus & Palmer, 1974) propose that memory is 
impacted, at acquisition, by processes of levelling (simplifying), sharpening some details 
and assimilating aspects of events to fit with a preconceived view of the world (Bartlett, 
1995; Roediger, Bergman & Meade, 2000), and again adjusted at retrieval, for example to 
fit with questioning style (Loftus & Palmer, 1974). Both monitoring - of incoming 
material, as well as current knowledge - and control operations - sharpening, assimilating 
and adjustments at retrieval - are therefore implicated. The view of memory as a faithful 
store of events or information, with each retrieval being the same copy of the original 
event, has been undermined both by studies of false memory (Mazzoni, 2008), and 
memory distortions (Roediger & McDermott, 2000). 
 
Accuracy-oriented approaches to memory focus on the correspondence between how 
accurate memory is in representing a previous event and the event itself. This might be the 
concern when interviewing an eye-witness (Perfect, 2002; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). In 
this context, the importance of accuracy - nothing but the truth - rather than quantity of 
remembered information is of more concern. The research literature has therefore explored 
such phenomena as confidence in remembered information, accuracy of what is recalled, 
and the relationship between the two (Perfect, 2002; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). This 
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correspondence view of memory focuses on processes such as ‘strategic control’ in 
memory (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996:492), meaning that both monitoring of the recalled 
information to decide if it is indeed accurate, and a decision whether to report it as known, 
can be made by the rememberer in order to maximise accuracy.  
 
In everyday memory situations, there is an opportunity to calibrate the level of generality 
of responses, from precise to more ‘coarse’, to maintain levels of accuracy (Goldsmith, 
Koriat & Pansky, 2005). Such strategic regulation can be attenuated by asking people to 
report exactly what they had originally learned, suggesting that where such subject-
controlled processes are limited by the report option, recall performance is akin to a normal 
forgetting curve (Goldsmith, Koriat & Pansky, 2005). This constraint on the use of person-
controlled performance underlines some of the limitations of quantity-oriented approaches 
to characterising memory ability, and points towards a range of variables that might be 
both investigated and manipulated in considering accuracy-oriented approaches. Having 
this accurate appreciation of ones' own memory performance, the factors that influence it, 
and qualities of the to-be learned information (e.g. its complexity), are important in 
learning (Thiede, Anderson & Therriault, 2003).  
 
From a historical perspective, only since the 1960’s were these qualitative aspects of 
memory phenomenon approached in an experimental sense (Hart, 1965; Flavell, Friedrichs 
& Hoyt, 1970; Flavell, 1979; Metcalfe, 2000; Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008a), around the time 
that Tulving & Madigan (1970) suggested that this avenue of research could be an 
important avenue for the development of understanding of the psychology of memory. Up 
to the early 1990’s there were disparate research directions; in education, cognitive 
psychology and, less commonly, in neuropsychology (e.g. Hart, 1965; Shimamura & 
Squire, 1986; Janowsky, Shimamura & Squire, 1989; Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005). After 
publication of a proposal for formalising research in the area and related measurement 
considerations (Nelson & Narens, 1980, 1990; Nelson, 1984, 1996a,b) a framework 
became available to help unify the approach to research with a view, more recently, 
towards application (Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008; Perfect & Schwartz, 2002). A more 
contemporary development has been an attempt to link models of metamemory, to 
cognitive neuroscience (Shimamura, 2000, 2008; Schwartz & Bacon, 2008), life-span 
development and neuropsychological impairment (Beatty & Monson, 1991; Moulin, 2002; 
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Hertzog, 2002; Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005; Perrotin et al., 2006; Souchay, 2007; Souchay et 
al., 2007; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). 
 
The relationship of metamemory to learning and memory has been investigated extensively 
in educational settings, in topics such as the regulation of study time (Thiede, Anderson & 
Therriault, 2003), or decisions about when to terminate learning (Maki & McGuire, 2002). 
Both allocation of study time and termination of study are classified as control operations 
because they involve modulation of cognitive processes to optimise learning (Nelson & 
Narens, 1990; Dunlosky et al, 2007; Hacker, Bol, Keener, 2008) It is proposed that control 
operations such as these are based on the results of monitoring of ongoing learning 
experience or of the features of the to-be learned material (Nelson & Narens, 1990; 
Metcalfe & Finn, 2008). 
 
In summary, metamemory therefore consists of accurate knowledge and beliefs about 
memory performance (‘I am good at remembering names’) and abilities related to 
monitoring and control of memory performance (Nelson & Narens 1990, 1994; 
Scarrabelotti & Carroll 1999; Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002; Perfect, 2002; Souchay & 
Isingrini, 2004; Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008). Additional abilities in appraising tasks to 
anticipate memory demands are also implied (Nelson & Narens, 1990; Metcalfe & Finn, 
2008). Metamemory, has also been demonstrated to be selectively impaired in people with 
similar levels of memory impairment (Shimamura & Squire 1986), suggesting some 
independence from memory functions and some reliance on other domains of cognition 
(Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005; Schwartz & Bacon, 2008) 
 
Metamemory belongs to a broader class of operations relating to cognitive functioning, 
Metacognition. Metacognition attempts to embody the implementation of self-appraisal 
and management processes in respect of one’s individual cognitive performance (Metcalfe, 
2008; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). The relationship of this meta-level to its respective 
cognitive process is presented by Nelson & Narens (1990) in three principles. 
 
First, there are cognitive processes occurring on at least two levels simultaneously – the 
object level (actual cognitive processing) and the meta-level. Second, that the meta-level 
contains a ‘dynamic model’ of the object level (Nelson et al., 1999). Third, two 
relationships exist between the object and meta-levels of cognition – those of monitoring 
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and control. A diagrammatic representation, given by Nelson & Narens, (1990:126) is 
presented below. 
 
Figure 1.2 Nelson & Narens’ (1990) summary of the relationship 
between object level and meta-level processes. Nelson, T. & Narens, L. 
(1990) 'Metamemory: A theoretical framework and new findings', The 
Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 26 pp.125-173 
 
Nelson suggests that control processes allow for modification of the object level functions, 
for example to ‘terminate, initiate or continue but modify’ behaviour (Nelson et al., 
1999:74). The control process itself does not obtain information from the object level. The 
monitoring component acts as the detection mechanism and has been likened to 
eavesdropping on a telephone conversation (Van Overschelde, 2008), where awareness, 
but not ability to influence, is possible. Van Overschelde (2008) goes on to propose 
however that the monitoring process is likely to be more active than the eavesdropping 
simile suggests, as there are likely to be goal-oriented judgments behind the monitoring. 
Rather than just through the object level ‘informing’ the meta-level, this monitoring is 
achieved by selection of relevant cues to assist monitoring accuracy. Such cues are likely 
to depend on the judgment task. This more active construction of the monitoring process 
has implications for considering the metamemory task, as well as the judgment maker. 
  
Nelson & Narens’ (1990) model of the relationship of task-based metamemory monitoring 
and control processes, and how they might be associated with acquisition and retrieval 
stages of memory, adapted by Dunlosky, Serra & Baker (2007), is presented in figure 1.3 
below: 
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Figure 1.3 Summary of metamemory judgments and their associations with memory 
processes, adapted by Dunlosky, Serra & Baker (2007) and presented in Durso, F Nickerson, 
R., Dumais, S., Lewandowsky, S & Perfect, T., Eds., (2007) Handbook of Applied Cognition 
2nd
 
 Ed., Wiley, New York. 
Monitoring-related processes comprise a sizable component of metamemory research (e.g. 
as reviewed by Koriat, 2002b) spawning a range of indices of monitoring-related 
processing: Feeling of Knowing, Judgment of Ease of Learning, Judgment of Learning, 
Retrospective Confidence, Source Monitoring (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991; Dunlosky, Serra 
& Baker, 2007; Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008a; Narens, Nelson & Scheck, 2008). This focus on 
monitoring-related processes is notable outside of the domain of developmental 
psychology (Koriat, 2002b). Clinically, in supporting increased awareness of memory 
performance, as an important part of rehabilitation of memory deficit, monitoring is a key 
area for investigation (Wilson & Moffat, 1992; Prigatano, 1999; Prigatano & Kime, 2003; 
Clare et al., 2004; Clare, 2004). As proposed by Nelson & Narens (1990), and supported in 
recent studies (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008), monitoring processes are the method by which 
control operations are instituted, which might suggest primacy in terms of rehabilitation 
intervention (Moulin, 2002; Dunlosky, Kubat-Silman & Hertzog, 2003; Dunlosky et al., 
2005). The following review will therefore focus on aspects of the monitoring processes 
within metamemory. 
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1.7.2. Metamemory Monitoring 
Metamemory monitoring processes are broadly considered to be of two types; declarative 
and procedural. Declarative metamemory is considered to be the ‘factual knowledge about’ 
memory (Schneider 1998:1), beliefs about memory competency (Koriat et al., 2008) to 
which some add the ability to ‘explain decisions relating to memory actions’ (Schneider & 
Lockl, 2008:392). This is akin to what Koriat and others (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999; 
Koriat, 2007; Koriat et al., 2008) have termed information-based metacognitive judgement, 
in that the appraisal is based on ‘information’ about memory known from memory use and 
beliefs, distilled to a perspective on one’s memory. 
 
The alternative to declarative or information-based metamemory, termed procedural 
metamemory, embodies an awareness of the proceeding of memory performance, which 
relies in part ‘on mnemonic cues that are devoid of declarative content…. [these] cues are 
derived from the very experience of learning, remembering and deciding, rather than from 
the content of thought’ (Koriat et al., 2008:119). Also termed experience-based (Koriat & 
Levy-Sadot, 1999; Koriat, 2007; Koriat et al. 2008), these metamemory judgments 
therefore implicate monitoring processes during task performance (i.e. ‘on-line’ 
monitoring). Examples of these ‘content-less cues’ include retrieval fluency (Koriat & 
Levi-Sadot, 1999) that experientially might tell the rememberer that speed of retrieval 
relates to knowing, and therefore accuracy. 
 
Information-based and experienced-based metacognition differ in terms of the data used to 
make the judgment (Koriat et al., 2008). Information-based judgments tending towards 
reliance on knowledge which could be affect-based causal attributions- ‘I am no good at 
memory tasks’ (Randolph, Arnett & Freske, 2004), expectation based - ‘I should know the 
answer to this’ (Glenberg & Epstein, 1987) or culture-based beliefs - ‘I am old and 
memory declines as you get old, so I will forget this’ (McFarland, Ross & Giltrow, 1992; 
Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000; Hertzog, 2002). Importantly, Koriat et al. (2008) suggest that 
these attributions should impact on information-based judgments. Information-based 
judgments are considered more global in their focus, whereas experience-based processes 
are borne out of the ‘on-line’ processing during the stream of activity, and are subjective 
experiences (Koriat et al., 2008). This might mean that more global judgments, not based 
on experiential memory processing, might be impacted more by stored perceptions about 
one’s memory, and related affective and efficacy factors (Toglia & Kirk, 2000). One 
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common measure of information-based global memory judgment would be a memory 
questionnaire (Gilewski, Zelinski & Schaie, 1990; Hertzog, 2002; Zelinski & Gilewski, 
2004); another might be a clinician’s questioning about a patient’s memory. 
 
Experience-based judgements are proposed to have multidimensional foundations (Nelson, 
Gerler & Narens, 1984; Krinsky & Nelson, 1985; Nelson & Narens, 1990) considered to 
be made based on cues from the experience of learning and remembering, including 
feelings of familiarity with the question (Reder & Ritter, 1992), or accessibility of even 
partial information about the target item, or fluency experiences during recall (Dunlosky & 
Nelson, 1992; Benjamin Bjork & Schwartz, 1998; Son & Schwartz, 2002; Koriat et al., 
2008). Generally these are considered heuristic approaches to monitoring, in that they are 
used a mental rules of thumb to guide judgments about memory ability (Dunlosky & 
Metcalfe, 2009). 
 
The processes underlying information-based and experience-based metamemory also have 
some similarities, according to Koriat et al. (2008). Inferential reasoning, as it relates to 
information-based judgments might be explicit reasoning relating to the judgment to be 
made, whereas in experience-based judgments, ‘various mnemonic cues are used en-masse 
to give rise to a sheer intuitive feeling’ (Koriat et al., 2008:120); experience-based process 
in this sense are considered to be ‘parasitic’ on object-level memory processes (Koriat et 
al., 2008).  Memory experience cues may imply a level of direct access to target items in 
memory that help with the metacognitive judgement. For example, good (fast or sizable) 
access will support a high confidence. Weaker indications of availability will provide 
perhaps more ambivalent judgments of confidence. Finally, tip-of-the-tongue experiences, 
where confidence is high even in the absence of access, suggest a role for a separate 
contribution of the familiarity sensations (Son & Schwartz, 2002).  
 
The distinction between information and experience-based contributions to memory 
monitoring is potentially useful in thinking about structuring research, assessment and 
interventions into metamemory, though not without some consideration of how they might 
be differentiated in practice. If one such inferential signal, cue familiarity, is considered, 
some blurring of the information versus experience-based contributions can be seen 
(Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992; Metcalfe, Schwartz & Joaquim, 1993). Cue-familiarity 
suggests that when judgment about a question in the sphere of Current Affairs, someone 
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might infer they could trust a guess as an answer and if they consider themselves ‘good’ at 
current affairs. The cue (e.g. a particular question) might be familiar because of repeated 
exposure, perhaps during the development of expertise in this domain. This, according to 
Koriat et al., (2008) would be considered an explicit, information-based inference. This is 
knowledge about memory strength in this area of semantic memory. Alternatively, some 
view cue-familiarity as an experience-based resource for judgment making, a heuristic that 
familiarity experiences generated by a cue suggest access to its target.  Dunlosky & 
Metcalfe (2009) suggest one approach to defining the difference between the two as 
considering one domain-familiarity the other cue-familiarity; the former being 
information-based, the latter experience-based. 
 
Notable by its absence in this review is consideration of direct-access to the contents of 
memory, which none of the above assume necessary for the judgment making. The role of 
direct-access will be considered in discussing specific metamemorial judgments, but for 
the present it can be summarised as not being typically given enormous weight in some 
judgments (Koriat, 2002) and this may be for two reasons. Firstly, a focus on direct-access 
perhaps removes the meta from metamemory (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Kimball & 
Metcalfe, 2003). Second, there is evidence that judgments in some circumstances are made 
faster than could retrieval (Reder & Ritter, 1992). Son & Schwartz (2002) suggest that 
direct-access might also be a graded resource, including partial access to the target 
information, which would guide a judgment being made about likely accessibility of the 
required information (Leonesio, 2008; Metcalfe, Schwartz & Joaquim, 1993) 
 
In summary, interpreting the literature on how metamnemonic judgments are supported, 
three areas of consideration are indicated; mnemonic, because of its contribution to 
experience-based judgments, executive, because of the inferential nature of many 
monitoring judgments and memory-efficacy in how it relates to knowledge-based 
contributions (Beatty & Monson, 1991; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999; Johnson et al., 2000; 
Koriat, 2007; Van Overschelde, 2008; Koriat et al., 2008). This latter element is more 
difficult to operationalise as it can be a function of culture, beliefs, attitudes or distortions 
in self-appraisal related to thinking style; the latter, as might be found in mood disorder, 
making it a final relevant factor in accuracy of memory judgment (Elliot & Lachman, 
1989; Clark, Beck & Alford, 1999; Hertzog, 2002; Koriat, 2002). 
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Therefore, while memory tasks are an appropriate and necessary way of assessing 
metamemory, consideration of the memory abilities of the judgment-makers is necessary, 
especially in those with memory impairment. One assumption might be that with impaired 
object-level memory ability, memory-experience cues themselves may be degraded, 
reducing their diagnostic utility for judgment makers. In respect of the other processes 
highlighted, if inferential abilities were impaired, both the selection and evaluation of 
appropriate cues to optimise judgment accuracy might also be limited. 
 
1.8. Monitoring Judgements 
Nelson suggests that ‘the primary [researcher] tool for generating data about 
metacognitive monitoring is the person’s subjective report’ (Nelson et al. 1999:74). Nelson 
& Narens (1990) underline that the introspection cannot be assumed to be a perfectly valid 
reflection of the processes of memory, but instead, accurate and distorted products of 
introspection are the data of interest, and to be explained (Nelson & Narens, 1990; Nelson 
et al., 1999). Despite the distortions that occur, this system of introspection is used to guide 
memory-related goals and behaviours (Van Overschelde, 2008).  
 
Monitoring mechanisms, with their distortions, are potential targets for training and 
adjustment, or de-biasing (e.g. by feedback schedules, Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009) within 
the rehabilitation environment, and are therefore of interest. In developing interventions for 
a clinically relevant distortion however, factors that contribute to distorted judgments are 
of initial interest to clinicians, as they have been to educators, because they may 
themselves be fruitful targets for intervention (Randolph, Arnett & Freske, 2004; Julian, 
Merluzzi & Mohr, 2007). In advance of considering performance of neurologically 
impaired samples, two aspects of metamemory research need consideration - the measures 
frequently used, and the methods of measurement for these judgments. Three common 
judgments are discussed, with a specific focus on the proposed mechanisms involved in 
making each judgment. 
 
In a memory task, a number of stages can be considered - encoding and retrieval being the 
most emphasised aspects of memory performance in the clinical environment. In the 
proceeding of these processes, Judgments of Learning can be made during and after 
learning, Retrospective Confidence Judgments after retrieval and for non-recalled items, 
Feelings of Knowing can be made. Each of these judgments is now discussed with a view 
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to understanding the roles of different contributions, so as to begin to outline the 
relationships between judgments and contributing factors in the sample used for this study. 
 
1.8.1. A Judgment of Learning 
A Judgment of Learning (JoL) is often made during or after an initial period of study and 
the judgement is of likely future recallability (Nelson & Narens, 1990). In a list-learning 
task, such as a shopping list, a judgment of learning might be made after generating and 
writing down the list. If the judgment suggested that the list had been committed to 
memory, it might be thrown away instantly and a trip to the supermarket embarked upon. 
Alternatively, if the judgment suggested the list was not known it might lead to a second 
learning episode and a quick self test of items. A number of features of Judgment of 
Learning can be revealed in this event.   
 
Nelson & Narens (1990) suggest that the basis of the judgment is generally in an 
assessment of currently recallable items, using covert retrieval. From this suggestion two 
approaches to testing grew - accuracy of immediate JoLs, which are made immediately 
after learning of information, based on an assessment of currently available target items in 
memory. These relate to an assessment of short-term memory stores.  
 
Also investigated are delayed JoLs, made after a delay and presumed to be based on and 
assessment of availability within long-term storage (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991; Narens, 
Nelson & Scheck, 2008). In the example given above, an assessment of having learned a 
shopping list made after a delay is likely to be more accurate because the judgment is 
based on interrogating long-term memory stores, the same memory store from which the 
list will be drawn on arrival at the supermarket. Therefore delayed Judgments of Learning 
are proposed to be better predictors of actual future recallability. The differences between 
accuracy of immediate and delayed Judgments of Learning were explained on the basis of 
a Monitoring Dual Memories hypothesis (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). 
 
Nelson and Dunlosky (1991) note differences in accuracy of the judgment in predicting 
future recall. If made immediately, JoLs can be inaccurate (gamma correlation between 
predicted and actual recall was G = 0.38). Accuracy was high in delayed JoLs (G = 0.90). 
This was explained by the proposal that people were monitoring from within two different 
memory systems for the immediate judgment. In making an immediate JoL, monitoring 
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happens from the recently given information as well as long term memory. Long term 
monitoring is required to assess learning, whereas short term only current availability.  
This dual monitoring in immediate JoL leads to interference; concurrent short-term 
availability-monitoring interfering with monitoring from the destination memory store for 
the target, in long-term memory (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009).  
 
For delayed JoLs monitoring was proposed to be concordant, in that monitoring was only 
of long-term store. Given that this memory store is the same store from which tested 
retrieval would take place, accuracy would increase with judgment at this delayed stage. 
This hypothesis was used to explain the delayed Judgment of Learning effect - the increase 
in predictive accuracy of the judgment noted after delay. 
 
Typical JoL tasks generate the gamma correlations based on a series of target item 
predictions, subsequently compared to tested performance for that item, providing an index 
of relative accuracy. Relative accuracy gives an assessment of each items’ judged learning 
compared to that of all other items. In some studies the JoL is made at a more global level, 
on groups of items (Hacker et al., 2000); the shopping-list example would be an example 
of the judgment being made on a group of items. In other versions of JoL tasks, repeated 
presentation of target items is given, with JoLs made between each presentation (Meeter & 
Nelson, 2003).  
 
Notable with the repeated presentation studies is a second characteristic of JoLs; what is 
termed the underconfidence with practice effect (Koriat, 2002). This is noted where 
predicted performance increases in smaller amounts that actual performance, leading to an 
increasing disparity (underconfidence) over repetitions of target learning (Koriat, 2002; 
Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). Returning to the shopping list example, repeated reading 
followed by a JoL would be expected to lead to increasing underconfidence in how many 
items on the list would be remembered. 
 
One explanation for this is that people use their performance on the previous test to 
estimate future performance, so that predictions lag behind performance - an example of an 
inferential mechanism contributing to the judgment, and termed the memory for past test 
heuristic (Finn & Metcalfe, 2007). Of interest, this underconfidence with practice is 
typically seen to be abolished if the judgment is made after a delay, which perhaps 
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supports some differences between the monitoring processes in immediate and delayed 
JoLs 
 
Debate continues over what processes or mechanisms contribute to JoL accuracy; that 
delays produce more accurate results is a robust finding across a range of studies (Koriat, 
Sheffer & Ma’ayan, 2002; Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009) There 
also continues some debate as to whether this judgment reflects mnemonic phenomena as 
opposed to a metamemory processes (Kimball & Metcalfe, 2003), though it is likely that 
some assessment of memory experience, and perhaps inferential judgments such as 
memory for past test do mould the predicted performance component of the judgment. On 
balance however, the mechanisms associated with accurate performance do appear 
primarily relate to memory and memory experiences, rather than inferential judgments 
(Spellman & Bjork, 1992; Kimball & Metcalfe, 2003; Narens, Nelson & Scheck, 2008) 
 
1.8.2. A Retrospective Confidence Judgment 
Retrospective Confidence Judgments (RCJ) are judgments of the likelihood of being 
correct, made after recall (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). One debate, given the judgment is 
based on the products of retrieval, is the extent to which so-called ‘privileged access’ 
informs the judgment. Privileged access relates to the access that people have to internal 
contents of mind (Nelson et al., 1986), and this contributes to inferences about 
performance judgment. Typically this is considered to relate to experiences of fluency or 
ease of processing, even if they are devoid of content (Koriat et al., 2008). However, given 
these experiences are considered parasitic on object level performance (Koriat et al., 
2008), some association with object level memory performance is likely. Alternative 
sources of information that do not relate to privileged access include assessments about the 
difficulty of a task, an extrinsic factor that may mediate judgment (Maki, 2008). 
 
In studies of RCJ, both confidence judgments about performance, and known item 
difficulty have been shown to predict performance in general knowledge tests, suggesting 
there may be some sensitivity to objective question difficulty (Maki, 2008). These studies 
went on to investigate judgments made on newly learned material to find the best predictor 
of performance; confidence or known item difficulty. The key finding was that confidence 
judgment was a better predictor of performance, notable in more difficult learning tasks, 
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supporting a view that idiosyncratic mnemonic information (privileged access) may be the 
key resources used, compared to test difficulty (Maki, 2008). 
 
To investigate the contribution of information-based and experience-based processes to 
confidence judgments, Koriat et al., (2008) presented a general knowledge task to high-
school students. A key manipulation was allowing either free-report of as many reasons for 
their answer, or a forced-report of a specific number of reasons (matched to the number 
given by the free-report participant). After reporting reasons under each condition, a 
confidence judgment was made. Their hypothesis was that ease of retrieval was a key cue 
used in informing confidence. In the free-report condition, ease of retrieval and number of 
reasons given was supported as having a positive relationship with confidence judgment 
accuracy. In the forced report, the effort at reporting a number of reasons was proposed to 
give an effortful retrieval experience, leading to subjective ratings of lower confidence. 
While these findings relate mainly to semantic memory, the new learning studies by Maki 
(2008) support the idea of mnemonic cues, such a fluency and ease, as having an important 
role in confidence judgments about newly learned text material also. 
 
One other factor investigated in confidence judgments has been that of the contribution of 
individual differences, including mood disorder, to under or over confidence. Perfect 
(2002) reports a number of studies (looking at personality factors that might impact on 
confidence, across both semantic (general knowledge) and episodic tasks (eye witness 
scenarios), with the conclusion that neuroticism and social desirability may be relevant 
factors, but generally, across a range of such measures there was little support for the 
relationship between measured personality factors and accuracy in either memory tasks. 
 
A related question is of the relevance of mood disorder, investigated by Fu et al (2005) 
from two standpoints. First, that mood disorder (in this study major depressive disorder) 
confers ‘depressive realism’ which might be expected to generate more accuracy. 
Alternatively mood disorder might create a negative bias, leading people to underestimate 
their abilities, so being more underconfident that their non-depressed peers. While not 
using memory tasks alone, Fu et al., (2005) concluded that depressive realism was not a 
feature in confidence judgments. The alternative hypothesis of underconfidence was not 
supported. 
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In summary, RCJs are supported to have their basis in the various cues that might 
accompany memory experience; fluency and ease of retrieval being two proposed 
indicators. Mood and personality factors do not appear to bias the judgments. Task 
structure and memory type (episodic or semantic) may relate to how the judgment is made 
because people probably have some ideas about their domain expertise in semantic 
memory tasks; this domain expertise might be considered an awareness of task difficulty. 
When awareness of task difficulty was compared to memory-experience to establish which 
was the primary cue associated with confidence, mnemonic cues were supported as the key 
factor. 
 
In assessing contributions to accuracy in this study therefore, memory ability is likely to be 
supported as the primary contribution. However, given that memory experience, as 
opposed to memory content, seems to be the key issue, and assuming that this experience 
may be available even with absent recall, it might be expected that accuracy in this 
judgment could be expected to be high, regardless of tested memory ability. Experiencing 
no fluency in a retrieval context, might be just as useful a mnemonic cue to accurately 
estimating confidence as low. 
 
1.8.3. A Feeling of Knowing Judgment 
On a memory task there are typically two outcomes - items correctly recalled, and items 
incorrectly or not recalled (wrong and ‘don’t know’). For those items that participants are 
unable to provide correct recall, a Feeling of Knowing judgement can be made, followed 
by a recognition trial to see if a previously unrecalled target can be recognised. A Feeling 
of Knowing judgment is a rating (high to low) made for such unrecalled items, of the 
chances that it would be recognised if seen. Feeling of Knowing (FoK) therefore seeks to 
assess how accurate judgments, not based on direct access to memory contents, are in 
predicting future recognition. 
 
Comparison of the strength of the Feeling of Knowing and subsequent recognition 
performance forms the basis of Feeling of Knowing indices (Nelson, 1996; Nelson et al 
1999; Shimamura, 2000). The judgement is in participants assessing the likelihood that the 
currently unrecallable item will be recognised. Dunlosky & Metcalfe (2009) provide a 
review of the Feelings of Knowing, concluding that the function of the FoK is to inform 
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retrieval strategy if it indicates a criterion level of knowing, or to terminate retrieval 
attempt, if it does not indicate knowing. 
 
The first experimental procedure for testing the accuracy of FoKs was published by Hart 
(1965), and focused on FoK accuracy. Hart states: ‘… asking how FoK memories are 
retrieved presupposes that the FoK experience is an accurate indicator of what is in 
memory’ (Hart, 1965: 208). The study involves a procedure structured as a ‘recall-judge-
recognise’ task (Hart, 1965:209), wherein participants were given a test of semantic 
memory and for those items that they could not remember, a judgment about their feeling 
of knowing the correct answer was taken. The FoK was measured by the participant rating 
their FoK as ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ in the first experiment, and on a scale of 6 down to 1 in the 
second, with 6 being the highest FoK. This was followed by a recognition task in which 
the correct answer and three foils were given; the participant was asked to select their 
chosen answer for all questions, regardless of whether they had originally answered 
correctly or not. Only data for the original ‘don’t knows’ was analysed in examining the 
accuracy of the FoK, wrong answers were excluded. From two experimental 
manipulations, Hart suggested that FoKs were accurate in predicting subsequent 
recognition, especially at the extremes of highest FoK and lowest FoK ratings. Further, he 
proposed that accuracy was an indication of a participant knowing what was, and was not, 
in memory store, without having access to it. 
 
Two interpretative points worthy of note are the assumption made by Hart that there was a 
basis of the FoK in access to memory contents - so called direct-access, so as to make an 
appraisal of ‘target strength’ (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009); that is, they indicate, according 
to Hart, the state of memory storage of items. Additionally, the interpretation of 
differences in accuracy in the low FoK conditions between experiments I and II is worthy 
of consideration. There was little concordance between low FoK and incorrect 
performance on recognition trials in experiment I. Hart (1965) explained this to be because 
the foils on the recognition trial were not being sufficiently related to the target, making it 
too easy to pick the right answer. When foils were made more related in the second 
experiment, there was more evidence of concordance between lowest FoK and actual 
performance (i.e. not being correct).  
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Hart explains the decision to change foils on the basis of participants using inferences and 
domain knowledge to lead them to correct answers on low FoK items, reducing their 
accuracy by them getting the low FoK items correct. This is perhaps ironic given his 
proposal that the FoK judgment is based on a direct-access mechanism, rather than an 
inferential one.  These two issues - the direct access to memory and the attempt to limit 
inference-based selection of recognition target, both mirror subsequent debates about the 
basis of FoK judgments. More recent analyses of FoK judgments support inferential rather 
than direct-access accounts (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). 
 
Importantly, the first step in a FoK procedure is to exclude the remembered material; this 
also, in part excludes the most obvious direct access mechanism of retrieval. Thereafter a 
number of types of processing have been proposed, under differing paradigms. Broadly the 
proposed contributing effects are first, inferential in that they relate to the use of heuristics 
about relevant factors surrounding the target, such as perceived expertise in the domain. 
Second, perceived ‘target-accessibility’, or being able to retrieve an aspect of the target, 
provides support to a feeling of eventually being able to recognise the target in the 
recognition trial. One example of this might be familiarity with the question, or cue-
familiarity (Leonesio, 2008; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). Of some import here is that 
many of these understandings about Feeling of Knowing judgments relate to semantic 
memory, where domain knowledge may be relevant. 
 
Leonesio (2008) draws some differences between others in his use of terms - using 
remembrance to indicate some of the target accessibility type information, such as memory 
of the encoding context, memory of the cue. There have been some attempts to separate 
these two heuristic approaches to FoK judgments, but in considering, for example, cue-
familiarity either heuristic could explain the process. Cues could be familiar because of 
expertise in a domain of general knowledge about authors, meaning that a cue in a test of 
authors would be familiar - this could lead to a reasonable inference that one is likely to be 
able to recognise an author or could lead to perceived target accessibility, because of 
familiarity with an aspect of question itself. 
 
One potentially important finding in respect of these heuristic approaches to the FoK 
judgment is that, while both may be used, they may be deployed differently, depending on 
the task. This may relate to the level of expertise of the judgment maker; with limited 
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expertise, heuristics may be invalid (Perfect & Hollins, 1996, Perfect, 2002). It may also 
relate to how the FoK task has failed. According to Koriat & Levy-Sadot (2001), if cue-
assessment does not trigger sufficient familiarity, then the target accessibility search may 
be aborted; in this sense there may be some hierarchical organisation of cue-based 
heuristics. This proposal may fit well with findings by Reder & Ritter (1992) that FoK 
judgments can be made faster than actual retrieval would, suggesting they are not based on 
retrieval availability (direct access), but on cue familiarity. Nelson’s (1984:297) use of the 
term ‘memory for prior encounters’ as being relevant to FoK judgments, could fit well 
with this proposal. Depending on the strength of that cue-familiarity, further processing 
may continue or be terminated.  
 
In summary, the Feeling of Knowing judgment, perhaps unlike Judgment of Learning and 
Retrospective Confidence Judgments is proposed to relate to inferences made on the basis 
of more scant cues from memory experience, in part because recall has failed when this 
judgment is being made. It seems plausible therefore that the judgment may harvest cues 
from a range of potential informants, from which an inference about likely recognition will 
be made. Expectations for the factors that contribute are twofold; executive abilities are 
implicated in the inferential aspects of the judgment and mnemonic perhaps in respect to 
the range of distal cues from which those inferences would be made. 
 
1.8.4. Measurement Approaches in Metamemory 
Aside from the investigation of factors contributing to metamemory judgments, a number 
of other debates continue with regard to measurement paradigms; how best to calculate 
accuracy (Hart, 1965; Nelson, 1984; Nelson & Narens, 1990; Schraw, 1995; Wright, 1996; 
Nelson, 1996; Nietfeld, Enders & Schraw, 2006), what is accuracy (relative or absolute; 
Nelson, 1984; Koriat, 2002; Nietfeld, Enders & Schraw, 2006) and what stimulus materials 
to use - previously learned knowledge or new learning (Nelson & Narens, 1980; Janowsky, 
Shimamura & Squire, 1989; Nelson & Narens, 1990; Souchay, Isingrini & Espagnet, 
2000). 
 
Calculation of the association between predicted and actual performance is typically by 
means of a number of measures including both parametric and non-parametric correlations 
(Goodman & Kruskal 1954; Nelson, 1984; Schraw, 1995; Nelson 1996b), difference 
scores (Hart, 1965), proportions correct or sign of difference scores and bias scores 
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(Nelson, 1984). In principle, accuracy is described by calculating the relationship between 
‘hits’ and ‘misses’ between judgment and performance. Concordant responses (hits) are 
those in which high judgment strength associates with successful performance, or low 
judgment strength with a failed performance (Hart, 1965; Nelson & Narens, 1990; Nelson, 
1996). Both are considered concordant because the strength of judgment is predictive of 
performance. Disconcordant responses (misses) relate to predicting success, but failing or 
predicting failure, but succeeding. Accuracy levels for these judgments vary with the 
judgment task and the type of memory task (semantic versus episodic); in general near 
perfect accuracy is not the norm. For some judgments, above-chance levels might be 
considered acceptable (Maril et al., 2003; Leonesio, 2008).  
 
1.8.5. Memory Self-efficacy Judgments. 
Memory-self efficacy (Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004) is typically assessed using memory 
questionnaires (Nelson et al. 1999), which aim to probe knowledge of memory ability, 
lapses, (e.g. kind, frequency and severity) or use of strategies. Such self-report measures 
are mainly evident in studies of older populations (Hertzog, 2002), perhaps because of the 
range of work looking at how implicit theories about memory and ageing impact on the 
reporting memory related behaviours in older people (Devolder & Pressley, 1992). Perhaps 
another reason is clinical relevance, given that, aside from older people, few, without 
definable neurological changes, present with complaints of memory deterioration. The 
focus of research in the area has increasingly been on its validity (Herrmann, 1982; 
Hertzog, 2002).  
 
Questionnaires about memory abilities may have demonstrated internal validity and 
consistent factor structure (Gilewski & Zelinski, 1988; Gilewski, Zelinski & Schaie, 1990; 
Hertzog, 2002; Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004) but they may have limited predictive validity 
(Dixon & Hultsch, 1983; Hertzog, 2002; Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004). Hertzog argues that 
while the tools themselves may consistently measure something, it may not be report of 
memory performance. As has been indicated, beliefs (implicit beliefs about memory or 
cultural stereotypes; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009), mood or personality traits (Zelinski & 
Gilewski, 2004) may all affect memory perception, rather than recall of specific memory 
performance instances across a range of everyday tasks (Hertzog, 2002). In testing this 
theory, Hertzog suggests that self-report could be made more accurate by emphasising the 
task-specificity of the question.  
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The impact of lower memory efficacy is that people may avoid memory-loaded activities 
(West & Berry, 1994) or be less likely to use strategies to aid memory performance 
(Lachman & Andreoletti, 2006). A final consideration in using questionnaires as an 
assessment of memory efficacy is that if people do have memory difficulties, they may 
adjust their activity or environmental demands as a management strategy, and so face 
fewer instances of memory failure. This might increase their efficacy, leading to the 
measure being less reliable indicators of objective memory function (Rabbitt et al., 1997). 
In clinical environments, an analogue of the memory questionnaire might be general 
questioning about memory abilities, and so it remains relevant to consider its validity as a 
form of assessment of memory function. 
 
In summary, metamemory is the ability to take a meta-stance on, appraise, and manage 
memory performance. In respect of monitoring, this stance can be taken in making a global 
appraisal of memory ability (‘off-line’ judgment), or in making specific judgments about 
performance in a specific memory task (‘on-line’ judgment). The former, global appraisal 
of memory is often measured through questionnaires, potentially collecting efficacy 
judgments about memory, rather than indicators of actual memory ability. The latter, 
through judgments made in relation to two of the key memory processes - acquisition and 
retrieval. To a greater or lesser extent then, all metamemory appraisals are considered to 
contain an element of distortion because they are introspective and subjective. A key 
component of their assessment is the inclusion of some objective measure of performance 
against which they can be calibrated (Bahrick, 2008). The nature or level of distortion is 
therefore a relevant focus in considering the self-regulation of learning, because of the 
proposed relationships between accurate monitoring of performance and that learning. Of 
specific interest, are conditions in which additional distortion might be conferred by 
impairments associated with neurological disease. There is a limited literature base 
regarding metamemory in neurological populations generally, and in Multiple Sclerosis 
specifically. 
 
1.9. Metamemory in Neurological Populations 
In a review of metamemory in neurological populations, Pannu & Kaszniak (2005) clarify 
the types of questions typically asked about metamemory in these populations. 
Specifically, whether metamemory can be normal in people with memory deficits. This is 
considered from the point of view of individual pathology, as well as from the perspective 
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of the association of executive function (and/or prefrontal lesions) with metamemory 
(Shimamura & Squire, 1986; Janowsky, Shimamura & Squire, 1989; Moulin, 2002; 
Souchay, Isingrini, Pillon & Gil, 2003; Schwartz & Bacon, 2008). The groups best 
represented in the literature are people with Alzheimer’s disease (Moulin, Perfect & Jones, 
2000; Moulin 2002; Souchay, Isingrini & Gil 2002; Souchay, 2007), for whom, as clinical 
samples issues arise with floor effects on recall tests, making some approaches to testing 
metamemory accuracy difficult. Effectively there is little recall data with which to compare 
prediction (Moulin, 2002). Approaches in this case have used indices of sensitivity to 
measure how people adjust their estimations before and after experience with a task to 
implicate both monitoring and control operations (Moulin, 2002; Ansell & Bucks, 2006; 
Souchay, 2007). These studies suggest that people with AD can adjust performance, can 
make correct judgments about item normative difficulty and reflect expected forgetting 
with delay in their judgments. 
 
With progress of the disease, both floor effects and the relative complexity of the FoK 
procedure may also impact on getting reliable estimations of predicted performance, 
though generally it seems that for semantic information, accuracy on FoK tasks tends to be 
nearer control performance (Lipinska & Bäckman, 1997; Souchay, 2007). An additional 
consideration is that the mnemonic cues used to make inference-based FoK judgments may 
themselves be unavailable in episodic tasks, which are typically novel, so that memory 
experiences do not assist with the FoK, perhaps explaining the lower levels of accuracy, 
compared to semantic FoK tasks (Souchay, 2007). 
 
In respect to cortical versus subcortical disease, Parkinson’s disease patients have, to a 
more limited extent, been investigated for metamemorial performance. While monitoring 
performance has been suggested to be generally intact on semantic tasks (Pannu & 
Kaszniak, 2005), there is some evidence that some control operations may be impaired. 
Souchay, Isingri & Gil (2006) proposed differences in a free recall task between a 
Parkinson’s group and matched controls related to control, rather than monitoring 
processes. In a self-paced learning condition, recall was poorer in the Parkinson’s group, 
compared to controls, but not in the experimenter paced learning task, suggesting that 
decisions about allocation of study time were deficient. 
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One study, which highlights the dissociated nature of memory and metamemory in clinical 
populations, is that of Shimamura & Squire (1986), which focused on amnesics with 
differing aetiologies. Of the sample, only those with Korsakoff’s syndrome, characterised 
by severe amnesia in conjunction with executive dysfunction, were impaired on episodic 
and semantic FoK tasks. In comparison to comparably amnesic participants (of different 
causes), the Korsakoff’s participants were impaired and the others performed at the same 
level as the control group. The authors suggest that the frontal/executive deficits could 
explain the differences between the groups. Pannu & Kaszniak (2005), in their review of 
metamemory in samples with focal frontal lesions make two important observations; that 
in such samples there may be little evidence of metamemory deficit unless there is some 
‘weakening of the memory trace’ (Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005:112). Their other observation 
is that semantic memory tasks may not be sufficiently sensitive or effortful to disclose 
deficits; that tasks may need to be more difficult. 
 
In discussing future directions of research, Pannu & Kaszniak (2005) item a number of 
questions; relating different aspects of metamemory to executive function, use of a range 
of neuropsychological tasks, further investigation of the relationship between deficits in 
awareness of memory problem and depression, and investigation of the relationship of 
metamemory inferred from questionnaire and performance on experimental tasks. In 
reviewing metamemory in MS, and formulating the focus for this study, these 
recommendations are borne in mind. 
 
1.10. Metamemory in Multiple Sclerosis 
Studies focusing on metamemory in Multiple Sclerosis are few (Beatty & Monson, 1991; 
Richardson & Chan, 1995; Scarrabelotti & Carroll, 1998; Scarrabelotti & Carroll, 1999; 
Landro, Sletvold & Celius, 2000; Randolph, Arnett & Higginson, 2001; Maor, Olmer, 
Mozes 2001; Randolph, Arnett & Freske, 2004; Middleton et al., 2006; Julian, Merluzzi & 
Mohr, 2007). Of these studies, only two have specifically investigated the factors that 
might contribute to metamemory performance, and one to general cognitive monitoring. A 
brief summary would suggest that mood, memory and executive functions are all 
implicated (Beatty & Monson, 1991; Randolph, Arnett & Freske, 2004; Julian, Merluzzi & 
Mohr, 2007). This generally accords with the contributors discussed earlier in respect of 
metamemory monitoring - attitudes and beliefs, memory, memory experience and 
inferential processes. Also concordant are general findings that the mix of associated 
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factors relates to different tasks used (Shimamura & Squire, 1986; Beatty & Monson, 
1991; Randolph Arnett & Freske, 2004; Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005). 
 
1.10.1. Memory Self-Report in Multiple Sclerosis 
An issue, indicated earlier as a concern for memory complaint, is whether subjective report 
of memory is valid in predicting memory task performance or whether it is a reflection of 
mood state or other factors. 
 
In two studies of memory self-report in MS (Randolph, Arnett & Freske, 2004; Julian, 
Merluzzi & Mohr, 2007), a questionnaire was the mechanism of self-appraisal. Randolph, 
Arnett and Freske (2004) suggest that dysfunctional attitudes mediated the contribution of 
both mood and executive function to scoring of items on a questionnaire relating to 
frequency of memory difficulties while reading. Actual memory performance was tested in 
this study, but did not correlate with the questionnaire score. The absence of consistent 
association between memory self-report and objective memory score in the literature has 
been discussed (Dixon & Hultsch, 1983; Hertzog, 2002; Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004). 
Probably the more interesting finding is a proposed role of executive function, which will 
be discussed later. 
 
Julian, Merluzzi & Mohr, (2007) also proposed that depressed mood influenced self-report 
of cognitive abilities, also measured by questionnaire. Self-report was not a predictor of 
actual cognitive performance, though self-report did become an accurate predictor, after 
successful treatment of mood disorder. Accepting that this latter study focused on general 
‘cognitive’ abilities, rather than memory specifically, it and the study of Randolph, Arnett 
& Freske (2004), propose a relationship between mood, and negative attitudes, and 
memory self-report. This is in line with the evidence base that mood, and other personality 
characteristics, such as conscientiousness, are associated with this method of self-
assessment of memory (Hertzog, 2002; Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004). Additionally, there is 
a proposed direction, in which depressed mood causes the lower memory ratings. In Julian, 
Merluzzi & Mohr (2007) causality is proposed through the study design, which was a 
randomized interventional study. Depression was the independent variable and the 
accuracy of cognitive function report the dependent. With treated and improved mood, 
accuracy of report increased.  
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This latter study design is a traditional approach to the issue of causality, meeting the 
criteria of precedence in time, non-spurious relationship between predictor and criterion, 
and a correctly specified direction (Kline, 2005), achieved by manipulating one variable 
with before-and-after measures of the criterion, and a supporting evidence base (Blunch, 
2008). The study of Randolph, Arnett & Freske, (2004) suggested that dysfunctional 
attitude mediated the effect of depression and executive function on metamemory, 
measured by questionnaire. This was a non-experimental study, which used so-called 
‘causal’ or path modelling as its analytic approach. In fact, this approach, which is based 
on covariance structure analysis, tests a priori relationships between variables, specified as 
a model, with directional ‘causal’ paths preassigned (Blunch, 2008:16). The supporting 
theory base for such models is seen to contribute to a sense of causal inference, supported 
by correlations and overall statistical fit of a model with the data (Schumacker & Lomax, 
2004; Kline, 2005). If pre-existing theory is used to develop an a priori model, then causal 
assertions might be made with more justification, than if the model was derived post hoc, 
from the data (MacKinnon, 2008). MacKinnon defers to Sewell Wright, who developed 
the method of path analysis: ‘The combination of knowledge of correlations with the 
knowledge of causal relations, to obtain certain results, is a different thing from the 
deduction of causal relations from correlations.’ (Wright, 1923:241). 
 
In terms of understanding the factors that contribute to accurate self-report (by 
questionnaire) of memory, both studies have advantages. Julian, Merluzzi & Mohr (2007) 
provide a more definitive account of the causal importance of mood in self-assessments in 
cognition. Randolph, Arnett and Freske (2004) propose a useful way of thinking about the 
relationship of potentially causal variables, as well as some support for a relationship 
between self-report, low mood, negative attitude, and executive functions. Their model is 
presented in figure 1.4, and perhaps requires some interpretation.  
 
The model is made up of observed variables (items in rectangles) and latent variables 
(items in oval enclosures). Latent variables are variables created from multiple observed 
measures, here the Tower of Hanoi and the Letter Number Sequencing tasks. These are 
proposed to represent a latent Executive variable, and directional arrows from the latent 
executive variable to each indicate that they load to a reliable extent on the factor. 
Measurement error for each variable is formally modelled so as to better represent the true 
relationships between variables; the epsilon notations indicate this. Straight arrows indicate 
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parameter estimates, here indicating significant causal paths between variables. Finally, 
executive function and depression are correlated to allow for relationships between them 
that are unexplained in the model; these might include relationships related to MS 
pathology, personality factors or the effects of medications on each. 
 
Despite the proposal in the model that Depressive Attitude mediated the 
Depression/Executive function relationship with metamemory (memory self-report) a 
number of features of this study are unclear.  
 
 
Fig 1.4. The structural model, of factors contributing to metamemory in MS, 
presented by Randolph Arnett & Freske (2004). The authors propose that both 
Depression (measured by the Beck Depression Inventory) and Executive Function 
(measured by the Letter Number Sequencing task and the Tower of Hanoi task) are 
mediated in their impact on Memory Function Questionnaire responses by negative self-
oriented attitudes. No test of mediation is reported in the paper. 
 
 
Aside from the model presented above, the relationship between self-reported and tested 
cognitive ability, other than memory, remains unclear. Beatty & Monson’s (1991) memory 
questionnaire results suggest memory self-report is inconsistently related to cognitive 
abilities in MS, making this assessment approach unreliable. Randolph, Arnett & Freske 
(2004) propose that scoring on a memory questionnaire is associated with dysfunctional 
attitude, as a mediator of the effect of executive function and depressed mood. What is 
unclear is the theoretical basis of an executive function - self-report memory link.  One 
possibility is a relationship wherein executive contributions to impaired memory 
performance are experienced, and reported, as a memory problem (Randolph, Arnett & 
Higginson, 2001).  
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Alternatively, understandings might be that in some way the executive role of ‘sculpting of 
the response space’ (Fletcher, Shallice & Dolan, 2000: 404) is biased by negative attitudes. 
This could occur because of the interaction of cognition and emotion associated with the 
role of executive function and because reduced processing capacities, associated with 
depression, both constrain and bias evaluative processes (Bunce, Handley & Gaines, 2008; 
Baddeley & Hitch, 2007). Prefrontal functions may be generally involved in reflective 
abilities, including ‘detailed, deliberative analysis, and maintenance of information while 
it is being evaluated’ (Nolde, Johnson & Raye, 1998). Taken together, there is support for 
both an affective and resource explanation that could characterise the impact of mood 
disorder. 
 
One additional contribution to the self-report debate was a study by Randolph, Arnett & 
Higginson (2001) who investigated whether a recall task, an executive function measure 
and information processing abilities might relate to self-report of memory on a 
questionnaire in MS. The findings, in conflict with another study (Beatty & Monson, 1991) 
but supported by a later one (Randolph, Arnett & Freske, 2004), suggested that executive 
function and information processing speed, but not memory ability, are associated with 
memory questionnaire items relating to current memory performance in MS. This may 
support the contention that the memory deficits in MS are in acquisition; both in terms of 
speed and strategy deployment at encoding (Demaree et al., 1999; Chiaravalloti et al., 
2003) and in this sense memory questionnaire reports may in part reflect these processes, 
rather than indices of forgetting. 
 
1.10.2. Task-based Metamemory Judgment in Multiple Sclerosis 
Cognitive factors appear contributory in task-based (‘on-line’) metamemory measures 
(Beatty & Monson, 1991; Scarrabelotti & Carroll, 1999), most notable in more demanding 
new-learning or episodic tasks (Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005). In the study of Beatty & 
Monson (1991) analysis of subgroups within the sample by levels of memory and 
executive deficit suggested that a no memory impairment, no executive impairment group 
were not different to controls on an episodic Feeling of Knowing task; all other subgroups 
- no memory impairment, executive impairment; memory impairment, no executive 
impairment and memory impairment, executive impairment were not reliably different 
from zero in their performance. One additional finding was that in a semantic task (the 
Nelson & Narens (1980) General Information Test), all groups performed as well as 
 
 
  65 
 
controls on the Feeling of Knowing measure, despite differences in recall performance for 
the task itself. The overall finding suggest that relevant cognitive domains were memory 
and executive function, and is supported by Pannu & Kaszniak’s (2005) review of 
neurological populations’ metamemory performance. Performance in episodic tasks do not 
compare with semantic tasks, the latter being potentially less useful in detecting difficulties 
with memory monitoring. 
 
Heavily emphasised by Scarrabelotti & Carroll, is that impairments in metamemory are 
associated with decreased ‘conscious processing’ (Scarrabelotti & Carroll, 1999:1347); 
this conscious or intentional processing may support explicit memory interrogation and 
inferential reasoning. Supporting this suggestion was the study of Beatty & Monson 
(1991), who initially demonstrated that impairments in metamemory, compared to 
controls, were increasingly seen in those MS participants who had the dual 
memory/executive deficit profile, compared to those with just a memory deficit, or neither. 
Importantly for both studies, while there is an acceptance of the requirement for effortful, 
controlled processing, there is no focus on what might support, or constrain, the enactment 
of such processing. In the MS literature there is significant support for the idea that 
decrements in information processing abilities may underlie a range of complex cognitive 
tasks (DeSonneville et al., 2002; Denney et al., 2004; O’Brien et al., 2008; MacNiven et 
al., 2008), and the deficit is common (up to 60% of people with MS: Rao et al., 1993; 
Brassington & Marsh, 1998). 
 
In the same way that limitations of processing ability (e.g. capacity, speed) might reduce 
abilities to effectively encode information or develop and deploy memory strategies 
(Salthouse, 1996; Demaree et al., 1999 Chiaravalloti et al., 2003; Bunce, 2003; Bunce & 
Macready, 2005; Lengenfelder et al., 2006) they might too be associated with difficulties 
with making accurate metamemorial judgments. Such judgments are proposed to be based 
on the maintenance of a dynamic model of proceeding cognitive operations, the organism’s 
goal state, and to make comparisons necessary for ongoing discrepancy-reduction during 
learning (Van Overschelde, 2008). 
 
Many metamemory judgments are, in explicit contexts (episodic research tasks, 
rehabilitation programmes) not automatised. Therefore it might be expected monitoring 
processes, being instituted as part of task-based processing, might require the recruitment 
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of more effortful, non-automatic processing as task difficulty increases. In doing so, they 
may demand increasingly effective information processing (Shallice, Burgess & Robertson 
1996; Schneider 1998; Scarrabelotti & Carroll, 1999; Garavan et al., 2002; Schneider & 
Lockl, 2008). The proposal for this study is that this might be evident as a positive 
relationship between information processing and the accuracy of metamemory judgment. 
Impairments in memory and executive function may lead to distortion in metamemory, but 
information processing limitations, common in MS, might underlie that distortion. 
 
1.10.3. Mood and Task-based Metamemory in MS 
Finally, the impact of negative attitudes, or depression, has not been investigated in task-
based metamemory measures in MS samples. In one study in Parkinson’s disease, it was 
suggested not to be relevant in the Feeling of Knowing performance of participants on a 
semantic memory (general knowledge) task (Coutler, 1989). Here, the proposal is that on 
an episodic task, which appears to be generally more challenging, the impact of low mood 
on effortful processing may disclose a relationship (Arnett et al., 1999a). Given that some 
metamemory judgments (e.g. Feeling of Knowing) are largely inferential, and given the 
results suggesting an interaction of mood and executive abilities in self-report, it may be 
that in conditions of difficulty, additional data for inferential judgments might include 
more global biasing factors, such as mood. Those conditions conferring complexity could 
relate to the nature of the judgment task or to impairments in cognitive domains typically 
considered relevant to the judgment. 
 
The nature of this potential relationship might relate to the findings that depression can 
constrain working memory abilities in MS, and so might be relevant in demanding 
cognitive tasks (Arnett et al., 1999a, 1999b Arnett, Higginson & Randolph, 2001). This 
relationship has been proposed in older depressed people as a resource competition 
between attention-to-task versus attention-to-intrusive thoughts (Nebes et al., 2000; 
Christopher & MacDonald, 2005; Bunce, Handley & Gaines, 2008). This relationship has 
also been proposed in other neurological disorders, such as Huntington’s disease (Nehl et 
al., 2001). Further, distortion may be added by the negatively biased appraisals associated 
with depression (Cavanaugh & Murphy 1986; Cavanaugh, Poon 1989; Lovera et. al., 
2006). 
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Beatty & Monson, (1991) and Randolph, Arnett & Freske (2004) have similar goals in 
their studies - to evaluate factors that are relevant to metamemory in MS. Beatty & 
Monson (1991), address many aspects of metamemory; Feeling of Knowing for episodic 
and semantic memory tasks, a list learning prediction task and a memory questionnaire. 
The study did not include mood disorder as a variable to be considered, nor did it include a 
specific index of information processing abilities. A test of ‘verbal fluency’ used (the FAS 
test) was not included in the analysis, even though all subgroups differed from controls in 
the task, which might support its sensitivity in the sample, to pervasive information 
processing deficits in MS. Randolph, Arnett & Freske (2004) focused on memory-efficacy 
measures in their study, rather than task-based measures of metamemory. Important 
differences in the samples used are also apparent. 
 
1.10.4. Samples 
In terms of cognitive profile, Randolph, Arnett & Freske’s (2004) 48 participants presented 
with a low level of cognitive impairment - Letter Number Sequencing, a working memory 
measure according to Wechsler (1997), indicated 4% in borderline impaired range, and the 
Selective Reminding Test, a long term memory measure indicated 8% borderline impaired, 
- an unknown executive deficit (because the measure used is unstandardised) and 31% 
having a Beck Depression Inventory score in the mild to moderate depressed range (point 
prevalence of depression is cited as between 15% and 51% in MS, according to Mohr et 
al., 1997).   
 
The memory performance, allowing for differences in testing methods, is considerably 
below the expectations from a review of 36 studies by Thornton & Raz, (1997), in two 
respects. There is a low level of working memory deficit; unusual because of its 
relationship with information processing and complex attention components, both common 
cognitive deficits in MS. Second, the long-term memory deficit is also sparse. Rao (2004) 
suggests 40%-60% of people with MS will display memory deficits. One issue is that the 
selective reminding procedure used by Randolph, Arnett & Freske (2004) may control for 
the impact of initial stimulus acquisition, therefore being a measure of delayed recall. As 
discussed when reviewing memory performance in MS, delayed recall is often not 
considered to be the key memory limitation in MS. 
 
 
 
  68 
 
In Beatty & Monson’s 1991 study of 45 MS subjects, 60% had a cognitive deficit of some 
kind based on performance below 5th
 
 percentile on the SECIMS (Screening Examination 
for Cognitive Impairment in MS; Beatty & Goodkin, 1990). No measure of mood disorder 
is reported in this sample. 
1.10.5. Analytic Differences 
This difference in approach relates to the aims of the studies. Randolph, Arnett and Freske 
(2004) aimed to model the performance of the sample as a group, whereas Beatty & 
Monson (1991) investigated subgroups of MS participants based not on disease subtype, 
but on cognitive performance, so as to clarify the memory-related and executive-related 
contributions to metamemory. This latter approach was proposed as useful when 
examining MS participants, because a single group based approach may have masked wide 
variance in performance (heterogeneity), which might be useful to interpret how some 
factors impact on metamemory, as opposed to others (Beatty & Monson, 1991).  
 
Taken together, the approach of Randolph, Arnett and Freske (2004) might usefully model 
and characterise relationships between cognitive and mood factors on metamemory 
performance, but Beatty & Monson (1991) perhaps makes explicit the contributions, and 
the relative severity of cognitive performance required, to lead to metamemory 
impairments; in doing so there is additional focus on the quality of the relationships 
between, for example executive function and metamemory. However, the key findings, 
reported by Beatty & Monson suggest that the main effects of cognitive function group on 
episodic metamemory measures, were between controls and all other groups, rather than 
there being discrete homogeneity in each subgroup. It would seem that cognitive sub 
grouping might not have given the useful distinctions aimed for in terms of levels of 
severity relating to reliably different metamemory performance. A limitation in respect of 
the analyses is the number of individual analyses carried out, both planned and post hoc. In 
this regard, it is an exploratory study and the findings offer some direction for development 
on a more a priori basis, especially in how the field of research has advance since the study 
was published.  
 
The structural equation modelling (SEM) approach, as used by Randolph Arnett & Freske 
(2004) allows for the development and testing of models of how variables are proposed to 
interact, and has some leaning towards causal interpretation; such models reflect causal 
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assumptions on behalf on the investigator, and allow causal interpretations to be made on 
that assumption (Russo, 2008). An important aspect of this approach is that the to-be-tested 
models are theory driven (Russo, 2008). The SEM approach also allows for multiple 
measures being used to indicate a single construct (called a latent variable). Latent 
variables offer the benefit of a level of abstraction, by using the performance on a number 
of indicators to create the variable, for example in developing the variable Executive 
Function, Randolph, Arnett & Freske (2004) used two measures proposed to be indicative 
of the executive abilities.  
 
Assumptions may have been made, based on theory, that the two measures were valid in 
representing this construct. These assumptions were not explicitly tested in the study; 
testing what is called the measurement model by means of confirmatory factor analysis 
typically achieves this. The purpose of this step is to test the validity of the proposed latent 
variables, especially relevant where unstandardised measures might be used, as in that 
study. SEModels with very small samples are also considered to have limited application 
(Schumacker & Lomax, 2004; Byrne, 2001; MacCallum, Browne & Sugawara, 1996). In 
Randolph, Arnett and Freske (2004) the sample was of 48 people with MS. Sample size 
considerations relate to the complexity of model, the more complex a model, the more 
parameters having to estimated with proportionally smaller amounts of data. Additionally, 
small sample sizes increase the chances of models being accepted (Schumacker & Lomax, 
2004). Despite this, the selection of indices of statistical fit reported in the study might be 
considered unusual. Some have argued that the primary index of fit, the chi-square test, is a 
mandatory index (Barrett, 2007; McIntosh, 2007), and is not reported in this study.  
 
Two final limitations are a failure to report a statistical test of mediation, such as the Sobel 
z test (Sobel, 1988; Preacher & Leonardelli, 2006). Although the reported fit statistics 
suggest an acceptable model, for mediation to be suggested it should be tested statistically. 
As mentioned, no confirmatory tests of the relationship between the indicators for 
executive function were carried out; instead as the two items were those that presented 
bivariate association they were proposed to reflect the same construct. Based on the earlier 
discussion, these could equally reflect processing abilities or working memory, not 
executive ability. The model does provide a useful starting point to extend the findings of 
the study and given issues with interpretation and method, could benefit from replication in 
this study. 
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1.11. Conclusions & Study Objectives 
Cognitive Impairment is a common occurrence in Multiple Sclerosis with memory being 
one of the most commonly complained of deficits (Rao et al., 1993). Subjective reports of 
memory impairment have been investigated to only a limited extent and, in agreement with 
more general literature on memory self-report, have been found not to relate to tested 
memory abilities. Such subjective-report approaches to testing accuracy of memory 
appraisal are infrequently used in the contemporary research base on metamemory. 
However, they are frequently used in clinical practice, and judgment appears to associate 
with mood, rather than memory ability. Alternative approaches to assessing accuracy in 
memory monitoring include a range of judgments made concurrent with memory task 
performance. Both mnemonic and executive processes contribute to accuracy in this on-
line monitoring of memory, using a range of cues to make judgments about past or future 
performance. 
 
The impact of MS frequently leads to problems in each of the domains implicated in 
accuracy of metamemory judgments; mood, memory and executive function. Studies of 
metamemory in neuropsychologically impaired samples is limited; in MS only a few 
studies have addressed the issue of what makes for accurate metamemory judgments, 
broadly finding that questionnaire report frequently relates to mood, and metamemory 
monitoring, carried out during tasks, relates to mnemonic and executive abilities.  
 
Limitations to drawing together the findings of these studies relate to differences between 
samples, measures and analytic approaches. None has sought to fully relate metamemory 
performance to current proposals about experiential, inferential or affective mechanisms 
involved in models of metamemory. Additionally, the impact of affective disturbance and 
decrements in information processing has not been assessed in the potentially demanding 
cognitive processing involved in metamemory monitoring in new learning.  
 
Given the evidence that information processing capacities, notably speed, appears to 
compromise object-level cognitive performance it is relevant to considering its impact in 
meta-level performance also. In the two studies highlighted, samples have been relatively 
small (less than 50 participants) and both based in the US where social, cultural and 
medical care may impact findings. Based on these considerations, the potential for 
improvements in statistical methods, and the specific recommendations for future research 
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into metamemory in neurological populations given by Pannu & Kaszniak (2005), the 
focus of this study will be to extend knowledge of metamemory in Multiple Sclerosis. 
 
1.11.1.  Aims of the Study 
The general aim of the study is therefore to present a profile of performance on a range of 
metamemory measures of a UK community-dwelling sample of people with Multiple 
Sclerosis, the first time such a study has been carried out. This will focus on both self-
report and a number of task-based monitoring judgments. Accuracy of judgments will be 
considered against mood disorder and implicated cognitive domains - memory, executive 
function and information processing ability. Analysis, using structural equation modelling, 
will consider how contemporary models of metamemory monitoring fit with performance 
of the sample and this will include replicating and extending the work of both Randolph, 
Arnett & Freske (2004) and Beatty & Monson (1991). The study will address the 
recommendations of Pannu & Kaszniak (2005): to relate different aspects of metamemory 
to executive function and a range of neuropsychological tasks, to further investigate the 
relationship between deficits in awareness of memory problem and depression, and to 
investigate of the relationship of metamemory inferred from questionnaire, and 
performance on experimental tasks. A final development of the research base will be the 
assessment of mediation of mnemonic or executive processes by information processing 
ability in metamemory accuracy. 
  
Using structural equation modelling methods, a number of a priori models of the factors 
that contribute to metamemory accuracy will be investigated. For these models, a set of 
latent variables representing Memory, Executive Function, Mood and Information 
Processing will be proposed and tested for factor structure, using confirmatory factor 
analysis. The study will use four metamemory indices to evaluate metamemory accuracy; 
Memory efficacy (self-report), Judgment of Learning, Retrospective Confidence Judgment 
and Feeling of Knowing judgment. Each judgment will be made on episodic rather than 
semantic memory tasks, as new learning is one of the contextual factors for the study. 
Models will contribute towards understanding the factors that underpin memory-
monitoring abilities in MS and provide some direction for both future study and 
intervention. Each of the a priori models is developed based on the review of the literature 
already presented, and models indicate what results are expected or unknown from that 
literature. The models presented are, at this stage, quite general, and will be specified to a 
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higher level over the coming chapters as methods are developed. Development of each 
model will include specification based on the measures of accuracy selected, which is 
considered in Chapter 2: Development of Methods. 
 
1.11.2. Memory efficacy models 
The specific aim is to validate the findings of Randolph, Arnett & Freske (2004), that self-
report memory is contributed to by executive function and mood, and that mood disorder 
mediates the executive contribution. Additionally, confirmation will be sought that 
memory self-report is unrelated to tested memory ability. The model will be tested using a 
more contemporary measure of mood disorder, and more psychometrically robust measure 
of memory self-report than reported by Randolph, Arnett & Freske (2004).  
 
There are some additional differences between the two models; as the revised Beck 
Depression Inventory incorporates some of the negative attitudinal components associated 
with more cognitive characterisation of depression, a separate affective and attitudinal 
variable is not used in this model. Figure 1.5 summarises the a priori model; there are 
hypotheses of a positive correlation between Memory and Executive ability, a negative and 
statistically reliable parameter estimate between Mood and Metamemory indicating more 
depression being associated with reduced efficacy and a non-significant relationship 
between tested memory performance and metamemory. A mediational relationship will 
confirm if mood mediates the contributions of executive ability to metamemory. 
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Figure 1.5. The a priori model of factors contributing to Metamemory (Memory-
efficacy). Arrowed lines are proposed causal paths, with the dotted line indicating the 
mediational relationships to be tested. Curved lines indicate correlations. Parameter sign 
indicate the direction of expected relationships and * indicates those relationship expected to 
be statistically reliable at p <0.05; n.s. = non significant estimates expected. Variables in oval 
enclosures are latent variables, measures for which will be confirmed in later analyses.  
 
 
1.11.3. Judgment of Learning Model 
The aim is to test the hypothesis that delayed Judgment of Learning accuracy is based on 
memory experience, and not associated with executive function. The model proposes that 
those who have better object-level memory ability are likely to benefit from the mnemonic 
factors thought to contribute to more accurate monitoring at delay on the Judgment of 
Learning - no dual-memory monitoring interference, the benefit of retrieval practice over 
multiple trials, and the benefits of covert retrieval attempts in making the judgment.  
 
The model therefore proposes a positive and reliable association between accuracy in the 
delayed JoL and memory ability. This model will also extend the findings of Randolph 
Arnett & Freske (2004) to investigate if mood remains a contributory factor to 
metamemory in this task-based, rather than self-report measure of metamemory. 
Expectations for the model are that Executive Function will not contribute to accuracy to a 
reliable extent, and a contribution of Mood will be investigated. The model proposes 
positive correlations between cognitive items, but negative correlations between mood and 
cognitive items indicating more depression being associated with lower cognitive function 
(Landro et al., 2003; Haase et al., 2004). The a priori model is shown in figure 1.6 
 
 
  74 
 
 
Figure 1.6. The a priori model of factors contributing to Metamemory (delayed 
Judgment of Learning: dJoL). Arrowed lines are proposed causal paths; curved lines 
indicate correlations. Parameter sign indicate the direction of expected relationships and * 
indicates proposed causal relationships expected to be statistically reliable at p <0.05; n.s. = 
non significant estimates expected. ? = parameter contribution to be investigated. Variables in 
oval enclosures are latent variables, measures for which will be confirmed in later analyses.  
 
 
 
1.11.4. Retrospective Confidence model 
The aim in this model is to test the hypothesis that Retrospective Confidence Judgment is 
based on memory experience and is not associated with executive/inferential processes. 
This is based on the proposal that this judgment, made on the product of recall offers many 
memory experience-driven cues towards accuracy; that privileged access informs the 
judgment and more robust Memory ability provides more such cues (Nelson et al., 1986; 
Koriat et al., 2008). Based on the discussed findings of Fu et al., (2005) Mood is not 
expected to contribute to accuracy to a reliable extent. Correlations between latent 
variables are expected to be as before; cognitive items correlating positively, and mood 
and cognitive items negatively. Figure1.7 summarises the expected relationships. 
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Figure 1.7. The a priori model of factors contributing to Metamemory (Retrospective 
Confidence Judgment: RCJ). Arrowed lines are proposed causal paths; curved lines 
indicate correlations. Parameter sign indicate the direction of expected relationships and * 
indicates proposed causal relationships expected to be statistically reliable at p <0.05; n.s. = 
non significant estimates expected. Variables in oval enclosures are latent variables, 
measures for which will be confirmed in later analyses.  
 
 
 
1.11.5. Feeling of Knowing model 
The primary aim is to retest the findings of Beatty & Monson (1991) that Memory and 
Executive Function are reliable contributors to Feeling of Knowing judgment accuracy. 
Findings in other neurological samples appear to suggest that Executive ability is the 
primary contributor in Feeling of Knowing accuracy (Shimamura & Squire 1986; Pannu & 
Kaszniak, 2005). Assessing the relationship between mood and accuracy will extend those 
findings. The model is shown in Figure 1.8.  
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Figure 1.8. The a priori model of factors contributing to accuracy in Metamemory 
(Feeling of Knowing: FoK). Arrowed lines are proposed causal paths; curved lines indicate 
correlations. Parameter sign indicate the direction of expected relationships and * indicates 
those relationship expected to be statistically reliable at p <0.05; ? = parameter contribution 
to be investigated. Variables in oval enclosures are latent variables, measures for which will 
be confirmed in later analyses.  
 
 
 
1.11.6. Information Processing mediation models 
A final set of models will be tested for each of the three task-based judgments to 
investigate a mediational role for information processing in accuracy. These models will 
tests for mediation of Executive Function by Information Processing and assume that 
under easier judgment conditions, i.e. those with available memory experience, there is 
low need for controlled processing resources, so that Memory is not mediated by 
Information Processing. In the low availability Feeling of Knowing task, Information 
Processing may mediate both Memory and Executive Function, to the extent that it 
facilitates the process of monitoring amongst the more distal cues that are used in making 
accurate judgment. The generalised information processing as mediator model is shown in 
figure 1.9.  
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Figure 1.9. The generalised a priori model of Information Processing meditating factors 
contributing to accuracy in Metamemory. Arrowed lines are proposed causal paths; the 
dotted causal paths indicate the mediation relationship of interest for Executive Function. 
Curved lines indicate correlations, here this may not be applied if both Memory and Executive 
Function mediation can be established, as their shared variance in information processing is 
modelled thorough the mediational relationship. Parameter sign indicate the direction of 
expected relationships and * indicates those relationship expected to be statistically reliable at 
p <0.05;Variables in oval enclosures are latent variables, measures for which will be confirmed 
in later analyses. For the purposes of generality, Mood is not included in this model. 
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Chapter 2: Development of Methods 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will focus on issues relating to measurement for each of the variables in the 
study. Each selected test will create an observed variable (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004), 
that is, each acts as an index of a proposed domain, such as Memory.  These individual 
variables are useful for the description of sample performance, most of them being 
standardised measures, for which norms are available in the literature.  
 
The main purpose of the study is to examine the relationships between the domains that 
these measures index; Memory, Mood, Executive Function, Information processing and 
Metamemory. Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) is pursued as an appropriate method 
to achieve this because it allows for the use of multiple indicators of each domain, and the 
testing of interactions between these (Kline, 2005; Weston & Gore, 2006). The first step in 
modelling these interactions is to create descriptors of each domain, termed latent 
variables (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). Latent variables are created from combining 
observed variables that are proposed to load on the same construct (Schumacker & Lomax, 
2004).  
 
In selecting observed measures to construct a latent variable, testing that they do satisfy as 
indicators of a latent construct is also planned as part of the statistical methods. In the later 
analysis of structural models, the relationships between these latent variables are then 
examined. The initial step in constructing latent variables is to review available measures 
and consider what published evidence is available for their reliability and validity as 
measures of the domains of interest in the sample under study. 
 
2.2.  Selection of Latent Variable Measures. 
A general issue which pervades test selection for this study is to develop a range of tests 
that can be completed by a heterogeneous group of people with Multiple Sclerosis (MS), 
taking into account the typical range of problems associated with the disease – visual 
disturbance, motor disorders (including speech and upper limb problems) and fatigue 
(Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004).  
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The aim was to avoid giving tests ‘on which failure is both inevitable and uninterpretable’ 
(Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004 pg 250). Therefore, visual complexity, motor demands 
and test length were considerations alongside the psychometric properties of each test to 
ensure appropriate measures were selected to gather the planned data. Pragmatic concerns 
included qualifications of the researcher, resource issues, relevance to clinical practice, and 
given that participants might need to be assessed in their own home environment, test 
portability (Auger, Demers & Swaine, 2006).  
An important additional issue was the level of practice effect with selected tests (Beatty, 
1999). Practice effects occur where experience with doing a test in the past supports better 
performance in the future, because of that previous experience (and not because of change 
in abilities; Field, 2005 pg 273). While this is not a longitudinal or repeated measures 
study, the fact that participants may have self-selected for involvement in the study, on the 
basis of some orientation towards their own cognitive function, may increase the likelihood 
of having been assessed in the past. Many of the cognitive assessments used in MS are 
routine because of the existence of guidelines for cognitive screening and commonly used 
screening batteries (Peyser et al., 1990; Rao, 1990). Therefore, consideration was also 
given to the availability of alternate form versions and the evidence about the length of 
practice effects (e.g. Wisconsin Card Sorting Test for Executive Function; (Beatty, 1999; 
Barker-Collo, 2005). The process and outcome of measure selection will now be described. 
 
2.2.1 Test Selection for Memory. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, there are a number of aspects of memory abilities 
that have been shown to be impaired in MS (Rao, 1995; Landro, Sletvold & Celius, 2000; 
Mohr & Cox, 2001). Testing memory performance requires that a number of 
manipulations be considered. Broadly, these relate to the length of delay between 
presentation and test of recall, immediate or delayed, and the particular retrieval demands; 
free recall, cued recall or recognition (Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004). One 
complication with a study of judgements about memory is that it requires tasks, about 
which participants can also make judgements about their memory performance. Therefore 
the selection of memory tasks is required to meet a number of criteria; have variable length 
of delay (immediate recall, delayed recall), have variable retrieval demands (recognition, 
free and cued recall), be auditory/verbal or of reduced visual demand, have acceptable 
reliability and validity and have some normed or reference group with whom to compare 
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performance. The proposed Memory latent variable will here represent delayed recall 
ability. 
 
One issue with tests of delayed recall for people MS, is that they may be confounded with 
the impact of the speed at which to-be-remembered information is presented (Demaree et 
al, 1999; Arnett, 2004). This typically has an impact on initial acquisition (Salthouse, 
1991), and can appear to be a recall problem, when in fact the information was never 
acquired in the first instance. Speed of information processing is a problem for people with 
MS (Diamond, et al., 1997; DeLuca, et al., 2004) and this may be independent of memory 
performance in that when controlled for, memory performance can be normal (Demaree, et 
al., 1999). It is therefore of interest to measure delayed recall that is not entirely dependent 
on processing speed. Additionally, processing limitations in general can be confounded 
with recall in tests that offer a single presentation of large amounts of to-be-remembered 
information (Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004), regardless of the speed of that 
presentation. Capacity limits impact on how much information can be acquired with a 
single presentation even in non-neurologically impaired adults (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; 
Baddeley & Hitch, 2001). A balance has therefore to be sought in not biasing the measures 
which define the latent variable Memory by entirely removing the impact of information 
processing - it is after all, an aim of the study to investigate the mediating role of 
information processing on the relationship between memory and metamemory. At the 
same time, concerns about adequate discriminant validity needs to be considered in not 
selecting a memory measure that, in reality, only reflects information processing abilities. 
One benefit in proposing a latent variable for this domain is that more than one measure 
can be used to capture performance. 
 
A final feature of an appropriate memory measure is that it requires scoring that is devoid 
of gist-based recall, so that predicted versus actual recall can be reliably compared; so 
performance can easily be deemed correct or incorrect. For example, if a stimulus story 
had information about a milkman knocking on the door and a participant reported a 
postman knocking on the door it would introduce unwanted complexity to the scoring, 
because the decision about correctness becomes difficult - information was half-
remembered, or the participant controlled the level of generality in their answer so as to 
maintain accuracy (Koriat, 2000). The exclusion of tests using this type of recall will be a 
trade-off in terms of external validity, to maintain internal validity. This excluded tasks 
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like the Story Recall and Logical Memory Test from the Rivermead Behavioural Memory 
Test (Wilson, et al., 1999) and WAIS-III (Wechsler, 1997a) both offer scoring for gist-
based recall (synonyms get points as well as word-for-word recall). 
Consideration of the issues associated with a single presentation of stimulus items, gist 
based recall and slowed information processing, led to a review of a number of tests that 
offered multiple learning trials before imposing a delay prior to testing recall. Typically, 
these tasks are list-learning paradigms, which can be considered a sensitive measure of 
memory, because they do not offer the support of context or gist, which might aid in story-
recall tasks (Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004). This category of memory tests includes 
tests such as the Selective Reminding Test (SRT: Buschke, 1973), The California Verbal 
Learning Test  (CVLT; Delis, et al., 1987) and the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test 
(Rey, 1958 cited in Spreen & Strauss, 1998: 326; Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004).  
 
The Selective Reminding Test gives participants a reminder of the words they have not 
recalled from the first and each subsequent trials of a 12-word list; therefore offering 
‘selective reminding’. Multiple trials of a 12-word list are given and the selective 
reminding continues until full list recall is achieved on three consecutive trials. There is 
then a 30-minute delay before recall is tested. In all, the test takes about 30-minutes to 
complete (Spreen & Strauss, 1998). It has been used in, and has been recommended for, 
the assessment of memory in MS (Beatty, 1999; Beatty et al., 1996a; Beatty et al., 1996b). 
However, with a 30-minute administration time and a design offering multiple indices of 
verbal memory (e.g. long-term storage, long-term retrieval, consistent long-term retrieval) 
this task is more complex than necessary for this study’s purposes. Lezak, Howieson & 
Loring (2004) also point out that this test has not been compared empirically to other 
learning tests to establish if it offers a better assessment of memory ability.  
 
The administration time of the California Verbal Learning Test (CVLT; Delis, et al., 
1987), a similar list-learning task, runs to about 35 minutes (Spreen & Strauss, 1998), and 
scoring reflects the strategies related to remembering perhaps more than the recall 
performance itself. Given the range of assessments planned in a single testing session, it 
takes too long to administer, and is again more complex than necessary for the purpose of 
this research.  
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A shorter administration time and reduced complexity is offered by the third of the 
repeated presentation list-learning tasks - the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test (RAVLT 
or AVLT; Rey, 1958: cited in Spreen & Strauss, 1998:326; Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 
2004, for the English version). The test has been used with an MS sample before (Bravin, 
et al., 2000), as an index of retrospective recall. Additionally, it does not suffer from SRT 
problems, such as being ‘often discouraging, certainly boring’ (Lezak, Howieson & 
Loring, 2004:443) or from performance being confounded because the stimulus items are 
already categorised, aiding recall for the learner, as in the CVLT (Lezak, Howieson & 
Loring, 2004). Extensive norms are available (Spreen & Strauss 1998), administration time 
is 10-15 minutes and alternate forms are available. It was therefore considered one 
appropriate test to use in this study, as the first of two tests of delayed recall.  
 
The second recall test had two criteria to fulfil - it was a test of recall after a delay and it 
could provide data that would contribute toward the assessment of metamemory. 
Additionally it would have to be more demanding in terms of the learning support it 
required, to balance the repeated presentation of the AVLT. A Sentence Memory paradigm 
was investigated to fulfil these criteria, as it has a long history of use in metamemory 
experiments. 
 
The Sentence Memory Task (Nelson & Narens, 1980; Nelson, 1984; Shimamura & Squire, 
1986) is not a standardised test of memory function, instead it is a testing paradigm used 
for generating data on recall performance and on accuracy of metamemorial predictions. 
Versions of this paradigm have been used in many metamemory studies in the past, 
including in MS (Beatty & Monson, 1991; Scarrabelotti & Carroll, 1998; Scarrabelotti & 
Carroll, 1999).  
 
Sentences for the test were taken from a set of incomplete sentences produced by Bloom & 
Fischler (1980) and the sentence completion words are based on those generated by a 
London-based sample of 73 non-neurologically impaired adults, using the Bloom & 
Fischer stimuli (Arcuri, et al., 2001). To avoid participants being correct by guessing the 
likely high frequency response during the test, the lower frequency generated completions 
were selected. The full set of test materials are presented in Appendix A. 
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The task structure of the Sentence Memory Task is based on a test paradigm used by 
Nelson (1984), Shimamura & Squire (1986), and where participants are given a number of 
sentences to read with their attention drawn to the final word of each sentence. These 
sentence completion words are learned from a single exposure and then, after a delay, 
participants are re-presented with the same sentences, with the final word of each sentence 
missing. A participant’s first task is to provide the word they remember to be the word that 
completed each sentence.  The performance on this recall portion of the task will be used 
as the second measure of delayed recall.  
 
The test also meets the second criteria of providing data for metamemory judgments. Use 
of the test to derive measures of metamemory (as opposed to memory) is discussed later in 
this chapter. While the Sentence Memory Task paradigm is appropriate for the study, as a 
paradigm, it does not stipulate the exact materials (i.e. the sentences) to be used. A full 
outline of the test structure and materials used in this study is given in Chapter 4: Methods. 
Administration time for the task is about 30 minutes, including the task elements relating 
to metamemory. This was considered acceptable, given the amount of information the 
process yields.  
 
In summary, two memory tasks were found to be appropriate to model the latent variable 
‘Memory’, which will be based on 20-minute delayed recall performance in the Auditory 
Verbal Learning Task and 60-minute delayed recall on the Sentence Memory Task. Both 
tasks reflect the inclusion criteria for study tasks; the AVLT has equivalent formats for 
those who might have experienced it before, the Sentence Memory Task will be new to all, 
as it has been compiled for this study. Each is relatively quick to administer and yields 
interpretable data for the study. While only the AVLT has adequate norms, the Sentence 
Memory Task primary function is in providing the basis for assessment of metamemory, 
rather than memory. The appropriateness of the Sentence Memory Task as an additional 
assessment of memory will be explicitly tested during the confirmatory factor analytic 
testing of validity. Figure 2.1. summarises the proposed formation of the latent variable for 
memory; convention in confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modelling 
indicates a latent variable by an oval enclosure, and an observed variable by a rectangular 
one (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004; Kline, 2005). 
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Figure 2.1 summary of observed measure for the proposed 
latent variable Memory. Latent variables are indicated by 
ovals and observed variables by rectangles. 
 
 
2.2.2. Test Selection for Information Processing. 
Given that one of the aims of the study is to investigate the impact of information 
processing abilities on metamemory, the collection of data reflecting this process (or 
processes) bears consideration – the main issues being the validity and reliability of 
measures used, as well as how best to operationalise the construct at the latent variable 
level.  
 
A guiding principle in selection of measures for the information processing latent variable 
is the proposal that this latent variable represents a key process underlying, perhaps 
mediating, the functioning of memory and other abilities, in their relationship with 
metamemory. Here, the variable is proposed to represent speed of processing and capacity 
to maintain and manipulate information ‘on-line’ (Gontkovsky & Beatty, 2006). The latter 
some would term ‘working-memory’ (Baddeley, 1996; Andrade, 2001a). That these items 
have some unidimensionality, in the sample of people with MS under investigation, will be 
tested in the confirmatory analytic process.  
 
Information processing abilities in MS, and their measurement, have been widely 
investigated (Archibald & Fisk, 2000; Fisk & Archibald, 2001; Rosti, et al., 2006; 
Williams et al., 2006; Gontkovsky & Beatty, 2006; Parmenter, et al., 2007). Two issues 
arise from the literature – a speed-accuracy trade off in measurement, and the expansion of 
the information-processing concept to include attention and working memory items 
(Demaree, et al., 1999; Gontkovsky & Beatty, 2006). Typically, the published literature 
focuses on two main indices of information processing in MS – the Paced Auditory Serial 
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Addition Test (PASAT; Gronwall & Sampson, 1974; Gronwall, 1977) and the Symbol 
Digit Modalities test (SDMT; Smith 1982); both were considered as potential measures for 
this study.  
 
Some advantages of the PASAT include the reduced motor demands of the task, which 
involves the mental serial addition (of two numbers, the currently-presented plus the 
previously-presented; that is, n + n-1) at a paced speed (increasing from a digit every 2.4 
seconds to every 1.2 seconds). The participant verbally reports the sum of the two 
numbers, while numbers continue to be delivered through headphones for the next serial 
addition. This test has been considered an ‘aversive’ test (Fos, et al., 2000), which some 
people refuse to do, cannot do, or stop doing because of the difficulty (Spreen & Strauss, 
1998: 248; Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004; Gontkovsky & Beatty, 2006).  
While the instructions are typically presented on audiotape, there can be a need to repeat 
these, or provide them in the form of an oral or written version too (Spreen & Strauss, 
1998). Practice effects have been noted, both within (Barker-Collo, 2005; using an MS 
sample), and between, sessions (Gronwall, 1977). The test takes, assuming no repetition or 
demonstration of instructions is required, approximately 15-20 minutes to complete 
(Spreen & Strauss, 1998). Additional limitations include the potential for difficulties 
distinguishing between problems with information processing demands of the task (speed 
of responses) and dysarthria (Spreen & Strauss, 1998); another is the numerical ability of 
the study sample, as perceived or actual numerical ability can have an effect on 
participation. Given the potential for difficulties with the test, an alternative to this test, 
which is shorter and less complex to administer, but with proven value for use in MS, was 
therefore was sought. 
Three shorter tests, also developed for the measure of information processing, are the Digit 
Symbol-Coding task (WAIS III, Wechsler, 1997a), the Coding subtests of the Repeatable 
Battery for the Assessment of Neuropsychological Status (RBANS; Randolph, et al., 1998) 
and the Symbol Digit Modalities Test (SDMT: Smith, 1982). Each test requires the 
matching of novel ‘hieroglyphic-like’ symbols (Wechsler, 1997b:2) to numbers, using a 
key that shows which numbers and symbols go together. The aim of the tasks is to 
correctly match as many as possible in a set time, e.g. 90 seconds for the SDMT. One 
limitation, for an MS sample, of both the Digit Symbol-Coding and the Coding subtest of 
the RBANS is that it requires the symbols to be written down as the response, offering the 
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potential of compromised motor function as a confounding issue in the time-based score. 
The SDMT also requires a written response, but an oral administration, where the 
participant calls out the numbers that go with each symbol is also permitted. Having an 
oral-only response option, as well as a test that could be completed in approximately two 
minutes was considered worthy of pursuit, so the psychometric properties of the test were 
investigated. 
 
The oral version of the SDMT (Smith 1982) has been investigated for use in MS as an 
index of processing abilities (Gontkovsky & Beatty, 2006) and is recommended for use in 
preference to the PASAT or the RBANS coding because of the oral response option. In 
terms of visual acuity, the stimuli are likely to be sufficiently large (Schear & Sato, 1989; 
Gontkovsky & Beatty, 2006). Recency effects appear not to affect performance (Lezak, 
Howieson & Loring, 2004) and the test, when used on people with MS who reported 
memory problems, correlated better with non-memory cognitive domains, rather than with 
memory performance (Randolph, Arnett & Higginson, 2001), suggesting it is not a 
memory related task, perhaps attesting to a relative purity as an information processing 
measure. Generally it has been proposed that the test is a sensitive measure of brain 
damage (Smith, 1982; Spreen & Strauss, 1998) and some propose it was the single best 
measure of information processing speed out of two alternatives (Ponsford & Kinsella, 
1992; Drake et al., 2010).  
 
Specificity for the instrument was reported as 0.82 by the author (Smith, 1982), and it has 
been demonstrated to correlate positively with neuropsychological performance, and 
negatively with mood disorder (Parmenter et al., 2007). A cut off of 55 correct responses 
demonstrated a sensitivity of 0.82 in an MS sample (Parmenter et al., 2007). The oral and 
written versions also correlated at r = 0.82 (Smith, 1982). The SDMT was therefore 
considered one appropriate test of information processing in people with MS for this study, 
but given the aim of reducing measurement error, and better characterising the latent 
variable, others were sought. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, in selecting any tests of information processing ability, it must 
be recognised that definitions of information processing, vary considerably. Some describe 
the SDMT as a test of sustained attention (Boringa et al, 2001), or visual attention (Beatty, 
1999), information processing speed (Gontkovsky & Beatty, 2006) or attention and 
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scanning (Sheridan et al., 2006). These differences about definitions reflect an expansion 
of the information-processing concept to include attention and working memory items and 
not just speed (Demaree, et al., 1999; Bunce & Macready 2005; Gontkovsky & Beatty, 
2006). 
  
As part of developing this latent construct, working memory capacities will be measured; 
if the SDMT is considered a measure of speed of information processing, then it is 
proposed that measures of processing capacity and mental manipulative abilities will also 
be included so as to develop a latent variable representing a range of operations relating to 
processing ability. This is because of the aim and theoretical orientation of this study, that 
this latent information-processing variable underpins the performance of other, more 
cognitively intensive mental operations, in the processing that supports metamemory. The 
lack of agreement about what processing capacities might or should include also supports 
selecting potential measures and using the confirmatory factor analyses to clarify their 
relationships. Therefore, measures of processing span (capacity) as well as manipulative 
processing were also considered for inclusion 
 
The ability to repeat progressively longer stimulus lists is considered a measure of 
immediate recall, or information processing capacity, both often considered a quantity 
dimension of attention (Spreen & Strauss 1998; Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004). Two 
standard measures were considered - the Digit Span Task (looking at how much 
information can be maintained for immediate recall) and Letter Number Sequencing task 
(looking at abilities to maintain and manipulate information for immediate (i.e. no-delay) 
recall).  
 
Span tasks come in a number of forms but typically fit into three types – span, supraspan 
and what Lezak, Howieson & Loring term ‘mental tracking’ (2004:360) span tasks. 
Straightforward span tasks start at easier capacity limits, e.g. two numbers to be repeated 
back, increasing in length from there. Supraspan tasks start with more than is possible to 
retain e.g. 15 items, and are therefore perhaps confounded with memory processes from 
the outset (Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004; the first trial of the AVLT is an example of a 
supraspan task, with 15 items). The mental control tasks have requirements for 
maintenance and mental manipulation of the given information, but, like simple span, they 
work from below capacity limits, increasing by 1 stimulus on each trial. Thus, supraspan 
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tasks, because of their mnemonic basis, will not be included as measures of processing 
abilities.  Three simple-span tests are reviewed first: Visual Span, Sentence Span, Digits-
Forward task (WAIS III; Wechsler, 1997b). 
 
Visual span tasks, such as the Corsi Block test (Milner, 1971) were discounted as the 
requirement for copying the block tapping pattern of the examiner may instead be sensitive 
to difficulties with the reaching and tapping blocks; even if achievable, it might be 
considered an interference (i.e. be attention demanding) in a person with a movement 
disorder, which could attenuate performance. The motor demands of the task are therefore 
likely to be confounded with recall performance, making this task inappropriate for use 
with MS participants. Difficulties with oculomotor control, diplopia or nystagmus, 
common in MS (Reulen, Sanders & Hogenhuis, 1983; Starck et al., 1996), might also lead 
to difficulties with the visual pursuit required in such tasks. 
 
Sentence repetition tasks require participants to repeat sentences that become increasingly 
longer (e.g. more syllables, more content). One noted confound is how meaningfulness, 
and familiarity, contribute to abilities at repetition, when compared to span for unrelated 
items (Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004). One other limitation is the importance of exact 
repetition; adjustment of pronouns is an example that Lezak, Howieson & Loring (2004) 
discuss, along with the impact of regional or ‘ethnic’ English on exact repetition. As there 
are other sentence-based tasks in the study this was considered inappropriate so as to avoid 
the potential for interference between tasks. 
 
The Digit Span forwards task, with numerical stimuli, offers some benefits in terms of the 
limitations of both tests discussed above. In addition, being part of the WAIS it has had 
considerable investigation into its dimensionality and internal structure, mainly confirming 
that it described a simple attention capacity measure (Spreen & Strauss, 1998), part of 
‘freedom from distractibility’ measure (Sherman et al., 1995) also considered ‘working 
memory’ (Wechsler 1997a). It was therefore selected as an appropriate information 
processing measure for this study, reflecting the capacity aspects of processing. 
 
Of interest, the Letter Number Sequencing task (LNS; Wechsler, 1997b) also correlated 
highly with a working memory/freedom from distraction factor, along with the Digit span 
task (LNS = 0.85; Digits = 0.83; The Psychological Corporation 2002:78). The Letter 
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Number Sequencing (LNS) task was therefore investigated further as a third, and more 
complex measure of attention / processing ability relevant to the aims of this study. The 
LNS task (along with Digits and Arithmetic) forms part of the Working Memory Index of 
the WAIS-III, supported by factor analyses (WAIS technical manual: table 4.6; Saklofske, 
Hildebrand & Gorsuch, 2000; Arnau & Thompson 2000). The factor structure also appears 
stable across age ranges (Wechsler, 1997a).  
 
Though the LNS concords with what Lezak, Howieson & Loring (2004:360) termed 
‘mental tracking’, working memory, or attentionally demanding tests. Others have 
considered it part of an executive ability (Randolph, Arnett & Freske, 2004). The main 
reason for this is theoretical orientation. In line with the proposal in this study, it will be 
considered a measure of working memory or ‘on-line’ processing, but a conclusion about 
whether it loads more on (has a greater statistical relationship with) an executive versus 
information processing/mental abilities factor can only be drawn after the confirmatory 
factor analysis has been carried out. It fulfils the criteria as an appropriate measure because 
of its short administration time and verbal presentation, but is selected with cognisance that 
it is unclear whether it would load on an information-processing or executive function 
factor in this sample. The expectation, to be tested in confirmatory factor analysis, is that it 
will load with the other two selected measures, SDMT and Digit Span Forwards tasks, on 
an information-processing factor. 
 
Alternative tests considered good indicators of the same functions include the PASAT 
(Gronwall & Sampson, 1974), the limitations of which were discussed earlier, and the 
Stroop Test (Stroop, 1935; Jensen & Rohwer, 1966). A limitation of the Stroop Test is the 
significant reliance on visual stimuli, which can consist of over one hundred colour names 
on a single A4 page (Sacks et al., 1991). Those with visual acuity problems may actually 
be at an advantage as the ability to easily read words increases the difficulty of ignoring 
the written word and attending to the colour of the ink in which the word is written (Lezak, 
Howieson & Loring, 2004). Conversely, the incidence of colour vision disturbance in 
people with MS (Ashworth, Aspinall & Mitchell, 1989) is likely to make colour naming 
more difficult.  
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In summary then, the latent variable of Information Processing will be constructed from 
the Symbol Digit Modalities Test, Digit Span Forwards and Letter Number Sequencing 
Test. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Summary of observed measures for the proposed 
latent variables of Memory and Information Processing 
 
2.2.3. Test Selection for Executive Function. 
One of the difficulties in testing executive functions is the diversity of component 
processes included in the construct (Spreen & Strauss, 1998; Miyake et al, 2000a). This 
leads to a number of issues from a measurement perspective. The first issue is what to 
measure in order to represent the construct. Broadly the skills involved include, at the 
behavioural level; planning, problem solving, regulation, monitoring and self-correction 
(Luria, 1980; Prigitano, 1999) The second issue is how reliably can these skills be 
measured; the multidimensionality is compounded by the need for low structure in the 
testing situation to allow for the demonstration of ‘discretionary behaviours’, that is 
executive abilities, on the part of the person being tested (Lezak, Howieson & Loring 
2004:612).  
 
Cognitive Neuropsychology has proposed a number of models of the executive system, 
one of which presents the idea of a Supervisory Attention System, which is engaged by 
novel (non-routine), complex or control-requiring tasks (Norman & Shallice, 1980; 
Shallice 1988; Miyake et al, 2000a). The focus on novelty, or non-routineness, is an 
important consideration because of how it relates to assessment procedures.  
 
Miyake, et al., (2000a) and Royall et al., (2002) in their consideration of the key 
dimensions of executive control, posit response inhibition, working memory, rule 
discovery, updating and set shifting as some of the key areas in executive function. 
Because of the multiple components of executive function, difficulty with being sure what 
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is actually being tested (Rabbitt, 1997; Burgess, 1997), and the nature of the tests 
themselves (low structure, requirement for novelty Burgess, 1997) have all been proposed 
as reason for low reliability and poor inter-test correlations (Burgess, 1997). As novelty is 
so important, test-retest reliability would be expected to be low (Beatty, 1999). Because of 
low structure, and therefore space for varieties of approaches to the task, internal validity 
may also be low (Rabbitt, 1997; Miyake, et al., 2000b). 
 
Aside from assessment techniques needing to be novel and having low levels of structure, 
which might aid performance, a second relevant issue in selecting measures of executive 
function is whether the measures are diagnostic of, or just sensitive to, disorders of 
executive function. Because of the proposed multidimensionality of the construct, selection 
of tests will aim for indicative measures rather than a whole battery of tasks. In a clinical 
situation, a full battery may be more appropriate where diagnostic concerns are primary. In 
the research context, where fatigue and testing-session length are important considerations, 
indicative testing is proposed to be sufficient. Full batteries of tasks, such as the 
Behavioural Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS; Wilson et al., 1997; Norris & 
Tate, 2000) were not therefore pursued as appropriate measures for this study.  
 
A final consideration relates to what Miyake et al., (2000b:52) term ‘task purity’. Studies 
have shown differences (and therefore possibly separable sub-functions) in performance 
between executive tasks (Miyake et al., 2000a). These could be accounted for by 
differences in the cognitive domains managed, or used, by the executive system – e.g. 
language abilities (Miyake et al., 2000b; Godefroy, 2003). The implications of this support 
the use of a number of measures to form the latent concept of executive function, as well 
as measures emphasising both executive in verbal, and executive in non-verbal domains 
(Hunt & Kingstone, 2004). As with other assessments, they also need to be relatively short 
and not heavily reliant on complex visual or motor mediated responses. 
 
The Stroop task, a frequently used measure of executive function, has been shown to be 
sensitive to frontal lobe functioning if comprehension or visual search deficits are 
controlled for (Stuss et al., 2001).  In one study (De Frais, Dixon & Strauss, 2006) it 
loaded, along with the Colour Trails task, on the same factor as the two other tests, the 
Hayling Sentence Completion test and the Brixton Spatial Anticipation test. The limitation 
of the Stroop’s presentation format was discussed earlier when considering this test as a 
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potential for testing information processing abilities. However, many also consider this test 
as sensitive to executive function (De Frais, Dixon & Strauss, 2006) and as such the 
reverse confound is proposed. MacNiven, et al., (2008) warn the use of tests where 
reaction time is a primary measure may not be appropriate for people with MS, because of 
the possibility of confounding with information processing abilities. It is likely therefore 
that in a factor analytic study, Stroop performance could easily cross-load between 
executive and information processing factors, making the modelling of one factor 
mediating the other more complex than is necessary, when an alternative measure might 
avoid such cross-loading effects.  
 
Because of its use in a key paper on metamemory in MS (Randolph, Arnett & Freske, 
2004), and their popularity as tests of executive function (e.g. Shallice, 1988; Manchester, 
Priestley & Jackson, 2004), Tower tests (Towers of Hanoi, London and others) were also 
considered. Of note, Randolph, Arnett & Freske (2004) used a computerised version of the 
Tower of Hanoi (ToH) task, presumably to reduce the impact of motor function 
limitations, in their sample of people with MS. However, this led to not having norms for 
performance on the task for comparative purposes. Tower tests do have a good track record 
for use as indices of executive function (Welsh, Satterlee-Cartmell & Stine, 1999), more 
specifically of planning abilities (Arnett et al., 1997; Arnett, et al., 2001; Lezak, Howieson 
& Loring, 2004). Such tasks are typically scored on the number of moves it takes to move 
the pieces of the tower (balls, discs) from an initial position to a desired position, with 
different towers having different levels of complexity. At certain points during the task it is 
required that counterintuitive moves be made, for the sake of future success, some have 
suggested that inhibitory processes are important (Goel & Grafman, 1995; Welsh, 
Satterlee-Cartmell & Stine, 1999; Miyake et al, 2000a). In addition, given the multiple 
steps involved, and the requirement to maintain a goal state in mind, while working 
through sub-goal steps, working memory is a likely contributor, especially when the tasks 
are more difficult (Goel, Pullara & Grafman, 2001). As has been noted with other 
executive tasks, these tower tasks also seem to be sensitive to information processing 
speed in MS (Arnett, et al., 1997), though this sensitivity may relate to time being a key 
indicator of performance. 
 
It is therefore likely that these Tower tests do reflect executive processes, but may be of 
limited use because of their gross and fine motor demands, and notably where time 
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measures are used (e.g. would slow movement of a disc from one position to another be 
counted as thinking time or psychomotor speed). The issue of task purity is also of 
concern, given that simpler versions may require less in terms of working-memory and 
executive function than more complex ones. Computerised versions of the test are 
available, including norms, but selection and movement of the discs on the screen again 
may mean that this task is not appropriate for all because of visual and motor disabilities. 
A final consideration related to resources needed for this test to be used, especially access 
to both software and portable hardware. Tower tests were for these reasons not deemed 
appropriate to this study. 
 
Probably the most frequently used test sensitive to executive function is the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting test (WCST; Grant & Berg, 1948). This task requires participants to sort sets 
of cards (each with differently sized and coloured shapes), where the sorting rule is not 
given and there are three possible sorting categories – size of geometric form, shape and 
colour. The only information given is either “right” or “wrong” feedback from the 
examiner after each card is sorted. The research participant therefore needs to use this 
feedback to generate the sorting rule. The sorting rule also changes without notice during 
the task.  The test has been used in MS samples (Beatty, et al., 1995; Rao, Hammeke & 
Speech, 1987; Arnett, et al., 1994).  
 
In a paper, which included a review of studies on the dimensionality and validity of the 
WCST as a measure of executive function, Royall et al., (2002) investigated what the 
dimensions of executive function might be, and the idea of the WCST as a gold standard 
measure of executive function.  Generally the authors’ findings suggest the WCST might 
be variously associated with planning, concept formation and inhibitory functions, though 
this has been difficult to establish empirically. 
 
In the Miyake et al., (2000b) study, set-shifting was proposed as the key demand of the 
WCST; this is the ability to move from one level of understanding (termed a ‘set’ - e.g. 
organise by shape) to another (organise by colour). It implies a level of cognitive or 
executive control to do the shifting, and may relate to the management of behavioural 
control, such as freedom from distraction, maintenance of task goal and of flexibility in 
task performance (Royall et al., 2002). Limitations of the task in consideration of this study 
relate to the length of time it takes to complete (about 45 minutes) and the potential impact 
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of visual problems, including colour appreciation, upon completion. Finally, as discussed 
in the introduction, this is a ‘one-shot’ (Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004:588) test with 
previous experience likely to compromise reliability, making the second administration 
potentially more a test of recall, than executive function (Beatty, 1999). Another task, 
which has a similar structure of rule detection, rule change and a yes/no feedback to guide 
rule detection and change, is the Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test (Burgess & Shallice, 
1997). 
 
The task is considered one of rule abstraction (Andres & van der Linden, 2000), concept 
formation (Lezak, Howieson & Loring 2004) or concept attainment (Burgess & Shallice, 
1997). In essence, it requires the participant to divine the rule(s) governing the movement 
of a coloured circle around a 2 x 5 matrix of plain circles. The participant is told only that 
there are rules or patterns governing the movement and that these rules may change during 
the course of the task. Feedback is immediate in that the page is turned after prediction, 
and the participant can see whether they were correct or not in their prediction. A group of 
patients with circumscribed frontal lobe damage (‘Anterior and Bifrontals’ Burgess & 
Shallice, 1997:7) differed significantly from both normal controls and a group of people 
with posterior lesions on the mean number of errors made in the task, suggesting the task is 
sensitive to frontal lobe dysfunction. The test has been examined for construct validity 
alongside two more ‘standard’ tests of executive function (De Frais, Dixon & Strauss, 
2006), using a confirmatory factor analytic approach. The authors suggest that all the tests 
loaded on a single executive factor. 
 
For a control group, split-half reliability was 0.62, suggested to be adequate given the 
caveats about reliability in tests of executive function, and given what the authors term to 
be ‘serial dependence between trials’ (Burgess & Shallice, 1997; Burgess, 1997) that is, 
each choice depends in some way on the previous choices. The factoral relationship with 
other tests of executive function has been discussed. 
 
As well as confirming that the Brixton test appears to be an appropriate index of executive 
function for this study, it supports selection of a second test – The Hayling Sentence 
Completion Test, also used in the De Frais, Dixon & Strauss (2006) study, as a potentially 
acceptable measure. Given suggestions of modality specific deficits in executive function 
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(Hunt & Kingstone, 2004), this second verbal test compliments the use of a non-verbal 
executive task (The Brixton test).  
 
The Hayling Sentence Completion requires, in part 1, rapid completion of 15 sentences, 
with a single appropriate word, so as to finish the sentence in a sensible way. Part 2 again 
requires a single word to be given rapidly, this time to provide a nonsensical completion 
for a new set of 15 sentences. Effectively, part 1 of the test is designed to offer practice in 
automatic completion of everyday sentences. Then, part 2 requires inhibition of the 
‘trained’ automatic completions so that the participant needs to inhibit the likely prepotent 
single word completion and generate an alternative, which is in no way related to the 
sentence; this is carried out under time pressure so as to be sensitive to where inhibition 
costs (a speed/accuracy trade-off) occur – longer response times or more errors in word 
generation. The authors, Burgess & Shallice (1997) describe the test as indicative of a 
number of executive-related abilities; response initiation and response suppression 
(measured in both number of errors or time taken to generate response; Burgess & 
Shallice, 1997:5).  
 
De Frais, Dixon & Strauss (2006) demonstrated that both the Brixton and Hayling 
Sentence Completion tests loaded on the same factor with other measures of executive 
function, supporting their construct validity as measures of frontal or executive function. 
Additionally they demonstrated measurement invariance across gender and age, at least in 
older people (Young-old and Old-old adults; n=427 community dwelling adults, mean age 
68.44 years). The Hayling Task was therefore selected as a second measure of executive 
function for this study.  
 
Inter-rater reliability for this test may be as high as 96% (Bielak, Mansueti, Strauss & 
Dixon, 2006), despite the test allowing latitude on the interpretation of errors. The test 
manual (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) reports split-half reliability for the three component 
scores, for a control group, as r = 0.35 (sensible completion – time), r = 0.83 (nonsense 
completion – time) and r = 0.41 (nonsense completion - error score).  For an impaired 
group with anterior (i.e. frontal) brain involvement the reliabilities are respectively r = 
0.93, 0.80 and 0.72. 
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There is possibility for confounding results with information processing speed, given this 
is a timed task, and this will be considered in the light of planned testing of information 
processing as a mediator to cognitive abilities in the final set of model testing. As there is 
an ‘initiation’ (response time) score in the easy sentence completion task and again a 
response time score for the difficulty completion task, one possibility to reduced the 
confound is to subtract the easy condition response time from the difficult condition 
response time, to indicate the additional processing time. This could be considered the true 
executive time cost, rather than being confounded with response initiation because of 
information processing deficits. 
 
A final approach to the assessment of executive function is the use of self-rating methods. 
Some self-rating instruments have been developed on non-neurologically impaired adults 
(Spinella, 2005), but are likely to be both unreliable and low in validity because they have 
not been assessed for their relationship with standardised measures, or for use in samples 
who have executive dysfunction (Bogod, Mateer & McDonald, 2003). These types of 
indices are not therefore considered optimal for this study; investigating the relationship 
between self-report of executive abilities and self-report of memory abilities, is likely to 
confound interpretation of results. 
 
In summary, because there appears to be diversity in the subcomponents of executive 
functions, multiple assessments are typically indicated. In addition, given the traditionally 
low reliability of tests, multiple measures are probably warranted, and their factor structure 
will also be confirmed for this particular study sample. 
 
Test selection was based on tasks that have limited complex visual and motor demands, 
and are not entirely speed based, or when they are, have a baseline speed measure for 
comparison. Finally, for the purposes of the study they are relatively quick to administer 
and have some demonstrated sensitivity for frontal lobe functions (Royall et al., 2002). The 
two tests selected to fit the range of criteria described - the Brixton Spatial Anticipation 
Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) and the Hayling Sentence Completion Test (Burgess & 
Shallice, 1997), have an administration time of 15 minutes in total. Figure 2.3 summarise 
proposed latent variables selected for cognitive items. 
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Figure 2.3 Summary of observed measures for the proposed latent variables; Memory, 
Information Processing and Executive Function 
 
 
2.2.4 Selection of Measures of Mood. 
Because of the purported association between depression and self-reported memory ability 
(Randolph, Arnett & Higginson, 2001; Randolph, Arnett & Freske, 2004, Bruce & Arnett, 
2004; Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004), an assessment of mood is required for this study.  
 
One key debate in the selection of measures of depression, or self-reported depression 
symptoms (Beck, Steer & Garbin 1988; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996), relates to their 
potential sensitivity to neurovegetative symptoms (e.g. fatigue), considered in the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI) as indicators of depression when, in fact, they may be 
indicators of the neurological diagnosis (Nyenhuis et al, 1995). In other studies in MS (e.g. 
Randolph et al 2000), caution is advised in removing confounded items because these 
types of symptoms may be associated with both mood and neurological symptoms, or 
because some somatic symptoms may differentially load for depression in different 
individuals (Clark et al 1992; Aikens, et al., 1999; Bruce, McGuigan & Hutchinson, 2006; 
Polen & Arnett, 2007) 
 
One issue discussed in Randolph et al., (2000), which used a revised version of the original 
BDI (Beck, et al., 1961; excluding tiredness, appetite and weight change) was the 
relationship between their version of BDI and the Chicago Multiscale Depression 
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Inventory (CMDI; Nyenhuis et al, 1995) mood scale. The CMDI Mood scale has been 
suggested to be a good indicator of depression in MS (Nyenhuis, 1995; Mohr et al, 1997), 
though the findings of Randolph, Arnett & Freske (2004), suggest that the ‘constellation of 
depressive symptoms’ assessed by the BDI may better indicate depression. The argument 
in some sense is moot if the newer conceptions of depression, with a more cognitive basis, 
are considered (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Capturing this cognitive 
conception was the aim of revising the BDI more recently (Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996). 
 
The issue of assessment of depression in MS has also been subject to expert review. The 
results published in 2005 (Goldman Consensus Group, 2005) supported the use of the BDI 
(Beck et al., 1961) for clinical assessment of depression in MS. It was accepted that the 
problem of MS-symptom and Depression-symptom overlap is a feature of screening 
assessments in general, including the BDI (Mohr et al., 1997; Goldman Consensus Group, 
2005).  
 
In a change from previous studies, the second version of the BDI (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & 
Brown, 1996) will be used. Two potential benefits are envisaged; the dropping of some of 
the items which may have been conflated with neurovegetative symptoms of MS – 
Somatic Preoccupation, Weight Loss, Body Image Change, and Work Difficulty. Second, 
it aims to reflect the updated American Psychiatric Association's definitions of depression 
(APA, 2000), reflecting a cognitive understanding of depression (e.g. the role of negative 
thinking styles), and considers mood over a two week period, not one. Factoral studies 
have proposed one, two and three-factor models based on the tool (Beck, Steer & Brown, 
1996; Harris & D’Eon, 2008). In samples of people with ‘fairly minor medical conditions’ 
(Viljoen et al., 2003:289), more serious medical conditions (Thombs et al., 2008) and in 
primary care medical attendees (Arnau et al., 2001), a two-factor model Somatic/Affective 
& Cognitive has been proposed, or confirmed to be as good other two or three factor 
models (Thombs et al., 2008). All three studies supported the presence of a single second-
order depression factor also. 
 
In summary, the BDI-II (Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996) in its entirety will be used here. The 
tool takes about 10 minutes to complete and can be completed verbally, if necessary (Beck, 
Steer & Brown, 1996). The confirmatory factor analyses reported in Chapter 6 should 
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clarify factor structure for this sample (1, 2 or 3 factors including affective, somatic or 
cognitive dimensions for example). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Summary of observed measures for the proposed latent variables; Memory, 
Information Processing, Executive Function and Mood. The 21 depression indicators of the 
Beck Depression Inventory will be subject to Confirmatory Factor Analysis to establish the 
number of factors to indicate the latent variable. 
 
 
2.3. Selection of Metamemory Measures. 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Two main approaches to the assessment of metamemory monitoring have been discussed. 
The first was global assessment of memory ability, memory-self efficacy, or subjective 
evaluation of memory ability. The second approach is based on a number of on-line 
memory-related monitoring tasks. 
 
A key assumption in the measurement of metamemory is that individuals act as their own 
measurement devices, in that introspection is the method by which access to internal 
‘subject-controlled’ processes relating to memory is achieved (Nelson & Narens, 1980; 
Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996:491). There are a number of paradigms for assessment of these 
processes, each requiring some method of deriving or calculating accuracy, in order to 
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make them meaningful (Nelson, 1984; Schraw, 1995; Moulin, 2002; Goldsmith, Koriat & 
Pansky, 2005; Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005; Spellman, Bloomfield & Bjork, 2008; Dunlosky 
& Bjork 2008).  As a result of the relative subjectivity of the process of introspection, the 
measurement of metamemory does not have the same consensus about the calculation of 
accuracy as there is in quantity oriented memory assessment.  
 
Generally, metamemory monitoring has been described as being either ‘on-line’ (made 
during task performance) or ‘off-line’ (made in respect of generally experienced memory; 
Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters & Afflerbach, 2006). One reason for the range of methods 
and analyses relating to metamemory performance may be that the tradition underpinning 
metamemory assessment differs from the approach to memory assessment in not being 
quantity-oriented (Koriat, Goldsmith & Pansky, 2000). Instead, it focuses on a 
correspondence view of memory, that is, the level to which, for example predicted recall 
corresponds to actual recall (Koriat, Goldsmith & Pansky, 2000). A second difference is 
that it does not focus on recall as its only index of memory-related processing; 
comparisons between judgements about ease of learning a piece of text, and time allocated 
to the task, is an example of other approaches to understanding metamemory in terms of 
the relationship between monitoring and control (Van Overschelde, 2008; Dunlosky & 
Bjork, 2008). 
 
Monitoring processes are the primary focus of this study, because of the clinical 
experience driving the study. Also, because of the proposition that for people with 
neuropsychological impairment, defective monitoring is instrumental in inappropriate, or 
ineffective, control mechanisms (Moulin, 2002; Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005). Given this 
focus, and in consideration of the on-line and off-line measurement approaches, it is 
proposed that a spectrum of measures will be used. At one end, an ‘off-line’, task-
independent measure that focuses on global subjective assessment of memory ability 
(memory-efficacy) will be sought. At the other end of the spectrum, are within-task 
predictive and postdictive measures of memory monitoring accuracy. 
 
The on-line monitoring judgments focused on in this study are a delayed Judgment of 
Learning, a Retrospective Confidence Judgment and a Feeling of Knowing judgment. One 
aim in selecting the specific monitoring judgments is that they reflect monitoring at 
different stages of the memory process - Judgment of Learning during learning, 
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Retrospective Confidence at retrieval and Feeling of Knowing prior to recognition, where 
retrieval has failed. The proposed mechanisms for each have been discussed in Chapter 1, 
and here the structure of testing will be discussed, followed by a review some approaches 
to the calculation of accuracy by correlation, proportion and probabilistic methods in 
Chapter 3:  Development of Statistical Methods. 
 
2.3.2. Selection of task-based Metamemory Measures. 
Two types of memory tasks are used in metamemory research – one based on the use of 
sets of general knowledge questions (semantic recall; Hart, 1965; Shimamura & Squire, 
1986). With semantic memory tasks, graded difficulty general information questions are 
available (Nelson & Narens, 1980; Shimamura, Landwehr & Nelson, 1981). Performance 
can therefore be compared to norms for both predictive ratings and accuracy of recall. 
Limitations of such lists relate to their applicability with the passage of time, with changes 
in education, or with changes in the facts themselves (i.e. the capital of Czechoslovakia). 
Grading of item difficulty is normed on university students, reducing external validity, as 
does the cultural biases inherent in such questions (e.g. the name of the 21st
 
 US president).  
The second approach is based on newly learned information, one benefit being that it may 
be more sensitive to monitoring deficits, especially for Feeling of Knowing (Souchay, et 
al., 2007). 
Of the list of potential monitoring led measures discussed, those that minimise the 
possibility for variable lengths of time to complete (so as to avoid fatigue related 
confounds affecting some, but not other, participants) were sought. Measures where 
participants are allowed to control their own learning rate by definition will introduce 
variability in timescales due to different learning rates (Son & Kornell, 2008). This, along 
with the range of other tasks in the study, is likely to increase the time per participant also.  
 
The proposed advantage of Judgments of Learning, Feeling of Knowing Judgements and 
Retrospective Confidence Judgements is that they can be built around a memory task 
without biasing the learning by drawing attention to the later recall component (unlike the 
judgements of ease learning perhaps). Therefore the measure can also be used as a 
relatively uncontaminated measure of recall. Only small additional time is required in the 
testing session, and they address different components of the memory experience - 
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encoding, recall and recall failure. Additionally there are measures that are traditionally 
reported in the metamemory literature in clinical samples. 
 
Benjamin & Diaz (2008) present a typical paradigm for metamemory measurement, which 
includes three components; a manipulation of study or judgement conditions, a measure of 
metamemory and a test of memory. The relevant memory tests have been presented earlier; 
the Auditory Verbal Learning Test and a Sentence Memory Test and the considerations for 
selecting them with this population have been discussed. Here, the study or judgment 
manipulation for each is presented. 
 
2.3.2.1. Judgment of Learning 
The Judgment of Learning (JoL) is to be derived from the Auditory Verbal Learning Test, 
for which a global judgement about likely recall can be made on the delayed recall of this 
15-item word list. As discussed, the task involves the serial learning of a 15-word list to 
which the participant is exposed 5 times. Then an interference list of 15 different words 
and a delay of 20 minutes provided, before recall of the original list is tested. Prior to 
offering each trial of the list, including the first, the participant will be asked to estimate 
how may of the 15 items they are likely to recall.  
 
While not fully in line with the typical structure of Judgments of Learning, where 
participants estimate whether they have learned something on an item-by-item basis for 
word pairs (Arbuckle & Cuddy, 1969), the proposed structure allow for factors that 
influence JoL accuracy - number of study trials and the timing of making the JoL - 
immediate or delayed (Kelemen & Weaver, 1997; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). This is a 
more global judgment about learning than has traditionally been used, but perhaps reflects 
more validity when considered in a real-life context. The aims of including a Judgment of 
Learning such as this are threefold. It focuses on a monitoring judgment relating to 
learning. Secondly, it allows for investigation of sensitivity to learning, a factor that may 
be relevant in people with memory impairment (Moulin, 2002). Finally presence of the 
underconfidence-with-practice can be determined. 
 
2.3.2.2. Retrospective Confidence Judgment. 
In the Sentence Memory Test, once recall for each of the 24 sentences is tested, 
participants will be asked to provide an indication of their confidence in the answer that 
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they have recalled (Retrospective Confidence Judgement, or RCJ; Pannu & Kaszniak, 
2005). The key measures relate to the association between confidence rating and correct 
recall, which can be considered both in terms of proportional accuracy and relative 
accuracy in the association of confidence with ‘correctness’. These two measures reflect 
calibration and resolution in judgment accuracy (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). For the 
purposes of investigating both accuracy and inaccuracy, it is proposed that for proportional 
measures, both proportion of High confidence/recalled and Low confidence/recalled will 
be examined. While the High Confidence/recalled indicates accuracy, a judgment of Low 
confidence for successfully recalled items is of interest in the context of cognitive and 
affective disturbance. It might imply better than sensed availability of a memory trace,  or 
indicate a tendency towards negative appraisal. 
 
In summary, relative accuracy in RCJ will be measures and two indicators of absolute 
accuracy - accuracy and inaccuracy in calibration. The measurement approaches will be 
discussed in mode detail in the following chapter. 
 
2.3.2.3. Feeling of Knowing 
Developed from the work of Hart (1965) and used by others with neurologically impaired 
populations (Shimamura & Squire, 1986; Beatty & Monson, 1991; Souchay, Isingrini & 
Gil, 2002; Souchay, Isingrini & Gil, 2006), the Feeling of Knowing task asks participants 
to rate the likelihood of recognising currently unrecallable information, using a scale of 
ratings or rankings. The unrecallable information is derived from performance on a recall 
task (here, the Sentence Memory Test), and selecting items for which no answer or an 
incorrect answer was offered. Prior to a recognition trial, participants are asked to rate the 
chances of recognising the correct answer when they see it. Accuracy of the judgment is 
typically assessed in both absolute and relative terms, discussed further in the following 
chapter. Figure 2.5. summarises the task structure and indicates one approach to 
determining accuracy, by correlating judgment and performance. 
 
It is recognised that there are some challenges in asking people to grade their Feeling of 
Knowing (Beatty & Monson, 1991). The aim will be to have each participant rank each of 
their unrecallable sentences so as to indicate the relative strength of their FoK, highest to 
lowest and then proceed to a recognition trial, which will be a 7-alternative forced choice 
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test among plausible lures, based on responses given by a sample of people from the UK 
(Arcuri, et al., 2001). 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Structure of the Feeling of Knowing (FoK) task. 
 
 
It has been established in the literature that these indices of metamemory reflect differing 
demands, so it would not be expected that they would be factorially related (Dunlosky & 
Metcalfe, 2009; Leonesio & Nelson, 1990) and will therefore, in contrast to the cognitive 
and mood items, not be pursued for their factorial convergence in confirmatory factor 
analysis.  
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2.3.3. Memory Self-report Measure. 
This approach to the measurement of metamemory, in which global judgements about 
memory performance are made, is often termed self-reported memory, memory complaint, 
subjective memory appraisal or memory-efficacy (Hertzog, 2002; Zelinski &Gilewski, 
2004). Given the weak or absent correlations between questionnaires about and 
performance in memory tasks, the reliability and internal consistency of questionnaires has 
been questioned (Hertzog, 2002).  
 
Two questionnaires in particular have been closely examined in the literature  – the 
Memory in Adulthood (MIA; Dixon, Hultsch & Hertzog, 1988) questionnaire and the 
Memory Functioning Questionnaire (MFQ; Gilewski, Zelinski & Schaie, 1990). Randolph, 
Arnett & Freske, (2004), used the latter MFQ scale with their MS sample. Since one 
objective in this study is to look at the stability of their proposed model in a different MS 
sample, it was selected for use.  
 
The main alternative to the MFQ is the Memory in Adulthood questionnaire (Dixon & 
Hultsch, 1983; Dixon, Hultsch & Hertzog, 1988), consisting of either 108 or 120 questions 
(Dixon & Hultsch, 1984), scored on a 5 point Likert scale. The length of the MIA would 
potentially detract from its use here, as would the limited 5-point response scale. 
Additionally, Cavanaugh & Green (1990), summarising the study of Hertzog, Hultsch & 
Dixon (1989), supported the Frequency of Forgetting scale, part of the MFQ, as having a 
high level of convergent validity with a similar efficacy factor in the MIA. In this regard, 
the selection between them becomes less an issue of contrasting validity and more an issue 
efficient data collection. 
 
Despite misgivings about the technical value of questionnaires about memory 
performance, they form an essential part of this study for a number of reasons. Their 
ongoing use in clinical assessment, previous studies using them to investigate metamemory 
in MS (Beatty & Monson, 1991; Randolph, Arnett & Higginson, 2001; Randolph, Arnett 
& Freske 2004) and finally for comparison with on-line measures of metamemory. A 
reasonable summary, in respect of questionnaires or memory complaint, would suggest 
that affectivity, implicit beliefs, conscientiousness and age relate to how questions are 
answered (Hertzog, 2002; Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004). Some studies have proposed that 
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recall independently explains a small amount of variance in efficacy scales (Zelinski & 
Gilewski, 2004). 
 
2.3.3.1. The Memory Function Questionnaire 
The questionnaire selected for use in this study is the Memory Function Questionnaire 
(Gilewski, Zelinski  & Schaie, 1990; Zelinski, Gilewski & Anthony-Bergstone 1990), 
proposed by the authors to measure self-perception of memory functioning. Minimum 
scoring is 64, maximum is 448, assuming all questions are answered. It is further proposed 
that the factor structure is age-invariant across two age groups (16-54years and 55-89 
years), and that it has high levels of internal consistency for each factor (all > 0.80). In one 
study, age did account for some variance in overall scores, with older subjects endorsing 
more memory difficulties (Gilewski, Zelinski & Schaie, 1990), as did levels of education 
and general health. The authors caution over-interpreting this as the total variance 
accounted for by all three was less than 9%. In another study, some evidence is presented 
of a correlation between scoring on this questionnaire and tested memory performance 
(Zelinski, Gilewski & Anthony-Bergstone 1990). At 64 items, the scale is likely to have 
some redundancy included, so further investigation, with a view to reduction was carried 
out.  
 
Principal component analysis has suggested four factors, the first of which contained 33 of 
the 64 items in the questionnaire and was interpreted as a General Frequency of Forgetting 
factor (Gilewski, Zelinski & Schaie, 1990). This index incorporates questions about 
general frequency of memory lapses in everyday situations, frequency of forgetting while 
reading, questions about ability to recall over selected periods of time and an overall rating 
of memory ability. Subsequent analysis of this factor (Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004) 
proposed that it could be further reduced to a 10-item scale, through a Rasch scaling 
process. Variance of the 10-item General Frequency of Forgetting scale was explained by 
conscientiousness, depression and list recall, independent of the other variables (Zelinski & 
Gilewski, 2004). As one of the aims of this study is to compare previous use of this 
instrument, the entire 64-item measure, with a 7-point Likert response scale will be used. 
Model testing will focus on the Forgetting While Reading subscale to comparing with the 
findings of Randolph, Arnett & Freske (2004). This scale is based on the selection of 
questions of reading related questions, and is not formally a subscale of the Memory 
Function Questionnaire. In addition, the study will use the 10-item General Frequency of 
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Forgetting scale. This scale, based on its statistical derivation, is proposed to be a more 
robust measure with which to index memory efficacy. Figure 2.6 summarises the 
metamemory measures to be used in the study. 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Summary of Metamemory measures to be used in the study. 
 
 
2.4. Summary 
A number of tests have been reviewed in order to select the most appropriate indicators of 
the key variables for the study. These tests have been selected based on knowledge of their 
reliability, validity and appropriateness for the sample and processes in this study.  
 
The development of latent variables, constructed from multiple indicators selected in this 
chapter requires testing for factoral coherence however. In the next chapter the statistical 
considerations for this process - Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) is considered. The 
methods discussed with also apply to the testing of relationships between latent variables 
themselves, the structural equation models. Additionally, approaches to quantifying 
accuracy in metamemory performance and underpinning statistical concerns will be 
discussed. These include sample size, missing data management and assessment of data 
quality. 
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Chapter 3: Development of Statistical Methods. 
 
3.1 Introduction.  
Three sections of methods of analysis are considered in this chapter. The first will relate to 
analysing performance on the range of tests used, required to summarise characteristics of 
the samples’ performance. This analysis will be used to describe the sample characteristics, 
in order to situate performance on cognitive, affect and metamemory measures in relation 
to normative levels. To this end, clarification of what will be considered impaired 
performance is first considered in this chapter. This will be followed by a consideration of 
how accuracy in metamemory measures is approached, the sample size and approaches to 
the assessment of data quality. 
 
The second set of methods of analysis, the Measurement Model, will explain assessment of 
the observed variables in terms of their factoral structure. The aim is to describe 
congeneric observed variables that can be used to create latent variables for each of the 
domains under investigation when the structural models are tested. The method of testing 
measurement models is Confirmatory Factor Analysis and statistical methods for this 
analysis are outlined. The final set of methods of analysis presented is the testing of latent 
variable or Structural Equation Models, needed to address the central objectives of the 
overall study. Statistical methods for the testing structural models are broadly similar to 
those of the measurement models but will be considered in respect of the additional 
elements relating to mediating processes in structural models, and how that is assessed. 
 
3.2 Defining Impairment in Selected Measures 
The decision about placing a point at which a score is considered abnormal is a trade-off 
between detecting impairment in those who are impaired and excluding those who are not, 
so-called specificity and sensitivity (Daly & Bourke, 2000; Sbordone, Saul & Purisch, 
2007) The setting of a cut-off score is also made in recognition of the many different 
conceptions of what normal is - clinical (where average or above scores are not of 
concern), prognostic or statistical (Daly & Bourke, 2000).  
 
For the purposes of evaluation of the sample, the distinction between impaired and 
unimpaired, will be considered as at or below the -1.5 standard deviation (SD) mark (7th 
percentile). This cut-off lies between 1 standard deviation (16th percentile) and 2 standard 
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deviations (approximately the 2nd percentile) below the mean score. This is a common 
point in many neuropsychological tests (Smith, 1982; Sbordone, Saul & Purisch, 2007), 
that avoids an overly ‘sensitive’ -1 SD (16th percentile) and a potentially too ‘specific’ -2 
SD (2nd
 
 percentile) in a normal distribution of performance (Field, 2005). This point will 
be used for all tests in conjunction with published norms. 
For the Beck Depression Inventory 2nd
 
 Edition, categorical descriptors have been set by the 
test authors, which reflect a relative emphasis on sensitivity over specificity (Beck, Steer & 
Brown, 1996). These categories also aim to indicate the severity of reported symptoms. 
For metamemory, the focus will be on accuracy of judgment, rather than impairment. 
There have been few studies on metamemory in MS, and those based on neurologically-
normal samples have used a variety of measurement tasks, making comparisons difficult. 
The statistical approaches to accuracy measurement are therefore now considered. 
 
3.3. The Measurement of Accuracy in Metamemory. 
Two opinions bear on the selection of metamemory measurement approaches in this study. 
Nelson & Narens’ (1980:70) recommendation that ‘it is desirable to employ sound 
techniques that have a relatively straightforward interpretation’, and Irwin’s suggestion 
(1934 cited in Goodman & Kruskal, 1959:156) that: 
‘we should try to make the end point of the statistical analysis not a single coefficient 
which may be hard to interpret, but a result bearing a ‘physical’ meaning; the more 
easily the result may be understood by an intelligent layman, the better we should 
regard it expressed’.  
There remains considerable debate about the measurement of accuracy both 
philosophically (e.g. Kruglanski, 1989), methodologically (Benjamin & Diaz, 2008: in 
Dunlosky & Bjork) and statistically (Nelson & Narens, 1980; Nelson et al., 1986; Schraw, 
1995; Nietfeld, Enders & Schraw, 2006; Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters & Afflerbach, 2006; 
Spellman, Bloomfield & Bjork, 2008).  
 
A number of measures of metamemory have been selected for this study, with the Memory 
Function Questionnaire and its Forgetting While Reading, General Frequency of 
Forgetting and total scores all derived through summation of the grades given by each 
participant. The accuracy of this ‘off-line’ measure will be investigated in relation to 
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performance on memory tests. Only on-line measures of metamemory, from which 
measures of accuracy can be derived, are therefore considered here.  
 
These are the Judgment of Learning (JoL), Retrospective Confidence Judgment (RCJ), the 
Feeling of Knowing (FoK) judgment. A description of each in terms of its measurement 
structure has been presented previously. All three are in some way measured in respect of 
how the predicted performance or confidence in performance relate to actual performance. 
Narens (2002) presents a discussion addressing a justification for the assignment of 
numerical values to subjective experience and thence using common ‘classical’ 
measurement approaches to analyse these numerical values. The conclusions are that these 
assigned values (given to subjective experience such as ‘more confident’) can be treated as 
‘numbers’ (Narens, 2002:787). Consideration is warranted of measures of accuracy that do 
provide interpretable data, as well as reflecting the range of accuracy measures 
traditionally use to allow for some comparison of results. A final factor in deciding the 
accuracy measures is pragmatic; what the different tests can yield in terms of measurable 
accuracy, and what might be of clinical utility in neurological populations. The selection of 
these measures is now outlined. 
 
3.3.1. Relative Accuracy, or Resolution 
Relative accuracy, or resolution (Dunlosky & Metcalf, 2009) is typically correlation-based, 
such that a correlation measure is derived based on each individual’s judgments and their 
performance, that is, a within-subject measure (Benjamin & Diaz, 2008). As a correlation, 
it indicates that a participant ‘can discriminate between the differences in the memorability 
of the items’ (Dunlosky & Metcalf, 2009:49) or predicts their performance on one item 
relative to another (Dunlosky, Rawson & McDonald, 2002). Koriat & Goldsmith (1996) 
suggest that this item-by-item assessment of the probability of being correct is the 
monitoring process used in free recall tasks. This has implications for the types of 
measures that are selected; that they reflect a correlation and that they are structured so that 
a participant can indicate a higher or lower strength in the judgment e.g. in Feeling of 
Knowing or Retrospective Confidence (Nelson, 1984; Koriat, Goldsmith & Pansky, 2000; 
Benjamin & Diaz, 2008; Dunlosky & Metcalf, 2009) It also has implication for how 
resolution is calculated - it needs to cope with a range of strength predictions (2+; Nelson, 
1984; Nelson & Narens, 1990) and performance outcomes (typically Yes/No indicators for 
recall or recognition). 
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As the Feeling of Knowing and Retrospective Confidence Judgments planned provide the 
opportunity for item-by-item judgment making, this would mean that the strength of 
feeling of knowing an answer should relate to the likelihood of correctly selecting the 
answer; for retrospective confidence, the level of confidence should relate to the likelihood 
that the given answer is the correct one. Many researchers (Davis, 1967; Nelson, 1984; 
Beatty & Monson, 1991; Nelson 1996; Dunlosky, Rawson & McDonald, 2002; Benjamin 
& Diaz, 2008), though not all (Schraw, 1995; Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005), have proposed 
that a non-parametric gamma correlation (γ, or Goodman-Kruskal correlation; Goodman & 
Kruskal, 1954; Goodman & Kruskal, 1959; Nelson, 1984; Nelson & Narens, 1990) is the 
most appropriate, or least worst (Spellman, Bloomfield & Bjork, 2008), measure of the 
relationship between predicted and actual performance.  
 
The relationships between Retrospective Confidence Judgments or Feeling of Knowing 
judgments and actual performance are each viewed as a bivariate association indicating ‘a 
within-subject correlation of performance and judgement’ (Benjamin & Diaz, 2008:76). 
As with standard parametric correlations, values range from -1 to +1 (Goodman & 
Kruskal, 1954; Goodman & Kruskal, 1959) giving it high levels of interpretability. Being 
easily understood, it therefore has some potential utility in terms of the regulation of 
learning (Dunlosky, Rawson & McDonald, 2002) because of ‘good psychological 
transparency’ (Benjamin & Diaz, 2008:77; Nelson, 1984). The indication of relative 
strength is commonly carried out by a rating or ranking of items, according to the strength 
of the feeling, and comparing these to performance. 
 
One consideration prior to investigating methods for the calculation of relative accuracy is 
the difference between rating and ranking methods of indicating judgment strength. 
Rating-based approaches, which might use a set of 4 ratings create, categories of judgment 
strength, allowing for only ordinal and nominal levels of analysis (Rating category and 
Yes, No response). Rank-based methods generate a single ranked judgment list from 
highest to lowest, allowing for an ordinal (ranks) to nominal (Yes, No) analysis. Both 
approaches mean the calculation of a non-parametric Goodman-Kruskal gamma 
correlation (G or γ) is warranted (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954; Nelson, 1984).  
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3.3.2. Goodman Kruskal Gamma. (Goodman-Kruskal, 1954; 1959; Nelson 1984, 1996; 
Nelson & Narens, 1990; Schraw, 1995). 
 
This is a classic approach to calculation of relative accuracy in that it provides ‘inferences 
about bivariate association’ (Gibbons 1993). More simply put, it describes relative 
accuracy, of ordered variables (Schraw 1995), in terms of the association or the ‘degree to 
which predicted performance on one set of variables corresponds to actual performance on 
the same set of variables’ (Nietfeld, Enders & Schraw 2006 pg 260). It is considered 
equivalent in interpretative terms to other correlation coefficients, such as the Pearson 
(Beatty & Monson, 1991) and ranges in value from +1 to -1. For the ratings-based 
judgments items with a high judgment ‘strength’ (e.g. feeling of knowing) and a positive 
outcome are considered concordances because the level of subjective judgment is 
associated with the same level of performance; likewise low judgment strength, associated 
with low performance, is also considered a concordance. 
Based on a 2 x 2 table of results, see table 3.1 
 
Table 3.1: A 2x2 matrix of possible responses in a judgment 
task cross-tabulated with Recognition/Recall performance, 
where Yes’ indicates correct recall/recognition. Cells a and d 
are concordant because strength and performance associated, 
whereas cells b and c are considered disconcordant because 
judgment strength and actual performance are not in 
agreement. 
 
Recognition/Recall 
Performance 
Judgment 
Strength 
 Yes No 
High strength a b 
Low strength c d 
 
 
Both a and d would be considered concordant responses, and b and c disconcordant in that 
the judgments align with performance in the former, not in the latter.  
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Using the rating procedure, the calculation of gamma is given alternatively by Schraw 
(1995) as 
       fig. 3.1 
by Beatty & Monson, (1991) as; 
     fig. 3.2 
and by Spellman, Bloomfield and Bjork (2008:105) as; 
     fig. 3.3 
It is not clear from the published research whether the number of concordances is achieved 
by summation or is the product of concordant cells in the contingency tables, though some 
have presented the gamma derived by summation as the Harmann coefficient, not the 
Goodman Kruskal gamma (Schraw 1995; Nietfeld, Enders and Schraw, 2006). For this 
study therefore, the method provided by Schraw (1995) will be used. If necessary, this 
method also proposes collapsing the four ratings to a High or Low judgment, reflecting a 
consideration that the judgment be scaled the same as the performance criterion 
(Recalled/Recognised or Not recalled/Recognised; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Koriat, 
2002). 
 
Some difficulties therefore emerge in using rating and ranking processes, notable where 
the complete set of rating options is not used or where complexities arise in the ranking of 
all items according to judgment strength (Nelson & Narens, 1990). Both are therefore 
considered. 
 
3.3.2.1. Rating-based approaches 
Some studies have used a 4-point rating scale, with a rating of 4 indicating a high level of 
confidence or feeling of knowing for an item, and 1 reflecting very low levels of 
confidence or feeling of knowing. For the purposes of clarity the following discussion will 
relate only to Feeling of Knowing, as the methods are similar for RCJ. 
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Using this rating approach, the calculation of a FoK gamma correlation from the Sentence 
Memory Task can allow for two possible contingency tables - one with the four ratings of 
Feeling of Knowing (4=high, 3=medium, 2=low and 1=none) and the two performance 
outcomes (recognised or not-recognised). This will yield a 4 x 2 table for gamma 
calculation. A second approach is to retain a 2 x 2 matrix in which the same two 
performance outcomes are used, but only two ratings of strength of Feeling of Knowing 
are calculated - High or Low; scores of 4 and 3 are considered ‘high’ and scores of 2 or 1 
‘low’.  
 
Beatty & Monson (1991) proposed an approach collapsing ratings into a High and Low 
category if the refined ratings were too difficult or if the full range of the scale was not 
used. If only ranks 3 or 4 were used, for example, 4 was given a ‘high’ value and 3 a ‘low’ 
value. This phenomenon of restricted rank use has been reported in other neurologically 
impaired groups (Moulin, 2002), though it may be related to participants having more 
severe memory disorders, rather than task difficulty per se. In truth the two may not be 
separable, as episodic memory tasks may be difficult to those with episodic memory 
deficits (Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1994; Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005). For this study, the four-
rating procedure will be used initially for both FoK and RCJ judgments and a gamma 
correlation will be calculated from this. Appreciating that rating non-use may be a feature 
of the more difficult Feeling of Knowing judgment task in clinical samples, use of the full 
ranking procedure will also be carried out. 
 
3.3.2.2. Ranking-based approaches 
The four-ratings procedure for assessing judgment strengths has been discussed. As well as 
an end in itself for organising relative strength of a judgment, it can also be used as a 
starting point for ranking judgment strength in an item-by-item way, especially for the FoK 
judgment (Shimamura and Squire, 1986; Nelson & Narens, 1990; Beatty & Monson, 
1991).  Unlike the rating-based procedure this will give an ordinal/nominal table from 
which the Goodman-Kruskal gamma correlation can again be calculated. Since the cross-
tabulation calculation discussed earlier typically ignores ties, this procedure might better 
reflect of performance. As ties cannot occur because only one ordinal rank can be used for 
any one item, more of the judgment and performance data is therefore included in the 
calculation than in the rating-based approach. Table 3.2 gives an indication of the 
  
    115 
 
differences between the two methods, based on six notional FoK judgments. The first 
column indicates the rating procedure, column two the ranking procedure, and column 
three the performance. 
Table 3.2: Comparisons of Ratings-based 
and Rankings-based assessment of Feeling 
of Knowing judgment accuracy. Scores of 1 
to 4 in the ratings of judgment indicate 
categorical strength of judgment strength e.g. 
High, Medium, Low or ‘pure guess’; scores in 
the rankings indicate ordinal strength of 
judgment since each rank can be used only 
once thereby indicating relative strength of 
the judgment compared to each other items’ 
judgment. Performance is binary in that an 
item is either recognised or not. 
 
Rating Ranking Performance 
Recognised = 1 
Not Recognised = 0 
4 6 1 
4 5 1 
3 4 0 
3 3 1 
2 2 0 
1 1 0 
 
 
In summary, two derivations of the Goodman-Kruskal gamma correlation are available one 
based on rating of judgment strength, the other based on raking of judgment strength. The 
rating-based approach will be used for both Feeling of Knowing judgment and 
Retrospective Confidence Judgment in the first instance. Bearing in mind that for the 
Feeling of Knowing judgment, rating-non-use may be a feature of the judgment making, 
the ranks-based approach will also be sought to allow for a gamma correlation to be 
generated also. Retrospective rating of judgment strength for the confidence judgment is 
unlikely to pose the same difficulties based on the limited literature in neurological 
samples (Kennedy, 2001). It may be inappropriate to seek a ranked list of confidence in 
already retrieved items as participants, having retrieved 24 items may be unable to 
discriminate their relative confidence, as a high number at that stage will be known. 
 
3.3.3. Absolute Accuracy, or Calibration 
Unlike relative accuracy, absolute accuracy or calibration provides insight into the degree 
of agreement between predicted versus actual performance; that is, difference and 
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proportion scores (Hacker, Bol & Keneer, 2008). As such, under and over-confidence are 
relevant considerations, the implications of which have been found to be important to 
performance in educational settings (Maki & McGuire, 2002; Hacker, Bol & Keener, 
2008). 
 
A number of indicators of absolute accuracy are available, variously based on differences 
between predicted and actual recall or proportional performance for judgments (e.g. Harts 
difference score, Hart, 1965; Nelson 1984). Measures of absolute accuracy reflect how 
accurate prediction is compared to actual performance (Koriat, 2002; Nietfeld, Enders & 
Schraw, 2006; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). This means that interpretation is based on, for 
example an ‘out of 10 items how many were correct and how many incorrect’, and how 
does this relate to the proportion predicted to be correct.  
 
Often these measures derive accuracy by the subtraction of the incorrect from correct, as a 
proportion of all decisions. However, in clinical samples it is of interest to consider 
differences between inaccurate and accurate calibration to assess whether the processes 
related to being accurate or inaccurate are different, as they might be with different types 
of cognitive impairment. One such instance might be in those with poor recall but high 
confidence (Johnson et al., 2000; Moscovitch & Wincour, 2002). Such a separation has not 
typically been the focus in previous studies. Instead, performance is often amalgamated 
into a single calibration score reflecting proportion correct minus proportion incorrect, as 
the measure of accuracy.In keeping with the proportional focus of these judgments, and 
with discrepancies between prediction and actual performance, these measures will 
therefore focus on proportion of each judgment correct, both for high and low condition 
(High FoK, Low FoK; High RCJ, low RCJ) in an attempt to understand both accurate and 
inaccurate calibration. 
 
For the delayed Judgment of Learning, a discrepancy score will be calculated as predicted 
minus actual performance on the 15-word list after a delay. 
 
3.3.4. Summary 
In line with much of metamemory research, measures of absolute and relative accuracy 
will be derived. For relative accuracy the measure used will be the Goodman-Kruskal 
gamma - based on both rating-based judgment and ranks-based judgment for the FoK task, 
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on rating-based judgment alone for the RCJ. For absolute accuracy - proportional measures 
and a discrepancy measure will be used. For delayed JoL, a discrepancy between predicted 
and actual recall, for FoK and RCJ measures, focusing separately on high judgment 
strength - high performance (accuracy focus) and low judgment strength - high 
performance (inaccuracy focus). 
 
The remaining sections of this chapter will review statistical considerations in respect of 
sample size and data quality, ending with a review of the statistical methods associated the 
two-step process in Structural Equation Modeling - the Measurement Model and the 
Structural Model. 
 
3.4. Sample Size 
The issues relevant to ideal sample size in Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) relate to 
both components of the process - confirmatory factor analysis and structural model 
assessment. Various heuristics exist suggesting 100-150 cases in CFA models with only 
two indicators per factor (Marsh & Hau, 1999; Kline, 2005), or a minimum for structural 
models of 100-150 cases (Ding, Velicer & Harlow, 1995; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004; 
Boomsma, 1982; Marsh & Hau, 1999). Other recommendations range from 5 to 10 cases 
per latent variable, or per estimated parameter, in a structural model (Bentler & Chou, 
1987; Kelloway, 1998). One additional benefit of larger samples, is in providing cases for 
cross-validation of developed models (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). Generally, given the 
global recommendation for about 100 as a minimum sample size, this study therefore 
aimed to recruit 100 participants. 
 
Small sample sizes tend to lead to acceptance of models (Type II error), where large 
samples tend to lead to rejection of models (Blunch, 2008). As a result there are a range of 
ways to judge acceptability of models aside from the primary measure - the x2 statistic and 
its associated p-value.  The x2
 
 statistic and the range of other model fit indices are 
discussed later in this chapter; some are more prone to the influence of sample size than 
others. It is therefore advised that a range be reported to best characterise a model’s fit with 
the data (Bollen, 1990). 
Schumacker & Lomax (1996) offer some suggestions to minimise the issues associated 
with sample size; use of sound theory, set out a-priori models, use the two step approach so 
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that each latent variable is tested and confirmed before the relationships between them are 
confirmed. In addition to reflecting the psychometric properties of the measures used, 
many of the issues of sample size also relate to the distribution of data, amount and 
treatment of missing data and. A consideration of the data distribution issues, including 
missingness handling is therefore now presented.  
 
3.5. Missing Data 
The goal of missing data evaluation and treatment is to allow better inferences to be made 
about the population of interest, rather than having a complete dataset from which to make 
estimations or derive the results that would have been seen with a complete dataset 
(Schafer & Graham, 2002). Graham (2009:509) addresses the questions about the function 
of missing data analysis and treatment from the point of view of ‘preserving’ the 
characteristics of the dataset as a whole. Schafer & Graham (2002) argue for example, that 
while filling the gaps in variables’ data with the average score in the variable (mean 
substitution) might accurately predict individual missing values, it will as a result, reduce 
both variances and covariances (Byrne, 2001) and bias the relationships between the data 
when estimating the population-based inferences that can be made. 
 
One of the key issues with the management of missing data is an understanding of any 
patterns to the missingness (Rubin, 1976; Allison, 1987; Little & Rubin, 1987; Byrne, 
2001; Graham, 2009) in order to support a ‘statistically principled’ approach to its 
management (Wayman, 2003:3).  Patterns of missing data can relate to problems with the 
instruments being used, the methods in which data is gained, or specific features within the 
population under study (Roth, 1994; Schafer & Graham, 2002). Questions about the extent 
to which there are relationships between gathered and missing data, or one piece of 
missing data and another, have led to the development of a taxonomy for describing 
patterns of missingness (Little & Rubin 1987, 1989; Graham, Cumsille & Elek-Fisk, 
2003). The first type of missingness is data Missing Completely At Random (MCAR); this 
is data that is missing because of a random event such that a coin toss could be the 
mechanism (Graham, Cumsille & Elek-Fisk 2003). The cause of missingness is not 
associated with the variable containing missingness. Missing At Random (MAR: Little & 
Rubin, 1987) data is where the cause of the missingness is not due to the missingness 
variable itself, but it is missing conditional on another variable (Schumacker & Lomax, 
2004), so that the reason for missingness could be linked to other variables in the data 
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(Byrne, 2001). The random here therefore means that the missingness, once the other 
variables in the dataset are controlled-for, does not depend on some unobserved variable; it 
is random (Graham, 2009). 
 
A final missingness mechanism relates to situations where the reason for missingness is 
Non-Ignorable (Little & Rubin, 1987); it is Missing Not At Random (MNAR: Graham, 
Cumsille & Elek-Fisk 2003) in the sense that it is systematically missing in some way 
(Byrne 2001) related to the data collection mechanism, the tools or the variables under 
study. Understanding patterns to missingness is important because of their potential effects 
on the estimations about the populations under study. Data missingness that is a random 
component will not typically bias estimates about the population; with MCAR it is 
‘random’. With MAR it is ‘random’ only if the cause of the missingness is taken into 
account. MNAR, because it is not random, will yield biased estimates, relating to the 
reason for the missingness (Graham, 2009). 
 
Wiggins & Sacker, (2002:106) discuss the approaches to managing missing data as a 
continuum from ‘ad hoc’ approaches, through simple model-based solutions to more 
complex model-based solutions. Approaches are a continuum from deletion approaches 
(listwise, pairwise), single imputation (mean and regression), Multiple Imputation and 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation approaches. The latter two approaches come more 
generally recommended (Wiggins & Slacker, 2002; Schafer & Graham, 2002; Graham, 
2009) 
 
3.5.1. Deletion approaches 
In general there is a range of treatments for missingness that are considered inappropriate, 
for various reasons. These include methods that effectively ‘pretend there is no missing 
data’ (Graham, Cumsille & Elek-Fisk 2003:90) and include deletions - such as listwise 
(whole case deletion) and pairwise (item deletion). One major limitation of the listwise 
deletion approach is that there may be differences between the people who complete tasks, 
and those who do not. Deleting the data from those who do not fully complete a 
questionnaire for example is likely to bias the estimation toward those who complete the 
questionnaire; people who fail to complete questions about memory performance may do 
so because of problems with memory. Deletion of the whole response set of individuals 
who do not complete a task is likely to bias the population estimated performance, perhaps 
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by deleting incomplete data from more impaired participants. An additional limitation of 
this procedure is the potential for significant losses in sample size (Graham, 2009). 
 
Unlike listwise deletion, pairwise deletion only deletes items where they turn up as missing 
data. This means that, on the face of it, as much data as possible is being used in the 
covariance matrices that are the foundation of the SEM process. However, it also leads to 
statistical issues relating to differing samples sizes for different elements of the covariance 
matrix. (Graham, Cumsille & Elek-Fisk 2003), and can lead to non-positive definite 
matrices in model estimation because of ‘out-of-bounds’ correlations, that is >1.0 in 
absolute value (Graham, 2009; Kline, 2005). 
 
3.5.2. Single-Imputation approaches 
Another general class of approaches are imputation based. The example of mean 
substitution given earlier is one method, where a value is imputed based on some 
characteristics of the dataset, in this case the mean value of the non-missing instances of 
the missing value. As mentioned, the implication of imputing the mean is that variance 
estimates reduce, as do correlations with other variables, and kurtosis being impacted by 
increasing the frequency of the central value (Vriens & Melton, 2002). Given the basis of 
SEM on variances and covariances, its use has been cautioned against (Brown, 1994; 
Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999). As the amount of missing data increases, error variance may 
also be underestimated because a single value is repeatedly entered as the missing items 
value (Vriens & Melton, 2002; Kline, 2005; Vriens & Sinharay 2006). 
 
A second type of imputation, often used in model-based solutions is regression-based 
single-imputation. Byrne (2001) outlines this as a process in which regression equations, 
using the missing data as the dependent variable and present data as predictors, are used to 
generate values that would be expected. This approach uses the structure of the data to 
make the imputation. Ideally, the data structure should be related to the data loss 
mechanism, so that variables used covary with the missing data variable to some extent 
(Kline, 2005).  Graham (2009) suggests that there may be loss of error variance from such 
a single imputation because imputed values are fit to lie on the regression line, reducing 
variability. Perhaps a positive of the approach is that it imputes values on a per-model 
basis, rather than for the dataset generally. So the imputing is based on an a priori idea of 
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the relationship of a set of variables to each other, rather than on filling holes in the dataset 
without any theoretical framework.  
 
Byrne, (2001); Graham, Cumsille & Elek-Fisk (2003); and others (Schumacker & Lomax 
2004; Kline, 2005; Blunch, 2008) consider all of the foregoing, with some specific 
exceptions, to be generally unacceptable approaches to missing data management. 
Importantly these recommendations are not without caveats; deletion methods might be 
used in the initial stages of an exploratory factor analysis, for example (Graham, 2009). 
The remaining approaches are considered generally more acceptable as approaches; one of 
the key issues with them relates to whether a full dataset imputation is sought (e.g. using 
Multiple Imputation) or a specific model is being tested where missing data is present, 
where a Maximum Likelihood approach might be implemented.  
 
3.5.3. Maximum Likelihood (ML) approaches 
A more advanced model-based approach to data imputation, than the single-regression 
imputation method, is the use of what it termed an EM (Expectation/Minimisation) 
solution (Wiggins & Sacker, 2002). This involves two steps - Estimation (or Expectation) 
of missing values again by an initial regression based single-imputation. This is followed 
by a Minimisation step - where the whole dataset (now complete from imputed data) is 
‘submitted for maximum likelihood estimation’ (Kline, 2005:55), which involves refining 
the best guess of the imputation values of parameters. As a result of the initial regression 
based single-imputation it suffers in terms of estimation of standard errors from the 
dataset, so hypothesis-testing procedures are cautioned against (Graham, 2009). 
 
From within the field of structural equation modelling there have been a number of 
approaches, which have been tested in simulation studies (Peters & Enders, 2002; Wiggins 
& Sacker, 2002), with the conclusion that in general there is one approach that offers better 
performance in imputing missing data than the aforementioned treatments (Byrne, 2001; 
Wiggins & Sacker, 2002; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004:43). This approach is alternately 
called Maximum Likelihood (ML) imputation in LISREL (SEM software: Joreskog & 
Sorbom, 1999) or Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) imputation for AMOS 
(hereafter ML). Wiggins and Sacker (2002) suggest that the FIML approach works well 
across 5-25% missing data, for both measurement and structural models. According to 
others (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004; Vriens & Sinharay 2006) 
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the ML approach works in giving unbiased, or least-biased, estimates of all missing data 
treatments discussed, in both MCAR and MAR patterns of missingness. Additionally, even 
though the approach might lead to biased estimates in non-ignorable (MNAR) data 
imputation, the bias is least with this approach compared to the others (Muthen et al, 1987; 
Schafer, 1997; Byrne, 2001; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). In a recent review of missing 
data handling, Graham (2009:573) proposed that Multiple Imputation and ML approaches 
should be used ‘as a matter of course’. The final approach to data imputation considered 
focuses on the dataset, rather than the model being used, and imputes the missing data to 
the dataset, prior to the estimation of models of interest.  
 
3.5.4. Multiple Imputation (MI) approaches. 
As Graham (2009:556) states one critical component of multiple imputations is to ‘restore 
the error variance lost from regression-based single imputation’. Some simulation studies 
suggest it may give similar or better approximations with smaller sample sizes than the ML 
approach (Schafer & Graham, 2002). Given this imputation can be provided to the dataset 
prior to analyses of models, it offers the potential benefits of increasing power in the 
because of the inclusion of variables (in the imputation process) that might more accurately 
predict a missing value. Since these may not yet be included in any model being tested it 
follows an ‘inclusive’ variable strategy (Collins, Schafer & Kam, 2001; Schafer & 
Graham, 2002; Graham, 2009). The inclusion of variables related to the missing variable, 
but not necessarily included in the analysis, also potentially offers a chance to reduce 
estimation bias for non-ignorable (MNAR) missingness (Collins, Schafer & Kam 2001; 
Graham, 2009), a problem with all of the approaches discussed. 
 
3.5.5. Missing data management in this study. 
For each measure, an assessment of data missingness will be considered. However, 
because of the planned procedures involved in collecting data (see Chapter 4), it is 
proposed that missingness will be minimised; by checking incomplete questionnaire 
responses with participants, the only data that will be left missing will have a non-random 
cause. It is therefore appropriate to use a form of model based imputation, and depending 
on the extent of missingness this may be single imputation (for small amounts of 
missingness) or multiple imputation, for larger amounts, where it would be important to 
maintain the variability within the data. The extent of missingness is therefore a factor in 
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selecting an approach; low levels of missingness generally mean more complex methods 
are less warranted (McCartney, Burchinal, & Bub, 2006). 
 
3.6 Data Screening 
The main issues with data quality, aside from missingness, relates to distribution; 
normality, skew, kurtosis and outliers. Non-normal distributions impact on variance and 
covariance of data, the core relationships in both Confirmatory Factor Analysis and 
Structural Equation Modelling (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004) 
 
3.6.1. Univariate Normality 
One approach to deciding on normality, presented by Field (2005), involves reviewing the 
critical ratio values associated with item univariate Skew and Kurtosis, and associated 
standard errors. Critical Ratios (c.r.) are derived by dividing skew and kurtosis values by 
their standard errors; these can be treated as z-scores (Arbuckle 2007). Given the 
assumption that a normal distribution will have a mean of 0 and a standard error of 1, the 
values can thus be compared for significant difference when converted to z-scores. With 
smaller sample sizes, it is appropriate to use a z-score cut-off at the p< 0.01 level (a value 
of 2.58 or greater; Field, 2005).  
 
An alternative heuristic, based on absolute values of skew and kurtosis, suggests skew > 
2.0 is moderately, and > 3.0 extremely, non-normal; for kurtosis > 7.0 is indicative of 
moderate non-normality, between 8.0 and 20.0, extreme (West, Finch & Curran, 1995:74; 
Osman et al 1997; Kline, 2005:50). Some authors suggest that kurtosis is the more 
significant concern with non-normality, in terms of impact on model estimation (West, 
Finch & Curran, 1995; Byrne, 2001). For kurtosis, Kline (2005:50) proposes a 
‘conservative rule of thumb,’ that values > 10.0 in kurtosis might suggest a problem. 
Univariate normality does not preclude multivariate non-normality and so a consideration 
of multivariate normality is also warranted. 
 
3.6.2. Multivariate Normality 
Lack of multivariate normality (MVN) tends to inflate the computed chi-square (x2) value 
(West, Finch & Curran, 1995). With higher x2 values, there is greater difference between 
model-implied and actual data matrices, which are compared when model fit is being 
calculated (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004:66). Inflated x2 could therefore lead to higher rates 
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of model rejections (Finney & DiStefano, 2006:277) and reduced values for other 
measures of model acceptability. In conjunction with smaller sample sizes, non-normality 
can lead to solutions that fail to resolve, or converge (West, Finch & Curran, 1995; Byrne, 
2001). On the other hand, departures from MVN can underestimate standard errors (West, 
Finch & Curran, 1995; Byrne, 2001). Smaller standard errors mean that regression paths, 
factor and error covariances can be statistically significant more often than they should be 
(West, Finch & Curran, 1995; Byrne, 2001). 
 
Multivariate normality can be assessed using Mardia’s coefficient of multivariate kurtosis 
in AMOS (Mardia, 1970; Mardia, 1974; Mardia 1980; Arbuckle, 2007). Mardia’s (1980) 
coefficient of multivariate normality possesses an ‘approximate standard normal 
distribution’ (West, Finch & Curran, 1995:61), meaning a critical ratio of  >1.96 represents 
a significant departure (at the .05 level). However, this figure is considered only a guide 
and the size of the score is not considered a good indication of the amount of departure 
from normality (Arbuckle, 2007). 
 
3.6.3. Outliers 
One final consideration is the impact of outliers, which might contribute to non-normality 
in the score distributions. Aside from ruling out data entry errors, options for treatment of 
outliers depend on whether they are univariate or multivariate outliers.  The classification 
comes down to whether the scores on a single item (univariate) or set of items 
(multivariate outliers) would be expected to be from within the population under study. 
Therefore, detection might depend on the number of standard deviations from the mean, 
position outside the top/bottom quartile from the median, or a value that has a p value of < 
0.001 on a x2 
 
distribution (Stevens, 2002; Kline, 2005). For univariate detection Stevens 
(2002) suggests that most values should be < 3.0 in absolute value in a z-score distribution, 
with an understanding that in a ‘large’ sample (>100) it might be expected that some would 
be  > 3.0, just by chance. 
Dropping data, which has been checked for recording or instrument errors, is not typically 
considered legitimate (Stevens, 2002:17). In part this is because deletion makes an 
assumption that the occurrence of this data is an anomaly, rather than of significance. 
Visual inspection will be the initial method for screening for univariate outliers in this 
study, followed by a consideration of whether action is warranted. 
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Multivariate outliers are more difficult to detect. These have extreme scores of one or 
more variables or a general atypical set of scores (Kline, 2005). One method used is 
judging the distance of a combined set of variables (e.g. values of multiple items on the 
Beck Depression Inventory) from a point in multidimensional space where the mean 
values on all 21 items (of the BDI) would intersect, and around which most values would 
be expected to collect (Fidell & Tabachnick, 2003); this is called the Mahalanobis Distance 
(d, with d2 being the score presented; Fidell & Tabachnick, 2003:130; Kline 2005:51) and 
since, at least in large samples, the d2 value has a Pearson x2
 
 distribution, a statistical value 
of p 0<.001 is considered a multivariate outlier. 
3.7. Measurement Scale 
While the 4 response options to each of the 21 Beck Depression Inventory items mean that 
the level of measurement is ordinal, a common assumption in such circumstances is that 
the underlying factor being measured is continuous, and therefore it is analysed as such 
(Quintana & Maxwell, 1999). Of all the measures selected for data collection, only the 
Beck Depression Inventory has such a restricted range of ordinal measurement (the MFQ 
has seven response categories), so this section considers depression throughout.  
 
Bentler & Chou, (1987) in a review of the assumption of continuity of a scale, generally 
made in CFA and SEM, discuss how continuous measurement scale is relevant in two 
respects - the data gathered from any sample under study is not itself continuous; there are 
only as many pieces of the supposed continuum as there are individuals in any sample 
(Bentler & Chou, 1987:87). The second point relates to the ability to determine linear 
relationships between ordinally- and continuously- measured variables; they suggest that 4 
or more categories were probably sufficient for a continuous treatment. 
 
Kendall et al, (1987) make a relevant point regarding scoring on the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI) being representative of a latent continuum rather than discrete categories, 
despite its four-choice response categories. In effect, the underlying continuum of mood 
not only stretches towards more severely depressed (higher scorers), but also towards 
people who were very not-depressed; these people, the authors suggest, were those who 
tend to score 0 on all items. This is the reason that this latent variable is termed Mood, 
rather than Depression in this study. Thus, because the BDI is not considered diagnostic of 
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categories of depression per se, the underlying distribution can be considered continuous; 
scores say that one person displays more depressive features than another. Higher scores 
indicate more sever depressive symptomatology than lower scores, not differences 
between, for example, Major Depressive Disorder and other Depression diagnoses. 
 
The second issue in using categorical description of presumed continuous constructs, such 
as depression, relate to the number of possible response categories, the amount of skew 
and whether all variables were skewed in the same direction (Bentler & Chou, 1987; Byrne 
2006). Byrne (2001) reviews the evidence on these issues and suggests that ‘critical’ 
problems with estimation of factor loadings and factor correlations arise when scales have 
3 or less response options (the BDI has 4) and when skew values were greater than 1.0.  
 
Alternative approaches to handling the ordinal nature of Beck Depression Inventory data 
have been used (Thombs et al., 2008), by explicitly modelling the Beck Depression 
Inventory items as ordinal data and estimating a polychoric correlation matrix. This 
approach has been discussed in the Structural Equation Modeling literature also (Byrne, 
2001; Kline, 2005) and could be characterised as reflecting, in part, the debate on ideal 
sample size required for SEM. One view is that very large sample sizes are required 
(>5000; Bentler, 1994), in order to use such alternative estimation techniques for 
categorical data (Byrne, 2001:71) and an ‘extremely strong’ multivariate normality 
assumption goes with these alternative estimation methods (e.g. Asymptotic Distribution-
fee estimators; Byrne, 2001), making it an approach, according to Byrne, that is more 
appropriate to simulated rather than real data. With normally distributed categorical 
variables and 4 or more response categories, that normal theory methods probably do not 
present significant costs, according to Bentler & Chou (1987). 
 
3.8. The two-step approach to Structural Equation Modeling 
The two-step approach to Structural Equation Modeling (SEM; James, Mulaik & Brett, 
1982; Byrne, 2001:12; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004; 209) proposes two stages in the 
modeling process. First, the Measurement Model tests a series of confirmatory factor 
analytic (CFA) models for each of the latent variables; these latent variables are used in 
later structural model testing, step two. The CFA aims to confirm that the observed 
measures do contribute to the factorial structure of each of the proposed latent variables 
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(Schumacker & Lomax, 2004) and is therefore an assessment of convergent and 
discriminant validity (Brown, 2006; Kline, 2006).  
 
The observed measures selected to represent the latent variables in this study have been 
presented in Chapter 2: Development of Methods. The set of processes for carrying out 
confirmatory factor analyses are the same as those for testing structural models and include 
model Specification, Identification, Estimation, Fit, Modification and reassessment of Fit 
(Bollen & Long, 1993; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). While the process can be iterative 
(modification, re-estimation, further modification), models being tested at this stage are 
confirmatory, rather than exploratory, in that the expectations about factorial structure are 
specified a priori. Decisions about adapting a model for best statistical fit are guided, and 
limited, by theoretical constraints on model specification (Kline, 2006). For measurement 
models, additional considerations are based on published factorial studies; for structural 
models, the a priori models are informed by theory. Finally, outputs from the statistical 
analysis support model acceptance or rejection at the statistical level (Schumacker & 
Lomax, 2004; Blunch 2008). These latter statistical guides include; parameter estimates, 
inter-factor correlation, r2
 
 (squared multiple correlation) values, Standardized Residual 
Matrix assessment and various indices of model fit (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1989; 
Schumacker & Lomax, 2004; Yuan, 2005; Steiger, 2007). The stages in model 
development, testing and modification are now discussed, followed by a summary of the 
statistical indices of model fit used in the study. 
3.8.1. Model Specification. 
Model specification is the description of parameters that are of interest, and proposed to be 
true in the data, that the investigator wishes to confirm or investigate (Kline, 2006). The 
specified model is based on a theoretically guided expectation of the relationships within 
the data, and this is tested to establish the extent to which these relationships fit with the 
theory implied relationships (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). Effectively, this specification 
sets out the model-implied variance/covariance matrix and this is compared to that given 
by the real data at the testing stage (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). Prior to estimating the 
model, it has to be checked that a solution can be derived; this process is called Model 
Identification. 
 
 
  
    128 
 
3.8.2. Model Identification. 
The question in model identification is whether there is enough data to estimate the 
parameters of interest (Blunch, 2008). A common example (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004; 
Kline, 2005; Blunch, 2008) provided to explain identification is to imagine solving an 
equation e.g. x + y =10, for values of x and y. If x and y are considered parameters, there 
are more parameters than data (10 being the data). Values for x and y cannot be derived 
and so the model is not solvable; it is indeterminate in that an infinite set of values for x 
and y could be found (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). This model would therefore be 
considered underidentified. 
 
An additional parameter would help with identification at this point, so if, in addition to x 
+ y = 10 we also include x - y = 2, the model now is considered just-identified in that its 
parameters are solvable (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004) Here the solution of x=6, y=4 is 
unique, and would indicate a perfect fit of the model (x + y; x - y) to the data (10). A third 
data value x + 2y = 16, leads to an over-identified model, for which a unique set of values 
for x and y are impossible to derive. Instead, using a fitting function a unique set of values 
might be achievable, though they may not exactly reproduce observed data (Kline, 2005). 
This is the job of model estimation, using a minimisation function (Arbuckle, 2007). With 
more and more parameters, and assuming there is sufficient data, the degrees of freedom 
within the model will increase, allowing for more refined fitting of the model (Blunch, 
2008). Thus, higher degrees of freedom typically help with model fitting (Blunch, 2008); 
at the same time with more parameters to be estimated less exact values can be determined 
(Kline, 2005). Therefore the relationship between degrees of freedom and model fit is one 
that needs to be considered in accepting model fit (Raykov & Marcoulides, 2006). The 
SEM software typically provides estimation of identification. 
 
A second aspect of identification for CFA is the setting of a measurement scale for each 
latent variable being modelled (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). The requirement to do this 
is so that a reference metric can be set from which to estimate factor loadings for the latent 
variables, scaling the factor (Kline, 2005) it is achieved by setting one loading for each 
factor to equal 1.00. This is automatically completed in some SEM software, but can be 
changed if there is an indicator (observed variable), which has more reliable scores than 
another. 
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3.8.3. Model Estimation 
In this study, all Confirmatory Factor Analyses, and subsequent structural models are 
tested using Generalised Least Squares (GLS) estimation, using the AMOS package 
(Arbuckle 2007). The GLS estimation approach is selected above the alternative Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) approach because it operates ‘under less stringent 
multivariate normality assumption’ (Kelloway, 1998; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004:69; 
Blunch, 2008;). Maximum Likelihood Estimation process may produce more inflated x2 
  
values, compared to Generalised Least Squares, when dealing with data typical of 
behavioural research (West Finch & Curran, 1995). 
3.8.4. Assessment of Model Fit. 
The concept of Model Fit is based on the relationship of the model-implied, compared to 
data-implied, covariance matrix being different (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). This is 
considered from two perspectives The first assessment, of global fit, tests the fit of the 
entire model and second, an examination of the fit of individual parameters of the model, 
includes an assessment of the parameter estimates’ significance and sign, the standardised 
residual covariance matrix and other features (Kline, 2005; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004; 
Byrne, 2001:74). These approaches to the assessment of fit will be discussed now, bearing 
in mind that the context for these judgements must be a theoretically plausible model in the 
first instance.  
 
3.8.5. Fit Indices 
A general heuristic is that a range of model fit indices should be considered, and reported. 
These are discussed and their ideal value ranges outlined, bearing in mind that ‘the array 
of writings on overall tests of model fit is extensive and not all together consistent’ 
(Maruyama, 1998:239).  
 
3.8.5.1.Chi-square value, p-value and Chi-square to degrees of freedom ratio (x2 /df) 
The chi-square (x2
 
) and its significance value (p) are considered important and generally 
required indices in terms of estimating global model fit. They are useful because they 
provide a statistical test of the model (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004).  
A key component of establishing model fit is the comparison of two matrices (data-implied 
and model-implied), using a x2 comparison (Schumacker & Lomax 2004). An acceptable 
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model will have a data covariance structure similar to the model being tested; the data will 
fit the model leaving a residual of the proposed model covariance matrix minus the data 
covariance matrix of zero, or not significantly different from zero (Byrne, 2001). 
Therefore, the difference between model-implied and data-implied covariance matrices 
should not be significantly different from zero if the model is an acceptable explanation for 
the data, that is, the p value of the x2 test should be >0.05 (Byrne, 2001). Thus, in a well 
fitting model, the p value of x2
 
 behaves as a ‘badness of fit’ index (Schumacker & Lomax, 
2004:82, 100; Hu & Bentler, 1995; Kline, 2005).  
The x2 test is the most basic fit statistic and while it is typically reported it is not without 
some limitations, notable in respect of distortions caused by sample size (Schumacker & 
Lomax, 2004; Kline, 2005). Samples above 200 and below 100 may cause x2 estimations 
of significance and non-significance respectively (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). One 
additional consideration with the x2 
 
test is the null hypothesis it tests against is probably 
too strict given the types of models being tested; the idea that any model fully accounts for 
performance in the population as a whole is probably unrealistic, for example, in the social 
sciences (Bollen & Long, 1993; Kline, 2005).  
The statistic is traditionally reported despite the proposed limitations and it is also used in 
some instances to derive other measures of model fit. Use of the x2 
 
to degrees of freedom 
(df) ratio (in AMOS this is denoted as, CMIN/df) is suggested as a potentially useful index 
of fit (Marsh, Hau & Grayson, 2005). Values for CMIN/df should be < 2.0 (Kline 2005), or 
‘near 1.0’ (Blunch, 2008:113).  
3.8.5.2. GFI: Goodness of Fit Index & CFI: Comparative Fit Index. 
Many of the measures of model fit are strongly related to the degrees of freedom (df) 
within the model, as well as x2 
 
(Hox, 2002). Thus, measures of fit based in part on df, such 
as GFI and CFI (Steiger, 1990), are impacted by the df number.  
CFI values tend to decline as numbers of variables are added to correctly specified models 
(Kenny & McCoach, 2003). Expected values for good fit are > 0.90 for both GFI and CFI 
(Marcoulides & Hershberger, 1997; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004; Kline, 2005; Hu & 
Bentler, 1995). Both indices indicate how well covariance and variances in the sample 
matrix are explained by the proposed model (Byrne, 2001), or how much better the 
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proposed model fits the data matrix, than no model for GFI (Mueller, 1996; Joreskog & 
Sorbom, 1998) and a null model for CFI.  
 
A null, or independence model is one where no covariance among observed variables are 
assumed, that is, unrelated variables (Kline, 2005; Joreskog & Sorbom, 1998) The CFI was 
developed in an attempt to minimise the impact of sample size (Bentler, 1990) and also to 
compare models not against no model, but the independence or null model (Byrne, 2001). 
One benefit of this index of comparative fit is that it does not assume zero error in the 
approximation, i.e. perfect fit, in the baseline model (Kline, 2005). 
 
3.8.5.3.Root Mean Square Error of Approximation, 90% confidence intervals & p value 
One of the proposed benefits of this measure (RMSEA; Steiger & Lind, 1980 cited in: 
Steiger, 1990) is that it is not based on a hypothesis that the proposed model is 100% 
correct, which is largely untenable (Brown & Cudeck, 1993; Blunch, 2008). Instead of 
focusing on fit, it focuses on the level of discrepancy, measured by residuals. In this sense 
it indicates the ‘degree of lack of fit’, taking the number of parameters into account 
(Brown & Cudeck 1993:137). Its benefit is in being the main other measure, aside form the 
x2 
 
test, which has a statistical test of its value, and offers both a point estimate value, and a 
confidence interval (Kelloway, 1998). What the index aims to measure is given by Brown 
& Cudeck (1993:137) as ‘How well would the model, with unknown but optimally chosen 
parameter values fit the population covariance matrix if it were available.’ The range of 
acceptable values for RMSEA is debated in the literature, with acceptable values suggested 
to be <0.10 (MacCallum, Browne & Sugawara 1996), <0.08 or <0.05 (Byrne 2001:85). 
Steiger (2000:161) suggests that cut-off ‘should not be taken too seriously’.  
Of more interest are the 90% confidence intervals (90% CI; Steiger, 1990; Steiger, 2000) 
around the value, especially when comparing models, and the p-value of the RMSEA 
(ideally p > 0.50; Byrne 2001). All these values will also therefore be reported. One 
cautionary note relates to model complexity, and sample size, and their influence on the 
confidence intervals (MacCallum, Browne & Sugawara 1996; Byrne, 2001). If sample size 
is small and model complexity high (many parameters) then wide confidence intervals are 
likely. This may be a concern when CFA modeling the Beck Depression Inventory, which 
as 21 observed items. 
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3.8.5.4. SRMR: Standardised Root Mean Square Residual 
A final index of model fit, recommended by Kline, (2005), is the SRMR (Standardised 
Root Mean Square Residual), defined as ‘the average discrepancy between the 
correlations observed in the input matrix and the correlations predicted by the model’ 
(Brown, 2006:82). Kline (2005) states that values of < 0.10 are favourable, and 
Schumacker & Lomax, (2004) and Byrne (2006) suggest values < 0.05. One proposed 
benefit of SRMR is that it is less sensitive to the effect of sample size than the non-
standardised RMR (Root Mean Square Residual; Marsh, Balla & McDonald 1988; Marsh, 
Hau & Grayson, 2005). Others suggest that this insensitivity to sample size is true with 
large samples and misspecified models, but not true with small samples where models are 
generally ‘acceptable; but might have some mis-specification’ (Marsh, Hau & Wen, 
2004:335). The SRMR will be used as an index of fit in the following model testing 
procedures, but consideration needs to be given to some CFA models likely being 
generally acceptable (they are in part, based on previous studies’ findings) with the 
possibility of some mis-specification (different population) in conjunction with small 
sample (n<150; Marsh, Hau & Wen, 2004). In general it is advised that a review of the 
‘raw’ standardised residuals themselves is also carried out (Grover & Vriens, 2006). This 
is achieved by reviewing the Standardised Residual Covariance Matrix which will be 
reported with each model tested. 
 
3.8.5.5. Other indicators of model fit. 
In addition to the x2 fit test, and the fit indices discussed, interpreting individual parameters 
for statistical significance, size and expected direction is warranted. For CFA models, 
interfactor correlation is also an important assessment. Additional information about model 
fit can be gleaned from inspection of the Standardised Residual Covariance Matrix and the 
r2
 
 (coefficient of determination; Steel & Torrie, 1960) values. Using these measures, fit is 
assessed by components (Bollen & Long, 1993:6).  
The Standardized Residual Covariance Matrix can be used to look at discrepancies 
between data-implied and model-implied item covariances (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). 
High values (> 2.58; Joreskog & Sorbom 1998) can indicate problems. It is therefore 
possible to inspect for item covariances generating high residual covariances with some 
specificity in terms of which items might underlie the poor fit. Arbuckle, (2007) 
recommends that the majority of these values should be < 2. 
  
    133 
 
 
In a Confirmatory Factor Analysis, indicators of r2
 
 < 0.20 should indicate possibilities of 
dropping those items (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004) that is, 20% or less of an items 
variance is accounted for in the factor loading, or conversely 80% is unexplained. A final 
reason that model fit might be questioned is based on the individual parameter estimates 
not being significant, when they were expected to be (Maruyama, 1998). These parameters 
might include expected correlations or specific causal paths in structural models. 
Table 3.3 summarises the range of assessments to be used in appraising both Confirmatory 
Factor and Structural Equation models, and ideal values for the specified fit indices are 
summarised in table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.3: Fit indices and other assessments of model acceptability. x2 = chi 
Square value; x2 
 
p-value = significance of chi-square statistic; CMIN/df = chi-
square to degrees of freedom ratio; GFI = Goodness of Fit Index; CFI = 
Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA=Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; 
90% CI = 90% confidence Intervals for RMSEA; SRMR = Standardised Root 
Mean Square Residual. 
Specific indices of model fit Other Assessments 
x2 Standardized Residual Matrix values < 2.80 & p-value 
CMIN/df Parameter sign & significance 
GFI Squared Multiple correlation (r2) values > 0.20 
CFI  
RMSEA:  90% CI & p-value  
SRMR  
 
 
Table 3.4: Summary of recommended values for model fit indices. x2 = Chi Square value; 
x2
 
p-value = significance of chi-square statistic; CMIN/df = chi-square to degrees of freedom 
ratio; GFI = Goodness of Fit Index; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA=Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation; 90% CI = 90% confidence Intervals for RMSEA; SRMR = 
Standardised Root Mean Square Residual. 
x2 CMIN/df  p-value GFI CFI  RMSEA  SRMR 
p > 0.05 < 2.0 > 0.90 > 0.90 
 
90% CI upper limit of 
0.08; pclose > 0.50 
< 0.10 
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3.8.6. Model Modification 
A number of elements of the statistical outputs can be used to identify modifications to a 
model. These include modification indices, used to detect relationships that may optimally 
reduce the x2 value, thereby potentially improving model fit. Modification indices are 
produced by AMOS and suggest which parameter changes would give the greatest change 
in the x2
 
 value of the model, potentially improving fit. The modification indices are based 
purely on statistical grounds, and bear no necessary relationship to the theory underpinning 
the model itself (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). For this reason many suggested 
modifications are not theoretically plausible. Typically, modification indices might 
indicate error term covariances, factor cross loadings or incorrect item-factor loadings, but 
until tested there is often no indication of the values of parameter estimates in the newly 
modified model (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). Kelloway (1998:38) discusses 
modification indices in terms of ‘theory building and theory trimming’, using backward 
elimination and forward entry stepwise regression. The implications of the analogy are the 
potential for inflated error and data-dredging approaches to theory building (Bolker, 2008), 
that is, a non-confirmatory approach being pursued (MacCallum, 1986). 
In a strict confirmatory process, modifications are not considered appropriate (MacCallum, 
Roznowski & Necowitz, 1992), but in reality some post hoc model modifications often do 
take place. Here, it is recognised that where a number of factor models have been 
presented in the literature, dimensionality may be different in different samples, so a 
conservative approach to modification is carried out, bearing in mind the measures of fit 
may be impacted by the size of the sample and the distribution of the data, and not a poor 
model (Maruyama, 1998). 
 
3.9. The Statistical Assessment of Mediation 
Figure 3.4 presents a generalised mediation model. An initial assessment for the potential 
for mediation is based on Iacobucci (2008), Baron & Kenny (1986) and MacKinnon 
(2008) who broadly indicate that there should at least be a significant relationship between 
predictor and mediator and/or mediator and criterion variable. The prerequisites for 
assessing mediation have been debated and are discussed from a strict perspective by 
Barron & Kenny (1986), or with fewer requirements by MacKinnon (2008) and Iacobucci 
(2008), based on how the mediation is tested and interpreted. One difference from Baron & 
Kenny is the proposal that there need not be a significant direct effect of a predictor 
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(exogenous variable) on a criterion (endogenous variable) in order of mediation testing to 
be carried out. Such occurrences are proposed to reflect a suppressing mediator or one in 
which with its effect removed (partialed), the true relationship can be uncovered 
(MacKinnon, 2008). A mediational process is tested for by use of the Sobel z-test (Sobel, 
1982; Iacobucci, 2008). How the Sobel z-test is calculated and interpreted is discussed 
below.  
 
 
Figure 3.4 Summary of mediation testing c = the direct effect of Latent 1 on Latent 
2; c’ = the effect of Latent 1 on Latent 2, when the mediated effect of Mediator latent. 
a*b should be equal to c minus c’. If the difference between c and c’ is statistically 
different from zero, then mediation can be suggested 
 
 
 
 
Statistically, this is tested as an indication that c (the direct effect of Latent 1 on Latent 2) 
is no different to c’ the effect of Latent 1 on Latent 2, when the mediated effect of 
Mediator latent is accounted for, a*b being equal to c minus c’. If the difference between c 
and c’ is statistically different from zero, then mediation can be suggested (Iacobucci, 
2008; MacKinnon, 2008). The Sobel z score is calculated using the unstandardised 
regression weights and standardised errors of paths a and b as outlined in figure 3.5. The 
values for parameters are populated from the SEM modelling output. This approach 
provides for more accuracy, compared to a series of individual regression equations that 
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would be required in the presence of multiple indicators of latent variables (Iacobucci, 
2008). The test formula and calculation tool is given by Preacher & Leonardelli (2006): 
 
Sobel test: z-value = a*b/√(b2*sa2 + a2*sb2
 
)       formula.1 
Where a is the unstandardised regression coefficient from the exogenous variable to the 
mediator, b between mediator and endogenous variable. sa  and sb
 
 are the standard errors 
for the their respective paths, a and b The p-values are drawn from the normal distribution 
with assumption of a two-tailed z-test of the hypothesis that the mediated effect equals zero 
in the population, with +/- 1.96 are the critical values. (Preacher & Leonardelli, 2006). An 
applied adjustment is proposed by MacKinnon et al, (2002) and MacKinnon, Lockwood & 
Williams (2004) who suggest mediation in samples of n=100 for the Sobel z test exists 
where the absolute critical value is > 0.97 (equivalent to two-tailed p < 0.05). This 
adjustment in interpreting the critical values provided by the Sobel z test, is based on 
findings that the derivation of the Sobel tests by dividing regression coefficients by their 
standard error provides low statistical power and assumes a normal distribution in the 
indirect effect (MacKinnon, Lockwood & Williams, 2004; MacKinnon, 2008). The cut-off 
of ± 0.97 will therefore be used in assessing mediation. 
 
3.10. Summary 
In the development of statistical methods three main issues were considered. First, defining 
what cognitive impairment and metamemory accuracy would be for the study. Second, 
considering adequate sample size, the management of missing data and the screening of 
data to address the assumptions of the proposed statistical method. Finally focusing on the 
two-step method of confirmatory factor analysis and structural modeling, addressing how 
acceptable fit is assessed.  
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Chapter 4: Methods 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This study used a cross-sectional design to investigate the factors that contributed to 
metamemory in a sample of community-dwelling people with Multiple Sclerosis. The 
purpose of the design was to investigate the relationships between measures of cognitive 
function and mood, and a set of measures of accuracy in memory judgments.  This chapter 
will summarise the participants, the selected materials and the procedures used for 
capturing data for the study. 
 
4.2. Specification of Sample Characteristics 
An important consideration for the study is of the sample characteristics. Here a brief 
consideration of the requirements in terms of sample characteristics is presented to 
underpin the generation of inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
 
In respect of the focus on subjective appraisal of memory function, two considerations are 
important; first that participants have a relatively stable experience of their abilities, as far 
as disease progression allows. Secondly recent or radical changes in ability have not 
occurred. To this end, people who are currently undergoing a relapse will be excluded 
from taking part. In order to minimise this type of participant recruitment was not planned 
using service providers (e.g. NHS, general practitioner), which might, in the main, include 
people who have had recent changes in function. 
 
Given the range of difficulties with sensory and motor performance, which might make 
participation difficult, and increase measurement error, tasks were specifically chosen to 
widen accessibility. More severe limitations, which would make participation too 
difficulty, and measurement unreliable, were therefore appropriate as exclusion criteria. 
 
A final consideration was of co-morbidities, which might confound interpretation of the 
results of the study.  The presence of other neurological diagnoses would make 
conclusions about the impact of MS on memory appraisal difficult. However, more 
difficulty arises with mood disorder.  The relationships of euphoric states with brain 
damage, hypomanic states with steroid treatment, increased incidences of bipolar disorder 
among people with MS (Minden & Schiffer, 1991) and the poorly defined genesis of 
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depression in MS, make clear exclusion criteria difficult to define. A psychiatric diagnosis 
prior to diagnosis of MS was therefore considered an appropriate exclusion, but subsequent 
diagnosis, especially of mood disorder, was not. 
 
A second consideration is accessing a range of participants, both those who tend towards 
‘involvement’ and those who do not, or do so to a lesser extent. Recruitment avenues were 
therefore considered carefully. Advertisement through support organisations were more 
likely to recruit those likely to be support seekers, reflecting the limitations of the expert 
patient programmes discussed earlier, whereas recruitment through magazines might better 
access those who, although members of organisations, might be less actively involved in 
support seeking. Relatedly was a consideration of how to recruit participants so as not to 
bias the study itself - if a screening process for cognitive impairment was carried out, this 
would likely exclude participants for whom affect related biases might be extant. The 
author was mindful too of the inconclusive literature about how related memory and 
metamemory impairments are in neurological populations. As a result the advertising 
required that it seek out a ‘typical’ community dwelling population as far as possible. 
There is no sampling frame for people with MS in the UK to guide selection (O’Hara, De 
Souza & Ide, 2000) of representative samples. In seeking people who have concerns about 
their memory as a general criterion, it was hoped that subjective appraisal would guide 
interest and therefore capture the concerned, but without memory deficit, as well as those 
concerned, and with memory deficit. 
 
The sample was a convenience sample of people with Multiple Sclerosis who were living 
in the community. In line with sample size recommendations for the statistical methods, a 
minimum of 100 was sought (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). Participants were recruited 
through advertising directed to a number of support organisations, publications, websites 
and the MS Therapy Centre network in London and surrounding counties. Participants 
were given a  £15 gift token for taking part. 
 
For inclusion in the study, participants were required to have a confirmed diagnosis of MS, 
be over 18 years old, and have no history of other neurological diagnoses. In addition, 
there were required to be community dwelling, have sufficient visual, writing and speech 
abilities to engage in tasks, sufficient ability to read and understand words, sentences and 
instructions in English (tests are normed for English speakers). A history of psychiatric 
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diagnosis prior to the onset of MS, and a history of alcohol or substance misuse were 
exclusion criteria. Advertising sought people who were interested in a study abut how well 
they knew their memory. 
 
4.3 Materials 
In Chapter 2 the selection of measurement tools was discussed. Here, relevant 
administration and scoring details are outlined for each of the Memory, Information 
Processing, Executive Function, Mood and Metamemory instruments. 
 
4.3.1 Measures of Memory 
Memory tests were interleaved with metamemory judgments. For clarity, the memory 
component of each is described. 
 
Auditory Verbal Learning Test (Lezak, 1983). 
This task required the learning and recall of two 15-word lists. The 15-word stimuli have 
been adapted into English (Lezak, 1983; Lezak, Howieson and Loring 2004), and consist 
of common high frequency nouns. The 15-word list (List A) was presented orally, with a 
one-second interval between each word. The participant received 5 presentations of word 
list A in total (Trials I-V), with a test of recall of the full list after each presentation. No 
feedback is given on performance between trials. After the 5 trials on List A, a second list 
of 15 new words is introduced for immediate recall (List B, Trial VI). After a 20-minute 
delay, a recall trial (Trial VII) is carried out on the original list of 15 words (List A).  
 
Using the scoring guidelines of Lezak, Howieson and Loring (2004:422-423) number of 
words correctly recalled after 20 minutes was the main scoring index for latent variable 
modelling.  
 
The Sentence Memory Test (Nelson 1984; Shimamura & Squire, 1986) 
In this task, both a recall and recognition test was provided. Participants were required to 
remember the final word of 24 sentences, each sequentially presented centred on a 
landscape A4 page in 30-point bold Century Gothic font. Verbal stating of each sentence 
was required from the participant, and the examiner provided an addition 2-second interval 
before turning to the next sentence. After a delay of 60 minutes, filled with a break and 
other cognitive tasks, the sentences were re-presented in a different order each having the 
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final word missing. Participants were asked to provide their answer for the missing 
sentence completion word. The recall score was the number of correctly completed 
sentences. 
 
To test recognition performance, participants were then presented with those sentences that 
were incorrect, or to which don’t know answers were given. They were given a choice of 
eight plausible completion words for each sentence and asked to select the correct answer. 
The number of correct selections was their recognition score. 
 
Participant instructions for the task were as follows:  
‘In this test I am going to show you twenty-four sentences. Your task is to read the 
sentence out loud, and try to remember the last word of each sentence. Your ability 
to remember the last word of each sentence will be tested later on. This is therefore 
a test of your memory.’ 
‘I will give you a practice sentence to start with, and I will explain the process. 
Then we will go through the whole set of twenty-four sentences’ 
‘In about an hour, I will be asking you to try and remember the last word that went 
with each sentence. This will be tested by showing you each sentence again, this 
time with the last word missing. These will be in a different order to the way you 
saw them the first time’ 
‘Now, let’s do an example’ 
Participants were then shown the sample sentence ‘She put the flowers in the VASE’ 
‘Here is a sentence with the key word for you to remember in large type. I want you 
to read this out and try to remember this word, because when you see the sentence 
again it will be missing’ 
Participants were shown the sample sentence again, with the final word missing ‘She put 
the flowers in the _________’ 
‘If you cannot remember the word, or get it wrong, I will give you a set of possible 
answers, only one of which is correct, to see if you can pick out the correct one, 
like this:’ 
Participants were given the incomplete sentence again, with 8 possible answers, and their 
attention was drawn to the fact that all of the choices are plausible answers - Garden, 
Water, Kitchen, Coffin, Soil, Vase, Bin, Window. 
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‘You will notice from the eight choices that only one is correct, Vase, but that all of 
them could fit and make sense of the sentence. This is important because it means 
the answer will not be obvious, unless you have some memory of it’ 
‘Do you understand what I am going to ask you to do?’ 
 
This task was also used to generate Retrospective Confidence Judgments and Feeling of 
Knowing judgments, the exact procedure for which is outlined later in this chapter. The 
full set of test materials, including recognition foils used in the Feeling of Knowing test, 
are given in Appendix A. 
 
4.3.2. Measures of Information Processing. 
 
Symbol Digit Modalities Test (SDMT; Smith, 1982). 
Participants were presented with rows of meaningless symbols on a single 11” x 8 ½ ” 
page. The task was to convert these to their appropriate number, by referring to a 
symbol/digit key, presented at the top of the page. Here, the oral version was administered; 
participants stated the number associated with each symbol instead of writing it down. A 
practice set of 10 symbol to number conversions was given and participants were notified 
of any mistakes they made. Scoring was the number of correct symbol to digit conversions 
made in 90 seconds, not including those carried out in the practice set. Higher scores 
indicate faster processing speed.  
 
Digit Span (Forward) task  (Wechsler, 1997b) 
The Digit Span forwards task required participants to immediately repeat increasingly 
longer lists of numbers, presented verbally by the examiner. Digit lists are reported back in 
the same order as they are presented. Digit spans start at 2 numbers and increase in sets of 
two, to 9 numbers. The task is stopped if a participant got two number strings of the same 
length incorrect. Scoring was the number of correctly recalled digit sequences. Maximum 
score is 16, with higher scores indicating better performance. 
 
Letter-Number Sequencing (Wechsler, 1997b) 
The Letter-Number Sequencing (LNS) task is taken from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale 3rd Edition (WAIS-III, Wechsler, 1997a) and required participants to reorder a series 
of mixed letters and numbers, which increase in length by one item on each trial. 
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Participants were verbally presented letter number mixes and are asked to reorder them 
(mentally) and report them back. Numbers have to be verbally reported back first, in 
increasing order of size, followed by letters in alphabetical order. Scoring was based on the 
number of sequences correctly reorganised. Higher scores on the LNS task represent better 
performance. The maximum score possible is 21. 
 
4.3.3. Measures of Executive Function 
 
Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test (Burgess & Shallice 1997). 
The Brixton Spatial Anticipation test requires participants to extract a rule from looking at 
the changing position of a blue circle among nine additional white circles, set in an array of 
two rows of five circles. As a 56-page stimulus book is worked through, the location of the 
filled circle in the 2 x 5 matrix changes. Each circle location is numbered 1-10. The 
participant looks at each page and indicates where they think the blue circle will be 
positioned on the next page, based on any patterns that they have detected in the movement 
of the blue circle.  In accordance with the instructions provided in the test manual, 
participants were told that there are patterns as to the way the circle moves around, but that 
they have to establish what those patterns are.  Additionally, they were told that an 
established pattern may change without notice, and, when this happens, they were required 
to figure out the new pattern governing the movement of the blue circle. Participants 
indicated their prediction of the upcoming location of the blue circle by pointing to the 
location and saying the number of the predicted location on the next page of the stimulus 
book. The researcher then turned the page.  
 
Scoring was the total number of errors made in estimating the patterns of location of the 
target circle. An error is an incorrect prediction of the location of the circle, except in those 
situations where the pattern changes; if the predicted location matches the location that 
would have been correct if the ‘old’ pattern had been maintained, then that is a correct 
response. The first prediction is correct regardless of location. 
 
Hayling Sentence Completion Test (Burgess & Shallice 1997). 
This test comprised two parts. For Section 1, the test required participants to verbally 
complete a set of 15 verbally presented sentences with any relevant final word. Participant 
instruction and scoring was in line with those outlined in the test manual (Burgess & 
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Shallice 1997). Two sample sentences were given as practice items – e.g. "The rich child 
attended a private..." The participant was asked to offer a final word that completes this 
sentence in a sensible way (e.g. "School"). Time taken to respond is recorded. This section 
gives a response speed score. Once complete, a new set of 15 sentences (Section 2: 
Inhibition) is provided, now with the requirement to complete sentences with an unrelated 
word. Again, two examples were carried out before the test begins, e.g. "Most sharks 
attack very close to..."  
 
Scoring on Section 2 was based on classification of the required inappropriate completion 
word according to its level of unreleatedness to the sense of the sentence (Errors Section 
2), as well as how long it took to produce a response (Response Time Section 2). Errors 
were classified based on their extent of unreleatedness to the obvious sensible completion.  
Category A errors are either sensible completions (‘that would be unsurprising if 
encountered in a story or other narrative’; Burgess & Shallice, 1997:9) or responses which 
are ‘obviously rude or inappropriate’ (Burgess & Shallice, 1997:9).  Category B errors 
include answers which have strong semantic relatedness to the sentence, are contrary 
words, including opposites, or words which connect with the last word of the given 
sentence (e.g. "Most sharks attack very close to...  the edge"). Examples of acceptable 
answers for ‘Most sharks attack very close to...’ might be potato, or yellow. 
 
In all, four measures were yielded, proposed to reflect aspects of executive function; 
response initiation (sum of response times in section 1), time taken to respond section 2, 
and error score in section 2.  All three of these scores can be combined to generate the 
fourth measure - an overall score of performance. Here, the Overall Score will be used as 
an indicator of executive function for between-participant comparisons. This score reflects 
the trade-off that is often made between speed of response and accuracy of response in 
Section 2. 
 
For structural modelling, three measures will be used from this task. Hayling Time will be 
calculated as response speed in the Inhibition condition minus response speed in the easy 
condition, to avoid confounding executive difficulty (indicated by speed) with information 
processing ability. The other two measures will be numbers of A-type and B-type errors. 
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For both executive function measures, higher scores indicate more impairment. In 
assessing the measurement and structural models, these scores are reversed so that higher 
scores indicate ability. This reversal was carried out to maintain coherence with higher 
scores indicating better performance in other cognitive domains. 
 
4.3.4.  Measure of Mood 
 
The Beck Depression Inventory II (Beck, Steer & Brown 1996) 
The Beck Depression Inventory Version II (BDI-II) was used to measure self-reported 
symptoms of depression. It consists of a set of 21 statements against which participants 
indicated their experience on a 0-3 scoring scale. Higher scores indicate greater levels of 
self-reported depression. 
 
Participants were asked to complete each item considering a time frame of ‘the past two 
weeks, including today’ in line with the current DSM-IV criteria for major depression 
(Beck, Steer and Brown, 1996:7; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Participants 
were given the inventory to fill out in the presence of the researcher. If participants had 
difficulty choosing between two options, they were asked to select the higher number 
score. For those participants who had difficulty with either reading or writing (e.g. with 
pen control), the researcher read each question. Scoring was the sum of scores across all 21 
items, with higher scores indicating more self-reported symptoms of depression. Total 
score on the scale will be used as the index of current mood for between-participant 
analyses. Scoring on each of the 21 items will be used in confirmatory factor analysis. 
 
4.3.5 Measures of Metamemory 
Two categories of measures were used to index Metamemory. First, three task-based 
memory judgements – Judgment of Learning (JoL) based on delayed recall of the 15-word 
Auditory Verbal Learning Test, a Retrospective Confidence Judgment (RCJ) and a Feeling 
of Knowing (FoK), both derived from the Sentence Memory Task. The second category 
was memory self-efficacy, based on the Memory Functioning Questionnaire (MFQ)  
 
4.3.5.1. Judgment of Learning 
The Auditory Verbal Learning Test (AVLT) has been outlined. The calculation of the 
Judgment of learning was based on predicted versus actual recall on the delayed recall trial 
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of this test. Relatedly, in order to derive an indication of sensitivity to repeated trials on 
this memory task, the underconfidence-with-practice effect was investigated. Prior to 
presentation of each word list of the AVLT, participants were asked to estimate how many 
of the 15-word list they thought they would correctly recall. Underconfidence-with-
practice was established by assessing the change in prediction discrepancy across all seven 
trials. The measure of Judgment of Learning accuracy was the difference between 
predicted and actual scoring on the delayed recall trial (Trial VII) 
 
4.3.5.2. Retrospective Confidence Judgment. 
Recalled items from the Sentence Memory Test were used for this judgment. When 
participants were asked to recall the sentence completing word for each of 24 sentences, 
they were also asked to make a judgment of their confidence in the retrieved answer, using 
a rating scale of 4, 3, 2 or 1 to indicate their level of confidence, where 4 indicated full 
confidence and 1 indicating a pure guess, no confidence. An A4 card, containing the 4 
rating definitions, was given to each participant during the recall trial so that they could 
indicate their confidence level.  Figure 4.1 shows the rating card given to participants so 
that they could indicate their rating of confidence. 
 
How confident are you that you are correct? 
4 =  High Confidence/ I am correct 
3 =  Medium Confidence / Probably correct 
2 =  Low Confidence / Unlikely to be correct 
1 =  No Confidence / Guess 
Figure 4.1 Retrospective Confidence rating card. This was 
given to participants during recall attempt on 24 Sentence 
Memory Test items. 
 
Relative accuracy was calculated using the Goodman-Kruskal correlation based on the 
cross-tabulation method discussed in Chapter 3, and is reported as a non-parametric 
correlation ranging from -1.0 to +1.0, with 0 indication no-correlation.  
 
Absolute accuracy was calculated by taking the proportion (in percent) of correctly 
recalled items given a high confidence rating (accuracy), and the proportion of correctly 
recalled items in the Low confidence condition (inaccuracy). 
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4.3.5.3. Feeling of Knowing Judgment. 
Non-recalled items from the Sentence Memory Test were used for this judgment. Prior to 
completing a recognition trial for unrecalled items, participants were given a 4-point rating 
scale on a landscape A4 page. Participants were then reminded about the sample 
recognition trial they completed at the beginning of the sentence memory test, and the 
seven alternative, and plausible, options they would see when making the recognition 
decision. The sorting card given is presented in figure 4.2. 
 
What are the chances you will know the correct answer, 
when you see it? 
4 = High Chance / Will recognise it 
3 = Medium Chance / Probably will recognise it 
2 = Low Chance / Probably will not recognise it 
1 = No Chance / Guess 
Figure 4.2 Feeling of Knowing rating card. This was given to 
participants prior to recognition attempt on any unrecalled Sentence 
Memory Test items. 
 
This scale, with 4 indicating a High Feeling of Knowing, and 1 indicating no/very low 
Feeling of Knowing was kept in view while all unrecalled sentences, still missing their 
final word, were given to the participant to sort according to the rating scale. Once sorted 
by ratings, participants were then asked to sort within ratings in line with ranking 
procedure outlined by Shimamura & Squire (1986) and Nelson & Narens, (1990) that is; 
the highest 4 down to the lowest 4, highest to lowest 3, 2 and 1, until a full ranking of 
sentences was achieved, from highest FoK to lowest FoK. If, during the task, a participant 
decided to move items from one rating to another, this was allowed. 
 
After the rating and ranking procedure was complete, the recognition trial was carried out. 
For each item, the unrecalled sentence was presented with the final word missing, this time 
with the eight possible completion words printed below. Participants were asked to state 
and point their selected word. The set of 8 choice words were derived from the range of 
words generated by the UK sample used by Arcuri, et al., (2001), but where 7 alternative 
completions from that study were not available, additional semantically related words were 
added.  
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Relative accuracy was calculated using the Goodman-Kruskal correlation for the ranked 
list, and is reported as a non-parametric correlation ranging from -1.0 to +1.0, with 0 
indication no-correlation. Absolute accuracy was calculated, using the 1-4 rating list by 
taking the proportion (in percent) of correctly recognised items given a High FoK rating 
(accuracy), and the proportion of recognised items in the Low FoK category (inaccuracy). 
Figure 4.3 summarises the how the Sentence Memory Test was used to derive the RCJ and 
FoK measures. 
 
Figure 4.3 Summary of the derivation of both Retrospective Confidence Judgments and 
Feeling of Knowing judgment measures from the 24-item Sentence Memory test.  
 
 
4.3.5.4. The Memory Functioning Questionnaire (MFQ; Gilewski, Zelinski & 
Schaie 1990, Zelinski, Gilewski & Anthony-Bergstone 1990). 
 
Participants were asked to complete this measure by themselves, or, if they needed 
assistance in physically completing it, not to use the opinions of others to rate their 
memory. Large print versions and an audio version to accompany the questionnaire were 
offered to participants, where necessary; one of each was provided during the study. As 
this questionnaire had been provided in advance of meeting the researcher for the testing 
session of the study, all answers were checked for completion when the participant and 
researcher met. Incomplete questions were checked with participants, and answered only if 
they were incomplete as the result of error. Non-applicable items remained incomplete. 
 
 
  148 
 
 
Three sets of scores were derived from the MFQ: the total score, the Forgetting While 
Reading score and the total score on the 10 item General Frequency of Forgetting (GFF-
10) score. This GFF-10 score was the primary measure of memory self-efficacy. To retest 
the hypothesis of Randolph, Arnett & Freske (2004) who used Forgetting While Reading 
questions of the MFQ, these were also used as an index of memory self-efficacy. 
 
4.4. Procedure 
 
4.4.1. Ethical Approval 
The study was given ethical sanction by the Brunel University School of Health Sciences 
and Social Care Research Ethics Committee. The main ethical issues addressed related to 
participant confidentiality, data protection, potential for distress and right to withdraw from 
the study. Confidentiality and data protection were addressed through an anonymisation 
process in recording data. All identifying information was retained as encrypted files for 
digitally held material, and in locked storage on the university site for other records. The 
potential for distress was highlighted in the participant information sheet, and right to 
withdraw from the study highlighted in both the information sheet and the consent form. A 
copy of formal ethical sanction is included in Appendix B. 
 
4.4.2. Recruitment 
Adverts were placed on the MS Society and MS Trust websites, local branch magazines 
and in MS Therapy Centres around Greater London. Potential participants were provided 
with a participant information sheet explaining the study, with follow-up contact arranged 
to answer any questions. The study information sheet outlined the nature of the research 
and the likely demands of taking part, including an indication of the level of 
reading/writing and speech abilities required by the task, likely length of testing session, as 
well as other inclusion criteria. A copy of the Participant Information Sheet is presented in 
Appendix C. 
 
4.4.3. Obtaining Consent 
Consent forms, one for signing and one for participants to keep, were provided with the 
Participant Information Sheet so they could be reviewed in advance of agreeing to 
participate. Once these had been provided, a follow up telephone call was made to answer 
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any questions about the study, and if the participant remained interested they were 
enrolled, after clarification of the inclusion criteria.  
 
Those enrolled to take part in the study were sent, and asked to complete, the Memory 
Function Questionnaire and to complete one consent form, the latter also to be signed by a 
witness. Appointments were made so that the testing session could take place within 2 
weeks of provision of the Memory Function Questionnaire. This was necessary in order to 
maintain congruence between completing the questionnaire and completion of the Beck 
Depression Inventory, which asks participants to consider their mood over the previous 2 
weeks (Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996). Participants for whom a within-two-weeks testing 
appointment could not be made were not sent the MFQ until within two weeks of the 
testing appointment.  
 
Participants were contacted again in the days prior to the agreed testing to confirm 
availability; this also provided an opportunity to confirm that the Memory Function 
Questionnaire and consent form were completed in advance of testing. If testing was to be 
carried out away from the Brunel University site, a quiet room was advised, along with 
participants selecting their best time of day from the perspective of fatigue. 
 
On the day of testing, the researcher took the completed consent form and Memory 
Function Questionnaire at the beginning of the testing session. At this time the Memory 
Function Questionnaire was checked for incompleteness and unanswered items were 
checked with the participant in order to reduce the occurrences of missing data. Those 
questions, for which the participant was unable to offer a response, remained incomplete.  
Where sought, presence of a companion during the testing session was permitted. 
 
4.4.4. Structure of Data Collection 
The testing session was structured in one of two ways to address potential facilitation or 
confounding effects of test order. Complete counterbalancing of subtests was not possible 
because of the necessity to have delayed recall on two tasks. The two testing orders are 
outlined in table 4.1. The aim was to preserve the same number of items between 
presentation and testing of the 24 sentences in the Sentence Memory Test and to allow for 
the same time period between presentation and testing on the Auditory Verbal Learning 
Test. Alternate participants received different test order administrations. Completing the 
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Beck Depression Inventory at the end of the testing session allowed for any distress to be 
addressed, as well as minimising the impact of that distress on performance during testing. 
The testing session was structured to last approximately 90-minutes and breaks were 20 
minutes in length. 
 
Table 4.1: Alternate versions of the testing session used in this study. 
 
Test Order A Test Order B 
Sentence Memory Test – Presentation 
Digit Span Task 
Symbol Digit Modalities Test 
Letter Number Sequencing Test 
Auditory Verbal Learning Test Trials I-VI 
 
Break 
 
Auditory Verbal Learning Test Trial VII 
Hayling Sentence Completion test 
Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test 
Sentence Memory Test – Recall & RCJ 
Sentence Memory Test –FoK 
Beck Depression Inventory 
Sentence Memory Test – Presentation 
Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test 
Hayling Sentence Completion test 
Auditory Verbal Learning Test Trials I-VI 
 
Break 
 
Auditory Verbal Learning Test Trial VII 
Digit Span Task 
Symbol Digit Modalities Test 
Letter Number Sequencing Test 
Sentence Memory Test – Recall & RCJ 
Sentence Memory Test – FoK 
Beck Depression Inventory 
 
 
4.5. Analytic Strategy 
The main issues with data analysis and management have been outlined in Chapter 3. The 
analytic strategy for this study had three stages. The first set of results sought to situate 
performance of the sample in respect of norms across the range of measures use. Analysis 
of performance by Memory and Executive Function subgroups and mood disorder 
subgroups was also carried out to address the findings and recommendations from previous 
work in the area (Beatty & Monson, 1991, Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005).  This analysis used 
SPSS version 16.0 (SPSS Inc., 2007). 
 
The second set of results presents the findings from submitting test results (observed 
variables) to confirmatory factor analysis in order to generate latent variables for the final 
set of analyses, the structural models; this included results of factoral assessment from 
previous studies.  Confirmatory Factor Analyses (CFA) were carried out using AMOS 13 
(Arbuckle, 2007) for Windows XP virtualised in Parallels version 3.0 for Macintosh. 
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Once factoral structure of these assessments was complete, regression-derived factor 
scores were created for the Beck Depression Inventory factors and for the Forgetting While 
Reading and GFF-10 scales. These factors scores were then used to represent the observed 
components of their respective latent variables. Regression-derived factor scores were 
generated using SPSS version 16.0 (SPSS Inc., 2007; Field, 2005) 
 
Structural equation models (SEM) were specified based on previous work with 
neurologically impaired samples, and the theory base and findings regarding metamemory 
in non-neurologically impaired populations. These models were set out in Chapter 1: 
Literature Review. These analyses were carried out using AMOS 13 (Arbuckle, 2007) for 
Windows XP virtualised in Parallels version 3.0 for Macintosh. The analytic approach is 
outlined in figure 4.4 
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Figure 4.4. Summary of data analysis for the study. 
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Chapter 5: Sample Performance  
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a description of the sample and their scoring on the range of 
cognitive, mood and metamemory measures used for the study. Analysis in this chapter 
aims to indicate performance on the range of measures used and present some indications 
of the relationships between the cognitive and mood variables and the metamemory 
measures used in the study. Full analysis of the relationships will be carried out in 
subsequent chapters presenting the measurement and structural models. 
 
There are four aims in this chapter. First, to report the sample features, and compare with 
similar samples in the published literature in terms of demographics; second, to compare 
cognitive and mood measures to normed data; third, to report performance on the range of 
metamemory measures, and where possible to compare these to published literature. A 
final aim is to address the issue of heterogeneity in performance, by comparing subgroups 
of cognitive and mood function in the domains of MS subtype and metamemory measures. 
This will assess the findings of Beatty & Monson (1991) that subgroups of cognitive 
performance may be one way to understand differences in performance on metamemory 
measures. A summary at the end will discuss initial understanding of the results to aid 
subsequent structural models’ interpretation. 
 
5.2 Demographics, MS Subtypes and medications 
 
Recruitment yielded 110 volunteers. Three people excluded themselves after receiving the 
participant information sheet. Additionally, one participant was excluded because of severe 
visual impairment, three were excluded because of past medical history (Chronic Fatigue 
Syndrome, history of psychotic illness, and anxiety disorder prior to MS diagnosis), and 
one person was excluded because they were outside reasonable travelling distance. Finally, 
after initial interest two people did not respond to follow up contact. After losses, and 
application of the inclusion criteria, the final sample consisted of 100 participants, all of 
whom were living in the community and had a confirmed diagnosis of MS. Figure 5.1 
outlines the process of recruitment, retention and study losses. Of the 100 people, two were 
seen at Brunel University, and the remainder at home or at the MS Therapy centre they 
attended. 
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Figure 5.1. Summary of recruitment process, participant exclusions and losses. 
The final sample was 100 all of whom completed all components of the study. 
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The Sample 
The mean age of the sample was 51.55years (SD = 11.61; range 25-84years; median age 
was 51 years) and the gender split was 22 (22%) male, 78 (78%) female, giving a ratio of 
1:3.6. The mean age of male participants was 49.64 years (SD = 11.10) and mean age for 
female participants was 52.09 years (SD = 11.76). 
 
Education 
Mean number of years spent at school was 12.15 (SD = 1.41; Range 8-15 years). 50% 
attended full-time further education ranging from 1 year (n=3) to 7 years (n=1). Of those 
who spent some time in further education, 3 and 4-year periods were the most common 
(76%), and included education to degree level.  
 
Employment 
59 (59%) of participants were medically retired from paid employment (59% of females 
and 59.1% males); 16% were in full time employment (27.3% of men, 12.8% of women); 
12% working part time (9% of men, 12.8% women). 6% were retired (all women); see 
Table 5.0 for status of remaining participants. 
 
Table 5.0 Employment status of sample 
(n=100). 
 
Employment Status % 
Full time 16 
Part-time 12 
Medically retired 59 
Retired 6 
Working < 1 day week 2 
Volunteering 1 
Full-time student 1 
Self-employed 1 
Not currently working 1 
On sick leave 1 
Total 100 
 
 
MS Diagnosis. 
For the sample as a whole, mean time since first symptoms was 21 years (SD = 10.66 
years, range 42 years) and mean time since diagnosis was 13 years (SD = 9.37 years, range 
39 years). 
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Participants were asked to give the type of MS given by their diagnosing doctor, and the 
subtype best characterised from their own experience. Table 5.1 summarises both subtype 
diagnosed, and experienced by participants. Slow progressive and progressive-relapsing 
types have been included as primary progressive forms of the illness, in line with the 
recommendations of Kremenchutzky et al., (1999). Hereafter, this five-category format of 
medically diagnosed subtype, including ‘none given’ will be used for comparisons. 
 
 
Table 5.1: Multiple sclerosis Subtypes in the sample (n=100) Primary 
Progressive includes ‘slow progressive’ and ‘progressive relapsing’, 
which some consider types of primary progressive (Kremenchutzky et 
al., 1999). 
 
MS Subtype Diagnosed Experienced 
Relapsing/Remitting 32% 33% 
Secondary Progressive  30% 35% 
Primary Progressive 19% 24% 
Benign   5%  8% 
None Given 14%  
Total n =100 n=100 
 
 
 
Age & MS subtype 
The mean age for receipt of a formal diagnosis of MS was 38.50 years (SD = 9.95), 
ranging from 18 to 65years and the mean reported age at first symptoms was 30.54 years 
(SD = 10.33), ranging from 5 to 61 years. This was a retrospective judgment about 
symptom onset. 
 
A one-way ANOVA was used to test for differences between mean participant age for 
each of the MS subtypes (5 levels). Mean age for each of the MS subtypes differed 
significantly among groups, F(4, 95) = 10.755, p<.001. Tukey post-hoc comparisons of the 
MS subtype groups indicated that the Relapsing-Remitting group (M= 42.72 years; SD = 
8.90) was younger than all other groups. Comparisons between all other groups revealed 
no statistically meaningful differences in respect of age. 
 
Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of MS subtype for each of six decades of life covered by 
the sample. Visual inspection indicates a higher proportion of younger participants having 
a diagnosis of Relapsing Remitting MS (RRMS), with an increasing proportion of 
Secondary Progressive MS (SPMS) in groups of increasing age. There were no participants 
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with benign MS over 66 years old. An increasing proportion of participants were 
categorised as primary progressive in older age 
 
Time since diagnosis 
Mean number of years since diagnosis was 13.10 years (SD = 9.36) ranging from a 
minimum of 1 year, to a maximum of 40. Mean number of years since first symptoms was 
21 years (SD = 10.66), ranging from 3 to 45 years.  
 
The time gap from first symptoms to diagnosis ranged from 0 to 34 years. The relative 
uniformity of mean time between first symptom and diagnosis, for each MS subtype, is 
demonstrated in the figure 5.3. A one-way ANOVA for MS subtype (5 levels) and time 
from first symptoms to diagnosis confirmed no meaningful differences between groups 
F(4, 95) = 2.034, p = 0.096 in respect of time from first symptom to diagnosis. This 
finding may relate to the ‘wait and see’ approach from initial symptoms, during which time 
dispersion of symptoms in time and space is required for a diagnosis. 
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Figure 5.2 MS subtype summarised by age groups within the sample. The figure shows the 
proportions of MS subtype in each of 6 age groupings, with larger proportions of younger 
participants having a Relapsing-Remitting diagnosis and an increasing proportion of 
Secondary-progressive and Primary Progressive course in older age groups. 
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Figure 5.3. Mean time, in years since 1st reported symptom and formal diagnosis of MS. 
The gap between the two events (1st
 
 symptom, formal diagnosis) shows some uniformity, 
which may relate to the wait and see approach to diagnosis required to demonstrate 
dispersion of demyelination in time or place. 
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Medication use 
The list of medications is organised according to the British National Formulary (BNF: 
Joint Formulary Committee, 2009). The treatment of neuropathic pain, which may involve 
the use of tricyclic antidepressants and antiepileptic medications, is also considered. Table 
5.3 summarises medications in use by the sample; off-label use (e.g. of LDN), where 
reported, contributes to structuring the data. 
 
Table 5.3: Medication use among the sample. Percent of 
sample currently using each is tabulated. Medications are 
categorised by their primary reasons for prescription according 
to the British National Formulary (Royal Pharmaceutical 
Society of Great Britain, 2009). Off-label use is also 
considered. 
 
Medication category / Target Symptom Percent of sample 
Disease Modifying  
• Interferons 15 
• Glatiramer Acetate 3 
• Low-dose Naltrexone (LDN) 5 
Relapse management  
• Prednisone 1 
• Methotrexate 1 
• Immunoglobin 1 
Pain 53 
Fatigue 3 
Spasticity/neuromuscular 35 
Continence 22 
Depression & Anxiety 36 
Sleep 4 
 
 
 
The mean number of medications taken was 2 (SD = 1.61), ranging from none to six. 23% 
of the sample took none, 23% one, 22% two, 15% three, 9% four, 5% took five and 6% 
took six. 
 
5.3. Comparison with other United Kingdom MS samples. 
A sample of 136 community dwelling people with MS reported by O’Hara, De Souza & 
Ide (2000), also in the UK, and an economic survey (Kobelt, et al., 2006) with samples 
drawn in the UK using an MS charity, presents scope to compare demographic features of 
the sample in this study, with many similarities evident. Notably, Kobelt et al., (2006) 
suggests the mean annual cost per person, from a societal perspective is estimated at 
£30,263. Table 5.4 summarises the data from the two UK samples. 
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Table 5.4: Comparisons of three community samples of people with MS from the United Kingdom by 
age, gender, employment status and MS-related features. Employed include Full, part-time and self-
employed employed. RRMS = Relapsing/remitting MS; CPMS = Chronic Progressive MS; PMS = 
Progressive MS; PPMS = Primary Progressive MS and SPMS = Secondary progressive MS. 
 
 O’Hara, De Souza & Ide (2000) 
n=136 
Kobelt et al., (2006) 
n= 2048 
Current MS sample. 
n=100 
Mean age in 
years (SD) 
50 (10.75) 51.3 (10.7) 51.55years (11.61) 
Gender Male: 32%. Male: 24.7%. Male 22%. 
Employment 
status 
Employed 27% 
Volunteering 17% 
Not Working 56% 
Employed 28% 
Retired due to MS 44% 
Not working 28% 
Employed 29% 
Volunteering 1% 
Retired due to MS 59% 
Retired 6% 
Years since 
diagnosis 
Mean 12 (SD 8.6)  13 (SD 9.4) 
MS Type RRMS 47% 
CPMS 53% 
RRMS 35% 
PMS 65% 
RRMS 32% 
SPMS 30% 
PPMS 19% 
Benign 5% 
None Given 14% 
 
 
5.3 Performance on Individual Tests. 
 
Test Version. 
Test version A was administered to 49% (n=49), and version B to 51% (n=51), of 
participants. No significant differences were found with an independent t-test between A 
and B Version groups for age t(98) = -1.668, p = 0.098, schooling t(98) = -0.90, p = 0.371, 
or higher education t(98) = -0.88, p = 0.380. A Pearson Chi-sq test of difference between 
test version (A or B) and MS subtype (5 levels) showed no significant difference between 
the test version given to each group x2
 
(4, N = 100) = 4.45, p = 0.349. 
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5.4.1. Memory 
 
Auditory Verbal Learning Test (AVLT). 
Comparisons against control performance are presented in table 5.5. These are based on 
norms published by Vakil & Blachstein (1993). For the AVLT, a number of scores are 
commonly used as measures of learning and memory (Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004). 
 
The initial recall trial score (AVLT Trial 1), often used as an index of the impact of 
information processing capacities on initial acquisition, was lower for the MS sample 
t(244) = 4.73, p < 0.001 and performance on this item correlated with other proposed 
measures of information processing capacities in the sample; Symbol Digit Modalities 
Test, r = 0.417, p < 0.01, Digit Span Task r = 0.292, p < 0.01 and the Letter Number 
Sequencing task r = 0.326, p < 0.01. Total acquisition over all five learning trials (summed 
score), an index of learning rate, was also lower in the MS sample t(244) = 5.61, p < 0.001. 
20-minute delayed recall, Trial 7, was lower for the MS sample t(244) = 7.51, p< 0.001. 
 
 
Table 5.5. MS sample compared to a neurologically normal sample on the 
Auditory Verbal learning Test. Means are reported and standard deviation in 
brackets. Maximum score is 15 on all trials. 
 
 Vakil & Blachstein (1993) n=146  MS sample n=100 
Trial 1 7.73 (2.11) 6.47 (1.97) 
Trial 5 13.30 (1.85) 12.05 (2.41) 
Total (sum) trials 1 to 5 56.90 (9.03) 49.67 (11.12) 
Trial7; 20 minute recall 12.23 (2.61) 9.45 (3.71) 
 
 
20-Minute delayed recall cut-off score 
Using the scores provided by Vakil & Blachstein (1993), the lower bound -1.5SD mark is 
8.32. Therefore, the cut-off scores for normal performance on delayed recall are scores > 8, 
classifying 36% (n=36) as impaired on this task.  
 
A number of studies suggest memory is impaired in MS and performance on this test 
accords with findings of Bravin et al,. (2000), who had a younger, but community 
dwelling, sample recruited form MS Society membership in Australia (Mean 45.75 years, 
SD  = 9.68).  In that study, Trial 1 performance was 5.38 (2.08) and Trial 7, 6.77 (4.16), 
suggesting the sample in this study was less impaired. 
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Sentence Memory Test 
There are no norms available for this test, as it was designed for the study. Performance is 
reported based on 60-minute delayed recall on 24 sentences completions. For the 100 
participants, the number of sentences completed correctly ranged from 0 to 22, with a 
mean = 9.50 (SD = 4.08). 
 
Recognition performance, on the unrecalled items, with a forced choice 7-alternative 
format was mean 47.33% (SD 20.61), ranging from 5% to 100%. No differences in 
recognition performance were detected in the MS subtypes. 
 
5.4.2. Executive Function 
 
Hayling Sentence Completion Test 
The three individual measures of the Hayling Sentence Completion Test  - Response time 
Sections A and B, and Errors Section B (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) - can be individually 
compared to scaled scores, with a score of 6 being equivalent to the 50th
 
 percentile for 
each. A combined scaled score can also be computed taking account of trade–offs made 
between reaction time and accuracy. This overall score is again scaled so that 6 is the 
average score. Table 5.6 indicates sample performance on Response Time Section A, 
Response Time Section B, Errors Section B and Overall Score, against the normed mean 
of 6, which represents an ‘average score’ or, performance at the 50th percentile level 
(Burgess & Shallice, 1997). 
Table 5.6: Mean Scaled Scores (SD) on Hayling Sentence Completion test of MS sample and a 
control sample reported by the test authors (Burgess & Shallice, 1997). n.s. indicated no reliable 
difference between norm and MS sample; for all other comparisons the MS sample were lower in 
response time, had fewer errors and a lower overall scaled score. 
 
 Response Time 
Section A (n.s.) 
Response Time 
Section B 
Errors  
Section B 
Overall Scaled Score 
MS sample 
n=100 
5.14 (1.2) 4.76 (1.8) 5.65 (2.2) 4.87 (2.0) 
Controls n=71 5.8 (1.0) 5.9 (1.0) 6.4 (1.7) 6.1 (1.6) 
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A t-test of MS sample means, indicated they differed from controls on Response Time 
Section B t,(169) = 4.83, p < 0.001, Errors Section B t,(169) = 2.41, p <0.05 and on the 
Overall Scaled Scores t,(1969) = 4.30, p < 0.001. Response times for Section A (easy 
sentence completion) was not different between the MS and control samples, perhaps 
suggesting that this was not sensitive to information processing deficits. 
 
According to the authors (Burgess & Shallice, 1997), scaled scores of 4 or below are 
categorised as Low Average (4 = 10th percentile), Poor (3 = 5th percentile), Abnormal (2 = 
1st percentile) or Impaired (1 = <1st percentile). The number of participants scoring at these 
levels is presented in Table 5.7. All those scoring at or below the 5th
 
 percentile (scores of 3 
or less) are considered here to be impaired, as it tallies closest with the  -1.5SD cut off used 
for other measures. 
14% of the sample were impaired on Response Time Section A (response initiation, simple 
condition), 20% were impaired in Response Time, section B (complex condition) and 21% 
impaired in the number of errors generated in Section B. Overall scores on the sentence 
completion task suggested 23% can be considered impaired. Since the overall score is a 
composite of the two response times and error scores, some participants, who were 
impaired on more than one aspects of the test can be included more than once. Table 5.7 
summarises performance. 
 
 
Table 5.7: Summary of scoring on the Hayling Sentence Completion Task: Numbers of 
participants scoring ≤10th percentile (a score of 4 or less) on each component of the Hayling 
Sentence Completion Task. Note: Overall Scaled score is a conjunction of the other 3 scores, 
and the same participant may be represented more than once if their score on two categories 
was ≤10th
 
 percentile. Shaded cells are those participants deemed impaired because their overall 
performance is below the -1.5 SD cut-off. 
 Response Time 
Section A  
Response Time 
Section B 
Errors 
Section B 
Overall Scaled 
Score  
Low Average  
(10th 
5 
percentile) 
18 2 8 
Poor  
(5th 
12 
percentile) 
6 3 6 
Abnormal  
(1st 
1 
percentile) 
1 12 2 
Impaired  
(<1st 
1 
percentile) 
13 6 15 
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Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test 
Mean number of errors on the Brixton Spatial Anticipation Tests was 18.13 (ranging from 
4 to 32; SD = 6.32) with n = 98. Two participants’ data was missing because of examiner 
error. Scaled scores for n = 98, and associated classification, are outlined in Table 5.8. 23% 
were classified as impaired. 
 
Table 5.8: Numbers of participants scoring ≤ 
10th
 
 percentile (a score of 4 or less) on the 
Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test. Impaired 
scores are contained in shaded cells and are 
equivalent to < -1.5SD; n=98. 
Overall Scaled Score 
(n=) 
Low Average  
(10th 
7 
percentile) 
Poor  
(5th percentile) 
6 
Abnormal  
(1st percentile) 
14 
Impaired  
(<1st percentile) 
3 
 
 
In comparison to the standardisation sample (mean 16.0 errors, SD = 5.7), the MS sample 
had a higher number of errors t,(169) = 2.27, p < 0.05. Setting the cut-off for impaired 
scores at the -1.5 SD, 23% (n = 23) of the sample is considered impaired. 
 
5.4.3. Information Processing. 
 
Letter-Number Sequencing Test (LNS) 
Mean score on this test was 10.43, (SD = 2.57) with a maximum score available of 21. The 
range of scores was 17 (3-19). For the purposes of classification, age-scaled score 
equivalents were computed for each participant using the UK standardization sample for 
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997b). For the sample in 
this study, the age scaled mean score was 10.67 (SD = 2.78). 21% (n = 21) of participants 
fall between the 1st and 2nd
 
 SD below the mean of age scaled scores, with 2% (n=2) below 
the -2 SD point. 23% (n=23) were therefore classified as impaired on this task. 
Digit Span Task - Forwards 
Mean score on the Digit Span Task was 10.0 (SD = 2.14). The range of scores was 11 (6-
16). Norms, for this task, are available from Strauss, Sherman & Spreen (2006:240).  A 
standardisation sample of 540 non-neurogically impaired adults was used, and scores are 
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age stratified.  Table 5.9 compares performance between the norm group and the MS 
sample in this study (n=100), and indicates the proportion of the MS sample classifiable as 
impaired using ≤ -1.5 SD as the cut off. The number classified as impaired, 3%, would be 
expected within the ‘normal’ population, given that ≤ -1.5 SD theoretically represents 
about 7 percent of the normal distribution. This result therefore suggests average 
performance of the sample on this task.  
 
 
Table 5.9: Age stratified comparison of performance on the Digit Span 
Forwards Task. Norms from Strauss, Sherman & Spreen, (2006) are used. 
Scores are analysed against a cut-off of ≤ -1.50 SD from the mean of the 
standardisation sample. 
 
Age Range Norms 
M (SD) 
MS Sample 
M (SD) 
Cut-off Score 
at  -1.50 SD 
% MS sample 
impaired i.e. ≤ 
-1.50 SD 
20-39 11.7 (2.5) 10.18 (1.74) 7.95 0 
40-49 10.6 (2.2) 9.92 (2.10) 7.30 1 
50-59 10.5(2.4) 10.31 (2.31) 6.90 0 
60-69 10.2(2.1) 9.37 (2.36) 7.05 2 
70-79 10.4(2.5) 9.75 (1.70) 6.65 0 
80-89 9.2 (2.2) 11 (0) n=1 5.90 0 
 
 
Symbol-Digit Modalities Test 
Mean score (total correct, in 90 seconds) was 45.57 (SD = 12.40). Norms for the SDMT 
are stratified by six age bands and by education in the test manual (Smith, 1982). Table 
5.10 summarises the performance of the sample against these stratified norms. There was 
no statistical difference, in an independent t-test, in scores between the ≤ 12 years 
schooling and the 13+ years schooling groups for the MS sample, t (98) = -0.69, p = 0.50. 
 
Table 5.10: Mean (SD) scoring on the SDMT stratified by age and level of 
schooling, using norms from Smith (1982). 
 
 12 years school or less 13 or more years school 
Age Range Norms MS sample   n=52 Norms MS sample   n=48 
25-34 60.57 (9.14) 52 (25.46) 65.71 (11.64) 56.67 (10.50) 
35-44 59.87 (10.49) 51.82 (11.88) 60.95 (11.32) 51.86 (14.11) 
45-54 53.91 (10.40) 47.57 (9.65) 58.31 (8.67) 42.81 (12.587)  
55-64 49.03 (9.03) 39.00 (9.10) 54.47 (8.93) 45.33 (11.45) 
65+ 42.05 (11.26) 40.20 (12.83)  52.89 (13.54) 40.17 (8.57)  
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The test authors suggest that ‘1 to 1.5SD below the mean should be considered suggestive 
of cerebral dysfunction’ (Smith, 1982:14), meaning it should be possible to classify 
participants into ‘Low’ (approximately -1SD) ‘Moderately Low (approximately -1.5SD) 
and ‘Very Low’ (approximately -2SD) groups. Table 5.11 summarises the results of this 
analysis. At the ≤ -1.5SD level (moderately- and very- low scorers) 28% of the sample 
would be considered impaired; wider parameters, such as including ‘Low’ scorers, would 
capture 48% of the sample. 
 
 
Table 5.11: Classification of performance by the 
MS sample (n = 100) on SDMT, using age and 
education-stratified norms of the standardisation 
sample (Smith, 1982). 
 
Age group Low Moderately Low Very Low 
25-34 0 1 1 
35-44 5 3 4 
45-54 7 2 7 
55-64 4 2 6 
65+ 4 1 1 
Totals 20% 9% 19% 
 
 
 
One limitation for these published norms (Smith, 1982) is that they are based on verbal 
scoring following a written attempt at the task. This may inflate the norms somewhat as 
prior experience may facilitate subsequent oral performance, at least in neurologically 
unimpaired samples (Barr, 2001). 
 
Sheridan et al., (2006) investigated normative performance in community dwelling 
neurologically normal volunteers on the SDMT. They provide aggregate scores from a 
range of previous studies, including oral-only norms. These aggregated means, stratified 
by age group, were compared with the MS sample, yielding scores in 36 participants (36% 
of sample) that are considered indicative of impairment, using the lower bound 1.5SD cut 
off. Table 5.12 presents a summary of this data and comparisons for each of the age-
stratified MS groups against the same age group normative data. 
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Table 5.12: Statistical comparison of age-stratified performance on the oral-only version of the Symbol 
Digit Modalities Test to derive indications of impaired performance among the MS sample. Sheridan et 
al (2006) presents oral-only norms for community-dwelling neurologically unimpaired samples. For each age 
group, the MS sample is reliably slower in their performance on an independent t-test 
 
Age Group 
Sheridan et al 
(2006)  
mean (SD)  
MS sample 
mean (SD) Comparison t test 
-1.5SD 
cut-off 
value 
Number (and %) of 
MS impaired 
< 30 years 
n=6 69.40 (10.6) 58.17 (15.70) p < 0.05 ≤ 53 2 (30%) 
30-55 years 
n=59 59.50 (9.2) 47.59 (11.60) p < 0.001 ≤ 45 26 (44%) 
> 55 years 
n=35 47.30 (11) 40.00 (10.73) p < 0.001 ≤ 30 8 (23%) 
 
 
 
 
5.4.4. Mood 
Beck Depression Inventory 2nd Edition (BDI-II) 
Median score on the BDI-II was 9.00, (IQR = 12; Range 0 - 43); using the cut-off given by 
Beck, Steer & Brown (1996), the most frequently endorsed symptom level was 
Minimal/None (mode = 0). There was no significant difference between male and female 
scores (t (98) = 0.906, p = 0.302). The levels of self-reported depression are reported in 
Table 5.13. 
 
 
Table 5.13. BDI-II Ratings of sample (n=100). 
 
Depression symptom 
level 
% of sample 
 
Minimal/none 64 
Mild 18 
Moderate 13 
Severe 5 
Total 100 
 
 
 
A one-way ANOVA by MS subtype (5 levels) indicated no differences in BDI-II scores 
between the MS subtypes F(4, 95) = 2.126, p = 0.084. Figure 5.4 summarises self-reported 
depression by each MS subtype.  
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Figure 5.4. Total score on the Beck Depression Inventory 2nd
 
 edition grouped by MS 
subtype. Maximum score is 63 and lower scores indicate less self reported depression 
symptoms. 
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5.4.5 The Memory Function Questionnaire, total score 
Higher scores in the MFQ indicate less frequent problems, less seriousness attributed to 
problems when they do occur, same or better memory compared to the past, and less use of 
mnemonics. Missing data (unanswered questions) was present for 11 participants in 
calculating the total MFQ score. Because of the distribution of unanswered questions, for 
the four subscales sample numbers varied from 92 to 100. For the total, mean score was 
237.42 (SD = 54.89), n=89.  
 
Reasons for not answering questions were often given on the questionnaire and typically 
related to personal relevance - questions about forgetting while public speaking, taking 
tests and chores were the most common unanswered questions, leading also to non-
answering of the same items when asked about how serious forgetting was rated, when it 
happened. Other unanswered questions related to forgetting while reading items not being 
applicable; typical reasons included difficulties holding a book/newspaper and reading 
difficulty relating to visual problems. These missing items can be considered generally to 
have a pattern to their missingness in that they relate to MS disability. 
 
Comparison, using t-tests, of age stratified scores for the MS group and the standardisation 
sample, indicate that people with MS reported a higher frequency of memory problems, t 
(868) = 5.58, p < 0.001, and considered them more serious when they did occur, t (870) = 
6.00, p < 0.001. The MS sample reported better past memory performance, t(876) = 9.89, p 
< 0.001, that is, more decline in memory over time. Use of mnemonics was reported as 
higher among the MS sample, t (876) = 6.89, p < 0.001. Table 5.14 indicates the age-
grouped performance of the normalisation sample and the MS sample, with the 
questionnaire divided into its four constituent subscales.  
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Table 5.14: Age stratified comparisons of the Memory Function Questionnaire standardisation sample 
Gilewshi, Zelinski & Schaie, (1990) across each of the four sub-scales: General Frequency of 
Forgetting, Seriousness of Forgetting, Retrospective Functioning and Mnemonic usage.  Where there is 
incomplete data for a scale this is indicated by the number of MS participants that contribute data to the 
comparison. Lower scores indicate more memory complaint, more seriousness of failures, greater decline 
from past memory (retrospective functioning) and higher reported mnemonic usage. M = mean, SD = 
standard deviation 
  
Age 
ranges. 
General Frequency of 
forgetting 
(33 items) 
Seriousness of 
forgetting 
(18 items) 
Retrospective 
functioning 
(5 items) 
Mnemonics usage 
(8 items) 
 
 
Norm  
M(SD) 
MS 
Sample 
M(SD) 
 
Norm 
M(SD) 
MS 
Sample 
M(SD) 
Norm 
M(SD) 
MS 
Sample 
M(SD) 
 
Norm 
M(SD) 
MS 
Sample 
M(SD) 
 
16-29 
years 
162.26 
(22.19) 
143.50 
(64.35) 
n=2 
77.10 
(20.13) 
42.00 
(10.00) 
n=2 
22.96 
(5.08) 
17.00 
(4.24) 
n=2 
32.47 
(9.59) 
21.00 
(4.24) 
n=2 
30-49 
years 
166.51 
(26.21) 
130.88 
(35.04) 
n=37 
85.58 
(21.59) 
69.74 
(23.48) 
n=38 
20.90 
(4.75) 
11.33 
(6.072) 
n=39 
29.42 
(8.43) 
22.51 
(8.75) 
n=39 
50-59 
years 
155.99 
(25.53) 
141.24 
(35.84) 
n=33 
83.75 
(20.02) 
69.21 
(22.26) 
n=33 
17.70 
(4.62) 
15.05 
(4.99) 
n=35 
30.49 
(8.89) 
23.05 
(10.12) 
n=35 
60-69 
years 
152.13 
(28.12) 
139.13 
(32.36) 
n=16 
85.52 
(20.09) 
69.64 
(20.01) 
n=17 
18.31 
(5.68) 
13.21 
(4.90) 
n=19 
30.87 
(9.44) 
26.21 
(12.26) 
n=19 
70-79 
years 
148.72 
(29.12) 
147.00 
(30.05) 
n=4 
83.55 
(20.89) 
91.50 
(17.89) 
n=4 
18.18 
(5.74) 
12.00 
(3.93) 
n=5 
29.70 
(10.26) 
23.00 
(7.28) 
n=5 
Totals 154.63 
(27.83)  
137.01 
(34.73)  
n=92 
83.48 
(20.56) 
69.87 
(22.35) 
n=94 
19.10 
(5.69) 
13.14 
(5.51) 
n=100 
30.40 
(9.52) 
23.40 
(9.87) 
n=100 
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Memory self-efficacy 
The primary measure of memory self-efficacy in this study is the 10-item scale drawn from 
the 33-item General Frequency of Forgetting scale (GFF), itself drawn from the Memory 
Function Questionnaire (MFQ, Lane & Zelinski, 2003; Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004). The 
relationship between the different scales was set out in Chapter 4 
 
The norms presented are for both 33-item and the reduced 10-item self-efficacy scale 
(Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004, using two samples).  Missing data was present for ten 
participants in calculating the total MFQ score, 8 for the 33-item General Frequency of 
Forgetting scale and for 4 in calculating the 10-item self-efficacy scale. Descriptive 
statistics for the MFQ subscales are calculated on available cases, so samples range from 
n=92 to n=100. 
 
Two samples reported by Zelinski & Gilewski (2004) with a mean age of 69.6 and 68.9 
years were compared with the MS sample on the 10-item GFF scale. Independent t-tests, 
comparing samples 1 and 2 to the MS sample demonstrated reliable differences between 
the MS group and Sample 1, t(663) = 6.54, p < 0.001 and Sample 2, t(581) = 5.92, p < 
0.001. The MS sample scored lower, indicating more reported problems with memory in 
day-to-day functioning, despite a lower age range. Given differences in age, with the norm 
samples being older by about 14 years, this comparison may underestimate the differences 
between the two groups. Performance of each of the three groups is summarised in Table 
5.15 
 
Table 5.15: Comparisons of two unimpaired samples and the MS sample on the 10-
item General Frequency of Forgetting scale (Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004). The number 
of participants contributing data to each comparison is indicated where there is missing 
data. n = number of participants in each group; SD = standard deviation. 
 
 10-Item General Frequency of Forgetting scale 
 n Mean SD 
Sample 1 565 4.7 0.9 
Sample 2 483 4.7 1.0 
MS sample 96 4.05 1.02 
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Memory Functioning Questionnaire scoring in other MS Samples. 
 
Randolph Arnett & Freske’s (2004) sample of MS participants also completed the MFQ. 
Only the items relating to Forgetting While Reading (FWR) are reported for that study, 
with a mean FWR score of 51.4 (SD = 12.9); here the FWR mean was 44.62 (SD = 14.65). 
An independent sample t test suggests that the samples’ ratings were different with the MS 
sample in this study (n=100) scoring lower on forgetting while reading items t, (146) = 
2.74, p = 0.007. Lower scores on this item indicate more frequent reports of forgetting 
while reading. 
 
Associations between MFQ and Memory performance. 
 
Each of the four MFQ subscales, and the shortened GFF-10 were submitted to bivariate 
correlation analysis with the two memory indices for the study - 20-minute delayed recall 
on the Auditory Verbal Learning Test and the Sentence Memory Test, 60-minute delayed 
recall. The full table of correlations is presented in Table 5.16 
 
The substantive questions were of relationships between self-reported memory and actual 
performance. Here, there was evidence of association between General Frequency of 
Forgetting scale and performance on the Sentence Memory Test (Pearson’s r = 0.24, p < 
0.05) suggesting those with better memory performance on the Sentence Memory Test 
endorsed less frequent memory problems in daily life (higher GFF scoring). This finding 
concurs with a small association found by the developers of the GFF-10 scale (Zelinski & 
Gilewski, 2004) that recall performance explained small amounts of variance, even with 
individual factors controlled. 
 
20-minute delayed recall on the Auditory Verbal Learning Test (AVLT 7) did not correlate 
with self-reported memory performance (10-item GFF), but there was a significant 
negative correlation with reported frequency of Mnemonic use (r = -0.211, p < 0.05) 
suggesting that better performers on the AVLT reported more frequent use of mnemonics. 
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Table 5.16: Pearson correlations between six Memory Function Questionnaire 
(MFQ) scales and memory measures: AVLT 7 and Sentence Memory test (SMT) 
total recall. ** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); * = correlation is 
significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). GFF = General Frequency of Forgetting; SF = 
Seriousness of Forgetting; RF = Retrospective Functioning; MU = Mnemonics Usage; 
FWR = Forgetting while Reading 
 
 10-item 
GFF 
SF 
MFQ 
RF 
MFQ 
MU 
MFQ 
FWR 
MFQ 
AVLT 
7 
SMT 
Recall 
10-item GFF 1.000       
SF MFQ .424** 1.000      
RF MFQ .398** .326** 1.000     
MU MFQ .220** .242** .081 1.000    
FWR MFQ .790** .371** .383** .253** 1.000   
AVLT 7 .051 .099 -.024 -.211* -.051 1.000  
SMT Recall .243* .000 .009 -.038 .114 .555** 1.000 
 
 
5.4.6. Task-based Metamemory Judgments. 
 
Judgment of learning 
This was measured as predicted minus actual performance (i.e. discrepancy) for the 
delayed recall trial of the Auditory Verbal learning Test (Trial 7). Figure 5.5 presents the 
performance of the sample over all trials. Trial 1 indicates judgment prior to initial 
acquisition, having only being told there were 15 words to remember. Both Trials 3 and 5 
have been proposed to be the maximum acquisition point (Spreen & Strauss, 1998; Lezak, 
Howieson & Loring, 2004) and Trial 7, delayed recall. In advance of each trial, 
participants were asked to estimate how many of the same list of 15 words they predicted 
they would remember. Trial 6 was a new list. 
 
Trial 7 is the key measure; there was a mean discrepancy of -2.7items (SD = 2.63) in the 
prediction. It suggests that actual recall was better than predictions made for the 20-minute 
delayed trial. Mean (SD) discrepancy for Trial 1 was +0.35 (2.66), Trial 3 was -2.21 (2.41) 
and trial 5 was -2.02 (2.42). Comparisons suggested Trial 1 was reliably different from the 
others  - on paired t-tests all p-values were < 0.001. Trial 7 was also statistically different 
from Trial 5 t (99) = 2.148, p = 0.031. These results suggest some underconfidence across 
repeated trials 2 to 5 of the word list. Of interest here is the suggestion that the delayed 
Judgment of Learning (Trial 7) was more inaccurate (larger discrepancy) than the earlier 
trials. This is an unusual finding, given the weight of evidence suggesting that delaying a 
Judgment of Learning tends to increase accuracy (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). 
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Figure 5.5. Mean discrepancy between predicted and actual recall performance on 
each trial of the Auditory Verbal Learning Test. Discrepancy was calculated by 
subtracting actual performance form predicted performance on a 15 item word list in 
advance of presentation and recall attempt for each trial. Positive values indicate 
expectations that are over confidence, negative scores underconfidence. Trail 7 was tested 
after a 20-minute delay without presentation of the list to the participant. 
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Retrospective Confidence Judgment. 
 
RCJ Relative Accuracy 
This judgment was made using a choice of four ratings after retrieval of an answer for each 
of the 24 Sentence Memory Test items. Rating use tended to be full, with 4% using only 
two ratings of confidence, 23% using three and 73% using all four. There were two 
missing datasets for this measure, so that n=98. Don’t know responses for retrieval 
confidence were considered a rating of 1 (Low confidence / guess). 49% of respondents 
had none, 10% had one, with the remaining 41% having up to 16. 
 
Because of near full use of the rating procedure, the gamma correlation was calculated 
using the method provided by Schraw (1995). The mean Retrospective Confidence gamma 
value was 0.89 (SD = 0.197; maximum = 1.0, minimum = -0.302). 42% of participants 
scored the maximum 1.0, indicating perfect resolution on this measure, that is, confidence 
in recalled answers matched success in recall. Remaining scores ranged from 0.98 to -
0.302. A One-way ANOVA of mean gamma correlation by MS subtype (5 levels) showed 
no significant group differences, F(5, 94) = 0.543, p= 0.744. The distribution of gamma 
scores is presented in figure 5.6 and suggests a highly skewed distribution, but also high 
levels of accuracy, indicated by the frequency of values at or near 1.0. 
 
RCJ Absolute Accuracy 
The proportion of High Confidence judgments with correct retrieval, and of Low 
Confidence with correct retrieval were also taken as measures of absolute accuracy. The 
first is proposed as an indicator of accuracy, the second an indicator of inaccuracy. 
 
For the sample, the mean % High confidence correct was 76.23% (SD = 21.22), ranging 
from 0 to 100%. For the % Low confidence correct, the mean was 12.01% (SD 12.56) with 
a range from 0 to 74%. In terms of RCJ calibration there were high levels of accuracy 
(76%) and low levels of inaccuracy (12%) for the sample as a whole on this task. 
 
MS subtype did not discriminate performance on a one-way ANOVA for either %High 
Confidence correctly recalled F(4,95) = 0.145, p = 0.965 or for % Low Confidence 
correctly recalled F(4,95) = 0.339, p = 0.852. 
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Figure 5.6. Distribution of Retrospective Confidence Judgment gamma scores, 
which can range from +1.0 to -1.0. Higher scores indicate more accuracy. The graph 
demonstrates the high levels of accuracy in this judgment, denoted by scores close to 
and reaching a value of 1.0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  178 
   
 
Feeling of Knowing Judgment 
 
FoK Relative Accuracy 
Relative accuracy, or resolution was calculated using the non-parametric gamma 
correlation based on the ranking process outlined in Chapter 3: Development of Statistical 
Methods. This was carried out because of incomplete use of the 4 ratings offered. 
 
The mean Feeling of Knowing gamma value was 0.18 (SD = 0.38), which ranged from -
1.00 to +1.00 as the correlation allows, with a median of 0.195 and mode of 0.50. 29% of 
participants had values less than zero. Values towards + 1 indicate higher levels of 
accuracy and values towards -1 suggest systematic inaccuracy in this task. There were no 
group differences relating to MS subtype on a one-way ANOVA, F (5, 94) = 0.718, p = 
0.611. FoK gamma scores are summarised in Figure 5.7. 
 
As a comparison, the findings of Beatty & Monson (1991) suggest the mean sample 
gamma for controls was 0.24, (SD 0.32; n=22; mean age: 49 years); here it was 0.18; (SD 
0.38; n=100), which is statistically similar (t (120) = 0.6882, p = 0.49).  
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Figure 5.7. Distribution of Feeling of Knowing gamma scores. Values range from 
+1.0 to -1.0. Higher scores indicate more accuracy. The graph demonstrates low levels 
of accuracy, with only 2 scores reaching 1.0. Scores between the red lines (absolute 
values 0.125) indicate chance performance on the 7-alternative forced choice 
recognition test.  
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FoK Absolute accuracy 
Absolute accuracy, or calibration was calculated by examining the % of Sentence Memory 
Test items correctly recognised for High FoK and Low FoKs separately. Variable use of 
the four available ratings led to some difficulties with the calculation of calibration of 
accuracy with the FoK, an issue that has been reported in a previous study with MS 
samples (Beatty & Monson, 1991). It has been noted more generally, that there may be 
restricted use of the full ratings, possibly indicating sensitivity to task difficulty, leading to 
what has been termed mid-point anchoring (Moulin, 2002). A count of rating use indicates 
that 10% (n=10) used only one rating 8 of whom used only a low ranking, 31%  (n=31) 
used two (mostly rating 2 and 3), 42% (n=42) used three ratings and 17% (n=17) used all 
four ratings. This is in contrast to the same rating used in the RCJ’s, within the same task, 
where 73% used all 4 ranks. 
 
Aside from the potential utility of examining rating use, it also made it difficult to decide 
whether the use of two low ratings (e.g. 2 and 1) were to be interpreted as Low FoK or 
whether one could be considered High and the other Low. Initially, ratings were collapsed 
into High (4 & 3 ratings) or Low (2 & 1 ratings). In calculating the proportions correct, this 
generated missing data because division by zero was attempted, caused by rating non-use. 
Excluding the missing data provided the following results; %High FoK correct (n=97); 
Mean = 52.84 (SD 24.95). For % Low FoK correct (n=80); mean = 38.92 (SD 26.66). 
 
In attempting to recover data, using a method outlined by Beatty & Monson (1991), ratings 
that were in the same end of the scale, e.g. only 4 and 3, or only 1 and 2 were split to 
reflect High or Low. For the derived %High FoK, subsequently recognised correctly; the 
mean score was now 54.43% (SD 26.11) n=98 and for the %Low FoK judgments 
subsequently correct; the mean was now 38.51% (SD = 27.435) n=92. This reduced data 
loss and maintained global characteristics of the data. 
 
Comparison of the means by t-test showed no reliable difference between the two %High 
FoK t(193) = 0.4347; p = 0.66, or the % Low FoK correct datasets, t (170) = 0.099; p = 
0.92 so the process was considered acceptable. No statistical differences were found 
between mean of % High FoK correct, or % Low FoK correct, for any of the MS Subtypes. 
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5.5 Investigating Heterogeneity of performance in MS 
 
Pannu & Kaszniak (2005) and Beatty & Monson (1991) suggest that consideration be 
given to subgroups of performance among potentially heterogeneous samples, such as 
participants with MS or traumatic brain injury. Heterogeneity could relate to the subtype of 
MS, but comparisons carried out suggest not, in this sample. 
 
Instead, Beatty & Monson (1991) attempted to address the potential confound of 
heterogeneous performance among people with MS by grouping performance according to 
cognitive performance, specifically memory and executive function. Here, consideration is 
given to Memory (AVLT7 score), and Executive Function (Total scaled score for Hayling 
test and/or Brixton spatial anticipation). Sentence Memory Test performance has no 
normative data from which to derive impaired memory performance so was not included. 
An additional factor potentially increasing heterogeneity is mood disorder. 
 
For each, a simple division was placed between those classified as impaired based on the 
foregoing analyses - scores of above 8 on the AVLT 20 minute delay, scaled Hayling and 
scaled Brixton scores at or below the 5th percentile according to the test authors’ 
recommendations (Burgess & Shallice, 1997). Executive function was therefore classified 
as impaired in either Hayling or Brixton, or both, if scores were at or below the 5th
 
 
percentile. Four sub-groupings were generated; No Impairment on either memory or 
executive function, Memory only impairment, Executive Function only impairment, and 
finally, Memory and Executive impairment. Figure 5.8 summarises the proportion of MS 
subtype representing each of the cognitive subgroups. Of note are the high proportions of 
both primary progressive and secondary progressive MS classified as cognitive impaired, 
compared to the relapsing-remitting course. 
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Figure 5.8 Cognitive subgroups organised by MS Subtype. The proportions of each 
subtype having membership of a cognitive subgroup is indicated 
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In a one-way analysis of variance, the groups (four levels) created did not differ in age F(3, 
96) = 1.36, p = 0.260, or in years of schooling F(3, 96) = 0.766, p = 0.516. Table 5.17 
summarises the proportion of the whole sample in each cognitive subgroup. 
 
 
Table 5.17: Summary of impairment in the MS sample across domains of cognitive 
impairment used to investigate heterogeneity in cognitive performance. 
 
 No 
Impairment 
Memory 
only 
Executive 
Function 
only 
Memory & 
Executive 
Function 
Impairment 
Percent of total 
sample in each 
impairment group 
38% 25% 26% 11% 
 
 
In line with one proposal in the study, SDMT performance was compared across cognitive 
performance subgroups (4 levels). ANOVA results suggested statistical differences 
between the groups on mean SDMT score F(3, 96) = 6.493, p < 0.001. Post hoc analyses 
suggested that the No Impairment subgroup had better performance on the SDMT than the 
memory impaired only group (p = 0.001), the executive function & memory impaired group 
(p = 0.038) and a difference approaching significance with the executive impaired only 
group (p = 0.074). 
 
 
Metamemory Measures & Cognitive Subgroups. 
 
When examined according to the cognitive subgroups discussed above, the MS sample 
showed a pattern of memory self-efficacy (i.e. MFQ responses) indicating more problems 
(lower scores) being reported by those with either executive deficits alone or executive & 
memory deficits. While all groups, as well as the sample as a whole gave lower efficacy 
ratings than the norm groups on the MFQ scales, Executive only and Memory & Executive 
groups gave the lowest efficacy ratings. Table 5.18 summarises the increasing memory 
complaint (lower scores) on the General frequency of Forgetting scale with increasing 
cognitive impairment, sample size for this comparison is n=96 because of incomplete 
completion of the scale. 
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Analysis of variance by cognitive subgroup (4 levels) for 10-item GFF scale did not 
support reliable differences between the cognitive sub-groups in the sample, though visual 
inspection suggests increasing differences when compared to the norms, for more 
cognitively impaired groups.  
 
 
Table 5.18: Summary of two unimpaired samples and MS 
sample cognitive sub-groups for the General Frequency of 
Forgetting scale. n = number of participants in each group; SD 
= standard deviation. For the MS group sample is n = 96. 
 
 10-Item General Frequency of 
Forgetting scale 
 n Mean SD 
Sample 1 565 4.7 0.9 
Sample 2 483 4.7 1.0 
No Impairment 38 4.27 1.02 
Memory only 25 4.09 1.18 
Executive only 24 3.83 .92 
Memory & Executive 
impairment 9 3.53 1.07 
 
 
 
Delayed JoL (Predicted minus Actual performance) on AVLT Trial VII. 
A one-way analysis of variance compared the mean difference between predicted and 
actual performance for each of the four cognitive ability subgroups, and suggested that 
there was a reliable difference between the means of the groups F(3, 96) = 13.442, p < 
0.001. A Tukey post hoc test confirmed that groups of participants without memory 
impairment (No Impairment and Executive only impairment) were different from those 
with memory impairment (Memory only and Memory & Executive Function impairment); 
all p-values < 0.01. As shown in figure 5.9 the No Impairment and Executive Function only 
groups had greater differences between predicted and actual performance, compared to 
either of the groups with memory impairment Why memory impaired sub-groups might 
apparently perform more accurately on this judgment is addressed in the context of 
structural model results in Chapter 7. 
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Figure 5.9. Mean discrepancy in delayed Judgment of Learning (JoL) 
organised by cognitive performance subgroup. Delayed JoL is the 
discrepancy between predicted and Actual recall performance on the delayed 
recall trial of the Auditory Verbal learning Test. Scores nearer 0 indicate more 
accurate JoL 
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Retrospective Confidence Judgment. 
On a one-way ANOVA, none of the cognitive performance subgroups (four levels) 
differed in mean retrospective confidence gamma score; F (3,96) = 0.953, p = 0.418). 
Generally the results were skewed as most participants had high levels of relative 
accuracy, on this task. 
 
For absolute accuracy in Retrospective Confidence Judgment, there was evidence of 
differences between the cognitive performance subgroups’ scores. In applying high 
confidence postdictions to recall, there was a group effect of cognitive performance. One-
way ANOVA with post hoc Tukey test of cognitive group (four levels) on % High 
confidence and correct, suggested that the Memory impaired only group had reliably lower 
scoring than the other three groups F(3,96) = 7.696, p < 0.001. Visual inspection of figure 
5.10 suggests that performance of the Memory only group was more variable than the 
others, and that exclusion of a number of outlying scores would might indicate that both 
Memory impaired only and Memory and Executive Function impaired cognitive groups 
would differ from the No Impairment and Executive impaired only group. This lends some 
support an interpretation of memory impairment being related to RCJ accuracy, a 
suggestion that will be investigated in later analyses of structural models. There were no 
differences between cognitive subgroups for inaccuracy in calibration, that is, mean % 
Low Confidence correct. 
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Figure 5.10. Retrospective Confidence Judgment absolute accuracy for each of 
the cognitive performance subgroups. The figure indicates that participants with 
memory impairment were more variable in performance compared to others and were 
statistically lower in the percent of High Confidence rated items that were in fact 
correct. 
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Feeling of Knowing gamma correlation 
None of the cognitive subtype groups (four levels) differed in mean FoK gamma scoring 
on one-way analysis of variance F (3, 96) = 1.366, p = 0.258. 
 
On the % High FoK correct and % Low FoK correct ANOVA for comparison of the 
cognitive subgroups (4 levels) also indicated no differences in mean % High FoK correct 
(F (3, 94) = 1,271, p = 0.292) or in mean % Low FoK correct (F (3,88) = 0.725, p = 
0.441). 
 
Metamemory measures and Mood 
 
The Beck Depression Inventory categorises self-reported depression symptoms into 4 
categories: None, Mild, Moderate and Severe. These groups were of unequal size as 
presented earlier. On a one-way ANOVA, only one comparison suggested mood group 
differences  (4 levels) on task-based metamemory measures. Those in the None/minimal 
depression category scored were reliably (p = 0.001) less inaccurate on the FoK task than 
those within the Mild depression group F(3,88) = 5.847, p =0.001. Visual inspection of 
figure 5.11 suggests a potential trend towards those being in the Minimal/None depression 
group being less likely to give a low FoK rating to a subsequently correct recognition-
based sentence completion.  
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Figure 5.11. Mean percent of Low FoK ratings subsequently recognised 
for each of the four depression symptom levels on the Beck Depression 
Inventory 2nd
  
 Edition.  FoK = Feeling of Knowing. 
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MFQ scores and Depression symptoms 
For the components of interest in this study - GFF-10 and the Forgetting while Reading 
(FWR), only FWR demonstrated a linear correlation with the total score on the Beck 
Depression Inventory and suggested that higher scores on the BDI, indicating more 
reported depression symptomatology was associated with lower scores on the frequency of 
FWR items, indicating more frequent problems reported in his area (Pearson, r = -0.25, p < 
.05, n=100). 
 
One way ANOVA, and post hoc analysis of depression symptom category (4 levels) for 
33-item GFF, 10-item GFF and Total MFQ scores was carried out and indicated that the 
Moderate group (n = 13) reliably endorsed more memory difficulty that the Minimal/none 
(n = 64) and Mild (n = 18) depression symptoms group, but not the Severe group (n=5). 
For Total score on MFQ: F(3, 89) = 4.443, p = 0.006, for 33-item GFF F(3, 89) = 3.777, p 
= 0.013 and for GFF-10 F(3, 91) = 3.198, - 0.027). Post hoc Tukey tests also supported no 
difference between the Severe group and any others, despite appearances from visual 
inspection of mean scoring. Figure 5.12 gives an example, on the GFF-10. 
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Figure 5.12. Mean score on 10 item General Frequency of Forgetting 
scale (GFF-10) for each of the four depression symptom levels on the 
Beck Depression Inventory 2nd
 
 Edition. Lower scores on GFF-10 indicate 
more reported memory difficulties. 
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5.6. Discussion 
 
This sample of 100 people with Multiple Sclerosis accords well in demographic detail with 
two recent community dwelling cohorts from the UK, and reflects a number of disease 
related patterns. The mean age for diagnosis was in the 3rd
 
 decade, in line with findings 
from a number of studies (e.g. Compston & Coles, 2002). Initially high, the proportion 
people with a relapsing-remitting course declines over time, in conjunction with an 
increasing proportion of secondary-progressive subtypes. This supports the findings that 
there may be a change in the disease process for the initially relapsing-remitting group 
(Weinshenker, et al., 1989; Noseworthy et al., 2000).  
Additionally, the frequent diagnosis of primary-progressive MS in later years (5th decade) 
is reflected in the sample proportions (Weinshenker, et al., 1989). The absence of a benign 
subtype in the 7th
 
 decade may relate to changes in the ‘benign’ expression of the disease 
also. There are few very long-term studies following the outcome of people initially 
diagnosed with benign MS, with which to verify this interpretation (Costello et al., 2008). 
The male to female ratio in the sample is not typical of gender-related incidence in the UK, 
which appears to be about twice as many women as men, possibly with increasing 
proportions of women. Generally males with MS can have poorer outcomes (Tomassini & 
Pozzilli, 2009) and so may be harder to recruit to such studies. McCabe, McKern & 
McDonald (2004) also suggested that men with MS tended to less often employ 
appropriate coping styles and more often failed to seek support, and so may not be 
available to recruitment through support organisations. Beatty & Aupperle (2002) suggest 
than men with MS may be particularly vulnerable to cognitive impairment, which may 
itself limit participation. Alternatively, and as suggested by Schwartz & Fox (1995), it may 
be that responders may have time available because they are out of work. Although almost 
60% of either sex was retired, just over twice as many of male participants were still in full 
time employment, compared to women.  
  
In this sample, 38% of the sample had no impairment in memory or executive function. 
36% had memory impairment, 26% had executive impairments 11% had impairments in 
both memory and executive function. 36% of the sample was considered mildly to severely 
depressed, on a self-report measure of depressive symptoms, but there was no reliable 
relationship between scoring on the Beck Depression Inventory and cognitive performance 
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subgroup, gender or MS subtype. Information processing, measured by an oral only trial 
Symbol Digit Modalities Test, was impaired in 36% of the sample and poorer performers 
on this test were associated with the impaired memory (p < 0.05), memory and executive 
subgroups (p < 0.05), but not executive-only subgroup. This finding offers some support 
for proposals in the general MS literature that these deficits are one way of understanding 
higher level cognitive deficits in MS (De Luca, et al., 2004; Demaree et al., 1999; 
Goverover et al., 2007) Letter-Number sequencing performance indicated an impairment 
level of 23% and Digit Span performance was in line with standardisation samples. 
 
In a global assessment of task-based metamemory measures, there was evidence of 
sensitivity to task performance and task demands on the Judgment of Learning task. This 
was evidenced by an underconfidence with practice effect (Koriat, Sheffer & Ma’ayan, 
2002); this is where, with repeated exposure to the same learning task, there is a tendency 
for prediction increase to lag behind performance increases, leading to a discrepancy 
between predicted and actual performance. Koriat, Sheffer & Ma’ayan (2002) discussed a 
pattern for this effect, including slight overconfidence in the initial trial - also noted in this 
study.  
 
The second performance component that may support sensitivity, this time to task 
difficulty is the difference in the 4 to 1 ratings used in the Feeling of Knowing and 
Retrospective Confidence Judgments in the study. 73% used all 4 ratings in the RCJ task, 
compared to 17% in the FoK task. As proposed by Moulin (2002), rank use may be 
diagnostic of task difficulties in people with Alzheimer’s disease. Here, on what was an 
easier task (RCJ) ranks use was consistently greater than on the FoK task.  
 
Accuracy, measured by gamma correlation, was high on the RCJ task. The RCJ task has 
traditionally established high levels of accuracy (e.g in traumatic brain injury; Kennedy 
2001). Greater variability was noted among those with memory impairment. These 
judgments are considered to be based on memory experience cues, such as ease of 
retrieval, fluency of retrieval and perhaps some content cues (Koriat et al., 2008). One 
possibility is that with memory impairment may come much greater variability in available 
cues to estimating confidence in a retrieved answer, or that in the face of reduced 
mnemonic cues (fluency, accessibility), less useful information-based cues (e.g. cue 
familiarity) may be relied upon, giving wider parameters of accuracy.  
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Mean Feeling of Knowing gamma was low. One study, which reports a FoK gamma 
correlation on a similar task, is that of Shimamura and Squire (1986). That study compared 
a control sample to samples with a range of memory impairments; amnesics, people 
receiving ECT and people with Korsakoff’s syndrome, the latter associated with memory 
and executive deficits. The findings of FoK performance show controls achieved a mean 
FoK gamma of 0.70 and amnesics 0.40, both higher than this study’s sample. The 
Korsakoff’s group achieved a mean FoK gamma of zero. The authors conclude that this 
would indicate that more widespread cognitive impairment is probably therefore 
responsible, rather than relatively circumscribed memory impairment, for success in this 
task. 
 
In this study, accuracy on the Feeling of Knowing task, may have been limited, in part, by 
task complexity in the ranking procedure, a feature suggested by a number of authors 
(Shimamura & Squire, 1986; Beatty & Monson, 1991; Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005). The 
second is that, being based on an episodic task, it may present more difficulty (Schwartz & 
Metcalfe, 1994). While one benefit of using a new learning task is in providing 
equivalence of learning across participants (McKenna & Warrington, 2000), a limitation 
for the FoK judgment is that magnitude of the FoK relating to the degree of prior learning 
of the material on which the FoK is based (Nelson & Narens, 1980); here, only a single 
learning trial was given so likely attenuating the size of the gamma correlation, though 
some participants did reach gamma correlations of 1.0, and the modal score was 0.50, 
which compares well to other studies. 
 
FoK calibration, measured by proportion of recognised sentence completions for High and 
Low FoK judgments was also examined. Results suggest that only the Low FoK, correctly 
recognised, were associated with other measures. Findings indicate that people not 
endorsing mood disorder were least likely to give Low Feeling of Knowing ratings to 
correctly recognised sentence completions. This only reached a statistical difference when 
compared to the mildly depressed individuals. Given the measure is based on correct 
recognitions, Mood may be a factor which contributes to the higher number of Low FoKs 
provided; this effect may be direct or indirect. Direct effect would suggest overly negative 
appraisals of Feelings of Knowing, and indirect may relate to a high number of ‘don’t 
know’ responses, which were recorded as low FoK in the study design. People with low 
mood or more cognitive impairment often use ‘don’t know’ responding more than non-
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depressed individuals (Foreman et al., 2003). This result will be investigated when mood, 
memory and executive abilities are considered simultaneously in structural modelling. 
 
In measures of memory self-efficacy, people with MS reported more problems, and 
considered these more serious when they happened, than non-neurologically impaired 
people, even though the norm samples against which they were compared were older. An 
older sample would be typically expected to endorse more memory difficulty than younger 
samples in part because of implicitly held theories about aging and memory decline 
(Hertzog, 2002). It may be that a similar disease-related bias also contributes to the 
samples rating of their own memory on this questionnaire, and this bias may be contributed 
to by mood disorder. Reported frequency of Forgetting While Reading (FWR) correlated 
with total score on the Beck Depression Inventory (r = -0.25) indicating more complaints 
of this memory disturbance with higher depression symptomatology. For the memory 
Function Questionnaire total score and 10-item General Frequency of Forgetting (GFF-10) 
scale lowest memory complaint was related to lowest depression report. 
 
These findings are in line with a number of studies of depression and memory self-report 
in MS (Julian, Merluzzi & Mohr, 2007; Randolph Arnett & Freske, 2004). The finding is 
further supported by no cognitive subgroup differences between memory self-efficacy 
ratings, suggesting that cognitive impairment per se is not the primary factor in memory 
self-report differences. In comparison to neurologically unimpaired samples, all cognitive 
subgroups (including the no impairment group) reliably rated themselves as having more 
memory difficulty on the GFF-10, the key measure in this study.  Interestingly, GFF-10 
scores did correlate with performance on a single trial measure of 60-minute delayed 
recall, but not with a multi-trial measure of 20-minute delayed recall. These two memory 
tests may reflect different aspects of experienced memory performance - the single trial 
task, acquisition or encoding processes and the multi-trial task, forgetting or retention 
processes. The experience of people with MS is typically of having difficulty with the 
encoding aspects of memory (Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004), rather than forgetting, so 
single trial tests of this nature may best associate with memory experience as sought in the 
self-efficacy scale. 
 
A final point of discussion relates to the heterogeneity of performance in the sample, which 
was quantified by memory and executive performance, and also considered as categories 
of mood. Neither cognitive performance nor mood category related to MS subtype. Neither 
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did cognitive subgroup consistently relate to any set of variables under study. In contrast to 
Beatty & Monson (1991) it would seem that categorising participants according this 
cognitive profile might not assist understanding on metamemory here, at least when a 
series of parallel statistical comparisons would need to be substantial.  
 
There were no statistical differences between cognitive subgroups in their mean accuracy 
on the Retrospective Confidence Judgment gamma scoring, though on absolute accuracy 
(% correct for High and Low confidence), memory impairment was associated with lower 
accuracy. In contrast to that finding, cognitive subgroups with no memory impairment (No 
Impairment or Executive only impairment) had reliably greater underconfidence with 
practice than the other subgroups. Those participants with memory impairment appeared to 
be more accurate in their estimation of learning after a 20-minute delay. 
 
Feeling of Knowing gamma was unrelated to any particular subgroup of cognitive 
function. This is actually in partial agreement with the findings of Beatty & Monson 
(1991) who demonstrated FoK gamma was different from zero, among controls and the 
cognitively unimpaired group, but no different from zero in the cognitively impaired sub 
groupings. 
 
An alternative approach to creating discrete subgroups based on cognitive performance is 
to examine the cohort as a whole. Exploring the relevance of multiple variables, such as in 
a regression based approach, may provide a better characterisation of the factors associated 
with accuracy in a multivariate way. As discussed in this and preceding chapters, the use of 
well-defined variables is important in this venture - results here suggest that some memory 
measures indicate relationships and others not. In addition, the relationships of variables 
are likely to be different in different metamemory measures and interact in different ways. 
Assessment of sub-group mean performance, while useful as an initial assessment of 
relationships, may obscure useful and multivariate relationships. 
 
The next analysis will focus on elucidating the relationships between these various 
findings from the point of view of how performance on the various metamemory measures 
may be understood based on the cognitive and affect factors examined. This analysis will 
be carried out through the testing of a number of proposed models to establish if they are 
acceptable, both theoretically and statistically. The theoretical basis has been explained 
during the review of the literature and in deriving the objectives for the study. The 
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statistical fit of the data is established next through two processes; first through assessing 
the validity of the proposed latent variables using confirmatory factor analyses and second 
through structural model testing. This first step, called the Measurement Model focuses on 
the validity of assumptions about the measures being used so as to underpin the second 
step, the Structural Model, which aims to statistically test the theoretical hypotheses 
presented in Chapter 1. The next chapter will therefore focus on the Measurement Model 
and the confirmation of the proposed latent variables - Memory, Executive Function, 
Mood, Information Processing and Metamemory. 
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Chapter 6: The Measurement Model 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The measurement model tests assumptions that specific observed variables are congeneric 
in describing the latent variables of interest. The method for testing these assumptions of 
factoral relatedness is Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), and the factors established 
from this analysis are termed latent variables in the field of Structural Equation Modeling 
(SEM: Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). In this chapter the measurement models are tested 
for each of the proposed latent variables; Memory, Executive Function, Information 
Processing and Mood. Specification for CFA each model will be set out in advance of 
testing. Each of the proposed latent variables is created from a number of observed 
variables, selected and discussed in Chapter 2: Development of Methods. 
 
The processes related to model testing have been outlined in the Chapter 3: Development 
of Statistical Methods. In summary, once data has been screened for quality, these steps 
consist of model Specification, testing for model Identification, model Estimation, 
assessment of model Fit, model Modification or Respecification and reassessment of Fit 
(Bollen & Long, 1993; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). While the process is iterative, in this 
study models tested were confirmatory, rather than exploratory, in that the expectations 
about factorial structure were specified a priori based on a number of published studies. 
 
For each measurement model, the process will be the same - assessing the quality of the 
data (normality, skew, kurtosis) followed by testing of candidate models. The first 
measurement model will be of the Beck Depression Inventory, 2nd
 
 edition (Beck Steer & 
Brown, 1996), as this best addresses all stages of the CFA process. Second, will be the 
measurement model for cognitive factors and finally, the memory efficacy scales. Two 
measurement models for the Memory Function Questionnaire subscales are investigated - 
for Forgetting While Reading and 10-item General Frequency of Forgetting scale. 
No measurement model is proposed for task-based metamemory judgments as it has been 
established that different indices, such as Feeling of Knowing or Retrospective Confidence 
Judgments tap different monitoring processes, making them unlikely to be factorially 
related (Dunlosky & Metcalf, 2009).  
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6.2. Measurement Model for Mood - Beck Depression Inventory, 2nd
 
 edition (Beck 
Steer & Brown, 1996). 
The Beck Depression Inventory proposes to represent a latent Mood variable, based on 21 
indicators of depression, such as changes in sleeping pattern, negative thinking styles and 
crying (Beck et al., 1961; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996). Previous factoral studies have 
proposed one, two and three factor models based on all 21 items or on a smaller number 
(Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996; Cole et al., 2004; Harris & D’Eon, 2008). Additionally, it has 
been proposed that some items are differentially sensitive to different factors, depending 
on the population (Bruce, Polen & Arnett, 2007); an example is the proposal that in people 
with MS some indicators of depression, such as fatigue, may actually be indicators of 
neurological disability (Nyenhuis et al., 1995). Many factoral models have been derived 
from earlier versions of the scale; the more contemporary version used here has been 
structured to reflect more current dimensions of depression, and considers a longer period 
of time in its assessment of mood disorder. 
 
6.2.1. Data Screening 
 
Missing Data 
There were no missing responses for the BDI. 
 
Normality 
Much of the data collected in behavioural research does not accord with univariate or 
multivariate normality (Micceri, 1989; Finney & DiStefano, 2006; West, Finch & Curran, 
(1995) discuss the implications and management of non-normality in their treatment of the 
topic in Hoyle (1995).  Two specific issues for the BDI were; the expected lack of 
normality in an assessment that measures depression in a heterogeneous group and the 
categorical response format (four options). 
 
Limitations to the process of model fitting for the BDI-II have been recognised elsewhere, 
in respect of non-normality of data (Osman, et al., 1997; Cole et al., 2004). Other issues 
include the appropriateness of assumptions about underlying continuity of the data 
represented by the four response categories (Byrne, 2006), and concern over the small 
sample size for such a CFA, which generates a large number of to-be-estimated 
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parameters, and therefore degrees of freedom (McIntosh, 2007). Subsequent to the degrees 
of freedom issue, non-normality of data is also relevant in assessing the criteria for model 
fit – many goodness-of-fit measures are impacted by degrees of freedom as well as non-
normality of data (West, Finch & Curran, 1995). Simulation studies reported by the 
authors have focused on testing known models with varying degrees of non-normality and 
different sample sizes, in order to test the robustness of indices of fit, or of some kind of x2 
adjustment for non-normality. One finding outlined is of the x2 
 
goodness-of-fit test 
rejecting more than 5% of true models (West, Finch & Curran, 1995).  
The combined effect of non-normality, small sample sizes and many free parameters 
associated with a 21-item scale like the BDI, is to increase the occurrences of ‘Heywood 
cases’ (West, Finch & Curran, 1995; Brown 2006:189). These are cases where model 
solutions cannot be achieved because of negative error variances occurring. Non-normality 
may also reduce some of the approximate indices of fit, such as the Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI; West, Finch & Curran, 1995). 
 
A final reason for problems in reaching statistical solutions is poor model specification 
(Brown, 2006; McIntosh, 2007). Therefore not all problems are therefore data related; 
some can be theory-related. Ultimately, acceptance or rejection of a theoretically plausible 
model is based on a number of criteria. The fit indices, parameter values and a range of 
other statistical judgements are the initial assessment of acceptability. Substantive theory is 
the other.  
 
In summary, item skew, kurtosis, the presence of outliers can be indicative of both 
univariate and multivariate non-normality (Field, 2005). In turn, these will impact on 
computing model solutions, accuracy of fit statistics and stability of solutions. For this 
reason each was considered in relation to this dataset, prior to analysis taking place. Cole et 
al., (2004), in validating the structural properties of a similar rating scale, report many 
similar considerations to those presented here – inadmissible solutions because of negative 
variance and positively skewed data.  
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Univariate normality. 
Item univariate Skew and Kurtosis, and associated standard errors, were tabulated and are 
presented in Table 6.1. Critical ratios suggest that data is skewed and kurtotic (values > 
2.58 or greater; Field, 2005). Some authors suggest that kurtosis is a more significant 
concern with non-normality, because of its impact on model estimation (Byrne, 2001; 
West, Finch & Curran, 1995). The positive direction of the skew is as expected because 
most respondents did not report significant mood disorder, and therefore scored at the 
lower end of the scale. 
 
Table 6.1: Univariate and Multivariate distributions of 21 Beck Depression 
Inventory II items. c.r. = Critical Ratios for Skew and Kurtosis. These are equivalent 
to Skew and Kurtosis values divided by their standard error, and represents z-scores 
(Field, 2005: 72). Assuming normality, Skew/Kurtosis have a mean = 0 and a standard 
error = 1. Critical ratios of > 2.58, plus or minus, indicate a non-normal distribution. 
Multivariate normality is indicated by Mardia’s (Mardia, 1970) coefficient, which also 
indicates multivariate non-normality when values > 2.58 
 
Variable / Univariate Normality Skew c.r. Kurtosis c.r. 
Loss of Energy -.014 -.055 -.549 -1.121 
Fatigue .745 3.041 -.127 -.258 
Crying 1.726 7.048 2.954 6.029 
Agitation 1.802 7.359 3.880 7.920 
Loss of Interest 2.013 8.220 4.071 8.310 
Indecisive 1.043 4.259 .129 .263 
Irritability 1.750 7.144 2.151 4.392 
Changes in Sleep .873 3.566 .112 .229 
Changes in Appetite 1.579 6.447 1.834 3.744 
Loss of Concentration .487 1.988 -.748 -1.527 
Loss of Interest in Sex 1.310 5.347 .636 1.299 
Past Failure 1.258 5.138 1.321 2.697 
Pessimism .906 3.698 .547 1.116 
Sadness 1.397 5.703 .703 1.435 
Self-Dislike 1.226 5.005 1.532 3.127 
Self-Criticalness 1.234 5.039 1.254 2.560 
Suicidal Thoughts or Wishes 1.858 7.584 2.624 5.357 
Worthless 1.068 4.362 .369 .753 
Punishment Feelings 1.803 7.362 1.891 3.860 
Guilty Feelings 1.019 4.160 -.029 -.059 
Loss of Pleasure 1.114 4.549 .503 1.026 
Multivariate Normality    105.142 16.914 
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Multivariate Normality 
Mardia’s coefficient of multivariate kurtosis had a critical ratio of 16.914, well above the 
1.96 value (at p < 0.05) or 2.58 (at p < 0.01) level at which significant departure is defined. 
Approaches to handling data that is not normally distributed were therefore investigated. 
The first consideration is whether the data would be expected to be normally distributed in 
this sample in the first instance (Ullman & Bentler, 2004) Given the non-psychiatric 
sample used in this study, the skewed result is expected (Cole et al, 2004); further, with 
low scores indicating lower levels of depression, a positive skew is expected. Data 
transformations are typically used to greatest effect with such skewed data (Schumacker & 
Lomax, 2004) but while transforming data towards normality, they may equally be being 
transformed away from the true population distribution (Hayduk, 2001) 
 
For untransformed data, a number of methods are available for adjusting for the non-
normality in calculating the model fit statistics, specifically the x2 statistic. Multivariate 
non-normality typically will impact on the x2 statistic, on parameter standard errors and 
some fit indices, though not necessarily the parameter value itself (Hutchinson & Olmos, 
1998; Finney & DiStefano, 2006). One mechanism for adjusting the x2 value for the non-
normality of the data is a bootstrap process (Efron, 1979; Bollen and Stine, 1992; Fouladi, 
1998). Bootstrap procedures involve random resampling of some of the available dataset, 
replacing the sampled data points with data that relates to the overall characteristics of that 
dataset itself. This generates many alternative datasets and these datasets can then be used 
to test the same model and generate adjusted x2 estimates by averaging the derived sample 
statistics (Finney & DiStefano 2006; Blunch, 2008). This would be a bootstrap process 
related to the x2
 
 goodness-of-fit statistic to account for non-normality in the original 
sample (Bollen & Stine, 1993; Byrne, 2001).  
The Bollen-Stine bootstrap procedure (Bollen and Stine, 1992; Bollen Stine 1993; Finney 
& DiStefano 2006; Arbuckle 2007) can be used specifically with more modest sample 
sizes (Finney & DiStefano, 2006).  Alternative bootstrapping procedures, such as the 
Satorra-Bentler correction (Satorra and Bentler, 1994; Harris, and D'Eon, 2008; Vanheule 
et al., 2008) can be used, but the recommended sample size is ideally greater than 200 
cases (Nevitt & Hancock, 2001). One CFA study of the BDI-II (Vanheule et al., 2008), 
points to the use of this Satorra-Bentler bootstrap only in a large sample of people. 
 
   203 
 
Some authors discuss the limited evidence at the n = 100 level for bootstrapping, making 
recommendation difficult (Nevitt & Hancock, 2001; Kline, 2005). Instead, especially for 
categorical data such as here, some suggest a process called parcelling (Hull, Tedlie & 
Lehn, 1995). Parcelling is an approach where a number of items on a scale are summed 
and treated as a single continuous indicator so that more normal estimation methods may 
give more stable results, by increasing the number of possible scores. The issue with 
parcelling, especially with a tool where the factor structure seems to differ in different 
populations (as the BDI-II does; Beck Steer & Brown, 1996), is deciding, a prioi, which 
items to parcel (Bandalos & Finney, 2001). In general, it is considered a somewhat 
controversial topic because it requires known information about dimensionality of a scale 
(Kline, 2005). Given the number of different models of the BDI-II derived from differing 
samples, such clear dimensionality cannot be assumed. Parcelling was therefore not used, 
and the small sample size meant that use of the Satorra-Bentler or Bollen-Stine bootstrap 
adjustment to the x2
 
 value has only limited support as an approach to management of non-
normality. Transformation of the data therefore remained an alternative option. 
While one proposed limitation of transforming data such as the BDI-II responses is that the 
original metric, and therefore some interpretability can be lost. However, results presented 
in Chapter 5 allow for understanding of the sample performance on this scale. The 
transformation was considered appropriate from the point of view of generating a more 
stable model, and from the perspective that various rotations were used in generating the 
original model that is tested here (Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996). On balance therefore, a 
square-root transformation was considered to present a beneficial impact on normalising 
the positively skewed data. The results of the transformation, in terms of univariate and 
multivariate normality are presented in table 6.2, and better concord with most heuristics 
about acceptable levels of normality.  
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Table 6.2: Univariate and Multivariate distribution of square-root (sq) 
transformed 21 Beck Depression Inventory II items. c.r. = Critical Ratios for Skew 
and Kurtosis. These are equivalent to Skew and Kurtosis values divided by their 
standard error, and represents z-scores (Field, 2005: 72). Assuming normality, 
Skew/Kurtosis have a mean = 0 and a standard error = 1. Critical ratios of > 2.58, plus 
or minus, indicate a non-normal distribution. Multivariate normality is indicated by 
Mardia’s (Mardia, 1970) coefficient, which also indicates multivariate non-normality 
when values > 2.58 
 
Variable / Univariate Normality Skew c.r. Kurtosis c.r. 
Loss of Energy .868 3.543 -.839 -1.712 
Fatigue .009 .038 -1.621 -3.308 
Crying .704 2.874 -1.160 -2.367 
Agitation -.071 -.292 -1.727 -3.525 
Loss of Interest .749 3.059 -.973 -1.987 
Indecisive 1.326 5.412 -.030 -.062 
Irritability -.062 -.255 -1.435 -2.929 
Changes in Sleep -1.108 -4.522 .190 .388 
Changes in Appetite .464 1.895 -1.496 -3.053 
Loss of Concentration .406 1.656 -1.494 -3.049 
Loss of Interest in Sex 1.194 4.876 -.155 -.317 
Past Failure .761 3.108 -.934 -1.907 
Pessimism 1.448 5.912 .300 .612 
Sadness .451 1.841 -1.433 -2.925 
Self-Dislike .513 2.093 -1.448 -2.955 
Self-Criticalness 1.268 5.178 -.020 -.040 
Suicidal Thoughts or Wishes .573 2.338 -1.468 -2.997 
Worthless .454 1.855 -1.465 -2.991 
Punishment Feelings .404 1.651 -1.422 -2.903 
Guilty Feelings -.001 -.004 -1.538 -3.140 
Loss of Pleasure 1.191 4.862 -.499 -1.018 
Multivariate Normality    27.903 4.489 
 
 
Outliers 
Figure 6.1 of individual box-plots was created for the untransformed z-scores of each of 
the 21 items on the scale, and demonstrated a number of outliers for 18 of the 21 items. 
This figure also underlines the positive skew in the scoring, with most people scoring low 
and outliers being higher scorers. Extreme values occurred where all but a small number of 
participants scored anything other than 0 on the scale (0-3) on items Suicidal Thoughts or 
Wishes and more Irritability than usual. Figure 6.2 presents the same assessment after 
square-root transformation; the dispersion of item-by-item responses suggests that this 
process reduced the number of outlying scores. 
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Multivariate outliers were sought through the information provided by AMOS about the 
Mahalanobis Distance (d2
 
) of scores. None of the observations in the transformed data 
appear to be ‘improbably far from the centroid’ (Arbuckle, 2007:240). 
Measurement Scale 
The issues relating to measurement scale for this instrument have been considered in 
Chapter 3 and suggest that it is unlikely to present significant cost, especially where data 
are or approach a normal distribution. Having considered the issues related to the data; 
normality, outliers, measurement scale, and having addressed them to a pragmatic extent, 
the square root transformed data was used for all models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   206 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Univariate outlier detection using z scores of 21 BDI-II items (n=100). Outlier 
labels refer to case numbers indicated in red, and extreme values those in green. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Univariate outlier detection using z scores of square root transformed data 
for the 21 BDI-II items (n=100). Outlier labels refer to case numbers indicated in red, 
and extreme values those in green. 
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6.2.2. Model Specification. 
Two groups of models were specified; first, models based on published factor structure in 
the test manual (Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996), with a single-factor model for comparison. 
Thereafter, testing of factor models based on three clinical samples, each of which might 
be expected to relate to the sample under study - people with chronic pain, treatment 
seeking substance abusers, and head-injured people. The reasons for this are discussed in 
considering theoretical specification of these models. 
 
A single factor model was tested first. It contained all 21 items of the BDI-II. The single 
factor model is based on a number of studies that suggest that there is a single second-
order factor structure to the BDI-II (Gullion & Rush, 1998; Cole, et al., 2004). This was 
considered a default model against which multi-factor models were assessed. The primary 
multi-factor models included a two-factor model based on the exploratory factor analyses 
published in the manual for the BDI-II (Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996) of 500 psychiatric 
outpatients, and a two-factor model based on exploratory factor analysis of 120 
undergraduate students, also presented in the test manual. 
 
Theoretical Specification of Models 
Many dimensionality assessments of the BDI-II tend to be taken from the North American 
undergraduate population (e.g., Beck Steer & Brown, 1996; Osman et al, 1997; Dozois, 
Dobson & Ahnberg, 1998; Whisman, Perez and Ramel, 2000; Storch, Roberti & Roth, 
2004), rather than clinical samples. One reason for this is that in testing and selecting the 
best fitting model for the BDI-II, the ratio of sample size to degrees of freedom (df) in the 
models requires large samples. The large sample size requirement for model testing is a 
challenge in health sciences, but perhaps less so in an undergraduate population. These 
undergraduate samples tend not to be chronically (medically or psychiatrically) unwell and 
tend to be young (e.g. Osman et al, 1997 mean age = 19.02 years; Stock, Roberti & Roth 
2004 mean age = 20.52 years). This is a limitation in terms of confirming models; in the 
main they have been developed on a young healthy, non-clinical, sample and not the range 
of populations for which many such measures have been developed. 
 
In samples of people with ‘fairly minor medical conditions’ (Viljoen et al., 2003:289), 
more serious medical conditions (Thombs, Zeigelstein, Beck & Pilote, 2008) and in 
primary care medical attendees (Arnau, Meagher, Norris & Bramson (2001), a two-factor 
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model including Somatic/Affective & Cognitive factors has been proposed, or confirmed to 
be as good other two or three factor models (Thombs, Ziegelstein, Beck & Pilote, 2008). 
All three studies supported the presence of a single second-order depression factor also. 
 
The picture is complicated however when considering people for whom symptoms of 
depression and somatic or psychosocial factors might be confounded, such as in MS 
(Nyenhuis et. al., 1995), in drug withdrawal (Seignourel, Green & Schmitz 2007), chronic 
pain (Harris & D’Eon 2008) or traumatic brain injury (Rowland, Lam & Leahy, 2005). A 
number of factorial studies of the BDI-II have been carried out which were deemed useful 
to consider. They include substance abusers, where withdrawal might implicate especially 
somatic aspects of depression (Buckley, Parker & Heggie 2001), people with chronic pain 
and people with traumatic brain injury potentially reflecting cognitive, affective and 
psychosocial results similar to an MS population. The dataset from the MS sample under 
study was therefore also submitted to these models to assess their potential as better 
accounts of self-reported depression in MS, than those derived from a younger sample or 
from people with psychiatric illness. 
 
Statistical Specification 
In specifying models, correlated errors (residuals) were allowed if considered theoretically 
plausible; there is some debate about whether this is statistically appropriate (Schumacker 
& Lomax 2004). Some suggest that allowing error terms to correlate might indicate some 
redundancy in inventory items, (e.g. items about fatigue and lack of energy) and is thus 
appropriate in analysis of tools where redundancy might occur (Byrne, 2001:93; Harris & 
D’Eon, 2008). In this sample of people with MS where fatigue and loss of energy might be 
confounded, it would therefore be acceptable.  In the initial models, no error covariances 
were included, but were considered as part of the modification and re-specification 
process. Error term covariances were kept to a minimum and were selected based on 
modification indices once considered theoretically acceptable. Figure 6.3. summarises the 
models. Each will be outlined prior to testing. 
 
   209 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Summary of planned Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis models. 
 
6.2.3. Model Testing 
 
Model Identification. 
This identification stage, including other components of identification (e.g. the rank 
condition: Schumacker & Lomax, 2004:173), are checked as part of the initial AMOS 
output, and was found to be identified in all models tested. 
 
Model Estimation. 
All models were tested using Generalised Least Squares (GLS) estimation in AMOS with 
transformed data used. Sample size for each model was 100 participants. 
  
Model Fit. 
The concept of model fit, and fit indices, was discussed at length in Development of 
Methods where the selected indices of fit were presented. Selected fit indices and other 
assessments of model acceptability are summarised in Table 6.3, with the acceptable 
values where appropriate indicated in Table 6.4. All statistical judgments were set a cut off 
for alpha of < 0.05, unless otherwise stated. 
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Table 6.3: Fit indices and other assessments of model acceptability. x2 = Chi Square 
value; x2 
 
p-value = significance of chi-square statistic; CMIN/df = chi-square to degrees of 
freedom ratio; GFI = Goodness of Fit Index; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA=Root 
Mean Square Error of Approximation; 90% CI = 90% confidence Intervals for RMSEA; 
SRMR = Standardised Root Mean Square Residual. Interfactor correlations are relevant to 
the interpretation of Confirmatory Factor Analyses with values > 0.80 suggesting that 
factors may be too closely relate to be discriminated. 
Specific indices of model fit Other Assessments 
x2 Standardized Residual Matrix values generally < 2.58 & p-value 
CMIN/df Interfactor correlations in 2+ factor models < 0.80 
GFI Squared Multiple correlation (r2
CFI 
) values > 0.20 
Parameter sign & significance 
RMSEA:  90% CI & p-value  
SRMR  
 
 
 
 
Table 6.4: Summary of recommended values for model fit indices. x2 = Chi Square 
value; x2
 
p-value = significance of chi-square statistic; CMIN/df = chi-square to degrees 
of freedom ratio; GFI = Goodness of Fit Index; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; 
RMSEA=Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; 90% CI = 90% confidence 
Intervals for RMSEA; SRMR = Standardised Root Mean Square Residual 
x2 CMIN/df  p-value GFI CFI  RMSEA  SRMR 
p > 0.05 < 2.0 > 0.90 > 0.90 
 
90% CI upper limit of 
0.08; pclose > 0.50 
< 0.10 
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6.2.4. Model I: 1-factor model of BDI-II 
The model is presented in figure 6.4. Model fit indices were: x2 = 233.653, df. = 189 p = 
0.015, x2/df = 1.236, GFI = 0.775, CFI = 0.345, RMSEA = 0.049 (90% CI 0.023 - 0.068; p 
= 0.523). SRMR= 0.1547. Regression weights were all significant at p < 0.05 level and 
positive in value; Standardised Residual Covariances again were generally < 2.58. Finally, 
item r2 values for 20 of 21ietms were > 2.0 (Changes in Sleep r2
 
 = 0.184). 
Modification indices suggested a number error covariance of which only Sadness & 
Pessimism and Loss of Pleasure & Crying were considered theoretically plausible, so were 
allowed to covary. The model was then retested for fit. Only Sadness & Pessimism had an 
expected positive error covariance and the value was significantly different from zero (p = 
0.018; r = 0.310). Respecified model fit statistics were x2 = 228.103, df. = 188, p = 0.024, 
x2/df = 1.213, GFI = 0.781, CFI = 0.412, RMSEA = 0.046 (90% CI 0.019 - 0.067; pclose = 
0.578). Regression weights were all significant at p < 0.05 level and positive in value, 
Standardised Residual Covariances were generally < 2.58 in absolute values and for item 
r2 values all but one was > 2.0 (Changes in Sleep r2
 
 = 0.189). 
The x2 p-value in this model was < 0.05, which should lead to outright rejection of the 
model, according to Barrett (2007). Given that some other indices present acceptable 
results, including the x2
 
/df value (1.213), it will be retained for comparison with the other 
candidates from the rest of the model testing process. Table 6.5 summarises fit indices for 
both the initial and modified 1-factor model, and Appendix D the statistical data for the 
final model. 
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Table 6.5. 1-Factor BDI: Summary of goodness of fit statistics. x2=chi square value; df=degrees of freedom; x2
 
/df = chi square to 
degrees of freedom ratio; GFI = goodness of fit index; CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA= Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation; 90% CI RMSEA= 90% confidence intervals for RMSEA; SRMR = Standardised Root Mean Square Residual. n/a = 
factor correlation not applicable because only a single factor. 
Model 1 x df 2 p x2 GFI /df CFI RMSEA 90% CI RMSEA RMSEA p value SRMR Factor correlation 
Initial Model  233.653 189 0.015 1.236 0.775 0.345 0.049 0.023 -0.068 0.523 0.1547 n/a 
Modified Model 228.103 188 0.024 1.213 0.781 0.412 0.046 0.018- 0.067 0.595 0.1520 n/a 
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Figure 6.4. I Factor Model of the Beck Depression Inventory. Parameter 
estimates are the factor loadings for each of the 21 observed indicators. These are 
standardised regression weights. Model fit statistics were x2 = 228.103, df. = 188, p 
= 0.024, x2
 
/df = 1.213, GFI = 0.781, CFI = 0.412, RMSEA = 0.046 
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6.2.5. Model II: 2-factor model of BDI (500 psychiatric outpatients).  
Factor 1: Cognitive, Factor 2: Somatic/Affective. 
 
The results of initial model fitting were: x2 = 229.131, df =188 p = 0.022, x2/df = 1.219, 
GFI = 0.780, CFI = 0.397, RMSEA = 0.047 (90% CI 0.019 - 0.067; pclose = 0.578), and 
SRMR = 0.1259. Parameter estimates did not meet the criteria for significance in a number 
of instances, with 10 of the 20 estimated parameters being non-significant. Inter-factor 
intercorrelation was also non-significant (p = 0.432; r = 0.624). The Standardised Residual 
Matrix presented large number of values > 2.58, suggesting model-implied and data-
implied covariance structures differed considerably. From the r2
 
 values 7 of 21 were < 
0.20. Overall this suggested a poor fit of the model based on both fit indices and individual 
parameter assessment.  
None of the modification indices were reasonable from a theoretical perspective, so were 
not pursued. Issues related to the non-significant interfactor correlation, parameter 
estimates and significant model-implied versus data-implied differences, underlined in the 
matrix of Standardised Residuals. The fit indices are presented in table 6.6 below, but 
should be interpreted with caution, as many other criteria for a theoretically acceptable 
model: regression weights that are significant, significance and size of the inter-factor 
correlation, were not met. As a result, it is proposed that this is a mis-specified model for 
this sample. Of interest, this result presents a good example of conflicting findings between 
global fit and component lack of fit. The full statistical outputs are presented in Appendix 
E. 
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Table 6.6. Model II. 2-Factor BDI: ‘Cognitive’ and ‘Somatic/Affective’. Summary of goodness of fit statistics. x2=chi square 
value; df=degrees of freedom; x2
 
/df = chi square to degrees of freedom ratio; GFI = goodness of fit index; CFI = comparative fit 
index; RMSEA= Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; 90% CI RMSEA= 90% confidence intervals for RMSEA; SRMR = 
Standardised Root Mean Square Residual. n.s. = non-significant 
Model II x df 2 p x2 GFI /df CFI RMSEA 90% CI RMSEA RMSEA p value SRMR Factor correlation 
Final Model 229.131 188 0.022 1.219 0.780 0.397 0.047 0.019 - 0.067 0.578 0.1259 0.624 n.s. 
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6.2.6. Model III: 2-factor BDI based on 120 undergraduates.  
Factor 1: Cognitive/Affective, Factor 2: Somatic. 
 
In the original development of this model, Beck, Steer & Brown (1996) removed the two 
items with lowest factor loadings (Pessimism and Loss of Interest in Sex). As this 
judgement was based on the results of an exploratory factor analysis, and in line with 
others (Osman et al, 1997), Pessimism and Loss of Interest in Sex were included with the 
Cognitive/Affective factor here because higher regression coefficients were associated 
with each in the original Beck Steer and Brown (1996) analysis.  
 
Results were as follows: x2 = 220.751, df = 188, p = 0.051; x2/df =1.174, GFI = 0.788, CFI 
= 0.520, RMSEA = 0.042 (0.00 - 0.063; pclose = 0.712), and SRMR = 0.1331. Correlation 
of factors was 0.766 (p < 0.05) and all parameters were both positive in value and 
significant. In the matrix of Standardised Residual covariances Loss of Interest in Sex, 
Crying and Agitation again seemed to be the least well described items, generating values 
> 2.58. r2 
 
values for 20 of the 21 items were > 0.20, with Sleep again < 0.20. 
The highest modification index value (8.228) was for an error covariance between Past 
Failure and Self Dislike. The estimated value of the covariance was (standardised r = -
0.46) which was not meaningful because of the negative relationship, so was not applied. 
Only a Sadness and Pessimism residual covariance was theoretically acceptable and 
resulted in a value of r = 0.30 (p = 0.021). Overall model fit statistics were: x2 = 215.477, 
df = 187, p = 0.075; x2/df = 1.152 GFI = 0.793, CFI = 0.582, RMSEA = 0.039 (90% CI 
0.00 - 0.061; pclose = 0.770), and SRMR = 0.1308. Correlation of factors was r = 0.769. 
The matrix of standardised residual covariances indicated Loss of Interest in Sex, Crying 
and Agitation remained problematic. Standardised (regression) parameter loadings were all 
significant and positive in value, and factor correlation between ‘Cognitive/Affective’ and 
‘Somatic’ was r =.796. r2 
 
values for all 21 items, except Crying were > .20. This model 
was therefore considered acceptable in terms of fit assessment, and was therefore retained 
for later model comparison. Table 6.7 summarises the fit indices for the initial and 
modified model, and Appendix F the statistical data for the final model. This CFA model is 
presented in Figure 6.5. 
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Figure 6.5. Beck, Steer & Brown’s (1996) Two-factor Confirmatory Factor model of the Beck 
Depression Inventory, based on a sample of 120 undergraduates. Factor 1: Cognitive/Affective, Factor 2: 
Somatic. Final fit statistics were x2 = 215.477, df = 187, p = 0.075; x2
 
/df = 1.152 GFI = 0.793, CFI = 0.582, 
RMSEA = 0.039.Error covariance between two observed items is modelled 
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Table 6.7. 2-Factor 21 item BDI: ‘Cognitive/Affective’ and ‘Somatic’ Model based on 120 college students, from Beck Steer 
& Brown, 1996. Summary of goodness of fit statistics. x2=chi square value; df=degrees of freedom; x2
 
/df = chi square to degrees 
of freedom ratio; GFI = goodness of fit index; CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA= Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; 
90% CI RMSEA= 90% confidence intervals for RMSEA; SRMR = Standardised Root Mean Square Residual. Factor correlation is 
p < 0.05 
Model III x df 2 p x2 GFI /df CFI RMSEA 90% CI RMSEA RMSEA p value SRMR Factor correlation 
Initial Model 220.751 188 0.051 1.174 0.788 0.520 0.042 0.000 - 0.063 0.712 0.1331 0.766 
Modified Model 215.477 187 0.075 1.152 0.793 0.582 0.039 0.000 - 0.061 0.770 0.1308 0.769 
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6.2.7. Model IV: 3-factor BDI-II model on a sample of ‘treatment-seeking substance 
abusers’. (Buckley, Parker & Heggie 2001; Seignourel, Green & Schmitz 2007). 
The model estimation gave a non-positive definite (NPD) covariance matrix error, so the 
model solution is considered inadmissible. This is likely because of multicollinearity 
between BDI items. The reported correlations were: Cognitive Factor & Affective Factor = 
0.96, Affective Factor & Somatic Factor = 0.92, Cognitive Factor & Somatic Factor = 
0.75.  
 
6.2.8. Model V: 3-factor model of BDI-II in people with chronic pain (Harris and D’Eon, 
2008). 
 A study of people with chronic pain was also selected because this is a population where 
somatic and depressive symptoms might concur (Harris & D’Eon 2008). One difference 
might be in the level of severity of endorsed depression symptoms; the MS sample might 
be more heterogeneous and people with chronic pain tend to more often report more severe 
symptoms of depression (Harris & D’Eon, 2008). A final note was that the chronic pain 
sample was of an average age of 43.25 years, more in line with the age of participants in 
this study. The model has 3 factors; Factor 1: Negative Attitude, Factor 2: Performance 
Difficulty and Factor 3: Somatic elements. Figure 6.6 presents this model. In the original 
study, inter-factor correlations were high with r’s = 0.84, 0.98, 0.95 in women and r’s = 
0.85, 0.98 and 0.96 in men. Not surprisingly therefore, a single second-order factor model 
was also deemed an acceptable model. Here, the 3-factor model was tested.  
 
Results were x2 = 216.952, df = 186 p = 0.060, x2/df = 1.166. GFI = 0.791, CFI = 0.546, 
RMSEA = 0.041 (90% CI = 0.00 - 0.062; pclose = 0.732) and SRMR = 0.1393. Parameter 
estimates and residual covariances were all acceptable. Modification indices suggested a 
number of potentially acceptable within-factor residual covariances between Past Failure 
& Self Dislike, and Guilt & Self Criticalness. Only Guilt & Self-Criticalness was positive 
in value. The addition of the error covariance between Guilt & Self-Criticalness led to a re-
estimation of model fit. Main fit indices were: x2 = 211.551, df = 185 p = 0.088, x2/df = 
1.144. GFI = 0.796, CFI = 0.610 RMSEA = 0.038 (90% CI = 0.00 - 0.06; pclose = 0.790) 
and SRMR = 0.1381. Statistical fit and interfactor correlations for iterations of this model 
are presented in Table 6.8. The full output is available in Appendix G. The high inter-
factor correlation in this model argues for a reduced number of factors - either 1 or 2 
factors being potentially a better theoretical fit and more parsimonious. 
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Figure 6.6.The Harris and D’Eon (2008) three-factor Confirmatory Factor model of the Beck 
Depression Inventory, based on a sample of people with chronic pain. Factor 1: Negative attitude, 
Factor 2: Performance difficulty & Factor 3: Somatic elements. Model fit for the initial model was 
x2 = 216.952, df = 186 p = 0.060, x2
 
/df = 1.166. GFI = 0.791, CFI = 0.546, RMSEA = 0.041 
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Table 6.8. 3-Factor Harris & D’Eon (2008): Summary of goodness of fit statistics. x2=chi square value; df=degrees of 
freedom; x2
Model V 
/df = chi square to degrees of freedom ratio; GFI = goodness of fit index; CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA= 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; 90% CI RMSEA= 90% confidence intervals for RMSEA; SRMR = Standardised 
Root Mean Square Residual. All interfactor correlations are P <0.05, but at r > 0.80, some are too large to be considered as 
separable factors. 
x df 2 p x2 GFI /df CFI RMSEA 90% CI RMSEA RMSEA p value SRMR Factor correlation 
Initial model  216.952 186 0.060 1.166 0.791 0.546 0.041 0.00 - 0.062 0.732 0.1393 0.960, 0.890, 0.734 
Final model 211.551 185 0.088 1.144 0.796 0.610 0.038 0.00 - 0.06 0.790 0.1381 0.958, 0.893, 0.737 
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6.2.9. Model VI: 3-factor BDI model - Traumatic Brain Injury (Rowland, Lam and Leahy, 
2005). 
Finally, a sample of people with brain injury was investigated (Rowland, Lam and Leahy, 
2005). This paper was considered because it implicated time since injury as a relevant 
factor in increasing depression, suggesting that the BDI was sensitive to a psychosocial 
contribution to measured mood disorder, which has been discussed also in respect of MS-
related depression (Minden 2000). 
 
This model generated a non-positive definite matrix, with the 3 interfactor correlations at 
r’s = 0.997, 1.109 and 1.011. It seems likely that the factor description is not sufficiently 
well specified. While a correlation value of  > 1.0 is not typically found, the AMOS 
software may estimate a correlation > 1.0 for a number of reasons including linear 
dependence between items, that is collinearity (Brown, 2006). Many would suggest that 
the appearance of Heywood cases in CFA could also relate to poor model specification 
(Schumacker & Lomax, 2004; Kline, 2006; Blunch 2008). 
 
6.2.10. Discussion of Results. 
 
Generally, high interfactor correlations (> 0.80) argued for smaller numbers of factors and 
many published studies also accept that there may be a single second-order ‘self-reported 
depression symptoms’ factor. From some perspectives single factor models may be of 
limited clinical utility. In a sample of people with MS for example it may be clinically 
useful to be able to separate different factors. The ability to discern whether one set of 
items is more affected by a disease process, is a better indicator of depression or is more 
responsive to intervention offers greater sensitivity (Nyehuis et al., 1995; Randolph et al., 
2000). It might also be of use in determining the relationships of the disease itself to 
reporting affective as opposed to somatic symptoms of depression, given the potential for 
somatic symptoms to reflect aspects of the disease - fatigue, loss of energy, sleep or 
appetite changes (Nyenhuis et. al., 1995). In conjunction with analyses of the normative 
samples of the BDI (Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996) a two-factor structure does seem 
applicable.   
 
Conclusions about best fitting models were necessarily tentative with an approximate ratio 
of participants to each parameter (n=100; BDI-II items = 21; parameters to be estimated = 
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42-47). Many of the measures of model fit are strongly related to the degrees of freedom 
(df) within a model (Steiger, 1990; Hox, 2002, Cole et al., 2004) and with 21 items in the 
models, df were between 185 and 188. Thus, measures of fit, based in part of df, such as 
GFI and CFI (Cole et al., 2004; Arbuckle, 2007), were expected to be impacted; in all 
models these were below desired levels (typically < 0.80, rather than > 0.90 for GFI). 
Measures less impacted by sample size or df in the model, such as the RMSEA generally 
were not expected to be impacted, and all values were < 0.05, and had desired p value of > 
0.50. In assessing model fit therefore, three assessments were made - Exclusion of 
inadmissible models, appraisal of Fit Indices (notably the x2
 
 and associated p-value), and 
between-model comparison.  
Typically modification indices were used to improve model fit, in this case based on 
correlating residual error terms. This decreases the df and is also a plausible modification 
based on similarity in some questions – e.g. Sadness & Pessimism or Sadness & Crying 
questions might share the some redundancy in the scale. In applying modifications to 
models, a light touch was maintained both because of the philosophy behind confirmatory 
approaches and because with the aim of creating factor scores based on the best fitting 
CFA model, these modifications would be lost. Factor assignment would be reflected in 
the factor score, but residual covariance would not. 
 
Inadmissible solutions 
 
The literature appears clear that a single dimension of ‘depression symptoms’ is reflected 
in the BDI-II.  This presents the possibility of encountering issues related to collinearity. 
As a result, the first set of judgements related to models for which collinearity was 
possibly a problem leading to their rejection, or inadmissibility. These typically involved 
generation of non-positive definite matrices, inter-factor correlations that were too high (r 
> 0.80; Maruyama, 1998) or regression weights that were non-significant or have the 
wrong sign (here minus values). Other reasons for initial rejection of models were where 
there were unacceptable differences between the model-implied and data-implied 
covariances/correlations. These latter differences became evident when the matrix of 
Standardised Residual Covariances was inspected and many values were > 2.58 (Joreskog 
& Sorbom1998; Arbuckle, 2007). In these cases it is proposed that the discrepancy 
between the model and data is unacceptable. 
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Model V: Harris and D’Eon (2008) 
With interfactor correlations of 0.96, 0.89 & 0.76 in the Harris & D’Eon (2008) model, 3-
factor dimensionality was discounted in favour of a more likely 2- or single-factor model. 
As the aim of the modelling process here is to test a measurement model rather than 
explore factor structure, and because of the high interfactor correlations, it is more realistic 
to reject these models as not being optimal in fit. The Harris & D’Eon (2008) model was 
therefore not selected for further evaluation. 
 
Model IV: Rowland, Lam and Leahy (2005)  & Model V: Seignourel, Green & Schmitz, 
(2007); Buckley, Parker & Heggie (2001)  
In a similar vein, the Rowland, Lam and Leahy (2005) model of people with traumatic 
brain injury, and the Buckley et al., model (Buckley, Parker & Heggie, 2001; Seignourel, 
Green & Schmitz, 2007) of treatment-seeking substance abusers were excluded because of 
their generation of non-positive definite (NPD) matrices. The basis of the SEM is in matrix 
algebra; for mathematical operations to take place on these matrices, a matrix needs to be a 
‘positive definite’ matrix. NPD matrices arise when this is not the case, and the reasons for 
this frequently relate to high levels of linear dependence between items on the BDI 
(Schumacker & Lomax, 2004:48; i.e. between the 21 items on the BDI-II), that may not 
have been accounted for in the correlations or ‘used-up’ by the latent variable structure 
(Blunch, 2008:93), suggesting model mis-specification for this sample. The inter-factor 
correlations of near and above 1.0 also support a specification error in the model, possibly 
related to poor item-factor assignment not applicable to this sample (Schumacker & 
Lomax, 2004) 
 
Model II: Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996 - Cognitive & Somatic/Affective factors 
One other model worthy of consideration in respect of high correlations between factors 
was the Beck model (Model II: Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996) based on a sample of 500 
people in an outpatient psychiatric setting. This model, with Cognitive and Non-Cognitive 
(Somatic-Affective) factors, generated a non-significant correlation of r = 0.624. 
Additionally, about half of the regression weights in the model were also non significant. 
As the matrix of standardized residuals contained many large residual values, this model is 
probably misspecified by poor item-to-factor assignment (Maruyama, 1998:67). In 
summary, this is likely to be a misspecified model, given non-significant regression 
   225 
 
weights, a high number of large values in the Standardised Residual Matrix, high standard 
errors for variance estimates and a non-significant correlation between the latent variables, 
despite a value of r > 0.60. One cause of this may relate to the conflation of affective and 
somatic items. In neurological samples (as opposed to psychiatric samples) somatic items 
might be seen to be congeneric, because of their relationship to the disease process, rather 
than anything to do with mood disorder (Nyenhuis, et al., 1995). 
 
Admissible solutions 
 
Assessment of a 2-factor model, this one based on a sample of 120 university 
undergraduates, and the single factor model remains warranted. In addition the relatively 
consistent findings of a second-order single factor of ‘self-reported depression’ (Steer et 
al., 1999:126), a model presenting two correlated factors - Cognitive/Affective and Somatic 
was also considered as an acceptable fit. Results of fitting are presented in Figure 6.8. 
Using only the x2 and associated p value, the two-factor model was the only of the two that 
met requirements for global fit. Given the outlined limitations of sample size to estimated 
parameters, consideration of other indices demonstrated little difference between these 
models; x2
 
/df, RMSEA or GFI.  
Model comparison was therefore carried out using a x2 difference test to confirm whether 
there is a statistical decrement in fit between the models. Using the initial version of each 
model, a x2 test of difference (1-factor x2 minus 2-factor x2) gives x2 = 12.902, with df = 1, 
supporting a reliable difference between the models at p < 0.001. This supports the 2-factor 
model, because it demonstrates that fit is reduced in the single factor. By effectively setting 
the correlation of the 2 factor model to = 1.0 (in doing so making a single factor, more 
constrained, model), the x2 difference test result 
 
says there is ‘no validity in imposing this 
constraint’ (Raykov & Marcoulides, 2006:102).  
A final comparison investigates if allowing correlated errors between Sadness and 
Pessimism supports them being related in a conceptual sense. The correlated error terms 
effectively assesses whether these items share error variance, exclusive of their 
relationship to a Cognitive/Affective depression factor. This again is tested by a x2 test of 
difference (2-factor no correlated error versus 2-factor no correlated error) gives x2 = 
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5.274, with df = 1, having a difference of p < 0.05 supporting the addition of a free-to-be-
estimated parameter, the residual correlation. 
 
Statistical comparison supports the 2-factor model with a Cognitive/Affective and Somatic 
factor, in line with the findings of Beck, Steer and Brown (1996) and supported by Dozois, 
Dobson & Ahnberg, (1998), which included a cross validation sample and a gender 
comparison that supported this as a generalisable factor structure. 
  
 
6.3. Measurement Model for Cognitive Items 
 
Introduction 
In this measurement model three cognitive latent variables were initially proposed – 
Executive Function, Memory and Information Processing. Measurement of each has been 
discussed in Chapter 2, Development of Methods.  
 
6.3.1. Data Screening 
 
Missing data 
Two missing scores from partial test completion were generated, both related to difficulties 
with the tasks; the data is therefore treated as non-ignorable. Remaining missing data (for 
2 additional participants) for these models were treated as missing completely at random 
(MCAR), in that it related to experimenter error for 2 instances of the Brixton test. 
Regression-based single-imputation was carried out based on the each model tested, to 
preserve characteristics of the dataset and because of the low instances of missingness. 
 
Univariate Normality. 
Absolute value for skew and kurtosis, and associated critical ratios are presented for each 
measure in Table 6.9. Absolute values for most are acceptable, in line with the previously 
discussed guidelines. The Hayling test performance was, according to critical ratios for 
kurtosis, non-normal, however the dependence between errors and time (i.e. a speed 
accuracy trade off) may explain this pattern. 
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Table 6.9: Univariate and Multivariate distributions of Cognitive tests. c.r. = Critical 
Ratios for Skew and Kurtosis. These are equivalent to Skew and Kurtosis values divided by 
their standard error, and represents z-scores (Field, 2005: 72). Assuming normality, 
Skew/Kurtosis have a mean = 0 and a standard error = 1. Critical ratios of > 2.58, plus or 
minus, indicate a non-normal distribution. Multivariate normality is indicated by Mardia’s 
(Mardia, 1970) coefficient, which also indicates multivariate non-normality when values > 
2.58 
Variable / Univariate Normality Skew c.r. Kurtosis c.r. 
Letter Number Sequencing (LNS) .241 .982 .640 1.307 
Symbol Digit Modalities Test (SDMT) .085 .349 -.495 -1.011 
Digit Span Task (Digits) .614 2.507 -.084 -.172 
Sentence Memory Test (SMT) .350 1.428 -.061 -.125 
Auditory Verbal Learning Test (AVLT) -.768 -3.134 .364 .706 
Hayling Errors A-type (A Errors) 1.746 7.127 2.924 5.968 
Hayling Errors B-Type (B Errors) .777 3.171 -.297 -.607 
Hayling Time (HayBminusA) 1.709 6.977 3.097 6.321 
Brixton Test Errors (BrixErr) .230 .938 -.582 -1.189 
Multivariate Normality   7.587 2.696 
 
 
Multivariate Normality 
Mardia’s coefficient for Multivariate normality (MVN) critical ratio was 2.696, indicating 
only a small departure from MVN.  
 
6.3.2. Model Specification 
 
Theoretical Specification of model. 
Selection of measures was based on the a prioi model of likely factor structure, the 
observed variables for which have been discussed earlier. The a prioi 3-Factor CFA is 
made up of: Factor 1: Information Processing (SDMT, LNS and Digits) Factor 2: Memory 
(AVLT7 and SMT recall) and Factor 3: Executive Function (Hayling A errors, Hayling B 
errors, Hayling Time and Brixton Errors). As discussed in Chapter 4: Methods the Hayling 
time score was calculated to exclude the possible confound of processing speed by 
subtracting simple initiation time from response time, in the difficult sentence completion 
task. Executive scores were reversed so that higher scores for all observed variables 
indicate better performance. 
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6.3.3. Model Testing 
 
6.3.4. Model I - 3 Factor Model: Information Processing, Memory & Executive Function. 
In this model, the Letter Number Sequencing task (LNS), Symbol Digits Modalities Test 
(SDMT) and Digit span test (Digits) indicate the latent variable of Information Processing, 
Executive Function is indicated by 4 Hayling & Brixton measures and Memory by the 
Auditory Verbal Learning Test and Sentence Memory Test. 
 
Results from initial model fit were x2=33.772, df = 24 p = 0.089, x2
 
/df = 1.407. GFI = 
0.924, CFI = 0.816 RMSEA = 0.064 (90% CI= 0.00 - 0.111; pclose = 0.30) and SRMR = 
0.0899. Global indices of fit were fairly encouraging and regression weights were all 
within expected size and were positive. Correlations between factors were the expected 
sign - positive between Executive Function and Memory, Executive Function and 
Information Processing and between Memory and Information Processing. The size of 
correlations was acceptable, and all were significant. Full statistical output is available in 
Appendix H, and the model is shown in Figure 6.7. 
Of interest in regard to model fit was a low CFI score (0.816), low factor loading for the 
Brixton test (r2 = 0.123), and values in the Standardised Residual covariance matrix 
associated with this item > 2.0. Unlike the models based on the Beck Depression 
Inventory, normality was within acceptable ranges for cognitive items, and the measures 
are perhaps more factorially validated, so the low (near significant) x2 p value in 
conjunction with CFI, residual matrix and r2 
 
factor loading was worthy of assessment. 
While acceptable model fit is suggested, given the discussion in Chapter 1 about factoral 
distinctiveness of executive function, working memory and information processing, some 
model improvements were considered. This process focused on theoretical considerations 
more than statistical. 
One issue in investigating this result relates to three of the four measures of executive 
function being from the same task - the Hayling Sentence Completion task. The measures 
taken from the task are Time, number of category A errors and number of category B 
errors. Scoring on these is not independent - e.g. a response time score is likely to relate to 
difficulty with the task and difficulties on this test might also lead to errors of word 
generation, of either A or B type. Effectively, participants may be slow to answer in order 
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to maintain a low error rate, or fast but errorful to increase speed. A and B-type errors are 
also mutually exclusive categories so may imply an association with each other. The 
relationship between these indicators might equally well be to do with the fact that they are 
generated from the same task performance. Such a common methods effect could explain 
the small amount of Brixton performance explained by this latent factor, largely indicated 
by the three Hayling task measures. Given that the normed data of the Hayling & Brixton 
tests (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) suggest they are not strongly correlated, a feature of 
executive tests already discussed, the Brixton test was kept as a contributor to the latent 
variable. Maintaining the Brixton measure is an issue of theoretical specification given the 
proposed diversity of executive function. 
 
Aside from the loading of the Brixton tests as an executive function item, the relationship 
of the LNS task to executive function is worthy of consideration. The latter was considered 
first as there was reason to suspect, from the literature, that it could load on the executive 
function factor. 
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Figure 6.7. The a priori Cognitive items’ CFA Model 1. IP=Information Processing, MEM= Memory, 
EF= Executive Function. SDMT=Symbol Digit Modalities Test, Digits=Digit Span Task, LNS=Letter 
Number Sequencing, AVLT7 = Auditory Verbal Learning Test (trial 7), SMT = Sentence Memory Test, A 
Errors/ B Errors - A type/ B type Errors Hayling Sentence Completion test. x2=33.772, df = 24 p = 0.089, 
x2
 
/df = 1.407. GFI = 0.924, CFI = 0.816 RMSEA = 0.064. Interfactor correlations are all significant at p < 
0.05. 
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6.3.5. Model II - 3 Factor Model – Information Processing Capacity, Delayed Recall and 
Executive Function (including LNS). 
 
This model generated a non-positive definite matrix and an inter-factor correlation of 1.07 
between Information Processing and Executive Function. This might suggest that the LNS 
item shares variance with both the information processing and the Executive Function 
dimensions, but equally could indicate that one of the other items in either factor is leading 
to the problem (Drew, Starkey & Isler, 2009). The single element, which might underlie 
each factor description, is the SDMT, proposed as a mediating factor (Information 
Processing) in the structural models, and in cognitive performance in MS more generally 
(DeLuca, et al, 2004). 
 
One of the key aims of developing a structural model was to investigate the mediating 
effect of an information-processing factor on the relationship of other cognitive operations 
(i.e. Memory and Executive Function) to metamemory. Two possible models could fulfil 
this function. The first alternative is a factor description in which information processing 
speed (SDMT) and complex processing or working memory abilities are related, but not 
congeneric. This decision relates to the discussion in Chapter 1 about lack of clarity in 
describing the processing deficit in MS. Therefore a four-factor model is proposed where 
the SDMT is a single indicator of information processing speed, the Digits and LNS 
indicate a ‘Working Memory factor’ with Memory and Executive Function remaining the 
other two factors. A second option, accepting the LNS might cause difficulties because of 
shared variance across two factors, was allowing it to cross-load on both executive 
function and information processing, though this would undermine the aim of modelling it 
and other information processing items as a mediators in later models. This latter approach 
was not considered warranted so a 4-factor model was specified with correlated factors and 
no item-factor cross loadings. 
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6.3.6. Model III. 4-Factor Model - Information Processing, Working Memory, Memory & 
Executive Function. 
 
In order to meet model identification requirements for the 4-factor CFA, error variance had 
to be explicitly modelled in the case of single indicators. This is recommended where the 
input is a covariance matrix, as it is here, by setting the path to 1.0 and the measurement 
error variance to a fixed non-zero value (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1999; Schumacker & 
Lomax, 2004; Blunch 2008) and the non-zero value should be, according to Bollen (1989): 
(1 - reliability) * varSDMT 
 
where varSDMT is the observed variance of the SDMT, r is the estimate of  internal or 
split-half reliability; for SDMT this is reliability is not reported in the literature, so a value 
of 0.80 was given; variance of sample performance was calculated to be var = 153.904. 
Measurement error was therefore given a value of 30.7808 for the unstandardised model, 
with a factor path loading of 1.0. The 4 factors for this model were therefore; Information 
Processing (SDMT), Working Memory (Digits, LNS), Memory (AVLT and SMT) and 
Executive Function (3 Hayling & 1 Brixton measures) 
 
Results of model fitting were: x2 = 24.370, df = 22 p = 0.328, x2/df = 1.108. GFI = 0.945, 
CFI = 0.955 RMSEA = 0.033 (90% CI= 0.00 - 0.093; pclose = 0.617) and SRMR = 
0.0697. All regression paths were positive and significant, interfactor correlations were 
significant and as expected, positive in sign. r2 values were all acceptable, with Brixton 
Errors the smallest, but improved, value at r2 
 
= 0.20. The matrix of standardised residuals 
was acceptable with all values < 2.58.  All three factors correlated to a reliable extent. The 
full statistical output is presented in Appendix I. 
The results of the a priori 3-factor model and the 4-factor model were compared 
statistically, given that both might be considered to fit. This was carried out by a x2 
difference test. The comparisons gave a x2 value of 9.402 for the 2 degrees of freedom 
difference between the models (model 1 minus model 2), which suggests a reliable 
improvement on model 1 fit statistics (p = 0.01). In conjunction with good values of CFI 
and in the standardised residual matrix, this supports a 4-factor account of the data from 
the sample. 
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6.3.7. Discussion of Results of Cognitive CFA Models 
In all, three models were tested with two models being good candidates. Both of the 
solvable models presented a non-significant chi-square (x2
 
) p-value indicating, at first pass, 
an acceptable global fit (Barrett, 2007). However when consideration was given to 
components of the models, Model I may have had some problems with specification 
leading to some elements of poor fit. This was the a priori model, but it was rejected 
because of apparent theoretical mis-specification, in favour of a model that seemed to 
address suboptimal distinctions between factors. Findings here therefore suggest that an 
additional Working Memory factor be considered, separate to both Information Processing 
and Executive Function. 
Model III had 4 factors; Information Processing, Working Memory, Memory and 
Executive Function. This four-factor model offers a distinct, and theoretically founded, 
differentiation of processing speed and working memory abilities. This finding is in line 
with a range of published investigations suggesting limited coherence in the concept of a 
single information-processing factor in Multiple Sclerosis (Chiaravalloti, et al., 2003; 
Drew, Starkey & Isler, 2009), that speed and attentional demands in the context of task 
complexity may reflect different factors, rather than a single coherent one.  
 
Generally, the evidence in MS suggests that information processing speed, rather than 
working memory, is the primary deficit (Demaree et al., 1999; DeLuca, et al, 2004; 
Lengenfelder et al., 2006; Diamond et al., 2008), though they are related, and may be more 
so for some MS subtypes than others (Archibald & Fisk, 2000; Drew, Starkey & Isler, 
2009). In the Relative Consequence Model proposed by DeLuca et al., (2004), processing 
speed is proposed to underlie other cognitive deficits, such as working memory. De Luca 
et al., (2004) propose that working memory is less often impaired in many people with 
MS, some threshold level of processing speed impairment may be required before it has a 
functional impact on working memory processes. This might, for example be staved-off by 
the recruitment of redundant capacity. This was proposed in MS on the basis of a fMRI 
study of working memory in MS carried out by Chiaravalotti et al (2005), which indicated 
that even with limited behavioural performance differences with controls, imaging data 
supported increased activations in additional areas of the brain in achieving those normal 
levels of working memory performance. Parallel debates as to the key deficit underlying 
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memory decline older people offers some related propositions (Salthouse 1996; Bunce & 
Macready, 2005), with support for the processing speed decrement than for competing, 
views such as attentional resource or working memory limitations (Balota, Dolan & 
Duchek, 2000). 
 
A useful finding from this analysis is the apparent distinction of information processing 
speed from both working memory and executive function at the factoral level. Interfactor 
correlations were only moderate (all r’s about 0.60), supporting the potential for 
considering these cognitive functions as to some extent distinct in the sample. 
Additionally, working memory appears well distinguished from executive abilities with the 
measures used, with the interfactor correlation of r = 0.32 (p < 0.05). The final model is 
shown in Figure  6.8 
 
On balance therefore, the model that best suited the objectives of this study was the four-
factor model, pursuing the SDMT as the best indicator of information processing abilities 
and supported in the MS literature as a sensitive index of this common deficit (Drake et al., 
2010). This will therefore be a single indicator, with measurement error modeled, as it is 
here, for the structural models in the following chapter. 
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Figure 6.8. The 4-Factor CFA model of Cognitive Items. IP=Information Processing, MEM= 
Memory, EF= Executive Function, & WM = Working Memory. SDMT=Symbol Digit Modalities 
Test, Digits=Digit Span Task, LNS=Letter Number Sequencing, AVLT7 = Auditory Verbal 
Learning Test (trial 7), SMT = Sentence Memory Test, A Errors/ B Errors - A type/ B type Errors 
Hayling Sentence Completion test. Model fit statistics were: x2 = 24.370, df = 22 p = 0.328, x2
 
/df = 
1.108. GFI = 0.945, CFI = 0.955 RMSEA = 0.033. Interfactor correlations are all significant at p < 
0.05. 
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Table 6.10. 3 Cognitive CFA Models; Memory, Information Processing & Executive Function factors: Summary of goodness of fit statistics. 
x2=chi square value; df=degrees of freedom; x2
 
/df = chi square to degrees of freedom ratio; GFI = goodness of fit index; CFI = comparative fit 
index; RMSEA= Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; 90% CI RMSEA= 90% confidence intervals for RMSEA; SRMR = Standardised 
Root Mean Square Residual. NPD = Non=positive definite matrix was generated, suggesting poorly specified model. All interfactor 
correlations are p < 0.05. Shaded results are those which present both theoretical and statistical fit, representing the accepted four-factor model; 
Memory, Executive Function, Working Memory and Information Processing. 
Tested Models x df 2 p x2 GFI /df CFI RMSEA 90% CI RMSEA RMSEA p value SRMR Factor correlation 
a priori Model 1 33.772 24 0.089 1.407 0.924 0.816 0.064 0.00 - 0.11 0.30 0.0899 0.63, 0.50, 0.54 
Model II NPD 
Model III 24.370 22 0.328 1.108 0.945 0.955 0.033 0.00 - 0.09 0.617 0.0697 0.53, 0.55, 0.62, 0.60, 0.55, 0.32 
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6.4. Measurement Models of the Memory Function Questionnaire scales (MFQ) 
 
6.4.1. Forgetting While Reading 
 
6.4.1.1. Introduction 
The next measurement model to be tested was that relating to the latent structure of the 
self-report metamemory measure – the Memory Function Questionnaire (MFQ). The aim 
of using this questionnaire was to capture self-reported memory performance, or memory 
self-efficacy (Gilewski & Anthony-Bergstone, 1990; Gilewski, Zelinski & Schaie, 1990; 
Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004) One issue with carrying out a CFA on this scale was the 
number of items within the scale, 64 in total. This would generate over 1000 degrees of 
freedom, depending on the number of factors in the model; not appropriate for a sample of 
100 participants.  
 
The scale of interest, proposed to reflect memory self-efficacy is the General Frequency of 
Forgetting subscale (GFF). This scale contains 33 items and only a portion of this, the 
section called Forgetting While Reading (FWR) was used as the indicator of metamemory 
in the Randolph, Arnett & Freske (2004) study. Since that study was published, a 10-item 
Rasch-modelled version of the 33-item GFF subscale has also been published (Zelinski & 
Gilewski, 2004). Both scales have 10 items and are therefore considered appropriate for a 
CFA with data from 100 participants. Factoral structure of each will be tested here. Figure 
6.9 summarises how the two scales were derived from the MFQ.  
 
Figure 6.9 Summary of the derivation of the two memory efficacy scales from the Memory 
Function Questionnaire. 
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6.4.1.2. Missing Data 
11 participants did not fully complete the 64-item Memory Function Questionnaire 
questionnaire. Checking with participants at the testing appointment that they had not 
missed out any questions reduced missingness. All other non-responses were considered to 
be either MAR or non-ignorable. As discussed in the previous chapter, the reasons for not 
answering related to the question not being relevant to lifestyle or current abilities. 
 
For the Forgetting While Reading scale there was item missingness of 3 out of 100 
responses for each of five observed variables. No approach to non-ignorable missingness 
imputation is without bias, but as there is an expectation of a high level of correlation 
between all 10 items on this scale and as there is only a very limited amount of data 
missing, it was decided that a single imputation regression method would be acceptable, 
instead of the more complex approaches based on ML and MI strategies. The risks of 
reducing variances and thereby increasing item intercorrelations are considered low (Roth, 
1994). In a set of questions such as these, the risks of inflating correlations in already 
highly correlated items are considered low. 
 
 
6.4.1.3. Data Screening 
The imputed values were examined to confirm they did fall within the expected limits. 
Two of the 10 items had critical ratios for skew of an absolute value greater than 1.96, and 
were negatively skewed. Table 6.11 summarises the assessment of normality for the 
Forgetting While reading items. None of the kurtosis critical ratios exceeded 1.96. In 
general the direction of skew was as might be expected; more people would report greater 
difficulty remembering the beginning of a book than the more recent portions (that is give 
lower scores on memory for earlier portions of the book). The same ‘remoteness’ effect 
was noted for reports of forgetting while reading a newspaper or magazine. With the 
limited skew, lack of kurtosis and lack of outlying scores, the data was considered 
univariate normal.  
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Table 6.11: Univariate and Multivariate distributions of 10 Forgetting While Reading items 
from the Memory Function Questionnaire (Zelinski, Gilewski and Anthony-Bergstone, 1990; 
Gilewski, Zelinski and Schaie, 1990). c.r. = Critical Ratios for Skew and Kurtosis. These are 
equivalent to Skew and Kurtosis values divided by their standard error, and represents z-scores 
(Field, 2005: 72). Assuming normality, Skew/Kurtosis have a mean = 0 and a standard error = 1. 
Critical ratios of > 2.58, plus or minus, indicate a non-normal distribution. Multivariate normality is 
indicated by Mardia’s (Mardia, 1970) coefficient, which also indicates multivariate non-normality 
when values > 2.58 
 
Variable / Univariate Normality Skew c.r. Kurtosis c.r. 
Forgetting while Reading Novel opening chapters .169 .690 -.587 -1.199 
Forgetting while Reading Novel 3 or 4 chapters earlier .131 .536 -.698 -1.425 
Forgetting while Reading Novel chapter before -.019 -.078 -.869 -1.733 
Forgetting while Reading Novel paragraph before -.292 -1.193 -.917 -1.873 
Forgetting while Reading Novel sentence before -.513 -2.095 -.875 -1.787 
Forgetting while Reading Mag/paper opening paragraphs -.064 -.263 -.948 -1.935 
Forgetting while Reading Mag/Paper 3 or 4 paragraphs -.093 -.381 -.909 -1.856 
Forgetting while Reading Mag/Paper paragraph before -.225 -.917 -.916 -1.870 
Forgetting while Reading Mag/paper 2 or 4 sentences before -.451 -1.843 -.814 -1.661 
Forgetting while Reading Mag/Paper sentence before -.643 2.627 -.698 -1.425 
Multivariate Normality    38.949 12.571 
 
 
The critical ratio for Mardia’s coefficient was 12.571, indicating a departure from MVN. 
15 participants’ observations were considered as outlying according to Mahalanobis 
distance estimates (d2
 
). However, as individual questions did not demonstrate non-
normality, a transformation was not applied. 
6.4.1.4.. Model Specification 
For the FWR scale a single factor model was proposed, given the potential for collinearity 
between items with similar questions structure. The 7-choice Likert scales were treated as 
continuous; the assumption of an underlying continuous distribution is common with 
categorical responses, especially where there are more than four response options (Bentler 
& Chou, 1987; Quintana & Maxwell, 1999). There are 10 items in this model, relating to 
how often memory problems occur while reading a book or newspaper/magazine. 
 
 
6.4.1.5. Model Testing 
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The single factor model reflected an assumption that all items reflected a shared 
dimension. All regression weights were significant and positive as expected, and 
standardised values ranged from 0.881 - 0.981 suggesting high levels of redundancy, or 
convergent validity, within the 10-item scale; r2 values ranged from 0.773 to 0.962. 
Standardised residual covariances were acceptable, generally < 2.5, suggesting a good fit 
between model and data-implied covariance matrices. Fit statistics however implied a 
generally poor fit x2 = 113.157, df = 35 p = 0.000, x2
 
/df = 3.233 GFI = 0.771, CFI = 0.330, 
SRMR = 0.1576, RMSEA = 0.150 (90% CI 0.120 - 0.182; pclose = 0.000). 
6.4.1.6. Model Modification 
Notable from the median scores is the difference between judgements about earlier parts of 
book and magazine recall compared to more recent recall. This may be of interest in CFA 
modelling as it might indicate a shared variance, or redundancy in the questions. Allowing 
these elements’ residuals to covary might therefore be appropriate in order to reflect the 
application of a more recent, therefore remember better heuristic being used to calibrate 
responses. That is, it reflects some shared variance outside of the measurement in the 
question itself - which was about how often does forgetting take place. In this sense it is 
proposed to be acceptable to allow covariance between the residuals. 
 
Two residual covariances were applied - between Magazine/Newspaper, two to four 
sentences before & Magazine/Newspaper sentence before and between Novel paragraph 
before & Novel sentence before. The model was then re-estimated. Again, all regression 
weights were significant and positive as expected. Standardised values ranged from 0.861 
to 0.963. r2 values ranged from 0.74 to 0.91 and the matrix of Standardised Residual 
Covariances was acceptable. Fit statistics again implied a generally poor fit x2= 82.195, df 
= 33 p = 0.016, x2
 
/df = 2.491 GFI = 0.834, CFI = 0.578, SRMR = 0.1383, RMSEA = 0.123 
(90% CI 0.09 - 0.156; pclose = 0.000). The freed residual correlation paths were 
significant at r = 0.619 and r = 0.571. Table 6.12 summarises the initial and modified 
model fit statistics. 
A two-factor solution was also investigated, based on a ‘Book/Novel’ items and 
‘Newspaper/Magazine’ items, but with an inter-factor correlation of 0.89 as evidence of 
unidimensionality, it was decided that a single factor better reflected convergent validity 
and that a two factor solution offered no gains in discriminant validity. 
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The Forgetting While Reading CFA presented generally poor fit statistics, which is likely 
to relate to the impact of item-word redundancy, a common-methods effect (Campbell-
Sills & Brown, 2005). This is where similarity of questions leads to higher covariances 
between items. While wanting correlations between items indicated by the same 
underlying factor, sometimes issues with the fit of the CFA such as experienced here can 
arise because of very high correlations (Netemeyer, Bearden & Sharma 2003). Items that 
are highly correlated and share variance may also present correlated error (residual) terms 
(as tested in the modification stage above). The fact that residuals were correlated, points 
to common-methods effects as one probable source of poor model fit and supports a 
redundancy rather than convergent validity interpretation (Netemeyer, Bearden & Sharma 
2003).  
 
6.4.1.7. Summary 
It is recommended that CFA models be based, at least to some extent, on previous 
exploratory analysis (Floyd & Widaman, 1995) and the Forgetting While Reading scale 
was not derived as a single factor in the proposed four-factor structure of the original 
Memory Function Questionnaire. Instead, it was part of a 33-item General Frequency of 
Forgetting scale, proposed to reflect memory self-efficacy. This scale was recently reduced 
further to a 10-item scale (the GFF-10) by rasch modelling (Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004) 
and it is this that will be submitted next for CFA. It is proposed that this latter scale has a 
psychometric provenance that makes it a more appropriate latent variable to be used to 
measure memory self-efficacy. 
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Table 6.12. Forgetting While Reading Models; Two assessments for single factor Forgetting While Reading model. The initial model 
represents a single factor, the modified model a single factor model with error correlations to reflect the similar question structure of 
questions about reading books and magazines.  Summary of goodness of fit statistics. x2=chi square value; df=degrees of freedom; x2
 
/df 
= chi square to degrees of freedom ratio; GFI = goodness of fit index; CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA= Root Mean Square Error 
of Approximation; 90% CI RMSEA= 90% confidence intervals for RMSEA; SRMR = Standardised Root Mean Square Residual.. All 
residual correlations are p < 0.05.  
1 Factor FWR models x df 2 p x2 GFI /df CFI RMSEA 90% CI 
RMSEA 
RMSEA 
p value 
SRMR Residual 
correlation 
Model 1 - single FWR 
factor 
113.157 35 0.00 3.233 0.771 0.330 0.150 0.012 - 0.182 0.00 0.1576 n/a 
Modified Model - 
single FWR factor with 
correlated residuals 
82.195 33 0.016 2.491 0.834 0.578 0.123 0.09 - 0.156 0.00 0.1383 0.619, 0.571 
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6.4.2. 10-item General Frequency of Forgetting Measurement Model 
Alternative CFA models of the GFF-10 were tested also, because of the original, and 
diverse, 33-item scale from which the 10 items were drawn is made up of a number of 
subscales. This suggests some potential for factoral separation might be possible. Tested 
models comprised a single-factor model and a three-factor model.  
 
6.4.2.1. Missing Data 
In the second dataset (GFF-10), there were again 10 observed variables with 100 
observations of each. For these, there was an item missingness of 3% for 2 questions. A 
single regression-based imputation was therefore applied here also.  
Normality. 
All values for skew and kurtosis were considered acceptable with absolute values < 2.0. 
The critical ratio for Mardia’s coefficient was 4.390, indicating some departure from 
MVN. Assessment of multivariate outliers using Mahalanobis distance suggested 
approximately 5 outlying respondents’ scores. Generally therefore, there was some 
departure from multivariate, though not univariate, normality in the response distribution. 
 
6.4.2.2. Model Specification 
 
1-Factor Model of GFF-10 
Based on the findings of Zelinski & Gilewski (2004), a single factor model of the 10 items 
was first tested.  
 
6.4.2.3. Model Testing 
Regression weights were all positive and significant at p < 0.001, standardized estimates 
ranged from 0.479 to 0.961 with Standardized Residual Covariances indicating some 
discrepancies between model-implied and data-implied model fit; r2 values ranges from 
0.23 (Faces) to 0.92 (Novel Reading: forgetting last paragraph). The fit statistics for the 
model were x2 = 93.336, df = 35 p = 0.00, x2
 
/df = 2.667 GFI = 0.811, CFI = 0.379, SRMR 
= 0.1715, RMSEA = 0.130 (90% CI 0.098 - 0.162; pclose = 0.00). General fit statistics did 
not therefore support this model as a good fit for the data.  
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6.4.2.4. Model Modification 
Modification indices suggested an error covariance for Remembering Faces and 
Remembering Names so the model was re-estimated after inclusion of this, with the 
following values obtained; x2 = 80.081, df = 34 p = 0.00, x2
 
/df = 2.377. GFI = 0.837, CFI = 
0.502, SRMR = 0.1618, RMSEA = 0.118 (90% CI 0.058 - 0.151; pclose = 0.0) 
Standardised residual matrix values remained unacceptable for some items, but regression 
weights were both significant and acceptable.  
As before, because of the potential for common methods effects, residual terms for the two 
Remembering While Reading items, and two items asking ‘How well do you remember 
things that occurred…’ 1-5years ago or between 6 and 10 years ago, were also allowed to 
correlate. This gave a final model with 3 sets of shared error variances and fit statistics of; 
x2 = 50.744, df = 32 p = 0.019, x2
 
/df = 1.586 GFI = 0.897, CFI = 0.800, SRMR = 0.1107, 
RMSEA = 0.077 (90% CI 0.032 - 0.115; pclose = 0.136). The matrix of standardised 
residuals was acceptable and all parameters were significant and positive in value. 
Considerable benefits to model fit were gained from the addition of error (residual) 
covariances, though none of the versions of the single factor were satisfactory across the 
full range of fit indices. Appendix J presents the full data from modelling, and the initial 
and 2 modified versions of the 1-factor GFF model fit assessment is presented in Table 
6.13 
An alternative interpretation is that the three residual term covariances actually indicate 
three separable factors, and since residual covariances would not be represented in the 
factor scores used in structural modelling, a 3-factor model of this scale was constructed. 
 
3 Factor Model of GFF-10 
This model consisted of a factor structure reflecting the original derivation of the scale; 
Forgetting While Reading (FWR), Retrospective Functioning (RF) and Frequency of 
Forgetting (FF). Results were: x2 = 59.906, df = 32 p = 0.002, x2/df = 1.872 GFI = 0.879, 
CFI = 0.703, SRMR = 0.1252, RMSEA = 0.094 (90% CI 0.056 - 0.130; pclose = 0.032). 
Regression weights were all significant and positive and the matrix of standardised 
residuals was acceptable. Interfactor correlations were r = 0.675, 0.621 and 0.569. 
Although the x2 was non-significant, indicating poor fit, the ‘normed x2’ (x2/df ratio) was < 
2.0, suggested by some to be a good index of fit in models where x2 might be limited by 
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sample size or departures from multivariate normality (Carmines & McIver, 1981; Byrne, 
2001; Kline, 2005). Summary fit statistics are presented in table 6.14, the full AMOS 
outputs in Appendix K and the model is shown in Figure 6.10 
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Table 6.13. 10-item General Frequency of Forgetting (GFF-10) Scale Models; Two assessments for single factor Forgetting While Reading 
model. The initial model represents a single factor, the modified model a single factor model with error correlations to reflect the similar 
question structure of questions about reading books and magazines.  Summary of goodness of fit statistics. x2=chi square value; df=degrees of 
freedom; x2
 
/df = chi square to degrees of freedom ratio; GFI = goodness of fit index; CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA= Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation; 90% CI RMSEA= 90% confidence intervals for RMSEA; SRMR = Standardised Root Mean Square Residual. 
All residual correlations are p < 0.05. 
GFF-10 
1-Factor 
Models 
x df 2 p x2 GFI /df CFI RMSEA 90% CI 
RMSEA 
RMSEA 
p value 
SRMR Residual 
correlation 
Initial Model 93.336 35 0.000 2.667 0.811 0.379 0.130 0.098 - 0.162 0.000 0.1715 n/a 
Modified Model 80.081 34 0.000 2.377 0.837 0.502 0.118 0.058 - 0.151 0.000 0.1618 0.44 
Final Model 50.744 32 0.019 1.586 0.897 0.800 0.077 0.032 - 0.115 0.136 0.1107 0.47, 0.81, 
0.59 
 
 
Table 6.14. 3-Factor GFF: Summary of goodness of fit statistics. x2=chi square value; df=degrees of freedom; x2
3 Factor 
/df = chi 
square to degrees of freedom ratio; GFI = goodness of fit index; CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA= Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation; 90% CI RMSEA= 90% confidence intervals for RMSEA; SRMR = Standardised Root Mean Square 
Residual. All interfactor correlations are p < 0.05. 
GFF Model 
x df 2 p x2 GFI /df CFI RMSEA 90% CI 
RMSEA 
RMSEA 
p value 
SRMR Factor 
correlation 
Initial Model 59.906 32 0.002 1.872 0.879 0.703 0.094 0.056 - 
0.130 
0.032 0.1252 0.68, 0.62, 
0.57 
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Figure 6.10 3 Factor General Frequency of Forgetting Model; Factor 1 = Retrospective Functioning. 
Factor 2 = Forgetting while Reading and Factor 3 = Frequency of Forgetting. Fit statistics were x2 = 
59.906, df = 32 p = 0.002, x2
 
/df = 1.872 GFI = 0.879, CFI = 0.703, SRMR = 0.1252, RMSEA = 
0.094. Each factor correlated p <0.05 
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6.4.2.6. Discussion. 
The three-factor GFF model lends some support to the proposed structure of the larger 
questionnaire from which it was drawn, where each factor was a separate scale - 
Retrospective Functioning, Forgetting While Reading & Frequency of Forgetting 
(Gilewski, Zelinski  & Schaie, 1990). It also offers gains in terms of absolute fit indices.  
 
There are limitations in all of the MFQ derived measurement models, and in larger samples 
they could be investigated for pruning of congeneric items. While the tools internal 
consistency was reported to be high (> 0.80) for all factors (Gilewski, Zelinski  & Schaie, 
1990), this analysis suggests that this may relate to item redundancy, especially for 
Forgetting while Reading items. Alternatively, unlike the cognitive and even mood latent 
variables derived by CFA, the concept of memory self-efficacy is unclear, and this too may 
be reflected in the results of this factor analysis.  
 
In accepting a single factor for the Forgetting while Reading and a three-factor model for 
General Frequency of Forgetting these limitations are acknowledged. For structural 
modelling, in part to reduce the numbers of parameters to be estimated, the factors will be 
reduced to factor scores. 
 
In respect of the scales themselves, the lower incidence of missingness in the GFF, 
compared to the FWR, scale may suggest more validity as a measure of self-efficacy for 
people with MS, for whom reading may not be a reliable way to index subjective memory 
impairment, being that it may be heavily confounded with other aspects of the disability, 
such as vision and upper limb function. 
 
 
6.5. General Discussion of Measurement Models 
 
Confirmatory factor analyses have been reported here to test the measurement models for 
cognitive, mood and memory-efficacy measures. The aim in testing the measurement 
model was to clarify the contributions of observed variables to latent variables, for the next 
stage of analysis. The model of cognitive items supported a four, rather than three, factor 
solution, underlining differences between information processing speed and working 
memory, and in disagreement with the proposed relationships of the a prior model. 
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However, this is in line with some of the literature in MS that suggests information 
processing is a generally imprecise latent construct. Because of the orientation of the study, 
information processing will be indicated in structural modelling by the Symbol Digit 
Modalities Test, and its modelled measurement error. Working Memory will be dropped 
from further analysis. This maintains the focus of the study on the mediating role of 
information processing on effortful metamnemonic judgments. 
 
In respect of measurement models for both mood and memory-efficacy, both perhaps 
suffered from the combined effects of restricted measurement scale, some non-normality in 
their distribution, similarity in questions leading to high levels of collinearity in the CFA 
models, which appeared to compromise fit. The BDI, using transformed data, presented a 
higher than ideal number of to-be-estimated parameters for the sample size, though an 
acceptable fit was found, in line with a 2-factor model proposed by the test authors (Beck, 
Steer & Brown, 1996). This CFA is the first analysis of this tool in a sample of people with 
MS, and has utility for examining the relative impact of the disease on somatic aspects of 
depression, as compared to the more cognitive and affective components. In terms of factor 
loadings, Worthlessness is the larger factor loading for the Cognitive/Affective factor and 
Loss of Concentration and Lack of Energy, for the Somatic factor. 
 
To summarise, latent variables have now been confirmed; Memory is indicated by delayed 
recall on the Sentence Memory Test and the delayed recall trial of the Auditory Verbal 
Learning Test and Information processing is indicated by the Symbol Digit Modalities 
Test. Executive Function is indicated from three Hayling measures and one measure from 
the Brixton test. For the Mood latent, two factor scores will be created to reduce the 
number of parameters in structural models. Similarly, for the two memory-efficacy scales - 
one factor score for FWR and three for GFF. 
   250 
 
Chapter 7: The Structural Models. 
 
7.1. Introduction 
This final chapter of results reports the findings of an assessment of a number of structural 
equation models exploring the relationships between the derived cognitive and mood latent 
variables, and metamemory measures; Memory self-efficacy, Judgment of Learning, 
Retrospective Confidence Judgment and Feeling of Knowing. The generalised a priori 
models were outlined in Chapter 1, and the results of their testing are reported here, 
including extensions to those models, suggested both by findings in the previous results 
chapters and indicated modifications from initial model fit statistics. In this regard the a 
priori model begins an iterative process. The models specified in Chapter 1 have been 
refined in three respects. The selection of accuracy measures for metamemory judgments 
was refined to include both relative and accuracy measures for Retrospective Confidence 
Judgment and Feeling of Knowing. Secondly, the testing of measurement models, reported 
in the previous chapter means that the latent variable are indicated differently to the a 
priori measurement models. Finally, the results from Chapter 5, notably for Judgment of 
Learning will inform model specification amendments. 
 
For each result, as in the previous chapter, a model is specified, tested and modifications 
considered based on results. These modifications are used in later models to advance 
understanding of relationships between latent contributors and metamemory. Later models 
are more exploratory, based on relationships that might be expected from the proposed 
underpinnings of metamemory judgments. Informing model specification too is an 
awareness that in MS, models may offer affirmative or contradictory findings from the 
metamemory theory base, itself mainly derived from neurologically-intact individuals. A 
concurrent aim is consideration of the contribution to information processing speed and 
mood as relevant factors in the more effortful aspects of metamemory judgment. 
 
A direct mapping of the latent construct of Memory to all mnemonic cues, and Executive 
Function to all inferences is not proposed; the literature on metamemory is not clear in 
suggesting this distinction can be cleanly made (Nelson et al., 1984; Koriat et al., 2008; 
Leonesio, 2008), though a dual process is proposed - reflecting what Koriat (2007) has 
termed information-based and experience based processes, what others have termed 
automatic versus effortful (Koriat et al., 2008) and others, trace-access and inferential 
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mechanisms (Nelson et al, 1984; Leonesio, 2008). As discussed in previous chapters, task-
based metamemory will be measured from two perspectives of accuracy - absolute and 
relative. The approach used for absolute accuracy is a focus separately on accuracy and 
inaccuracy. Model interpretation will explore relationships between cognitive and mood 
latent variables and inaccuracy, with the assumption that inaccuracy has clinical relevance 
as a target for intervention. Understanding the factors that contribute to it is therefore of 
relevance also. In the absence of memory-experience for example, inferential judgments 
might contribute to inaccuracy (Leonesio, 2008), or affect bias efficacy judgments 
(Randolph, Arnett & Freske, 2004). 
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows; a specification of each model will be outlined, 
including the expected parameter sign and significance. The model will be then tested and 
modification reviewed based on the result. As before, a set of fit indices will be considered 
to assess model acceptability, in conjunction with parameter size and sign, and its 
acceptability in providing a theoretically plausible account of the data. Final models will 
be selected for each judgment and accuracy type, with only initial discussion of each result 
presented. All models are reported using standardised parameter values. 
 
Where possible, a number of questions will be addressed in a single model assessment. 
One of the advantages of the SEM approach is that a number of simultaneous comparisons 
can be made, avoiding the need for multiple regression-based parameter estimations 
(Iacobucci, 2008) and providing better empirical support for findings because the results 
can be interpreted in the context of all other relationships in the model. So, as before, 
specification, testing, modification and re-testing is presented, followed by evaluation and 
initial interpretation. As with the previous chapter, this chapter integrates a discursive 
approach because the modelling process is as much a theoretical endeavour, as it is 
statistical. A convention of indicating a model’s latent variables will be followed wherein 
they will be italicised, whereas the domain they are proposed to represent will not; this will 
mean Memory refers to a latent variable used in the model whereas ‘memory’ relates to the 
cognitive domain. 
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7.2. Memory self-efficacy. 
 
7.2.1. Model Specification 
There are a number of objectives in this set of results, based on the findings of Randolph, 
Arnett & Freske (2004), that non-memory cognitive processes might be mediated by 
negative attitude or affect in efficacy judgments about memory. Beatty & Monson (1991) 
in respect of MS, and many others more generally (Hertzog, 2002), propose that tested 
memory ability is generally not associated with these efficacy judgments.  
 
Here, given the availability of some relevant literature, it is appropriate to test all aspects in 
one model, and assess whether the combined theory of published studies can be supported. 
 
The aims addressed in model testing are to: 
1. Validate the model of Randolph, Arnett & Freske (2004) that performance on a 
metamemory scale is contributed to by both mood and executive function, with 
mood acting as a mediator of executive relationships with memory self-efficacy.  
2. To confirm that subjective memory report is not associated with tested memory 
performance. This will be tested by the inclusion of Memory in the self-efficacy 
models, with the expectation of finding non-significant parameter estimates. 
 
The key expected relationships in the models are: 
1. A negative association between executive ability and mood disorder and between 
mood disorder and metamemory, because more depression will be associated with 
lower executive ability and lower questionnaire scoring (indicating more memory 
complaint).  
2. The direct effect of Executive Function on Metamemory, in the context of Mood 
mediating Executive Function, is expected to be non-significant, so indicating no 
direct mapping of executive abilities to memory self-efficacy, in line with the 
findings of Randolph, Arnett & Freske (2004).  
3. Memory and Executive Function are expected to correlate to a significant extent 
 
The validation of the findings of Randolph, Arnett & Freske (2004) will be tested with the 
two measures of memory self-efficacy previously outlined; the 10-item General Frequency 
of Forgetting scale, and the Forgetting-While-Reading scale, the latter used by Randolph, 
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Arnett & Freske, the former proposed as a more valid measure of memory self-efficacy 
(Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004). The model, reflecting these aims, and expected relationships, 
is presented below in Figure 7.1. 
 
Given that two variables have a large number of observed items (Beck Depression 
Inventory has 21, FWR and GFF each have 10 items) cognisance had to be taken of the 
ratio of observed items, and therefore estimated parameters, to the sample size for the 
study. It is proposed here that the structural models benefit from having the confirmed 
measurement structure established in Chapter 6, prior to model testing. As a result of the 
large numbers of indicators for these scales, factor scores are created for those latent 
variables. 
 
Factor scores are considered potentially useful, and intuitively straightforward, ways of 
testing the interaction of latent variables (Marsh, Wen & Hau, 2006). However, they suffer 
from some of the limitations of using observed variables, in that they effectively remain a 
conflated measure (that is, measurement error and true score combined) in the 
psychometric context. Thus, as Bollen (1989) discusses, the key limitation, after partialling 
measurement error from true latent-related variance during CFA, factor scores effectively 
re-combine both types of variance together to create a score. Some suggest that the use of 
SEM and CFA negates the need to pursue factor score creation at all (Brown, 2006). Here, 
it is seen as a pragmatic approach to reducing model complexity (Grover & Vriens, 2006), 
because the numbers of free parameters would be inappropriate for model testing with a 
sample size of 100 (Boomsma & Hoogland, 2001). Based on the confirmatory factor 
analyses presented in the previous chapter, regression-derived factor scores were therefore 
created for the two Beck Depression Inventory factors (Cognitive/Affective and Somatic) 
and for the Forgetting While Reading and GFF-10 scales. In the models to follow, there are 
2 factors for the Beck Depression Inventory, 1 factor score for the Forgetting While 
Reading items, and 3 factor scores for the General Frequency of Forgetting 10-item scale. 
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Figure 7.1: Memory Self-efficacy model including expected parameter signs (+ 
and -) and significant paths; n.s. = expected non-significant paths; * = expected 
significant paths. The mediational relationship is outlined in blue. Observed 
measures contributing to latent variables are not shown. 
 
 
Setting residual variance. 
Because a single factor score was created for the FWR indicator of the metamemory latent 
variable, a residual value (error variance) was set, based on the reliability of the MFQ as a 
whole (Gilewski, Zelinski & Schaie, 1990; Zelinski, Gilewski & Anthony-Bergstone, 
1990); this was required both in the interests of making an identifiable model, and to 
reflect measurement error, related to the reliability of the FWR variable. The setting of this 
residual, or error variance, is based on the formula provided by Bollen (1989) and is given 
by: 
(1-rx)varx
 
           formula 7.1 
Where rx is the reliability of the measure used, and varx
 
 the variance within the data 
derived from the measure. The residual value for FWR was 0.1563. 
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Assessment of mediation. 
A mediational mechanism in which Mood mediates the relationship of inferential judgment 
and self-efficacy is also proposed in this model, reflecting findings in the literature. The 
process for assessment has been discussed in Chapter 3: Development of Statistical 
Methods. The specific mediational relationship tested here is outlined in figure 7.2. To 
summarise, the Sobel z-test is carried out to test if the difference between path, c as a direct 
effect and c’ as a direct effect with the addition of the mediator, is statistically different 
from zero. If it is, some mediation is proposed to exist. 
 
 
Figure 7.2: A schematic model of mediation of Executive Function by 
Mood. The test of mediation assesses whether the difference between path c, 
the direct effect of Executive Function on Metamemory and path c’ the effect 
when mediation is also modelled, is statistically different from 0, so that a*b 
should be equal to c-c’ if mediation is not extant. 
 
 
7.2.2. Model Testing Results 
Initial model testing generated a negative error variance (Heywood case) for the Somatic 
factor loading on Mood. This latent variable was estimated with the Cognitive/Affective 
and Somatic factors from the BDI-II measurement model. The standardised regression 
weight for the loading of the Somatic factor on Mood was greater than 1.0 in this model 
estimation, caused by a negative error variance of -0.059 SE = 0.282, that is the variance is 
not statistically different from zero. It can occur because of multicollinearity between 
indicators or almost perfect linear relationships between the observed variable and its 
latent. Error variance for this item was set to a non-zero value (0.01) in line with 
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recommendations of Joreskog & Sorbom, (1999). The Heywood case may reflect the 
creation of this variable from factor scores, which include measurement error. 
 
The GFF-10 model, had the following global fit results: x2 = 49.035, df = 40, p = 0.155, 
x2
 
/df = 1.226, GFI = 0.910, CFI = 0.876, RMSEA = 0.048 (90% CI = 0.00 - 0.088; pclose 
= 0.503), SRMR = 0.0961. Memory and Executive Function correlated as expected and to a 
significant extent (r = 0.65, p = 0.003). The model was acceptable in terms of fit statistics, 
parameter sign and size. Only Mood had a direct and significant effect on efficacy (B = -
0.408, p = 0.008), indicating that participants who reported higher depression also reported 
more memory difficulties (lower efficacy scores). This was in the absence of a relationship 
between memory function and Metamemory. A Sobel test of mediation was z = 1.598, 
suggesting that  the relationship between executive function and Metamemory was 
mediated, by Mood. 23% of the variance of metamemory was explained in the model. 
Appendix L presents the full statistical outputs related to this model. Figure 7.3 
Summarises The Model And Findings. 
Ideal model fit statistics are summarised in Table 7.1, and is used for the assessment of 
global fit of each model tested. Additional assessments of model fit are outlined in Table 
7.2. 
 
Table 7.1: Fit indices and other assessments of model acceptability. x2 = Chi Square 
value; x2 
 
p-value = significance of chi-square statistic; CMIN/df = chi-square to degrees of 
freedom ratio; GFI = Goodness of Fit Index; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA=Root 
Mean Square Error of Approximation; 90% CI = 90% confidence Intervals for RMSEA; 
SRMR = Standardised Root Mean Square Residual. Interfactor correlations are relevant to 
the interpretation of Confirmatory Factor Analyses with values > 0.80 suggesting that 
factors may be too closely relate to be discriminated. 
Specific indices of model fit Other Assessments 
x2 Standardized Residual Matrix values generally < 2.58 & p-value 
CMIN/df Interfactor correlations in 2+ factor models < 0.80 
GFI Squared Multiple correlation (r2
CFI 
) values > 0.20 
Parameter sign & significance 
RMSEA:  90% CI & p-value  
SRMR  
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Table 7.2: Summary of recommended values for model fit indices. x2 = Chi Square 
value; x2
 
p-value = significance of chi-square statistic; CMIN/df = chi-square to degrees 
of freedom ratio; GFI = Goodness of Fit Index; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; 
RMSEA=Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; 90% CI = 90% confidence 
Intervals for RMSEA; SRMR = Standardised Root Mean Square Residual 
x2 CMIN/df  p-value GFI CFI  RMSEA  SRMR 
p > 0.05 < 2.0 > 0.90 > 0.90 
 
90% CI upper limit of 
0.08; pclose > 0.50 
< 0.10 
 
 
The FWR model (figure 7.4) generated similar conceptual results; mediation of executive 
function by mood support for the relationship between mood and metamemory, and no 
support for a relationship between tested memory and memory efficacy. Global fit was x2 
= 36.125, df = 24, p = 0.053, x2
 
/df = 1.505, GFI = 0.919, CFI = 0.813, RMSEA = 0.071 
(90%CI = 0.00 - 0.117; pclose = 0.219), SRMR = 0.0944. 16% of the variance in 
metamemory was explained by the model. A Sobel test of mediation was z = 1.748 and 
using the MacKinnon, Lockwood & Williams, (2004) cut-off ponts, indicating mediated 
relationship. Appendix M presents the full statistical outputs related to this model 
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Figure 7.3: The mediation of Executive Function by Mood in contributing to Metamemory - General 
Frequency Of Forgetting. Metamemory is described by the General Frequency of Forgetting scale factors * 
= significant path at p < 0.05 level. Memory was not a contributor in this model. All latent variable loadings 
were also significant. FFgff = Frequency of Forgetting items (factor score) from the General Frequency of 
Forgetting scale; RFgff = Retrospective Functioning items (factor score) from the General Frequency of 
Forgetting scale; FWRgff = Forgetting while Reading items (factor score) from the General Frequency of 
Forgetting scale; AVLT = Auditory Verbal Learning Test delayed recall; SMT = Sentence Memory Tests, 
delayed recall; Brixton = Brixton test; Hay Time = Hayling time section B minus time Secion A; A and B 
errors are Hayling Sentence Completion tests errors. Cog/Affect = Cognitive Affective Beck Depression 
Inventory items (factor score) and Somatic =  Somatic Beck Depression Inventory items (factor score). e = 
residuals for observed items, and d = residuals (disturbance) for endogenous latent variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
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Figure 7.4: The mediation of Executive Function by Mood in contributing to Metamemory. Metamemory 
is described by the Forgetting While Reading scale factor score. * = significant path at p < 0.05 level. 
Memory was not a contributor in this model. All latent variable loadings were also significant. FWR = 
Forgetting while Reading factor score; AVLT = Auditory Verbal Learning Test delayed recall; SMT = 
Sentence Memory Tests, delayed recall; Brixton = Brixton test; Hay Time = Hayling time section B minus 
time Secion A; A and B errors are Hayling Sentence Completion tests errors. Cog/Affect = Cognitive 
Affective Beck Depression Inventory items (factor score) and Somatic =  Somatic Beck Depression 
Inventory items (factor score).e = residuals for observed items, and d = residuals (disturbance) for 
endogenous latent variables. measurement error was modelled for the single item Metamemory latent 
variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* * 
* 
   260 
 
7.2.3. Summary of memory self-efficacy models. 
 
Model fit indices were generally as desired, with only the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 
extending below the ideal values, notable in the Forgetting While Reading (FWR) model. 
The CFI generally reflects the average level of correlations within the models, is related to 
degrees of freedom, so that each additional parameter estimated (or variable added) is 
penalised (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). In part, the inclusion of Memory is likely to have 
reduced its value therefore, without contributing to the model.  
 
Parameter estimates, in terms of sign and significance were also as expected, so supporting 
the a priori models and confirming the findings of Randolph, Arnett & Freske (2004). 
Mood was supported as the only direct contributor to Metamemory in both models, though 
fit statistics were more acceptable using the more valid instrument, the General Frequency 
of Forgetting scale. Memory did not relate to subjective memory appraisal, in agreement 
with the findings of Lovera et al., (2006) and Julian, Merluzzi & Mohr (2007) that self-
assessed cognitive dysfunction in MS typically relates more to depression, than actual 
cognitive abilities. Mood may also mediate the more inferential judgment involved in this 
type of metamemory assessment. 
 
7.3.  Task-based Metamemory Judgments 
 
7.3.1 Introduction 
 
The aims of model testing here are to address the recommendations for further study laid 
out by Pannu & Kaszniak (2005) to better understand metamemory in neurological 
populations by assessing a number of different measures of metamemory. The order of 
analysis is structured around the stages of memory at which each judgment is made; 
Judgment of Learning (JoL) at acquisition, Retrospective Confidence Judgment (RCJ) at 
recall, and Feeling of Knowing at recognition. The Feeling of Knowing model will be 
assessed against the Beatty & Monson’s 1991 data on the performance of people with MS.  
 
The goals of modelling are twofold; first, to examine direct contributions of memory, 
executive function and affect to metamemory. This will be in the form of a direct effects 
model for each judgment. The informing theory has been discussed, but generally would 
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suggest that mood is unrelated to task-based judgments. Studies not finding such a 
relationship however are in samples where memory, executive function or mood is not 
compromised. It is possible mood may inform judgments where there are difficulties in 
cognitive aspects of the task, or where efficacy-related inferences are used in the presence 
of cognitive deficit. However, the relationship between mood-disorder and metamemory in 
MS has not been investigated for this judgment. For this reason, Mood will be retained for 
assessing any direct contribution to metamemory judgments. 
 
Second, mediation is investigated with information processing as mediator of proposed 
effortful processes in making metamemory judgments. Information processing is suggested 
as a mediator to many cognitively effortful tasks; some of the judgments modelled here 
can be considered effortful, notably those judgments that are not typically considered to be 
based alone on retrieval fluency; one such is the Feeling of Knowing judgment. Both 
Judgments of Learning and Retrospective Confidence are likely more supported by 
memory experience than Feelings of Knowing because they involve judgments made on 
items for which some retrieval has already taken place. Feeling of Knowing judgments are 
based on items for which there has been a retrieval failure, perhaps making them less 
dependent on processing related to explicit memory experience. To this end, it is proposed 
that of primary interest are results for Executive Function being mediated by information 
processing in Feeling of Knowing models. For each however, the contribution of 
executive-level processing is considered to be the more controlled type and therefore likely 
to be mediated by information processing. These contentions will be tested and 
expectations for each model will be outlined prior to testing. The overall aim of the next 
series of models then, is to assess mnemonic and executive contributions to metamemory 
accuracy, to assess whether information-processing abilities facilitate these contributions 
and to enquire is mood disorder relates to accuracy in task-based metamemory judgment. 
 
7.3.2.  Judgment of Learning. 
 
Judgments of Learning at delay continue to provide debate both in terms of their utility, 
and the basis on which they are made (Meeter & Nelson, 2003; Kimball & Metcalfe, 2003; 
Dunlosky& Bjork, 2008; Narens, Nelson & Scheck, 2008; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). 
One important component of this debate is whether they reflect memory or metamemory. 
Additionally, whether they are based on direct-access, mnemonic experience, or inference 
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made from normative aspects of the task such as task difficulty is debated (Dunlosky & 
Bjork, 2008). It was proposed in developing the forthcoming model that both Memory and 
Executive Function would encompass both types of contribution.  
 
7.3.2.1. Model Specification 
 
Delayed Judgment of Learning (JoL) was based on the 20-minute delayed recall trial of the 
Auditory Verbal Learning Test, and was calculated as the discrepancy between predicted 
and actual recall performance. Accuracy in the judgment is indicated by the size of the 
discrepancy between the two. A score of zero indicates a well-calibrated judgment and 
departures from that, increasing inaccuracy. The meta contribution is therefore contained 
in the discrepancy, not the memory performance. Predicted score was lower than actual 
score for 95% of participants for the delayed JoL, so values were typically negative, 
indicating underconfidence.  
  
Overall performance of the sample has been outlined in Chapter 5, and is summarised in 
Figure 7.5, which indicated that for the sample, there was evidence of an underconfidence 
with practice effect (Koriat, Sheffer & Ma’ayan, 2002). This effect is characterised by an 
initial small overconfidence, followed by increasing underconfidence with repeated 
learning trials (Meeter & Nelson, 2003). The effect has been demonstrated in both item-by-
item judgments and global judgments (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Koriat, Sheffer & 
Ma’ayan, 2002). In many studies, at the delayed JoL stage, the underconfidence is 
extinguished, so that the accuracy of the delayed JoL is greater, compared to prior trials’ 
JoL. Even in populations with neurological impairment, this delayed Judgment of Learning 
effect has been noted (Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005). As reported in Chapter 5, the mean JoL 
was less accurate after with delay in this sample, compared to the last of a set of immediate 
JoLs (Trial 5); t (99) = 2.148, p = 0.031. It is of particular interest here that the delayed 
Judgment of Learning effect was not found, a result that has implications for model 
specification. 
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Figure 7.5 Summary of Judgment of Learning performance across trials of the Auditory Verbal Learning 
Test. Serial prediction is presented in green with actual performance in blue, both indicating mean prediction 
and performance on each tests of the 15-word list. Trial 6 is a new list episode and Trail 7 a 20 minute 
delayed recall test. 
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In one study on neurologically unimpaired participants, Meeter & Nelson (2003) report a 
similar finding to this study, and suggest that the failure to ameliorate underconfidence 
with delay in making the judgment might relate to insufficient weight being given to 
external cues, such as the number of repetitions in the task, or incorrectly focusing on the 
wrong cues to make the decision. One such cue could relate to the use of the pre-delay JoL 
to guide the subsequent delayed JoL (Finn & Metcalfe, 2007). This finding was therefore 
considered in specifying the model. The proposal that previous trial judgment contributes 
to later judgment, was not considered initially, but was added because the continued 
underconfidence after delay was a novel finding.  
 
Three features of Judgments of Learning were investigated in structural modelling; first, 
the planned investigations of factors associated with accuracy in the delayed Judgment of 
Learning - memory, executive and affective. Secondly, the contribution of pre-delay JoL as 
a possible (incorrect) cue used to estimate the delayed JoL. Finally, given the supposed 
differences between pre and post-delay JoLs, the factors contributing to pre-delay JoL 
were also investigated. Figure 7.6 summarises the model, now respecified to account for 
the results presented in Chapter 5.  
 
The main theoretically drive for this relates to the proposal that each judgment is based on 
differential monitoring of memory stores, as suggested by the Monitoring dual Memory 
hypothesis (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). In terms of causal effects, a contributory 
(directional path) effect is investigated, instead of a covariance, between pre-delay JoL and 
delayed JoL, because in the majority of the literature there is no proposed correlation 
between the two, given that underconfidence is typically extinguished after delay. The 
parameter expectations are outlined and the specified model is summarised below: 
 
1. Memory will be associated with both pre- and post-delay Judgments of Learning, with 
accuracy (higher scores) in pre-delay being positively associated with memory, because 
predictions will be lower than performance due to the underconfidence with practice effect. 
In the delayed Judgment of Learning, with maintained underconfidence, the same 
relationship is expected. 
 
2. Mood may be associated with pre-delay Judgment of Learning because, in the presence 
of mood disorder, it could contribute to underconfidence in future performance.  
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3. Executive Function will be a non-significant path in both Judgments of Learning, 
supporting a view that mnemonic factors relate to this judgment. 
 
4. As a result of a maintained underconfidence with practice effect, pre-delay Judgment of 
Learning, will be positively associated with delayed Judgment of Learning, supporting a 
proposition that the earlier judgment, may be used, inappropriately, as a heuristic in setting 
the delayed prediction of performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6. Summary of revised delayed Judgment of Learning Model, to account for 
maintenance of underconfidence at delay. 
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7.4.2.2. Model Testing 
Skew, kurtosis and multivariate normality were all within acceptable values. The global 
model fit statistics were: x2
 
 = 30.972, df = 27, p = 0.272, CMIN/df = 1.147, GFI = 0.937, 
CFI = 0.949, RMSEA = 0.039, SRMR = 0.0683. The model is presented in Figure 7.7. 
The model explained 18% of the variance in pre delay JoL, and 56% of that for the delayed 
JoL. For pre-delay JoL, Mood and Memory were significant parameters: Mood B = -3.29, p 
= 0.043, Memory B = 0.542 p = 0.033, but Executive Function was not (B = -0.420, p = 
0.107). The model suggests that for Pre-delay JoL, higher levels of reported depression 
were associated with more underconfidence (wider discrepancy). Memory ability was 
positively associated with accuracy, suggesting the most inaccurate judgments in the pre-
delay JoL were associated with greater depression and greater memory impairment.  
 
For the delayed JoL, only Memory and the pre-delay JoL were predictors (Memory: B = -
0.846, p < 0.001; pre-delay JoL B = 0.387, p<0.001). Against the expectations of the a 
priori model, memory ability was negatively related to the Delayed JoL. This negative 
association between memory ability and accuracy suggests better rememberers had wider 
discrepancies between predicted and actual performance. Executive function was not a 
reliable predictor in either judgment. Finally, Pre-delay JoL was positively associated with 
this Delayed JoL, supporting a contention that participants may have used the previous 
judgment to inform subsequent judgments. The full statistical outputs for this model are 
presented in Appendix N. 
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Figure 7.7 Structural model of delayed Judgment of Learning (delayed JoL) * = significant path at p < 
0.05. AVLT = Auditory Verbal Learning Test delayed recall; SMT = Sentence Memory Tests, delayed recall; 
Brixton = Brixton test; Hay Time = Hayling time section B minus time Secion A; A and B errors are Hayling 
Sentence Completion tests errors. Cog/Affect = Cognitive Affective Beck Depression Inventory items (factor 
score) and Somatic =  Somatic Beck Depression Inventory items (factor score).e = residuals for observed 
items, and d = residuals (disturbance) for endogenous latent variables. 
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7.3.2.3.  Judgment of Learning Mediation Model 
The second Judgment of Learning model investigates whether Information Processing 
might mediate some of the cognitive processing in making the delayed JoL. This is based 
on the proposal that interrogation of memory store is a primary method for making this 
judgment, at delay, and that better information processing might facilitate this. For the 
purposes of this investigation, information processing was investigated as a mediator to 
Memory. This reflects the findings of Kimball & Metcalfe (2003) that the judgment may 
relate strongly to mnemonic phenomena, and perhaps less of a meta-mnemonic one. Here 
the proposal is that reduced Information Processing speed might limit the covert retrieval 
processes, so reducing accuracy. This might occur if a person is unable to make the covert 
retrieval attempts required to best judge learning after delay. In this sense, despite the 
increase in learning, which might occur over the 5 learning trials, covert retrieval processes 
should allow for prediction to reflect that. 
 
7.4.4.1. Model Specification 
The JoL model was simplified to focus on the relationships of interest - with the Delayed 
JoL being the single criterion variable. Mood was removed from the model because it was 
not associated with the delayed JoL. Information processing was assessed for a mediational 
role in the relationship between Memory and Delayed JoL. The first analysis assessed a 
direct effects model of the variables of interest: Memory, Information Processing, 
Executive Function, Pre-delay JoL and Delayed JoL. 
 
7.4.4.2. Model Testing Results 
For the direct effects model, fit statistics were generally acceptable with: x2
 
 = 32.547, df = 
23, p = 0.089, CMIN/df = 1.415, GFI = 0.927, CFI = 0.870, RMSEA = 0.065, (90% CI = 
0.00 - 0.112) pclose = 0.295, SRMR = 0.0858. In all 59% of the variance in the JoL 
discrepancy was explained. As before, Memory was a reliable contributor (B = -0.770, p < 
0.001) with better recall performance being associated with greater underestimation of 
performance. Information processing ability was a predictor of accuracy (B = 0.559, p < 
0.001) and previous JoL positively contributed to the delayed JoL (B = 0.302 p < 0.001). 
The model is shown in Figure 7.8 and the full statistical output for this model is presented 
in Appendix O 
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7.8. Structural model establishing the potential for mediation, including Information Processing 
as a direct effect * = significant path at p < 0.05. AVLT = Auditory Verbal Learning Test delayed 
recall; SMT = Sentence Memory Tests, delayed recall; SDMT = Symbol Digit Modalities Test; Brixton 
= Brixton test; Hay Time = Hayling time section B minus time Secion A; A and B errors are Hayling 
Sentence Completion tests errors.e = residuals for observed items, and d = residuals (disturbance) for 
endogenous latent variables. All latent variable loadings were significant also. 
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As Information Processing was associated (correlated) to a significant extent with 
Memory, and Delayed JoL, conditions for assessing mediation of Memory were satisfied. 
Theoretical specification was that Memory is the primary factor underpinning Judgment of 
Learning, as demonstrated in the last model. Based on the MS literature, object-level 
processes, such as Memory may be limited by Information Processing. The task in delayed 
Judgment of Learning is to estimate future recall, based on an assessment of what is known 
in long term stores (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). This is proposed to be carried out using 
covert retrieval, which typically abolishes underconfidence at delay (Dunlosky & Bjork, 
2008). 
 
The direct effects model shown above suggests that accuracy in the judgment is 
contributed to by Information processing, but decreased by Memory performance. This 
may support an understanding of accuracy in this judgment being associated with 
sufficient processing speed abilities to support the covert retrieval process in conjunction 
with better memory performance widening the gap between prediction and accuracy. 
Apparently the two domains work in opposing directions in contributing to accuracy. It is 
against this background that the mediation of Memory by Information Processing was 
tested. 
 
7.3.2.4.  Mediation Model Testing Results 
 
The model generated poor fit statistics: x2
 
 = 39.658, df = 24, p = 0.023, CMIN/df = 1.652, 
GFI = 0.911, CFI = 0.786, RMSEA = 0.081, (90% CI = 0.030 - 0.125 pclose = 0.128). 
This offers no support for what might be described as an object-level mediation model, 
where Memory is mediated by processing speed, to support covert retrieval processes and 
abolish underconfidence at delay. 
7.3.2.5.  Summary of Judgment of Learning Models. 
Direct effects modelling suggested that better recall was associated with greater accuracy 
in the pre-delay Judgment of Learning, but less accuracy in the delayed judgment. The 
other factor related to delayed Judgment of Learning was the pre-delay judgment, in line 
with proposals of Finn & Metcalfe (2007) that it may inform the delayed judgment. Here, 
this may relate to the maintenance of the underconfidence with practice effect at delay. 
While mediation was not supported, there was a conflicting contribution of Information 
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Processing and Memory to accuracy in the judgment. Information processing speed was 
reliable associated with accuracy at delay, but better memory performance associated with 
least accuracy. This finding will be considered further in the following chapter. An 
interpretation of the finding is that both relationships with delayed Judgment of Learning 
accuracy indicate better cognitive performance, with information processing explaining the 
better learning and resultant memory performance the greater disparity between predicted 
and actual performance. In this regard, neither seem to offer an explanation of the low 
predictions, instead just the better actual performance. 
 
7.3.3.  Retrospective Confidence Judgments (RCJ). 
 
Confidence judgements were made for each of the retrieved answers at the cued-recall 
phase of the Sentence Memory Test. This consisted of participants seeing each incomplete 
sentence and being asked to supply an answer (including ‘don’t know’) and then giving a 
confidence in the answer supplied. ‘Don’t know’ responses were rated as no confidence 
ratings. 
 
Absolute accuracy judgments were derived, based on the proportion (in percentages) of 
High Confidence correct (accuracy) and percent Low Confidence correct (inaccuracy). The 
second accuracy measure was RCJ gamma; as a measure of relative accuracy (resolution), 
it is often reported to be quite low in studies, perhaps because general knowledge is often 
used as the basis of testing (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). Here it was high, perhaps 
relating to the episodic measure used (mean gamma = 0.894 SD = 0.197). Models were 
tested for both absolute and relative accuracy. 
 
A number of considerations in modelling these judgments here relate to the task used; most 
of the literature reports performance on general knowledge tasks, many using forced 
report; that is, no option to report a ‘don’t know’. The relevance of memory type in 
assessing contributions to these judgments is that in the semantic condition people may be 
able to use information-based processes in coming to an assessment of confidence e.g. 
perceived domain expertise, or how much related information about an answer they can 
retrieve (Koriat et al., 2008). In an episodic task such as that used in this study, there will 
perhaps be less information available, so that people may rely more on experience-based 
processes to decide on their degree of confidence. Since the structure of the test was a set 
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of incomplete sentences, there were opportunities for cue-familiarity processes to be used 
however, along with other experience-based indicators towards confidence; ease, speed or 
contents of retrieval (Nelson & Narens, 1990). 
 
As before, executive, mnemonic and affective contributions are first tested, as direct 
effects, for each accuracy type. Models are then extended to investigate a role for 
information processing ability. 
 
7.3.3.1.  Model Specification - Calibration or Absolute accuracy 
 
The percent correctly recalled for both High and Low Confidence attributions were first 
modelled; the model to be tested the two aspects of calibration; RCJ Accuracy (% High 
RCJ, Correct) and RCJ Inaccuracy (% Low RCJ correct), with the following expectations: 
 
1. Memory will be a contributor to RCJ accuracy, given that accuracy in this judgment is 
proposed to relate to memory experience.  
2. Mood will not contribute to RCJ inaccuracy. The study of Fu et al., (2005) did not 
support such a relationship between depression and confidence. However, this will be 
confirmed in the model 
3. Executive Function will contribute to RCJ inaccuracy reflecting difficulty with ascribing 
accurate confidence to successful recall. A negative parameter is expected indication better 
executive performance being associated with lower levels of RCJ inaccuracy. Figure 7.9 
summarises the model to be tested and expected parameter estimates. 
 
7.5.2 Model Testing Results 
The values for RCJ Inaccuracy had a kurtosis value of 5.15, within acceptable ranges 
according to some heuristics (Kline, 2005), and all other values were within acceptable 
ranges on both kurtosis and skew measures. 
 
Both High and Low confidence were modeled together and global fit indices were 
acceptable; x2=30.433, df=28, p= 0.343, x2
 
/df= 1.087, GFI= 0.939, CFI= 0.958, RMSEA = 
0.030 (90% CI = 0.00-0.085; pclose = 0.665) and SRMR= 0.0751. Full statistical output is 
available in Appendix P. 
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Figure 7.9. Summary of expected parameter and model results for 
Retrospective Confidence Judgment, absolute accuracy and inaccuracy. 
 
 
The model, shown in figure 7.10, indicates the significant parameter for Memory on RCJ 
Accuracy (B = 0.780, p = 0.001), with 46% of the variance explained. None of the 
included predictors - Memory, Mood or Executive Function - contributed to a significant 
extent to explaining variance in RCJ inaccuracy. Only Executive Function and Memory 
correlated to a reliable extent (r = 0.585; p = 0.023), with Mood and Executive Function 
correlated r = -0.30, p = 0.061. In both the RCJ accuracy and RCJ inaccuracy indices 
actual responses were correct, so parameter estimates relate to the assessment of 
confidence, in the context of availability of the correct sentence completion. High 
confidence appeared based on memory related experience, but not other inferential 
judgments, whereas Low confidence did not relate to inferential or mnemonic experiences. 
Mood was not a reliable predictor in either case. 
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7.10 Structural model testing factors contributing to Retrospective Confidence judgment, absolute 
accuracy (RCJ accurate) and inaccuracy (RCJ inaccurate). * = significant path at p < 0.05. * = 
significant path at p < 0.10. AVLT = Auditory Verbal Learning Test delayed recall; SMT = Sentence 
Memory Tests, delayed recall; Brixton = Brixton test; Hay Time = Hayling time section B minus time Secion 
A; A and B errors are Hayling Sentence Completion tests errors. Cog/Affect = Cognitive Affective Beck 
Depression Inventory items (factor score) and Somatic =  Somatic Beck Depression Inventory items (factor 
score).e = residuals for observed items, and d = residuals (disturbance) for endogenous latent variables. All 
latent variable loadings were significant also. 
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7.3.3.3.  Model Specification - Relative accuracy 
The second model investigates the relative accuracy of the Retrospective Confidence 
Judgment. This is indicated by the RCJ gamma score, and indexes the ability to ascribe 
confidence judgments on one item, relative to another. The literature generally presents 
findings that support memory-related processes (ease of retrieval, amount retrieved) being 
linked to this judgment accuracy under free report (Koriat et al., 2008). As this was the 
structure here, the expectations for this model are for Memory to be positively associated 
with accuracy. Figure 7.11 is the a priori model to be tested. 
 
 
Figure 7.11. The a priori structural model for Retrospective Confidence gamma. 
 
 
 
7.3.3.4.  Model Testing 
All but one gamma value was  ≥ 0, so interpretation of the gamma statistic (a correlation) 
is of larger values indicating greater accuracy. Initial modelling, in spite of significant non-
normality in the distribution of gamma scores, was carried out. The model testing 
suggested no statistically significant relationships between the exogenous variables and 
RCJ accuracy, though memory approaches reliability as an indicator; Memory (p = 0.068), 
Mood (p = 0.458) or Executive Function (p = 0.336).  
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The model explained 14% of the variance in RCJ Gamma. Memory and Executive 
Function were correlated (r = 0.594, p = 0.019) and Mood and Execuitve Function again 
almost reached significance at the p <0.05 level (r = -0.301, p = 0.061). The global fit 
statistics were: x2
 
 = 27.975 df = 22 p = 0.177, CMIN/df = 1.272 CFI = 0.937, GFI = 0.937, 
CFI = 0.905 and RMSEA = 0.052 (90% CI = 0.00 - 0.104; pclose = 0.436), SRMR = 
0.0698 suggesting acceptable global fit. Figure 7.12 shows the model, with full statistical 
output provided in Appendix Q. 
There was significant kurtosis in the gamma distribution, with most values having a high 
RCJ gamma score (mean = 0.894, SD = 0.197; Kurtosis critical ratio = 33.45). It seems 
likely that the distribution of data limited the model’s interpretative power. In order to 
retest the model based on more acceptable distributional characteristics, a number of 
transformations were carried out on the data, including reflecting followed by Square-root 
transformation, Log10 and log e, aimed at reducing the higher values and extending the 
range of scores. These transformations did not improve normality, or the outcome of 
modelling, and are not reported. 
  
As a speculative execise, outlying values were deleted, based on a search for both extreme 
and outlying cases, and included eight cases. The model was retested and resulted in 25% 
of the variance in the RCJ gamma  being explained, and an significant parameter estimate 
for Memory (B = 0.540, p = 0.029) with fit statistics: x2
 
 = 31.009 df = 23 p = 0.100, 
CMIN/df = 1.392, GFI = 0.867, CFI = 0.922, and RMSEA = 0.066 (90% CI; 0.00 - 0.099; 
pclose = 0.296) SRMR = 0.0849. The model is proposed as indicative rather than 
demonstrative of expected findings, given the distributional properties of the data, absolute 
accuracy results for the RCJ process, and substantive theory about how RCJ judgments, 
under free report conditions, appear to be supported by retrieval-related experiences; 
amount retrieved, content retrieved, speed and ease of retrieval (Koriat et al., 2008). 
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7.12 Structural model testing factors contributing to Retrospective Confidence judgment gamma, or 
relative accuracy. * = significant path at p < 0.05. * = significant path at p < 0.10. AVLT = Auditory Verbal 
Learning Test delayed recall; SMT = Sentence Memory Tests, delayed recall; Brixton = Brixton test; Hay 
Time = Hayling time section B minus time Secion A; A and B errors are Hayling Sentence Completion tests 
errors. Cog/Affect = Cognitive Affective Beck Depression Inventory items (factor score) and Somatic =  
Somatic Beck Depression Inventory items (factor score). e = residuals for observed items. All latent variable 
loadings were significant also. 
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7.3.3.5. Mediation models for Retrospective Confidence Judgments 
A direct effects model, using only the RCJ absolute accuracy measure (percent High 
Confidence, and correct), with the inclusion of Information Processing did not establish a 
potential for mediation, and Memory remained the only significant parameter (B = 0.790, p 
= 0.001). Correlations were moderate to high between Memory and Executive Function, 
and Executive Function and Information Processing (both r = 0.607). Given the non-
significant parameters for both Mood and Information Processing in relation to RCJ 
confidence, support for a mediated process is lacking. This would support suggestions that 
Retrospective Confidence Judgments, where accurate, are in large part supported by 
experience-based mnemonic cues, rather than the potentially more effortful information or 
inference based judgments (Koriat et al, 2008).  
 
For the RCJ gamma model, there was, again, no direct association with the proposed 
mediator, Information Processing, so no mediation was tested. This may have occurred for 
reasons of RCJ related contributions not typically being related to effortful or controlled 
processing, but could also have been because of the distribution of the gamma scores. 
 
7.3.3.6.  Summary of Retrospective Confidence Models 
Based on the direct effects model of absolute accuracy (calibration), the strong association 
of memory ability and accuracy in the RCJ task likely relates to memory-experience 
indicators. The impact of information processing speed was not expected to contribute as 
these memory experiences are proposed to be ‘parasitic’ on the retrieval process itself 
(Koriat et al., 2008:120).  In this respect it offers some support for these retrieval-based 
experiences not being impacted by information processing capacities, perhaps because of 
their procedural quality (Reder & Schunn, 1996) 
 
In sum, only concordant responses - high confidence in answers that were correct, 
presented expected relationships, namely the proportion of answers given a high 
confidence (and were correct), being positively associated with memory performance. Of 
interest too is the lack of any relationships between presumed predictors and the 
inaccuracy condition, the proportion of items for which a Low confidence rating was 
given, which were actually correct. The findings from relative accuracy (RCJ gamma) to 
some extent mirror the absolute accuracy findings, with memory ability alone relating to 
accuracy. 
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7.3.4. Feeling of Knowing judgment. 
 
Feeling of Knowing judgments (FoKs) are typically assessed in respect of semantic 
memory, rather than newly learned, episodic, information; suggested mechanisms for 
achieving accuracy include domain-familiarity, cue-familiarity and target accessibility 
(Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009), but not direct access to the target item. FoK items in this 
study were based on sentence completions for which recall already failed, and episodic 
rather than semantic recall. 
 
In addition to the cue-familiarity information, accessibility information may be available, 
based on failed retrieval attempts, giving mnemonic information from which an inference 
about recognition might be drawn (Koriat, 1993; Koriat et al, 2008). Related to Beatty & 
Monson’s (1991) findings that, for a MS sample, both memory and executive impairment 
was associated with increasing inaccuracy in FoK, it is proposed that both executive 
function and memory will be relevant predictors. Additionally, to address the relevance of 
mood in task-based judgment, this will also be included as a predictor of performance in 
the models. As before, accuracy in both calibration and resolution was investigated. 
 
7.3.3.1. Model Specification - Absolute Accuracy 
 
The model investigates differences in performance between those items for which a High 
FoK was ascribed, and those for which a Low FoK was ascribed. This difference is not 
about association (relative accuracy), but rather proportion, measured here as percent 
correct for each of High FoK, or strong Feelings of Knowing for an answer (measured in 
the recognition trial) and Low FoK, or weak Feelings of Knowing. The two measures are 
used in respect of correct recognition. The endogenous variables in the model therefore 
consist of the proportion of High FoK with correct recognition, and the proportion of Low 
FoKs with correct recognition; both are measured in percentages. 
 
The model assumes a greater degree of explicit and controlled processing, in addition to 
implicit experience-based processes, that the previous models, mainly because retrieval has 
already failed; FoKs are made only on unrecalled or incorrectly recalled Sentence Memory 
Test items. It is proposed that a range of distal cues may be used to make inferences about 
future recognition. The aims were to assess the contributions of memory and executive 
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function to investigate inferential and experienced-based processes on FoK accuracy and 
inaccuracy, and expectations of this model are listed below with parameter projections 
outlined in figure 7.13 
 
1. Expectations were that Memory and Executive Function were both associated positively 
and significantly with accuracy (High FoK, correctly recognised), and Executive Function 
negatively with inaccuracy (Low FoK, correctly recognised). The negative association 
with FoK inaccuracy was proposed as a process in which frontal memory contributions 
were compromised. Memory is proposed to remain positively associated with FoK 
inaccuracy, because it is based on items for which there was correct recognition.  
 
2. Mood is assessed for a contribution, but was expected not to provide a significant 
parameter for High FoK, correctly recognised. For Low FoK, correctly recognised. It was 
considered as a potential contributor, explaining why Low FoKs might be ascribed to 
recognisable targets as being a function of affect-associated underconfidence. 
 
3. As many have suggested that FoK judgments, especially for new learning, appear to be 
effortful, inclusion of information processing as a mediator to the inferential (executive) 
and mnemonic components is modelled subsequently. This is different to previous models, 
which assumed that having available memory-experiences would not constitute an effortful 
process.  
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Figure 7.13. The a priori model of Feeling of Knowing (FoK) calibration. FoK accuracy 
is measured by proportion of High FoKs that were recognised and the FoK inaccuracy as 
the proportion of Low FoKs subsequently recognised. n.s. = expected non-significant 
parameter. * = expected significant parameter and ? = an unknown contribution to be 
investigated in the model + and - indicate the expected direction of contribution. 
 
 
7.3.4.2. Model Testing 
 
Univariate skew and kurtosis, and multivariate normality assumptions were generally met. 
Fit statistics were: x2 = 35.482, df = 28, p= 0.156, x2
 
/df = 1.276, GFI = 0.928, CFI = 0.885, 
RMSEA = 0.052 (90% CI 0.00 - 0.099, pclose = 0.442) and SRMR = 0.0729. 26% of the 
variance of accuracy and 38% of inaccuracy was explained in the model, which is shown 
in Figure 7.14. 
For accuracy in this task, measured by % High FoK correct, parameter estimates were 
significant for Memory (B = 0.505, p = 0.032) but not for Mood (p = 0.623) or Executive 
Function (p = 0.834). Better recall was associated with higher proportions of concordance 
between High Feelings of Knowing and subsequent correct recognitions; suggesting that 
weak or content-less mnemonic cues, might have assisted the judgment in this accuracy 
condition. 
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For inaccuracy, indicated by the proportion of Low Feelings of Knowing subsequently 
correctly recognised, (% Low FoK correct), both Memory and Executive Function were 
significant contributors (B = 0.670, p = 0.002 and B = -0.469, p = 0.036 respectively); 
Mood was not a contributor (B = 0.062, p = 0.717). The relationship in the inaccuracy 
condition was positive for Memory, but negative for Executive Function, suggesting those 
with better executive abilities had less had less inaccuracy. 
 
Noteworthy is that Executive Function only approached a significant correlation with 
memory in this model (r = 0.540, p = 0.069) perhaps suggesting some discrimination in the 
respective contribution of each to the metamemory measures, rather than a general higher 
order association with ‘Cognition’. In all other models there were robust correlations 
between the two. Mood correlated with Executive Function (r = -0.313, p = 0.022). Full 
statistical outputs are presented in Appendix R. 
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Figure 7.14. Structural model testing factors contribution to Feeleing of Knowing calibration, or 
absolute accuracy. * = significant path at p < 0.05. * = significant path at p < 0.10. AVLT = Auditory 
Verbal Learning Test delayed recall; SMT = Sentence Memory Tests, delayed recall; Brixton = Brixton test; 
Hay Time = Hayling time section B minus time Secion A; A and B errors are Hayling Sentence Completion 
tests errors. Cog/Affect = Cognitive Affective Beck Depression Inventory items (factor score) and Somatic =  
Somatic Beck Depression Inventory items (factor score). e = residuals for observed items. All latent variable 
loadings were significant also. FoK accuracy is measured by proportion of High FoKs that were recognised 
and the FoK inaccuracy as the proportion of Low FoKs subsequently recognised 
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In order to test for any relationship between accuracy and inaccuracy in this FoK measure, 
a model in which the two were freed to correlate was tested. The result was r = -0.002, p = 
0.989 suggesting they were unrelated when the contributory factors were taken into 
account, perhaps supporting a view that inaccuracy is not simply a failure of accuracy, but 
relates to a separate set of processes. 
 
The differential contribution of executive abilities - no direct association in the accuracy 
condition, negative association in the inaccurate condition - fits with a proposal that 
inaccuracy in neurological samples is associated with executive deficit (Beatty & Monson, 
1991; Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005). Inaccuracy is increased in the presence of executive 
deficit - the ascribing of Low FoKs, in the context of subsequent correct recognition - 
suggesting that impaired inferential mechanisms might override mnemonic availability 
cues in this condition. This possibility was pursued for a statistical assessment by testing a 
model in which Executive Function mediated Memory in the FoK inaccuracy condition. 
 
 
7.3.4.3. Mediation Model for Feeling of Knowing Inaccuracy. 
 
Mood was excluded as a predictor variable in the model for mediation, as it was 
demonstrated not to relate to either endogenous variable. As before, with a requirement for 
a mediator to be tested, it must relate to the endogenous variable of interest - the FoK 
inaccuracy measure. From the direct effects model presented above, both Executive 
Function and Memory were contributory factors. Given that an initial FoK may happen 
faster than a retrieval attempt, there may be a two-step process in completing the FoK 
judgment (Miner & Reder, 1994; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001). In specifying such a model 
of mediation, the main question relates to the likely processes.  
 
For the Low FoK condition, of interest here, any mnemonic contributions to forming the 
judgment might be discounted in some way by other inferential information - this would 
support Memory being mediated, with negative effect, by Executive Function in the FoK 
inaccuracy condition. An initial experience-based process might thus be discounted by 
more explicit, but faulty, information-based judgment, undermining potentially useful 
mnemonic experience (Koriat & Levi-Sadot, 2001; Koriat, 2008; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 
2009).  
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Such a process might be expected in people with more executive dysfunction, which has 
been linked with memory related deficits in source failure in remembering, and 
confabulation (Johnson et al., 2000). Both disorders have been associated with insufficient 
regard to accuracy, typified, by errors in attributing appropriate weight to memory-related 
diagnostic information (Johnson et al., 2000), or over reliance on heuristic as opposed to 
systematic processing which might better note useful mnemonic cues and use them to infer 
likelihood of future recognition (Johnson et al., 2000; Moscovitch & Wincour, 2002). The 
model presented (figure 7.15) tested whether Executive Function might mediate Memory in 
FoK inaccuracy performance. 
 
 
Figure 7.16 Schematic model of mediation of Memory by Executive 
Function in leading to Feeling of Knowing calibration inaccuracy. FoK 
inaccuracy as the proportion of Low FoKs subsequently recognised. 
 
 
 
Model fit statistics were: x2 = 19.439, df = 12, p = 0.078 x2
 
/df = 1.620, GFI = 0.944, CFI = 
0.833, RMSEA = 0.079 (90% CI = 0.00 - 0.141; pclose = 0.209) SRMR = 0.090. Sobel test 
z = -2.105, p = 0.035 (MacKinnon et al., (2002), adjusted = p < 0.01). Parameter estimates 
were significant for all mediational paths. The model fit indices and Sobel test are 
consistent with a mediation view of the relationship between Memory and Executive 
Function. Figure 7.16 presents the model results and Appendix S the full statistical output. 
This model supports a proposition that the direct effect of memory is reliably different 
when executive function is included as a mediator of the Memory - FoK Inaccuracy 
relationship.  The model has limited utility in that it presents the same fit statistics, x2 and 
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degrees of freedom as a model in which both Memory and Executive Function were 
correlated direct effects, so that statistical comparison between the two models is not 
possible. Its benefit is proposed in addressing the nature of the relationship between the 
two predictors, as an alternative to a correlated direct effects model. As such, it presents 
the same associations, but interpreted in terms of causal, as opposed to correlated, 
relationships between predictors, but with some theoretical support (Johnson et al., 2000) 
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Figure 7.16. Structural mediation model of memory mediated by Executive Function in Feeleing of 
Knowing inaccuracy. * = significant path at p < 0.05. AVLT = Auditory Verbal Learning Test delayed 
recall; SMT = Sentence Memory Tests, delayed recall; Brixton = Brixton test; Hay Time = Hayling time 
section B minus time Secion A; A and B errors are Hayling Sentence Completion tests errors. e = 
residuals for observed items. All latent variable loadings were significant also. FoK inaccuracy is the 
proportion of Low FoKs, subsequently recognised. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.3.4.5. Information Processing mediation in FoK Calibration 
* 
* 
* 
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The main additional aim in FoK model testing was to investigate whether Information 
Processing might mediate the processing involved in metamemory accuracy. In a direct 
effects model of FoK calibration, with all four predictors, Information Processing, 
Memory, Executive Function and Mood included, Information Processing did not provide a 
significant relationship with either of the FoK measures (for FoK accuracy, B = -0.215, p = 
0.198; for FoK inaccuracy B = -0.063, p = 0.704) and so could not be assessed for 
mediation, despite correlating with both Memory and Executive Function. 
 
These negative results in terms of information processing are worth considering from the 
perspective of effortful cognition and the proposed role of Information Processing in that. 
The Memory and Executive Function direct effects model has already demonstrated that 
only Memory was a contributor for absolute accuracy. Measured in this way, it supports a 
proposal that with each incomplete sentence acting as a cue to diagnose future recallability, 
cue-familiarity may be what supports the accurate calibration decision, and that 
deliberative or controlled processing contributions may not be used to a significant extent. 
Given that both absolute accuracy and absolute inaccuracy were assessed on the basis of 
subsequently recognised items, familiarity may have been the key contribution. 
 
 
7.3.4.6.  Model Specification - Relative Accuracy in Feeling of Knowing 
The aims in this set of models are to test factors associated with accuracy in FoK gamma 
and more specifically the findings of Beatty & Monson (1991), that in people with MS, 
increasing inaccuracy in FoK is associated with increasing executive dysfunction, in 
addition to memory deficits. Additional models investigate a contribution of information 
processing abilities towards accuracy in FoK judgment, based on the proposal that it can be 
considered an effortful cognitive judgment process, potentially constrained by the reduced 
processing ability common in MS.  
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Specification of FoK gamma direct effects model 
As before, the initial model was based on direct effects of Memory, Executive Function 
and Mood on FoK gamma. Model expectancies are as follows: 
 
1. Memory and Executive Function will demonstrate a positive contribution towards 
accuracy (higher FoK gammas), in agreement with the findings of Beatty & Monson 
(1991). 
2. Mood may demonstrate a negative contribution to accuracy, indicating more mood 
disorder is associated with lower accuracy. 
 
Figure 7.17. The a priori model of Feeling of Knowing (FoK) gamma.* = expected 
significant parameter and ? = an unknown contribution to be investigated in the model + 
and - indicate the expected direction of contribution. 
 
 
 
7.3.4.7. Model Testing 
As encountered previously, a negative error variance was calculated for the error term for 
the Somatic factor score for Mood. Error variance for this item was therefore set to a non-
zero value (.01) in line with the previously cited recommendation (Joreskog & Sorbom, 
1998). Results for model fitting were: x2
 
 = 25.483 df = 23 p = 0.326, CMIN/df = 1.108 CFI 
= 0.961, GFI = 0.943 and RMSEA = 0.033 (0.000 - 0.091; pclose = 0.620), SRMR = 
0.0719.  
Higher gamma scores indicate greater accuracy. In terms of contribution to FoK gamma, 
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Mood was a significant item (B = 0.286; p = 0.052), but neither Memory nor Executive 
Function contributed directly (B = 0.103, p = 0.618 and B = 0.139, p = 0.522). The model 
explained 11% of the variance in the FoK gamma score. Mood correlated with Executive 
Function (r = -0.297, p = 0.017) and Memory with Executive Function (r = 0.588, p = 
0.005). Figure 7.18 summarises the model results, full statistical outputs are available in 
Appendix T. 
 
This model suggests that those scoring higher on a depression measure had higher gamma 
scores (more accuracy), contradicting expectations. Further, no reliable direct contribution 
of Memory or Executive Function was evident. The results were not as expected generally, 
although general fit of the model was good in terms of global indicators of fit. Reasons for 
lack of expected findings may relate to the complexity of the task, which has two 
implications; first that the gamma findings are unreliable, and second the processing 
demands of the task meant that requirements for effortful cognitive operations are high; 
without considering a mediational relationship of information processing actual 
relationships may not be uncovered. This latter prospect was addressed first as it was a 
planned assessment. It was explored by means of assessing indirect contributions of 
Memory and Executive Function, mediated by Information Processing. 
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Figure 7.18. Structural model of factors contributing to Feeleing of Knowing accuracy, measured by 
gamma.  * = significant path at p < 0.05. * = significant path at p < 0.10. AVLT = Auditory Verbal Learning 
Test delayed recall; SMT = Sentence Memory Tests, delayed recall; Brixton = Brixton test; Hay Time = 
Hayling time section B minus time Secion A; A and B errors are Hayling Sentence Completion tests errors. 
Cog/Affect = Cognitive Affective Beck Depression Inventory items (factor score) and Somatic =  Somatic 
Beck Depression Inventory items (factor score).  e = residuals for observed items. All latent variable loadings 
were significant also. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.3.4.8. FoK gamma Mediation Model Specification 
* 
* 
* 
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As an initial step, a direct effects model of four correlated latents (Memory, Executive 
Function, Information Processing and Mood) was assessed, to establish statistical support 
for a mediational model, which required a significant relationship between the mediator 
(Information Processing) and the to-be-mediated (Executive Function and/or Memory), in 
the presence of significant effect of the mediator on the FoK measure. 
 
7.3.4.9. Model Testing Results 
Results of the modelling supported a significant relationship between Executive Function 
and Information processing (r = 0.608, p <0.001) and Memory and Information Processing 
(r = 0.565, p <0.005). Neither Mood and Information processing, nor Mood and Memory 
correlated (r = -0.122, p = 0.309 and r = 0.126, p = 0.338 respectively). Direct effects were 
evident for both Information processing to FoK gamma (B = -0.344, p = 0.049) and, as 
before, Mood to FoK gamma (B = 0.277, p = 0.049), but not for Executive Function and 
gamma (B = 0.281, p = 0.192) or Memory and gamma (B = 0.203, p = 0.312). Global fit of 
this model, which accounted for 17% of the variance in FoK gamma was acceptable; x2 = 
29.286, df = 28, p = 0.398, x2
 
/df = 1.046, GFI= 0.941, CFI= 0.980, RMSEA= 0.022 (90% 
CI 0.00 - 0.082, pclose= 0.714) and SRMR = 0.0712. The model is presented in Figure 
7.19, and statistical outputs in Appendix U. 
The negative parameter estimate for Information Processing to FoK gamma suggests that 
those with better processing speed tended to have lower gamma values, indicating less 
accuracy. This finding runs contrary to what was expected from the perspective of 
information processing abilities supporting the processing involved in making the accurate 
judgment in the FoK task. This finding will be considered here in how it might guide 
further model specification. 
 
The a priori mediation model proposed that Information Processing mediates the effect of 
both Executive Function and Memory on FoKs. Theoretically, this tests the idea that in the 
FoK task, effortful processing, which may not have available the same experience-based 
cues as other metamemory judgments, is demanded. Mnemonic and inferential effort is 
proposed to be high in a task where retrieval has already failed, and where item by item 
ordering of FoK strength is required; greater reliance on a range of more distal cues may 
be necessary in promoting accuracy.  
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Figure 7.19. Structural model of factors, including Information Processing, contributing to Feeleing of 
Knowing accuracy, measured by gamma. This model established the potential for mediation.  * = 
significant path at p < 0.05. AVLT = Auditory Verbal Learning Test delayed recall; SMT = Sentence 
Memory Tests, delayed recall; Brixton = Brixton test; Hay Time = Hayling time section B minus time Secion 
A; A and B errors are Hayling Sentence Completion tests errors. SDMT + Symbol Digit Modlaities Test; 
Cog/Affect = Cognitive Affective Beck Depression Inventory items (factor score) and Somatic =  Somatic 
Beck Depression Inventory items (factor score).  e = residuals for observed items. All latent variable loadings 
were significant also. 
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In proposing mediation by Information Processing, which has demonstrated a negative 
beta weight, contrary to that expected, but a positive correlation with both Memory and 
Executive Function as expected, it may be more appropriate to consider that this indicated 
a confounding, or suppressing, relationship on the variables of interest - Memory and 
Executive Function (MacKinnon, Krull & Lockwood, 2000; Iacobucci, 2008). The lack of 
a significant path, notable for Executive Function as a significant contributor to FoK 
accuracy, may relate to the impact of processing speed suppressing such a relationship. 
The bivariate correlation between Executive Function and Information processing is high 
at r = 0.61 perhaps indicating some collinearity, or shared variance. If variance relating to 
information processing is removed by setting it as a mediator, a relationship between 
Executive Function and FoK accuracy, which would be expected from a range of findings 
in neurological populations (Beatty & Monson, 1991; Shimamura & Squire, 1986; 
Souchay et al., 2003; Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005; Souchay, 2007), might be demonstrated.  
 
In respect of Memory, a similar relationship may be demonstrable; the contribution is less 
clear, based on more inferential accounts of making FoKs, and because these judgments 
are being made on already unrecallable targets. The model will investigate the role of 
Information Processing as mediator or confound in this manipulation of the model. As 
theoretical specification proposes that the relationship of Memory and Executive Function 
to FoK relates to a shared supression by information processing speed, the correlation 
between these two items is modelled through the mediator alone. Some support for this 
specification is justifiable by the weak correlation of these two latent variables in FoK, 
compared to other models. Against the background of the parameter sign for Information  
Processing, the revised a priori model to be tested is outlined in Figure 7.20 proposing the 
expected relationships. 
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Figure 7.20: The adjusted a priori model of factors contributing to Feeling of Knowing gamma 
accuracy, with Information processing mediating the relationship between both executive and memory 
ability in achieving accuracy. Mood disorder has already been demonstrated to relate to accuracy. * 
Indicates expected significant parameters; n.s. = non-significant parameters and + or - indicates the 
expected direction of the effect. The two mediational relationships are shown in green. 
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7.3.4.9. Mediation Model Testing Results 
Model fit statistics were generally acceptable; x2 = 37.786, df = 30, p = 0.155, x2
 
/df = 
1.260, GFI= 0.924, CFI= 0.880, RMSEA= 0.051 (90% CI 0.00 - 0.097, pclose= 0.452) and 
SRMR = 0.1518. In this model, a significant parameter estimated for Executive Function 
and FoK accuracy was established (B = 0.33, p = 0.020), in addition to near significant  (at 
p <0.05) estimates for Mood and Information Processing and FoK accuracy (B = 0.25, p = 
0.69 and B = -0.27, p = 0.056).  
Of note in the model, is support for a direct effect of executive function in increasing 
accuracy in FoK judgments. Parameter estimates for Information Processing are of not in 
the expected direction, challenging the proposal that information processing speed is 
positively related to metamemory accuracy; instead it suggests that processing speed may 
confound the relationship between executive abilities and accuracy, and contribute towards 
inaccuracy in this measure. Sobel tests of mediation suggested the mediation relationship 
led to significant changes in the direct relationship between Executive Function and FoK 
gamma as a result of the inclusion of information processing as a mediator (Sobel z = -
1.257, p = 0.20, adjusted p < 0.05), and in Memory (Sobel z = -1.273, p = 0.20, adjusted p 
< 0.05), though the direct effect of Memory was non-significant, even with the mediational 
relationship. The mediational role of Information Processing might therefore best be 
characterised as one of suppression, against expectations of the a priori model’s parameter 
sign. A final finding of this model was the failure to maintain a significant contribution to 
the latent variable Executive Function by one of the observed variables the Brixton Spatial 
Anticipation Test. The full set of statistical outputs in available in Appendix V, and the 
model is shown in figure 7.21. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   297 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Executive Function
.31
ErrA
e1
.56
.79
ErrB
e2
.89
.38
TimeHAY
e3
.62
.02
ErrBRIX
e4
.13
Mood
.41
Cog/Affect
e8
.64
.99
Somatic
e9
.99
Memory
.62
AVLT7e10
.79
.31
SMTe11
.55
.19
FoK gamma
d3
.16
Info Process
.72
SDMT
e5 .85
d1
.27
.25
.33
.19
-.27-.26
.30
.38
 
Figure 7.21 Structural mediation model of Feeling of Knowing accuracy (FoK gamma) with 
Information Processing proposed as a suppressing mediator of Executive Function and Memory. . * = 
significant path at p < 0.05. * = significant path at p < 0.10. AVLT = Auditory Verbal Learning Test delayed 
recall; SMT = Sentence Memory Tests, delayed recall; Brixton = Brixton test; Hay Time = Hayling time 
section B minus time Secion A; A and B errors are Hayling Sentence Completion tests errors. Cog/Affect = 
Cognitive Affective Beck Depression Inventory items (factot score) and Somatic =  Somatic Beck 
Depression Inventory items (factor score). e = residuals for observed items. n.s.= non significant latent 
variable loading 
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7.3.4.10. Post hoc FoK analyses 
 
In the FoK calibration models, two findings are of interest; the contribution of executive 
function in the inaccuracy condition, suggesting that poor executive function is associated 
with larger proportions of misapplied Low FoK ratings to subsequently recognised items. 
The second finding, more speculative in nature, was support for a model in which 
executive function may have constrained available experience-based mnemonic cues in 
applying FoKs, leading to higher proportions of inaccuracy. These results in part accord 
with the proposal of Beatty & Monson (1991) that FoK accuracy is associated with both 
memory and executive impairments in people with MS, and with Pannu & Kaszniak 
(2005), that a contribution relating to frontal lobe dysfunction appears a consistent finding 
in neurological populations.  
 
In respect of the FoK relative accuracy models, a key result warrants consideration; that of 
a negative association between information processing and FoK gamma scores, suggesting 
a relationship contrary to expectations, and contrary to a non-significant zero-order 
correlation between FoK and performance on the Symbol Digit Modalities test. For 
reasons relating to the complexity of the process in deriving the FoK gamma, the gamma 
calculation itself, and because of the small amounts of its variance explained by the model 
the initial consideration for this finding is to assume the finding is artefactual. Some post 
hoc analyses were carried out to investigate the unexpected findings, based on a number of 
possibilities generated from the literature. 
 
Heterogeneity of performance 
Initially, given the distribution of FoK gamma scores, performance was split between those 
scoring positive and negative FoK gammas, with zero scores used to split the file. The two 
groups were compared (> 0.00, n=67 and < 0.00, n = 33). Comparison of mean scores 
across the range of observed variables was carried out. Comparing FoK subgroups, no 
significant differences were found between groups on memory, executive, information 
processing or mood variables.  
 
A second comparison across group was carried out to reflect those who were accurate 
(greater than chance, n = 53), who performed at chance level (n = 26; a one in eight chance 
of being correct or gammas of -0.125 to + 0.125) and those who were systematically 
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inaccurate (gamma < -0.125; n = 21). In all assessments support for the negative parameter 
estimate for information processing and the positive parameter value for Mood was 
maintained. 
 
7.3.4.11.  Summary of Feeling of Knowing models 
There was general support for an executive relationship with poor performance on Feeling 
of Knowing judgments. This was evident in both inaccuracy in FoK calibration, and in 
gamma scores. While information processing might mediate the relationship of executive 
function and FoK gamma, the relationship warrants consideration because of the 
unexpected direction of the relationship between processing speed and FoK accuracy. 
Memory was found to be unrelated to FoK relative accuracy (gamma). Finally, mood 
disorder was related to accuracy in relative FoK accuracy; the stability of the relationship 
appeared inconsistent across the direct and mediational models however. Of note in this 
respect the relationships between memory and executive function were less robust, and 
only the inhibition-related descriptors of the latent Executive Function (Hayling test items) 
were significant contributors in the FoK gamma model. 
 
Calibration accuracy of FoK was associated with mnemonic, and potentially inferential 
contributions and relative accuracy with affective disorder and executive ability, in 
conjunction with slower processing speeds. The relationship between memory and absolute 
accuracy may in part have been because of the way accuracy was measured, using only 
recognised sentence completions. The key result therefore was the potential contribution of 
executive deficit to increasing levels of inaccuracy, even in subsequently recognised items.  
 
7. 8. General Summary. 
This chapter investigated a range of metamemory measures, including memory self-
efficacy, Judgment of Learning, Retrospective Confidence Judgment and Feeling of 
Knowing Judgments. Performance was considered specifically in relation to three factors 
proposed to contribute to these judgments - Memory, Executive Function and Mood. In 
large part results were in line with a priori models; that Mood was a contributor to memory 
efficacy judgments, both directly and acting in a mediation role to more inferential aspects 
of judgment. This confirmed the findings of Randolph Arnett & Freske’s (2004) model, 
using a similar instrument.  
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In Retrospective Confidence models, the relevance of mnemonic processes in accuracy 
was supported. Accuracy in Judgments of Learning at delay was related to memory ability, 
but not in the expected direction, with some evidence perhaps that while the learning over 
many trials was accounted for, the judgment might not have been. Finally, for Feeling of 
Knowing, a more complex interaction of factors was found; calibration accuracy was 
associated with memory ability, and memory and executive function appearing to conflict 
in their role in generating inaccurate calibration of FoK judgments. In this respect the 
findings of Beatty & Monson (1991) are reflected in part in these results. Mood disorder 
related to accuracy in relative accuracy of FoK judgments and executive contributions only 
disclosed when shared information processing related variance was partialed out. 
 
Unexpected findings related to the apparent contribution of mood disorder towards 
accuracy in the FoK task, along with the negative association between information 
processing and accuracy in this task. With both results in mind, along with the contribution 
of executive function towards accuracy in the task, an emerging picture of dissociated 
contribution of information processing speed in cognitive, but not metacognitive tasks is 
suggested. Additionally, processes that might limit information processing - slower speed 
and mood disorder - appear to confer benefits in accuracy, positing a potentially important 
inhibitory construct in FoK accuracy. 
 
The findings presented here have been considered only as they drive modifications to 
model specification, and their interpretation and relevance to the broader aims of the study 
will be considered in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 8: Discussion 
 
8.1. Introduction. 
 
One of the key reasons that metacognition in clinical samples should be better understood 
is because of its importance in self-regulated learning (Toglia & Kirk, 2000; Efklides, 
2006) This learning is supported by an ability to control related processes, contingent on 
accurate monitoring of ongoing learning. The monitoring of memory is therefore of 
interest in understanding learning capacities, as it offers insights supplementary to tested 
memory performance. Metamemory is not typically a consideration in estimating the 
potential for learning, but may be more relevant to the estimation of rehabilitation potential 
than object-level memory (or cognitive) performance alone (Cicerone & Tupper, 1991; 
Cicerone et al., 2005; Ownsworth et al., 2006; Ownsworth & Clare, 2006).  Additionally 
treating the impairment in learning rather than the memory impairment may be a way of 
proceeding. (Chiaravalotti et al., 2005) 
 
Broadly, the results of this study point towards some areas of strength in memory-oriented 
judgment, despite varying levels of object-level memory, executive, information 
processing and affective status. In considering the relevance of performance across the 
various metamemory tasks, attention was paid to the differences between accurate and 
inaccurate performance on calibration measures; these absolute accuracy measures are 
relevant, because for the learner, they are an index of overall levels of learning (Hacker, 
Bol & Keener, 2008). Additionally, the contributions to relative accuracy were considered 
because of its importance to the learner in identifying specifically which information is 
known, or not (Hacker, Bol & Keener, 2008). This was considered in terms of 
Retrospective Confidence and Feeling of Knowing gamma scores. Taken together, relative 
and absolute accuracy in memory monitoring contribute to the selection and use of a range 
of control operations to manage performance (Nelson & Narens, 1990; Dunlosky & Bjork, 
2008; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009) 
 
Based on the expected multifactorial nature of these judgments, the analytic approach 
modelled interactions of latent variables in their contribution to metamemory judgments, 
and each tested model was set a priori, informed by relevant literature. In rehabilitation, 
much of the reasoning carried out by clinicians might be considered to proceed at the level 
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of latent constructs such as learning, insight, motivation and rehabilitation potential. The 
models investigated underscore this reasoning. While observed variables, such as 
performance on individual tests, may be used for diagnostic purposes, intervention and 
outcome is often considered and measured with respect to performance on a range of tasks 
required in daily life; these tasks reflect multiple domains of cognitive performance, and 
other, often person-controlled, variables. Latent variable modelling can potentially act as a 
bridge between neuropsychology and neurorehabilitation, connecting performance scores 
to the interactions between cognitive domains in generating behaviour. In rehabilitation 
these interactions are typically manipulated to provide graded, task-related, individually 
tailored interventions. 
 
The overall goal of the study was to investigate metamemory in people with Multiple 
Sclerosis, by addressing three issues: 
• First, by investigating the factors that contribute to metamemory performance in 
MS, both in accuracy and inaccuracy of judgments. Previous studies of the topic in 
this clinical group were replicated and extended using additional measures of 
memory monitoring and more robust statistical analysis.  
• Second, the extent to which current models of metamemory account for the 
performance of the sample was investigated. Mnemonic experience and inferential 
factors associated with accuracy in metamemory were considered to this end.  
• Third, the literature was extended by the inclusion of both mood and information 
processing as potential contributors.  Specifically this related to investigating if 
information processing, as it does in object level memory performance in MS, 
functions as a constraint on performance in metamemory. 
 
The implications of the findings for rehabilitative approaches are also addressed. At the 
end of the discussion, consideration is given to emerging questions and limitations of the 
study, and how they might be addressed. Prior to discussing the findings in detail, a 
summary of the study, its context, and participants is presented. 
 
8.2. Summary of Study 
 
The sample was generally representative of other UK community-dwelling samples of 
people with MS, offering some potential for generalising the results, in terms of mean age 
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of the sample, employment status, and MS subtype (O’Hara, DeSouza & Ide, 2000; Kobelt 
et al., 2006).  Disease subtype reflected the expected incidences. Relapsing-remitting MS 
participants were younger than other participants. Primary progressive MS incidence was 
in line with expected proportion of the sample, and the later age of diagnosis. Finally, the 
decreasing proportions of relapsing-remitting MS accompanied by increasing secondary 
progressive MS in older groups of participants is also in agreement with a changing 
disease course from relapsing to secondary progressive types over time (Noseworthy et al., 
2000; Compston & Coles, 2002). 
  
Cognitive impairment, including information processing, memory and executive deficits, 
was present in 62% of the sample, higher than some other studies, but within the range of 
reported incidences (Rao, 1995; Deloire et al, 2006). Findings concord with differing 
incidences of cognitive impairment within MS subtypes; benign MS being least, and 
progressive forms most, associated with cognitive impairment (Rao et al., 1991a; Rao, 
2004; Denney, Sworowski & Lynch, 2005). Mood disorder was noted in about one third of 
participants, mainly endorsed to a mild or moderate level.  
 
The mix of cognitive impairment across the sample reflects the common experience of 
heterogeneity in MS samples. However, from the individual test results presented, 
subgroups based on memory and executive ability did not provide clear differences in the 
range of metamemory measures. This finding is not entirely in opposition to Beatty & 
Monson’s (1991) findings because in that study only one comparable measure of 
metamemory (FoK gamma) was reported, and groups were only reliably different in 
accuracy when compared to the control and cognitively unimpaired MS group, not to each 
other. This suggests that within impaired participants, heterogeneity of performance would 
in fact not differentiate subgroups of metamemory accuracy. Rather, cognitively impaired 
subgroups should differ from controls and cognitively unimpaired subgroups.  
 
Contributing factors to metamemory in a priori models were operationalised as Executive, 
to indicate inferential and frontal processes, Mnemonic to indicate a range memory-
experience processes and affective to indicate mood-related evaluations, which might 
impact judgments. Consideration was also given to information processing ability, which 
was expected to constrain effortful processing related to the tasks, and therefore accuracy. 
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Confirmatory factor analysis was used to evaluate how well selected measures could 
maintain discriminant validity so as to be used as latent variables. Measurement model 
assessment of the Beck Depression Inventory, version II supported a two-factor solution to 
this scale consisting of Cognitive/Affective items and Somatic items, in line with the 
findings of Beck, Steer & Brown (1996). This two-factor structure, the only reported 
confirmatory factor analysis of the BDI-II reported in the literature for this population, 
presented the best statistical fit; the finding concords with a number of similar 
investigations (Arnau et al., 2001; Viljoen et al., 2003; Thombs et al., 2008). 
 
Of specific interest in respect of the cognitive items’ measurement model was a factor 
model that substituted the a priori model. In selecting measures for the latent variables, 
initially a three-item information-processing factor was proposed to indicate a range of 
processing related features - speed, capacity and complexity. However, this was not 
supported, in the context of memory and executive latent variables. A better fitting model 
was found that supported related, but separable, Information Processing and Working 
Memory factors. The model in fact reflected findings of a number of studies in MS, which 
fail to find a coherent information-processing factor (Chiaravalotti et al., 2003; Drew, 
Starkey & Isler, 2009;). The theoretical orientation of the study was based on findings that 
information processing, and not working memory, is the primary deficit in MS. This factor, 
described solely by performance on the Symbol Digit Modalities Test, was therefore 
endorsed for assessment in the structural models. 
 
The final set of factor analyses, and specifically that based on the General Frequency of 
Forgetting ten-item scale, aimed to confirm a factor structure for the memory efficacy 
scales. Generally, there appeared scope to reduce these scales further because both appear 
to have redundant items. There is also a possibility, in the use of Forgetting while Reading 
items, that factoral coherence related to common method effects, rather than to their strong 
association with efficacy. Perhaps one of the benefits of both scales is that they do ask for 
an assessment of specific memory failures; the General Frequency of Forgetting scale 
relating to a more representative range of memory failure instances. While not high, 
missing data instances on these scales, and the Memory Function Questionnaire more 
generally seems to reflect some items that are inappropriate to some participants. Items 
asking about memory in public speaking, test-taking and reading generated missingness, 
suggesting reduced applicability in the population. The results from both factor analysis 
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and structural modelling supported the use of the ten-item General Frequency of Forgetting 
scale in favour of the alternative. 
 
Confirmed latent variables were then tested in a set of a priori structural models to 
examine the relationships between these and a range of metamemory judgments; memory 
self-efficacy, Judgment of Learning, Retrospective Confidence Judgment, and Feeling of 
Knowing. With clinical application in mind, the study’s focus was on episodic memory, in 
contrast to a sizable amount of metamemory research, which has typically focused on 
semantic memory.  
 
8.3 Metamemory in Multiple Sclerosis 
Given that there are few established relationships between different measures of 
metamemory (Souchay, 2007; Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008a; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009), 
each is considered initially as a separate judgment, prior to considering them as a set of 
conceptually related monitoring judgments. This discussion generally relates to the results 
of structural models, and will focus on the questions for the study. These regarded 
contributory factors to each judgment, how results situate with current models of each 
judgment and the role of information processing and mood in metamemory accuracy. 
 
8.3.1. Memory Self-report 
The first finding from this study was that subjective memory report (memory self-efficacy) 
was not found to relate to tested memory performance. Instead, mood was a reliable 
independent predictor of memory complaint, supporting the findings of a number of 
studies of both neurologically impaired and neurologically intact samples (Broadbent et al., 
1982; Lovera, et al, 2006).  
 
On the General Frequency of Forgetting scale, participants reported more problems, and 
considered these more serious when they happened, than non-neurologically impaired 
people, even though the normative samples, against which they were compared, were 
older. An older sample might typically expected to endorse more memory difficulty than 
younger samples, in part because of implicitly held theories about aging and memory 
decline (Hertzog, 2002). In addition, all cognitive subgroups (including the no memory 
impairment group) rated themselves as having more memory difficulty than age-matched 
groups from the complete Memory Function Questionnaire standardisation sample. Alone, 
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mood disorder established a reliable association with memory self-efficacy, with higher 
depressive symptomatology being associated with more memory complaint. There was 
some indication too that evaluative aspects of efficacy judgments may have been mediated 
by this mood bias. 
 
In concluding that this index of metamemory might be impaired, consideration should be 
given to the fact that objective memory impairment was evident in the sample. Defining 
accuracy in memory efficacy would suggest it should relate to tested memory ability. This 
perhaps ignores both the impact of extraneous contributors to efficacy judgments, and the 
experiences of memory failure. Two anecdotal findings both from study participants are 
relevant here. Word-finding difficulties and other experiences of apparent forgetting, are to 
the person experiencing them, often considered as evidence of memory problems. In 
reality they might better be considered non-memory deficits. Semantic and phonemic 
fluency problems in MS are common and appear to relate to processing speed and 
executive abilities, rather than memory impairment (Henry & Beatty, 2006), despite being 
experienced as such. Likewise, apparent forgetting, may relate to acquisition failures, again 
associated with processing resources in MS (Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004).  
 
Of interest therefore, was a failure to find a relationship between processing abilities and 
memory self-report when this was tested in the structural models, suggesting a complex 
and indirect relationship in how experiences attributed to memory failure may be 
incorporated into memory-efficacy, or stored metacognitive knowledge of memory. One 
such possible mechanism might relate to mood disorder; each experienced memory 
problem confirming already negative memory evaluations about memory. 
 
In assessing the two memory-efficacy models, there was support for the findings of 
Randolph, Arnett & Freske (2004), that mood acts as a mediator of the evaluative 
components in making this efficacy judgment. Those with higher levels of mood disorder 
reported more memory problems in daily life, and the contribution of executive function 
was reliably different when examined as a mediated contributor, compared to a direct 
effect. The question remains of how that relationship might be understood. 
 
One theme of studies, from samples of older people with late life depression (Alexopoulos 
et al., 2000), is that the relationship between both mood and executive function may relate 
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to disruption of a number of cortical-subcortical loops, contributing to an imbalance of 
excitatory and inhibitory modulation of both cognitive and affective function. In MS, left 
hemisphere pathology, specifically left frontal and temporal lobe areas appear implicated 
in depression (Feinstein et al., 2004; Siegert & Abernethy, 2005). These findings offer 
potential for a neural correlation between executive and affect disturbance. Mechanisms by 
which depression and executive function might interact include difficulties in shifting 
cognitive or emotional set of focus (Bunce, Handley & Gaines, 2008; Wang et al., 2008). 
This might relate to ‘state’ components of depression such as the impact of rumination on 
inhibitory control (Watkins & Brown, 2002). Negative biases in thinking more generally, 
which might relate to ‘trait’ views of the impact of depression (Beevers & Miller, 2004). 
Each proposes an extent of mediation by mood of evaluative processes. 
 
Experimental evidence for such mediation is proposed from the treatment of mood 
disorder leading to changed perceptions of cognitive ability in MS (Julian, Merluzzi & 
Mohr, 2007). Mechanisms for such findings could relate to changing the cognitive bias 
caused by mood disorder, or attenuation of the impact on mood on effortful cognitive 
processing, noted in MS (Arnett et al., 1999b; Demaree, Gaudino & DeLuca, 2003). In the 
study of Julian, Merluzzi & Mohr (2007), the authors propose a relationship between 
objective cognitive function and subjective report emerging as a result of the attenuation of 
mood disorder. This suggests a causal role of depression in the relationship between 
objective and subjective measures. In people who are cognitively unimpaired, mood 
disorder has also been suggested to be associated with complaint of cognitive difficulty 
(Broadbent et al., 1982).  
 
A second area for consideration in respect of these results is whether there are other 
specific explanations for the lack of a robust relationship between memory self-report and 
tested memory performance. Questioning about memory ability is often the initial 
assessment of memory ability made by clinicians. Memory complaint is often used as a 
trigger for formal memory evaluation, so such a relationship is often assumed. Despite the 
structural models’ findings of no reliable relationship between tested and reported memory 
performance, an additional finding was that memory efficacy scores did correlate with 
performance on one measure of memory used in the study, but not the other. The two 
memory tests may reflect different aspects of experienced memory failures - the single trial 
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Sentence Memory Test, acquisition and the multi-trial Auditory Verbal learning Test, 
retention.  
 
While the experience of people with MS may be of memory failures, there is some 
evidence, with which Sentence Memory Test performance and efficacy correlation 
accords, that difficulty with acquisition, rather than retention is a key memory problem in 
MS (Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004). The correlation, albeit low (Pearson’s r = 0.24), 
for each memory efficacy scale and Sentence Memory Test, suggests some sensitivity in 
the questionnaire to actual memory performance. The developers of the 10-item General 
Frequency of Forgetting (GFF) scale have proposed that memory performance explains 
small amounts of the variance in GFF scores, even with individual factors controlled 
(Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004). In the study of Randolph, Arnett & Freske (2004) no 
relationship between memory-efficacy and tested memory performance was found, but the 
memory measure used was one in which participants were trained to a criterion level of 
performance before memory was tested, thereby negating the impact of acquisition 
problems. From the results presented in this study, a focus on acquisition deficits in 
memory testing may yield a more consistent relationship between efficacy and tested 
ability in people with MS.  
 
The lack of a consistent association between self-reported and tested memory performance 
might also relate to factors, aside from the type of memory process tested. Experienced 
memory failures may be infrequent because environmental demands have been adapted 
downwards to equate with disability; on standard assessment of memory impairments 
might be sizable, but complaint low (Rabbitt et al., 1995; Hertzog, 2002). The reverse 
proposition might better reflect the finding in this study, given memory complaint was 
higher than normed samples. This could imply a failure to adapt environmental demands in 
the context of experiences of memory deficit, this perhaps suggesting inadequate control 
processes.  
 
Tests of memory may not be ecologically valid in comparison to a questionnaire, or there 
may be insufficient specificity to actual memory behaviour in both questionnaires and 
memory tasks (Hertzog, 2002). This may point to ways in which questions about memory 
in MS might be improved by subjective memory report specifying a more task-specific 
‘retrieval context’ (Hertzog, 2002:184) to limit the use of generalised self-appraisal. 
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Hertzog, for example, suggests that questionnaires relating to specific memory behaviours 
such as remembering to take medication should be related to measured instances of 
‘forgetting in medication taking’ to disclose the self-report and tested memory link.  
 
Additional factors attenuating the self-report and tested memory link in MS samples might 
also include factors that apply in non-clinical groups too - such as age (Hertzog, 2002; 
Lineweaver & Hertzog, 1998) or personality factors (Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004). 
Inclusion of these factors in an assessment of the contributors to efficacy judgments might 
also explain increased amounts of variance in efficacy; here, 23% of the variance of the 
preferred General Frequency of Forgetting scale was explained, suggesting inclusion of 
additional fators is warranted. 
 
Memory efficacy might best be considered in respect of how efficacy judgments can be 
calibrated, in order that they do not limit memory effort, rather than approached from an 
assumption that accuracy is quantifiable. It is perhaps because of these validity issues that 
memory-efficacy measures are not the focus of the majority of metamemory research. 
Importantly however, efficacy is seen generally to have an important role in the sense of 
agency in human activities, meaning memory efficacy probably influences learning-
oriented effort, regardless of correspondence with objective measures (Bandura, 1982; 
Sniehotta, Scholz & Schwarzer, 2005). Rather than self-report being indicative of memory 
performance, it may have validity in predicting memory or learning effort. 
 
8.3.2. Delayed Judgment of Learning 
Accurate delayed Judgments of Learning are important in decisions about how much is 
known (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008). The results here indicate underconfidence with practice 
was maintained at delay, that better recall was contributory to greatest underconfidence 
and that information processing speed was associated with greater accuracy. The proposal 
in assessing this contribution is that both may reflect those with better object-level 
cognitive function. 
 
The accuracy measure used in this study was the discrepancy between predicted and actual 
recall, after a delay, and all scores were negative, indicating underconfidence in the 
judgments. The presence of both initial overconfidence and underconfidence-with-practice 
across learning trials and are common findings during list-learning among unimpaired 
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samples (Koriat, Sheffer & Ma’ayan, 2002). In this regard the MS sample displayed 
typical patterns of learning during the task.  
 
One model of how accuracy in JoLs after delay in achieved, compared to pre delay, is the 
Monitoring Dual Memory (MDM) hypothesis (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991; Koriat, 1997; 
Narens, Nelson & Scheck, 2008; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). The MDM model proposes 
that an immediate JoL is based on monitoring short and long-term memory availability and 
delayed JoLs are made only from long-term memory monitoring. Delayed JoL is proposed 
to be a more accurate indicator of learning, because covert retrieval attempts are made 
from the same memory store used for the recall test, increasing concordance between 
prediction and performance. The main implication in assessing the JoL results relates to 
the presumed use of covert retrieval attempts to abolish underconfidence with practice at 
delay (Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). This was not the finding 
here however. 
 
A key finding was of maintained underconfidence in the delayed Judgment of Learning 
(JoL). This phenomenon not typically reported in the literature. A second finding suggests 
that most underconfidence in the judgment was associated with better recall performance. 
A number of possibilities for explaining these results come from two perspectives of how 
this judgment might be implemented in unimpaired samples. Broadly, these relate to 
failure in using the correct diagnostic cues and artefactual mnemonic factors, relating to 
the judgment task itself. 
 
It was seen in the structural model that prior JoLs were contributory to the delayed JoL, 
supporting a contention that pre-delay underconfidence contributed to the error of low 
recall prediction after a delay. Nelson & Meeter, (2003) suggest that ‘perhaps when 
making JOLs people do not give as much weight to external cues (such as the amount of 
study time) as objectively should have been given’ (2003:131). Here, the failure may have 
been not attending to the likely benefits of five learning trials, but instead indexing the 
delayed judgment against mounting underconfidence from earlier trials. Meeter & Nelson, 
(2003) and Finn & Metcalfe, (2007) suggest a reason for maintained underconfidence 
might be mistaken assumption that immediate judgments of learning are better indicators, 
not only of learning, but also of subsequent Judgments of Learning. The structural model 
does support a reliable relationship between pre-delay and delayed JoL. However, in 
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proposing this explanation of the findings, only the delayed underconfidence itself is 
addressed, not the finding that larger discrepancy (more underconfidence) was associated 
with better recall performance. 
 
An alternative theory about delayed JoLs might offer some explanation of that result; the 
so-called self-fulfilling hypothesis (Spellman & Bjork, 1992). According to this model of 
delayed JoLs, if covert retrieval is carried out in making JoLs there is better learning from 
which a final covert retrieval can be made, abolishing the underconfidence effect. The 
retrieval practice provided through multiple trials, may lead to a large increase in final 
recall (Narens, Nelson & Scheck, 2008), explaining the increase in performance in better 
rememberers. The wider discrepancy between prediction and performance, begs the 
question as to why prediction did not increase in line with better performance, if covert 
retrieval took place. The proposal in interpreting the results presented here is that the 
influence of prior JoL predictions accounts for the maintained underconfidence, which was 
accompanied, in better rememberers, with a self-fulfilling increase in learning, so widening 
discrepancies.  
 
Finn & Metcalfe, (2007; 2008) suggest a memory for past test heuristic as a cause of 
underconfidence with practice effects because people use prior performance as an indicator 
of subsequent performance, and it may be that this was extended to delay. With the 
inclusion of the additional relationships in the final structural model, immediate JoLs 
contributed to underconfidence in delayed JoL, memory ability was positively associated 
with accuracy pre-delay JoL, but negatively in delayed JoL. The picture that emerges is of 
delayed JoL accuracy being associated with the JoL prior to delay (‘what did I get last 
time’), itself containing underconfidence. If this underconfidence served to lower 
predictions, then those who were in fact learning better would generate wider discrepancies 
between predicted and actual performance. This would give the appearance of more 
underconfidence in those with better memory, but the discrepancy in facts relates to better 
recall performance relative to others. Nominally ‘less accurate’ delayed JoL is in part 
therefore, artefactual because the multiple learning trials offer spaced retrieval practice, 
from which better rememberers benefit most (Kimball & Metcalfe, 2003). 
 
Perhaps then, the more interesting finding was the maintenance of underconfidence, 
regardless of its size. The relevance of maintained underconfidence is that it might indicate 
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poor task apprehension or attention to non-diagnostic cues. Use of cues including what 
might be considered a memory-efficacy effect (prior JoL), may have driven the judgment 
more than appropriate mnemonic control operations, such as covert retrieval. The efficacy 
contributions might be understood as a conflict between what Vilkki, Servo & Surma-aho, 
(1998) term stored metacognitions and concurrent metacognitions about memory - the 
ideas people have about their memory, or a task, compared to their within-task monitoring 
of memory. Participants may have taken a global approach to making the judgment, which 
may have included such extrinsic, information-based factors; prior performance or 
heuristics about the impact of delay on memory, rather than using available mnemonic 
methods to make this judgment (Meeter & Nelson, 2003). In line with Koriat’s (1997) 
proposal of the cues relevant to JoLs, specific attention may be required in weighing up 
intrinsic, extrinsic and mnemonic cues, and an understanding that some cues might assist 
with memory, and others with a Judgment of Learning. This final point may imply a failure 
apprehend the task context fully, and implicate some wider executive failure. This may 
relate to the proposal of Van Overschelde, (2008) that monitoring processes should be 
considered in terms of their goal basis, rather than a passive process. 
 
It is not known from this study, whether covert retrieval was used in making this judgment. 
Evidence from the high Retrospective Confidence Judgment accuracy of the sample 
suggests that it would be an accurate predictor of performance, so it appears for the 
delayed JoL this may not have been a failure of ability to accurately monitor what is 
known. Instead it implicates failure to do so, because of inattention to the key requirements 
in making this judgment. 
 
One final consideration is of the role of information processing in respect of accuracy in 
the delayed JoL. Bearing in mind that the judgment remains debated in terms of whether it 
is fundamentally mnemonic (object-level) in its nature (Kimball & Metcalfe, 2003), the 
findings that processing speed is associated with accuracy might support a relationship 
with object-level performance, the improved list-learning over trials. This would be akin to 
the proposed role of information processing mediating other object level cognitive 
processes in MS. Information processing maintained a positive and reliable correlation 
with the other cognitive domains as would be expected, but while speed was associated 
with greater accuracy in the delayed JoL, better memory performance was associated with 
less accuracy. One potential explanation is in recourse to the object-level contribution the 
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judgment. Both memory ability and information processing speed were associated with 
better performance, but only in relation to the performance components of the Judgment, 
not the predictive component. This interpretation, though speculative accounts for the 
positive correlation between the two variables, while also accounting for their apparently 
opposing relationship with accuracy at delay. 
 
In summary, the maintained underconfidence at delay on the JoL task was a relatively 
novel finding, supporting the maintenance of pre-delay JoL judgment in informing the 
delayed judgment. Accuracy was associated with memory ability in a direction opposite to 
that expected in the a priori model. Explanations for this might relate to increased learning 
over study trials being greater than appreciated by participants, appearing to suggest some 
impairment in monitoring. The result might also indicate, in agreement with Kimball & 
Metcalfe (2003), that the process of making the JoL may not be a clear metamemory 
judgment.  
 
Attention to the diagnostic task characteristics may have been a difficulty, and this may 
relate to poor task appraisal or to the structure of the task itself, appearing to emphasise 
learning, rather than judgment about learning, as its goal. Whether the interpretation relates 
to the task design, or to participants failures to use diagnostics relevant to accuracy 
appraisal, the importance of apprehending the key information from a task is underlined. 
The importance of this task appraisal might therefore be characterised as paying sufficient 
attention to intention (Lau, et al., 2004).  
 
Proposals that delayed Judgment of Learning is primarily a memory event in 
neurologically unimpaired samples perhaps assumes that the initial task-apprehension 
stage is not part of its metacognitive status; here it appears that the failure in this regard 
could be attributed to some broader executive ability. While this is not supported by a 
statistical relationship between delayed Judgment of Learning and executive function in 
the tested model, the results may suggest a failure to deploy monitoring appropriately 
towards key diagnostics for accuracy. 
 
8.3.3. Retrospective Confidence 
Participants were accurate at making judgments about which items were more likely 
correct than others, after recall attempt, even on a single exposure new-learning task. The 
  
                  314 
 
Retrospective Confidence Judgment (RCJ) task has traditionally established high levels of 
accuracy even in clinical populations, such as people with traumatic brain injury (mean 
RCJ gamma = 0.99; Kennedy 2001). It is possible that the high levels of relative accuracy 
in RCJs relate to the use of an episodic task because there is limited availability of 
alternate information from which to make a judgment about confidence. This is contrary to 
a semantic version of the task, which is likely to require the assessment of a number of 
candidate answers, because of its general knowledge basis (Perfect & Hollins, 1996). 
Given a general knowledge question for example, it is likely that there would be a number 
of alternative candidate answers that might confound making a confidence judgment, in 
conjunction with a general assessment of domain expertise. High levels of accuracy in the 
confidence judgment found in this study, suggest that this process could be considered a 
reliable source of information in new-learning (episodic) situations, so that self-testing 
approaches might provide a useful index of what is known (Kennedy, 2001).  
 
In terms of absolute accuracy, memory ability was a contributor to the proportion of 
correctly recalled targets given a high confidence rating. For the few instances where 
correctly retrieved targets were given a low confidence rating, none of the selected latent 
variables were explanatory. Failure to find relationships therefore may have related to their 
small number across the sample or the lack of a systematic reason for their occurrence. 
 
Despite the high levels of accuracy, one potential limitation in recommending the post-
retrieval confidence judgment as a reliable measure of knowledge in episodic memory 
relates to the findings of Brewer & Sampaio, (2006) and Brewer, Sampaio & Barlow, 
(2005). Results from these studies suggested that this confidence judgment was prone to 
specific types of errors. Their experiments demonstrated that the inclusion of incorrect, but 
gist-related, sentences into a judgment process caused over-confidence. They proposed that 
if there was mistaken recall of having seen the deceptive sentence (of similar gist) during 
the original study episode, confidence was higher than warranted. This biasing of 
confidence in retrieved material may also extend to how responses are sought during tasks. 
Forced report, where people are not allowed a don’t know option, means that effort is often 
required to generate answers, and this effort, plus the memory experience of the given 
answer itself, may act to raise confidence in this answer in a future situation, regardless of 
its accuracy (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). 
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A positive interpretation of this relationship between effort and confidence judgment is 
that in a sufficiently structured, or even errorless, forced report condition, self-generation 
may assist learning (Akhtar, Moulin & Bowie, 2006). One MS related study that used self-
generation to guide recall of the steps of a task, reported improved performance 
(Goverover, Chiaravalotti & DeLuca, 2008). The intervention aimed to teach the sequence 
of everyday tasks by providing incomplete sentences, which supported generation of the 
correct steps of the task in a highly structured way; an example for an omelette preparation 
task was ‘beat together two___’. In terms of design, such a training approach would fulfill 
the criteria outlined above for a structured, errorless, forced report intervention. While the 
study in question proposed the method as enhancing encoding, it could additionally be 
seen as one in which effort at encoding would increase fluency experiences at recall, 
indicating confidence, which is predictive of performance in recall. 
 
In free report paradigms, as in this study, where don’t know answering is allowed the 
limitations of self-generation may be avoided (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). In 
rehabilitation contexts, a don’t know option is an important component of learning 
monitoring, and given its utility in increasing accuracy, it is appropriate. One limitation in 
regard to recommending free report as a method for avoiding confidence in non-studied 
information, is that it presupposes that people can themselves place the report/don’t report 
criterion at the appropriate level by themselves, that is have good monitoring and control 
processes. Executive dysfunction in this sample was evident in about one third of 
participants and such dysfunction has been associated with difficulties in controlling 
retrieval (Thornton & DeFreitas, 2009). This may predict that the placing of the report 
threshold could be difficult; an extreme example being confabulated memory responses 
(Johnson et al., 2000). Despite this, on item-by-item recall, this did not present cost in 
terms of accuracy. This relative accuracy finding is mirrored when calibration is 
considered too, because there were low instances of inaccuracy. 
 
In both assessment of relative and absolute accuracy, retrospective confidence was 
associated solely with memory performance. The result supports the view that privileged 
access and mnemonic cues support accuracy in these judgments, and that some inaccurate 
judgments (that is low confidence even when recall is correct) are unrelated to memory 
performance. This may suggest that these are instances where although the target is 
available, and is recalled, the ascribing of a low confidence might be based on insufficient 
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retrieval fluency or memory-experience to generate a confidence assessment. This 
interpretation might concord with the wider variability in accuracy scores observed in 
subgroups with memory impairment. 
 
The positive relationship between memory performance and accuracy is consistent with the 
proposal that those with better memory performance have more robust memory-experience 
cues (Wheeler, Stuss & Tulving, 1997; Wheeler, 2000; Brewer, Sampaio & Barlow, 2005; 
Koriat et al., 2008). For relative accuracy, cognitive subgroups were no different 
suggesting that memory performance per se was not a significant factor, though those with 
memory impairment alone tended to be more variable in their performance, perhaps 
supporting a characterisation of their memory-experiences as being of less diagnostic 
utility. In terms of absolute accuracy, some support was available to make an interpretation 
that memory impaired subgroups (Memory impaired, Memory & Executive impaired) may 
have reduced confidence for correctly retrieved targets, again supporting a mnemonic-
experience basis for this judgment. This is consistent with the findings of Maki (2008) that 
privileged access accounts for much of the judgment material for Retrospective 
Confidence Judgments, specifically ease and fluency in retrieval experiences (Benjamin & 
Bjork, 1996; Koriat et al., 2008). 
 
Findings about Retrospective Confidence in this study demonstrate that post-retrieval 
confidence to be a reliable indicator of what is known, in episodic memory, under 
conditions of free report. The sample, when given a single learning trial could accurately 
identify the differences between high, medium and low levels of confidence, and this 
related to actual retrieval success. This offers support for a view that this metamemory 
judgment is accurate, even in people with impairments in memory, executive function and 
mood disorder. The judgment is likely to have benefited from a number of factors - the 
time they were made (after retrieval), the item-by-item structuring of the task and its 
episodic nature. Only memory-related processes were reliably associated with accuracy, 
underlining the presumed importance fluency and availability likely being two important 
cues to such accurate judgments. No reliable relationship was found between accuracy on 
this judgment and information processing abilities, which might support the view of Koriat 
et al., (2008) that the process is parasitic on object-level memory processes and therefore 
does not require additional controlled processing. 
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8.3.4. Feeling of Knowing - Relative accuracy. 
 
As a group, the finding of a mean FoK gamma of 0.18 suggests a low level of accuracy. 
Some participants did reach gamma correlations of 1.0, and the modal score was 0.50. Two 
studies, which report a FoK gamma correlation on a similar task, are those of Shimamura 
& Squire (1986) and Schnyer et al., (2004). Shimamura and Squire compared a control 
sample to a sample with a range of memory impaired impairments; amnesics, people 
receiving ECT and people with Korsakoff’s syndrome, the latter associated with additional 
executive deficits. FoK performance showed controls achieved a mean FoK gamma of 
0.70 and amnesics 0.40, both higher than this study’s sample. The Korsakoff’s group 
achieved a mean FoK gamma of zero. The authors concluded that more widespread 
cognitive impairment is probably therefore responsible, rather than relatively 
circumscribed memory impairment, for success in this task. This accords with the findings 
in this study that the lowest levels of accuracy, both in terms of relative accuracy (gamma) 
and absolute measures focusing on inaccuracy, being associated with executive 
dysfunction. 
 
As a group therefore, this sample had low gamma accuracy values in the FoK task, 
supporting a view that this is impaired. In the sample of people with MS reported by 
Beatty & Monson (1991) mean FoK gamma is reported for each cognitively impaired 
subgroup and ranged from 0.24 (SD = 0.32) down to -0.02 (SD = 0.35) across the sample. 
Given the findings of Beatty & Monson that lowest gammas were associated both with 
memory and executive impairment, the results here offer only partial agreement. Only 
executive impairment, and not memory, was reliably associated with relative accuracy 
here. This supports an interpretation of some dissociation of memory and metamemory 
ability (Souchay, Isingrini & Gil, 2006; Souchay, Bacon & Danion, 2006). Considerations 
in respect of differences in approaches to calculating gamma may be relevant, and will be 
discussed later. 
 
Schnyer et al., (2004) report a sample of people with frontal lobe damage, but do not detail 
the mean FoK gamma statistic for the group as a whole. Instead only highest (mean 
gamma = 0.41), and lowest performers (mean gamma = - 0.31) are reported. Their findings 
also support a relationship between relative accuracy and executive ability, but not 
memory. 
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The methods for acquiring FoK judgments were very similar across Beatty & Monson 
(1991), Schnyer et al., (2004) and this study, so differences in the calculation of gamma 
may be a factor in the different findings. Beatty & Monson (1991) do not explicitly state 
the method of calculation of the gamma score, though the suggestion from the paper is that 
it was based on the sum of concordances minus sum of disconcordant FoK as a proportion 
of all judgments. Some have argued that this product-based calculation of accuracy in fact 
produces the Hamann coefficient, a measure of absolute accuracy (Nelson et al., 1986; 
Nelson, 1996). A comparison with the absolute accuracy results therefore may be more 
appropriate, in which case there is support for the memory and additional executive 
impairment being associated with the lowest accuracy condition here (higher numbers of 
Low FoKs correct), as was suggested by Beatty & Monson (1991). What the Hamann 
statistic measures, that is different to the Goodman & Kruskal gamma statistic, remains 
debated in the literature (Goodman & Kruskal 1954; Nelson 1984; Schraw, 1995; Nietfeld, 
Enders & Schraw 2006). 
 
The literature points to FoKs, being based on cue familiarity and in this sense having a 
more inferential quality (Koriat, 1993, 1994; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Leonesio, 
2008). Inferences about future recognition may in fact be based on a range of cues, 
including memory of the encoding episode itself, any extant feelings of familiarity or 
accessibility, task features, perceived ability heuristics and perhaps cues generated by the 
person themselves (Reder & Ritter, 1992; Metcalfe, Schwartz & Joaquin, 1993; Reder & 
Schunn, 1996; Benjamin & Bjork, 1996; Souchay, 2007; Maki, 2008). These cues are 
evaluated for diagnostic utility in predicting future recognition in the absence of direct-
access as a mechanism for making the judgment. 
  
There were a number of relationships of particular interest in the relative accuracy of FoK 
models. First, the contribution of executive, but not memory ability. Second, the 
association of faster information processing with lower FoK accuracy, in the context of a 
positive relationship between executive function and accuracy. A third relationship of 
interest was that between lower mood state and degree of accuracy. The structural model 
suggests that executive ability is positively, and information processing, contrary to the 
assumed effect, is negatively associated with accuracy. Finally, lower mood also appears to 
contribute to the accuracy of FoK judgments.  
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These may be important indications of how Feeling of Knowing judgments differ from 
other metamemory judgments (e.g. RCJ, JoL), the latter proposed, and validated to some 
extent in the study, to have their basis in mnemonic experiences. The role of executive 
function concords with documented relationships in both MS and other neurological 
conditions (Shimamura & Squire, 1986; Beatty & Monson, 1991; Souchay et al., 2003; 
Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005). The contribution of information processing and mood have not 
been reported in models of the Feeling of Knowing in MS, so these have limited 
provenance to guide interpretation. A wider consideration of executive function, beyond 
representing inferential abilities, to indicating frontal integrity more generally, may help in 
understanding how the mood and information processing findings could be understood. 
 
Frontal lobe dysfunction has been shown to reduce the accuracy of memory predictions 
(Janowsky, Shimamura & Squire, 1989; Vilkki, Servo & Surma-aho, 1998; Shimamura, 
2000; Souchay et al., 2003; Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005; Schwartz & Bacon, 2008), and when 
tasks are most difficult the requirements of frontal-mediated monitoring are perhaps most 
critical (Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005). While there is some evidence for an association 
between FoK accuracy and memory ability, this has been shown to be negated when 
executive contributions are statistically are removed (Schnyer et al., 2004). Here the 
structural models statistically separated their presumed shared relationship with 
information processing ability, by modelling that relationship through the mediator. 
 
In an assessment of the neural correlates of the Feeling of Knowing judgment, not only are 
frontal contributions generally supported, but a shift from stimulus-oriented to internally-
oriented cognition is also suggested, in conjunction with a shift away from stimulus-driven 
attention (Chua, Schacter & Sperling, 2009). Frith & Frith, (1999) suggest that internally 
oriented reasoning involves ventromedial regions of the frontal lobe, an area also 
associated with Feeling of Knowing performance (Schnyer et al, 2004; Modirrousta & 
Fellows, 2008). An additional dependence of Feeling of Knowing performance might 
relate to a frontal role in ‘dynamic filtering’ (Shimamura, 1996). This filtering functions to 
control information processing, through the management of the amount and type of 
processing carried out. The relevant deficit then might be a regulatory one (Benedict et al., 
2001). 
 
  
                  320 
 
One example of this filtering provided by Shimamura (1996:155) is the effect of 
interference during retrieval causing memory-blocking effects leading to tip of the tongue 
experiences and poor verbal fluency. As mentioned before, such experiences are common 
in MS (Henry & Beatty, 2006) and are often complained of as memory deficits. Frontal 
dysfunction, such as that indexed in this study, has been associated with a failure to inhibit 
processing unrelated to task demands. Such unconstrained processing is one approach to 
describing MS-associated disinhibition in the literature, where it is considered as evidence 
of a neuropsychological basis for disinhibition, in respect of fronto-limbic dysfunction 
(Benedict et al, 2001; Fishman et al., 2004). 
 
The breakdown in applying control to behavioural output, including cognitive behaviours, 
may mean that processing abilities are poorly directed in respect of task demands. This 
failure to fashion responses in accordance with the task context was indicated as potential 
basis for maintaining underconfidence with practice in the JoL findings from the study. 
Additionally, it may offer a potential way to consider how speeded information processing 
ability may not necessarily support the internally-oriented processing required in the FoK 
task, where the traces and cues upon which accuracy might be based are scant. Additional 
processing may act as interference, as it does in controlling word retrieval in MS (Henry & 
Beatty, 2006). With this interpretation, the suppression effect of information processing 
speed on executive function, found in the Feeling of Knowing model may be considered 
one where additional information processing acts as interference (in content and quantity). 
Potentially this might lead to pitting familiarity sensations against explicit cues to future 
prediction, the latter hindering this kind of judgment, because of its implicit nature (Reder 
& Schunn, 1996).  
 
Notably, one observed measure for the executive function latent variable became non-
significant in this model, leaving the latent to be described only by the three items 
reflecting inhibitory processes, measured by the Hayling Sentence Completion task. In 
people with MS, comparing their report of cognitive ability to an informer whom they 
knew, it is proposed that inaccurate estimation of abilities - here indicated by the lowest 
FoK gamma scorers - was associated with less depression, more cognitive impairment, 
disinhibition and euphoria (Benedict et al, 2001, 2004; Carone et al., 2005). This could be 
considered a reasonable characterisation of the final structural model. Executive 
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impairment co-occurs with fast, but unconstrained, information processing, and less 
depression symptoms.  
 
Such a characterisation may reflect the features of ‘euphoria sclerotica’ (Cottrell & Wilson, 
1926:8) a noted presentation of MS involving mood elevation, disinhibition and more 
significant cognitive impairment (Cottrell & Wilson, 1926; Kendall et al., 1987; Finger, 
1998; Fishman et al., 2004). Returning to the idea of an affective continuum discussed in 
Chapter 3, the lowest depression symptom scorers in this context might be considered 
those who are absolutely not-depressed, as opposed to being euthymic in their mood 
(Kendall et al., 1987). This has been discussed as ‘low-end specificity’ in the tool (Joiner, 
Schmidt & Metalsky, 1994). 
 
The interpretation of executive and information processing relationship to accuracy in the 
FoK task is not to suggest that there is some kind of speed-accuracy trade-off. Instead, in a 
complex inferential metamemory judgment with limited cues, effective or goal-relevant 
processing can be conceived of as resistance to interference. This was not the proposal in 
the a priori model, based on the relationships between information processing and object 
level cognitive functions in MS. The results from modelling suggest that in considering 
this meta-level process, information processing contributions may be qualitatively different 
to their relationship with object-level processes, and this may be because of failures in the 
top-down (executive) directing of processing resources. 
 
Parallel debates as to the key deficit underlying memory decline and metamemory in older 
people offers some related propositions (Salthouse 1996; Bunce & Macready, 2005), with 
support for the processing speed decrement rather than for competing views such as 
executive impairment models (Balota, Dolan & Duchek, 2000). In one study, offering 
conceptual support to the findings here, a double dissociation was proposed between age-
related variance in Feeling of Knowing accuracy and cued-recall performance. Variance in 
FoK accuracy was best explained by executive capacities, and in recall by information 
processing speed (Perrotin et al., 2006). 
 
One way in which this might be considered is in terms of whether explicit or implicit cues 
are used for this task. Reder and others, in a series of papers focusing on the relationships 
between metamemory and implicit memory, propose that the two functions may have more 
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in common than might first be acknowledged in the literature (Reder & Schunn, 1996). 
The relevant cues might be implicit rather than explicit, especially given its episodic 
nature. Interference in, and caused by, deliberation, itself making explicit what might be an 
implicit process might also offer some explanation why, even in unimpaired samples, 
Feeling of Knowing accuracy is typically low. This is a monitoring judgment that is 
implicit in nature and bringing to bear substantial controlled processing may obscure the 
judgment-maker from its more procedural basis. In this sense, the proposal at the outset of 
the study that executive function represented explicit, controlled and deliberative 
processing might be expanded to include the maintenance of freedom from interference so 
that the appropriate experiential sensations from ongoing, and perhaps implicit, cognition 
can be drawn into FoK judgment making. While additional information may become 
available to the judgment maker from this deliberation, the question of its utility has to be 
considered. 
 
Informational deficiencies have been proposed as a way of understanding accuracy errors 
in social psychology also and may offer some conceptual support. This view of accuracy 
errors considers informational availability not just in terms of insufficiency, but also 
surplus (Kruglanski, 1989:400). An extrapolation might suggest that extensive and fast 
information processing might indicate to a judgment maker a level of knowing, leading to 
reduced vigilance towards inconsistent information (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987). 
 
A final consideration is in respect of mood disorder, which demonstrated a negative 
association with Feeling of Knowing accuracy. The majority of participants were of a 
minimal/none or mild level on the Beck Depression Inventory. In addition to the 
suggestion proposed earlier that this could include some participants with euphoric 
presentations at one end of an affective continuum. People with MS who have milder 
cognitive impairment may be those with higher incidences of depression (Landro, Celius & 
Sletvold, 2003; Siegert & Abernathy, 2005). This is necessarily a tentative proposition 
because of the evidence of interactions between mood disorder and processing abilities, 
planning abilities and working memory in other studies (Arnett et al., 1999b; Arnett, 
Higginson & Randolph, 2001; Arnett et al., 2002). Relationships in the model could 
therefore also represent Feeling of Knowing accuracy, as a marker for milder or absent 
cognitive impairment, being associated with more depression. Further, there is evidence of 
dysphoric mood being associated with decreased recollective experience, but not 
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familiarity experience (Hertel & Milan, 1994). This might support a view that, in the 
context of better executive performance, the bias towards familiarity processing might 
support accuracy, because diagnostic evaluation of familiarity experiences is both 
appropriate and possible. 
 
8.3.5. Feeling of Knowing - Absolute accuracy 
As with Retrospective Confidence, an attempt was made to investigate the factors that are 
associated with separate measures of accuracy and inaccuracy for the Feeling of Knowing 
judgment. This means that concordant judgments (High Feeling of Knowing, and 
recognised) and disconcordant (Low feeling of Knowing, and recognised) were modeled. 
From the results of this modelling, memory performance related positively to proportions 
correct of both High Feeling of Knowing and Low Feeling of Knowing. This might be 
expected since both measures are based on successful recognition performance. 
 
For sentence completions correctly recognised, with a High Feeling of Knowing, this 
suggests that memory experience does support FoK accuracy on an item-by-item 
assessment of likely recognition, which may relate in part to the use of cue-familiarity 
assessment. For inaccurate assessments of future recognition, a model in which executive 
function mediated memory performance to negative effect was assessed. Although having 
no statistical superiority to a direct-effects model in characterising the data, it may clarify 
the relationships between the two. That the key deficit in leading to greater inaccuracy is 
the frontal mediated limitation in the assessment of future recognition.  
 
The absolute accuracy mediation model proposes that, despite subsequent recognition 
performance, the application of a Low FoK rating may be associated with executive 
impairment; a failure to usefully evaluate cues diagnostic of future recognition. The 
mediational model will require validation as it accounted for the data only to a similar 
extent as the direct effects model, though both support a reliable executive contribution. 
Given both High and Low Feeling of Knowing measures were based on correct 
recognition, the additional contribution of executive deficit could be interpreted as the 
single factor that was associated with the misapplication of the Feeling of Knowing rating. 
This finding accords with the literature highlighting frontal mediated memory errors, such 
as confabulation, source memory deficits and high rates of false positive in memory tests 
(Johnson et al., 2000; Moscovitch & Wincour, 2002; Burgess & Shallice, 1996a). The 
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finding is also more in line with that of Beatty & Monson (1991), and as discussed, may 
relate to their use of a gamma calculation that reflects absolute, rather than relative, 
accuracy in that study. 
 
In respect of Feeling of Knowing judgments investigated, it is proposed that executive 
contributions to metamemory could be summarised as attention to appropriate task features 
and the evaluation of material that might yield sufficient diagnostic information, notable in 
prospective judgments, where recall has failed (Schnyer, et al., 2004). The unexpected 
negative association of information processing with accuracy in Feeling of Knowing 
judgment might suggest that this probing might have a reflective or intuitive quality, as 
proposed by Koriat & Goldsmith (1996) and others (Moscovitch & Wincour, 2002), rather 
than an effortful, stimulus-oriented process. The association with Feeling of Knowing with 
right hemisphere medial frontal lobe function (Schnyer, et al., 2004) concurs with the 
hemisphere’s proposed role in memory retrieval and subjective evaluation (Tulving et al., 
1994), part of which may be the evaluation of familiarity in the presence of degraded 
recollection (Kelley & Jacoby, 2000). 
 
8.4. A Perspective on Metamemory in Multiple Sclerosis. 
 
Sensitivity to task features 
Performance on task-based metamemory measures in the study suggested that the sample 
demonstrated some sensitivity to task features and demands, evidenced by the 
underconfidence with practice effect (Koriat, Sheffer & Ma’ayan, 2002) noted across 
learning trails for the Auditory Verbal Learning Test. Additionally, there was evidence of 
sensitivity at the first learning trial, with slight overconfidence noted. Both are common 
findings among unimpaired samples too (Koriat, 2006), suggesting the MS sample is no 
different from unimpaired samples in this respect.  
 
The second performance component, supporting sensitivity to task difficulty, is the 
difference in the number of ratings used in the Feeling of Knowing and Retrospective 
Confidence Judgments in the study. 73% used all 4 ratings in the RCJ task, compared to 
17% in the FoK task. Moulin (2002) suggests extent of rating use may be diagnostic of 
sensitivity to task difficulty in people with Alzheimer’s disease. Here in Retrospective 
Confidence Judgment, range of rating use was consistently greater than on the Feeling of 
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Knowing task. In the Retrospective Confidence Judgment, the wider use of all four ratings 
may indicate an ability to more accurately discriminate correctness between retrieved 
answers. Good discriminative ability in RCJ was supported by the performance indicated 
by gamma or relative accuracy, which was high for the group as whole, despite varying 
levels of actual recall. 
 
General Implications 
One difficulty with assessing performance of metamemory in a general sense, is that there 
are limited relationships between the various indices of metamemory themselves. Selective 
impairments in memory monitoring are a feature of performance of the sample tested here. 
A difference in accuracy between retrospective and prospective judgments has been 
documented in a range of studies using clinical samples (Pappas et al., 1992; Schnyer et 
al., 2004), supporting the lack of a generalised monitoring deficit. Instead it may relate to 
the facility with which monitoring is achieved on already retrieved, versus unrecallable 
data. This competence may therefore relate to the use of mnemonic-experience, rather than 
inferential processes in estimating performance. 
 
This may support differences at the differing levels of awareness presented by Toglia & 
Kirk (2000) knowledge based, emergent, and anticipatory awareness. Applying these 
taxonomies would suggest that stored metacognitions about memory, or off-line 
assessment, may be evidenced through memory self-efficacy measures, implicating 
perceptions of a participants own memory functioning, beliefs and affective states. Second, 
emergent awareness, that which develops as a result of experience during tasks, might be 
characterised in both Judgment of Learning and Retrospective Confidence Judgments. 
Both generally relate to memory experience diagnostics, including past performance 
experience in the JoL task and retrieval experience cues in Retrospective Confidence 
Judgments. Finally, anticipatory awareness captures a range of factors including appraisals 
of task feature and goal and higher levels of monitoring ability, which might be associated 
with FoK estimations because of the lack of more concrete experience-related cues from 
which to form judgments.  
 
The interpretation of Judgment of learning performance, while attributing discrepancies to 
mnemonic factors, also perhaps implicates task representation failures suggesting some 
executive contribution. Judgment of Learning therefore, depending on how failure occurs, 
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might equally be considered a mnemonic (a failure to monitor accessibility through covert 
retrieval) or executive (failure to apprehend the task) phenomenon. If the former, then 
emergent awareness might be implicated; if the latter, anticipatory awareness might best 
characterise the area of difficulty. Figure 8.1 summarises one such interpretation, based on 
differential contribution of mnemonic as opposed to executive processes to judgment 
accuracy in this study. 
 
 
Fig 8.1. Summary of findings suggesting Retrospective 
Confidence Judgment is primarily mnemonic, and Feeling of 
Knowing (FoK) primarily executive, with delayed Judgment of 
learning potentially a combination of mnemonic and executive 
factors. 
 
 
Many aspects of current models of metamemory were upheld in the analysis of 
performance through structural modelling. Retrospective Confidence is primarily 
mnemonic for episodic tasks, and that Feeling of Knowing judgments are primarily 
executive in nature. Performance on Judgment of Learning at delay offers less clarity in its 
interpretation, which may reflect the numerous theories about its dimensions, 
underconfidence with practice and the delayed Judgment of Learning effect. This study did 
not evaluate specifically what cues or heuristics are used, so it is not possible to clarify the 
ongoing debates about information-based or experience-based cues being specifically used 
in a mnemonic or inferential way. The metamemory literature continues to debate these 
issues too (Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). For now however, the 
presented results can offer some indicators relevant to rehabilitation and learning in people 
with MS who have, or complain of, memory problems. These include the relevance of 
mood disorder, the accuracy of post retrieval confidence, the importance of adequate task 
appraisal and executive function in anticipatory judgments. 
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A final consideration is a perspective on task complexity; the task themselves offered a 
continuum from high to low structure and number and type of available cues for making 
judgments. Variability in both structure and material-richness across the tasks used here 
suggest that these two factors, if manipulated, offer some opportunities for optimising 
accuracy. Here, high levels of structure and high levels of memory experience appear to 
maximise accuracy. In the structured FoK task, assessment of scant cues appear to tap 
executive weaknesses which may not have been so limiting with increased availability, 
suggesting some approaches to optimising accuracy. Generally the results suggest that 
weaknesses in the domain of executive function, because of its relevance in more difficult 
metamemory monitoring tasks impact more than memory impairment. With memory 
impairment accuracy can perhaps be achieved, whether calibrated on either the presence or 
the absence of memory-experience cues. In this sense emergent awareness of memory 
ability might be considered binary (available, not available) with both the presence and 
absence of the memory experience being diagnostic.  
 
Anticipatory awareness, relating to a range of judgments not only about the task, but what 
experiences and cues might best be diagnostic of likely performance, offers less to the 
judgment maker. In this sense support is available for an extended role of executive 
abilities is selecting the focus of reflection in respect of the task, rather than just inferring 
from everything available. This accords with the proposal of Van Overschelde (2008) that 
while listening in on a telephone call may be an analogy that generally fits with 
metacognitive monitoring, it is likely to underestimate the active monitoring that takes 
place. Approaches to improving anticipatory aspects of memory monitoring might 
therefore focus on remembering as, in and of itself, a purposeful task (Neisser, 1996; 
Koriat, Goldsmith & Pansky, 2000; Lau, et al., 2004). 
 
8.5. Implications For Memory Rehabilitation And Self-Regulated Learning in MS. 
 
In considering the implications for improving memory monitoring in MS, consideration 
must be given to features of the disease itself, its potential to progress, the lack of a 
circumscribed locus for damage, meaning that cognitive impairment can be both 
generalised and incomplete, and the resulting heterogeneity of presentation. The results 
presented here demonstrate that accuracy in monitoring is likely to be associated with 
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different domains of cognitive function and affect, suggesting intervention should be 
multidimensional. 
 
Inferring clinical application requires some extrapolation to rehabilitation and daily life; 
the primary consideration being how the findings might relate to improving self-regulated 
learning. With this in mind, a conceptual shift is required away from a focus on the 
accuracy of judgment-making alone to consider the findings of the study within a 
framework of learning as a task, with specific goals. The monitoring of learning and 
memory constitutes sub-tasks within that. Relatedly, the meaning of accuracy in memory 
monitoring should be considered with regard to its ecological validity. From the 
perspective of social cognition, accuracy has been viewed as correspondence between a 
judgment and its criterion, as consensus, or in terms of utility (Kruglanski, 1989). While 
the focus of the study has attended to the correspondence approach, in considering 
interventions, the additional component of utility becomes important. Baron, (1990) in a 
commentary on Kruglanski’s 1989 paper, suggests that the utility of situational accuracy is 
its contribution to action and not reflection. It arises from ‘veridical contact with the 
environment’, which becomes the criterion against which the judgment is made (Baron, 
1990:201). The task for which an accurate judgment is required may therefore be the true 
criterion against which accuracy, both in utility and correspondence, is measured. 
 
As the study of metamemory in education, and to a lesser extent in clinical populations, 
moves towards ecological investigations of monitoring-in-action, so the challenge for 
clinicians is to consider how monitoring and awareness of memory abilities can be 
optimised, in relation to the specifics of daily life. It is proposed here that one way of doing 
this is to focus on accuracy in memory monitoring as part of the skill of memory that 
contributes much to self-regulated learning. As such, rehabilitation approaches should 
focus on both metamemory and memory as a process of skill acquisition. These skills 
might be taught explicitly with a view to them being used procedurally, and generalised, 
after training. 
 
In addition to this skill focus, Toglia & Kirk (2000:68) suggest that in metacognitive task 
failures it is often unclear whether inaccurate prediction ‘is based on failure to recognise 
the full demands of the task or based on faulty beliefs about ones abilities’. In all, three 
particular dimensions are therefore implicated in considering interventions to optimise the 
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monitoring of memory in self-directed learning; metamemory and related awareness, the 
task, and the learner. These are now considered in respect of the study’s results. 
 
8.5.1. Metamemory and awareness 
Attention to memory awareness is important, though is often not the focus when 
assessment of rehabilitation potential is considered. Instead, object-level measures of 
cognitive function are often used as indicators of likely rehabilitation success. This seems 
only partly appropriate in light of the findings of the study, which themselves suggest that 
there may be dissociations between memory performance and learning abilities, in the 
sense of being able to accurately appraise even poor memory performance. With accurate 
appraisal, the successful activation of control operations to manage learning and memory 
performance is proposed in rehabilitation (Wilson & Moffat, 1992; Prigitano, 1999; Toglia 
& Kirk, 2000; Clare et al., 2004). The clinical heuristic of patient insight relating to 
rehabilitation outcome may in part be true, but where insight is assessed by subjective 
report, it is proposed that only one component of awareness, stored metacognitions about 
memory, is being considered. This appears from the results of this study to be an index 
mediated by affective disturbance, unrelated to memory ability.  
 
Given the high levels of depression among people with MS, higher than both the general 
population and other chronic illness groups (Siegert & Abernethy, 2005), it would be 
expected that memory complaint will be a common presentation to clinicians during their 
practice. Findings in respect of memory self-report would therefore suggest that one initial 
consideration should be of the contribution of mood disorder, with a view to its treatment. 
 
The developing evidence for cognitive-behavioural treatment approaches for depression in 
MS supports its use for treating mild to moderate depression (Mohr et al., 2000; Mohr & 
Cox 2001; Mohr, Hart & Goldberg, 2003; Thomas, et al., 2006). Such mild to moderate 
levels generally accounted for the extent of depression symptom report in this study.  The 
measure of mood disorder used here encompasses more contemporary views of depression 
as having a basis in negative cognitions (Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996; DSM IV; American 
Psychiatric Association 2000). This characterisation of depression relates directly to 
cognitive-behavioural approaches used to treat it, to some effect (Beck, 2002).  
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Memory-efficacy too may mediate the relationship between mood and learning-oriented 
behaviours, perhaps explaining more nebulous concepts such as motivation or confidence 
(Dodds, 1989; Kruglanski, 1989; 1999). Aside from the treatment of mood disorder, a 
number of studies have investigated whether intervening at the efficacy level would impact 
on learning effort. Findings suggest that both strategy-use and subsequent performance 
were positively related to the intervention, including increased maintenance and use of 
memory strategies (Lachman, et al., 1992; Lachman & Andreoletti, 2006; Lachman, 
Andreoletti & Pearman, 2006; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). This is not to suggest that 
people who had higher domain efficacy improved on measures directly as a result of 
treatment. Instead, at longer-term follow up, they demonstrated improvements related to 
their successful use of strategies, which they were more likely to implement (Altmaier et 
al, 1993). In conjunction with global efficacy-oriented ‘wellness’ programmes, which have 
demonstrated benefits in MS (Stuifbergen, et al., 2003), there may be scope for developing 
structured interventions for addressing memory efficacy, in conjunction with management 
of mood disorder. Such a combined intervention would aim at reducing memory reluctance 
and increasing deployed effort towards control operations in learning situations. 
 
Studies addressing efficacy therefore suggest it is a malleable construct (Gardiner, Luszcz 
& Bryan, 1997) and in respect of people with MS, this kind of intervention might be 
supplemented with education about memory itself. One such educative approach might 
include promoting understanding that information processing deficits may impact on 
acquisition, increasing understanding that, although experienced as forgetting, in fact this 
is likely to relate to failures at acquiring information. Similarly, verbal fluency deficits 
might be targeted with a similar aim. Once labelled as a memory failure, these too may 
contribute to overly negative stored metacognitions about memory, which may influence 
future assessments of memory abilities, selection and deployment of control operations, 
and effort given to learning. 
 
Aside from approaches that focus on efficacy, the specific monitoring judgments 
investigated in the study may offer some ways of structuring memory-monitoring tasks to 
optimise accuracy. Modirrousta & Fellows (2008) suggest that the differences between the 
Learning, Retrospective Confidence and Feeling of Knowing judgments are their reliance 
on different weights of various cues and memory strength. This accords with the findings 
presented; in an MS sample, they are also more or less accurate depending on a mix of 
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cognitive and affective impairment. This suggests that accuracies of the judgments might 
be dissociable under differing conditions of memory and other cues, with some benefiting 
from improved memory experiences (Modirrousta & Fellows, 2008). Specifically, training 
on the skills underlined by the results of this study - internally oriented assessment of the 
proceeding of memory, evaluation of the task and likely future retrieval demands, the use 
of covert retrieval, attention to such retrieval experiences as fluency, amount and 
availability sensations, and training sensitivity to information diagnostic of accuracy - 
might be approaches taken, concurrent with object level memory rehabilitation. 
 
A final issue relates to the axiomatic use of practice to improve learning and the 
implications of the development, and unusually, maintenance of underconfidence with 
practice in the Judgment of Learning result. The question arises as to whether practice may 
‘foster underconfidence’ (Koriat, 2002:274) in the calibration of accuracy. Koriat proposes 
the existence of underconfidence with practice with repetition in action learning, as well as 
list learning tasks; that is, it is a characteristic of learning generally (Koriat 2002). Here, 
such calibration in JoL relates to the global assessment of how much is known, potentially 
in this case leading to continuation of unnecessary of learning, or an efficacy-mediated 
termination of learning as failing.  
 
8.5.2. The Learner 
 
Discrepancy reduction, between current and desired levels of performance, is one view on 
the processes involved in learning (Hacker, Bol & Keener, 2008). In memory monitoring, 
the current level of performance depends in part on knowledge of what is known and not, 
in order to allocate resources to learning towards reduction of the gap. This supports the 
importance of these judgments being accurate. The relevance of subject control over 
resource use to regulate learning is also implied (Son & Kornell, 2008). Extensions to the 
skill acquisition perspective for metamemory are considerations of how it might be both 
developed and deployed. 
 
In a sample of undergraduates, the benefits of feedback and training were proposed to be 
most helpful for better performers, whereas incentive and reward appeared useful for lower 
achieving students (Hacker, Bol & Keener, 2008). This may be applicable to those with 
cognitive impairment (Toglia & Kirk, 2000). For those who benefited from feedback, it 
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had to be explicit, and specific to elements of performance (Hacker, Bol & Keener, 2008). 
Feedback can be graded in terms of from where it comes. Better performers may 
themselves be able to identify the key feedback elements from within a task. For others, 
success or failure may be the only usable feedback, meaning that highly structured tasks 
may be required to give pointers to ongoing performance (Ownsworth et al. 2006; 
Ownsworth & Clare, 2006). High-level extensions of such approaches to the calibration of 
judgment accuracy have included the exposure of novices to experts’ decision making as a 
method to improve skilled judgment-making (Karoly, 1993; Weiss, Shanteau & Harries, 
2006).  
 
The development of expertise is often also associated with the ability to exclude task-
irrelevant information (Karoly, 1993; Dunlosky & Hertzog, 1998). The ability, as is a 
feature of expertise, requires both experience with a task so as to have access to previous 
instances of occurrences, but also requires accurate appraisal of a task. With this, comes 
the deployment of processing resources only towards those features that assist performance 
or reduce discrepancies (Charness, 1991; Salthouse, 1991; Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008). The 
task of Judgment of Learning at delay may bear out this latter point. The proposal is that 
the focus in making the judgment may have been on goal-irrelevant information, previous 
underconfident judgments, when estimating what was known.  
 
This might support an approach where the modelling of learning-oriented monitoring skills 
is carried out, including the directing of attention towards information which is diagnostic 
of accuracy in judgment making. In addition to a focus on diagnosticity of memory or 
information-based cues, some anticipatory approaches at the learning stage might also 
improve accuracy in performance prediction. One example of an approach specifically to 
making the Judgment of Learning is suggested by Nelson, Narens & Dunlosky (2004), the 
pre-judgment recall and monitoring approach (PRAM); the use of a covert retrieval to 
make the judgment. A potentially useful elaboration, given the proposed contribution of 
executive abilities to correctly appraising task contingencies in the first instance (Norman 
& Shallice, 1986), are interventions focusing on training these kinds of evaluations.  
 
Explicit guidance in appraising ongoing performance, or the nature and goal of the task is 
proposed to benefit the executive management of ongoing behaviour. Examples of this 
include training in problem orientation or definition, self-instructional methods to improve 
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monitoring and ‘content-free’ cueing, to alert to the need for a monitoring episode. All 
have been shown to be of benefit to people with executive deficits (Cicerone & Wood, 
1987; Von Cramon, Mathes-von Cramon & Mai, (1991); Hux, Reid, & Lugert, 1994; 
Cicerone, et al., 2005; Fisk et al, 2007). 
 
Koriat & Bjork (2005; 2006) also suggest a role for sensitising learners to future retrieval 
conditions during the learning stage. The results here would suggest a further level of 
specificity to this recommendation. Sensitivity to the key task demands, and structure, both 
of which might support anticipatory awareness, and may avoid illusions about competence 
(Koriat & Bjork, 2005). An approach, which may have utility in this regard, is a focus on 
correctly defining a task as a memory task, the test portion of which may occur in a 
supermarket aisle, at a meeting, or during a therapy session.  
 
This issue of appropriate task representation extends, at the learning stage, to attention to 
the future retrieval context. Echoed from within educational contexts, the advice that 
students ‘study for the type of test you expect to receive’ (Lundberg & Fox, 1991:97 cited 
in Hacker, Bol & Keener, 2008), emphasises that remembering is a purposive task 
(Neisser, 1996; Koriat, Goldsmith & Pansky, 2000). In the learning context ‘sensitising’ 
goals would relate to envisaging where, and for what purpose, one might be expected to 
use to-be-learned information, rather than just making a assessment of whether it is 
remembered or not. This might be considered as emphasising both utility and 
correspondence views of accuracy. A final point, in respect of generalising monitoring 
skills between tasks, relates to sensitising learners to the fact that a different learning task 
may have similarities to other memory tasks in terms of process or monitoring demands 
(Wykes & Reeder, 2005; Toglia 1991).  
 
8.5.3. The Task 
Given the focus on task monitoring contingencies, goals and retrieval context, a task-
specific approach to treatment is implicated, because many everyday tasks do not 
necessarily provide the level of structure or goal clarity that might assist in making 
accurate monitoring judgments. Adaptation and routinisation of specific tasks may 
minimise the requirements both for predictive judgment and executive control. General 
consideration should therefore be given to: grading from high to low levels of structure 
either by task manipulation, number and type of prompts and monitoring requirements. In 
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this regard, education about task-specific methods of monitoring might be included. Wykes  
& Reeder, (2005) suggest some additional task-structuring manipulations such as limiting 
task requirements, the scope of possible responses, managing impulsivity in performance, 
the use of self-talk during processing as a method of self-regulating performance and 
emphasising target-oriented, rather than global evaluation. As well as being task-specific, 
this is also an individualised enterprise because of the centrality of subject-controlled 
factors in metacognition generally (Koren et al., 2006), and the relationships between 
awareness, efficacy and knowledge about memory.  
 
A limitation in many studies of metamemory is that participants are not given full control 
over the learning, meaning that tasks may be more structured than they would be in real-
life situations (Koren et al., 2006). This provides for both a positive in terms of task 
structure maximising performance in those with impairments, and a negative, because 
without providing latitude for subject-control, the real extent or impact of metamemory 
deficits may not become apparent. Faglioni et al., (2000) have suggested of people with 
MS that intentional processes, because they are subject-controlled, may not be affected to 
the same extent by limitations in information processing speed, perhaps supporting the 
proposal the key deficit being one of intentional control in the executive relationship with 
FoK accuracy. 
 
A significant challenge for the future is the development of approaches to evaluating, 
measuring and structuring such approaches in ecologically relevant ways. Equally, there is 
a challenge in expanding how clinicians think about memory performance. Shifting from a 
focus on object-level performance alone to include meta-level processes is required, with 
the latter including elements of subject control, task dependence and subjective estimation 
during learning (Koriat, Goldsmith & Pansky, 2000; Koren et al., 2006). The axiom, ‘its 
not how good your memory is, but what you do with what you have got, that matters’ bears 
further reflection in this regard, implicating both the monitoring and control processes 
characterised by the Nelson & Narens’ (1990) model of metacognition. 
 
The metacognitive approach to learning should be an additional, not alternative, approach 
to structuring assessment and rehabilitation interventions. As yet however, application to 
clinical intervention has been limited (Koriat, 2002; Moulin, 2002). Future developments 
in metamemory research in clinical populations will need to involve the development of 
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ecologically valid assessment and the elevation of interventions to everyday learning and 
memory tasks. A possible direction for the development of measures and interventions is 
laid out by Koren et al., (2006) in their proposals for a ‘new-approach’ in schizophrenia 
research. They suggest that metacognition may be able to bridge the gap between object-
level cognitive performance and real-life functioning in two key respects; allowing the use 
of subject-controlled variables to be included as both diagnostic and treatable elements, 
reflecting real-world instances of individual control over their performance. Second, 
performance on neuropsychological testing, notably of memory, cannot typically 
distinguish between the operation of object level memory or metamnemonic processes 
(Koren et al., 2006). Separation of these components of performance may be of use in 
assessing whether metacognitive impairments could be used to reduce the ‘rate-limiting’ 
effects of object level cognitive impairment on learning (Vauth et al., 2005; Koren et al., 
2006). 
 
8.6. Appraisal of the study 
A number of limitations to the study require acknowledgement, and they relate to three 
domains specifically; the sample, measurement and analytic strategy. In addition, a number 
of strengths are indicated, along with avenues for further study. 
 
8.6.1. The sample. 
Half of the sample was taking medication for pain, and over a third were prescribed 
medications for depression, anxiety or sleep disturbance. Many of these medications can 
have psychoactive effects, and may have a long-term impact on cognitive function 
(Stewart, 2005). Of interest in this study is whether they have been demonstrated to impact 
on memory related judgments. A review by Schwartz & Bacon (2008), mainly restricted to 
benzodiazepine use, is relevant because this class of medications are frequently used to 
treat muscle spasm, pain, anxiety and insomnia in MS. Summary findings of this review 
were that measures of relative accuracy were not typically impacted, but more global 
absolute accuracy was, initially after administration of these drugs. Generally, the findings 
relate to the acute effects of administration, and so they may be less relevant here, though 
global assessments in Judgment of Learning and memory efficacy were noted to be 
inaccurate. Other medications being taken by the group, while representing typical 
combinations of medications in the population, for pain, spasticity and depression 
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(Compston et al., 2006), may have had some influence on cognitive performance and 
affect, both in terms of inhibitory and facilitative impacts (Krupp et al, 2004). 
 
The sample was a convenience sample of community dwelling people with MS. In 
recruiting the sample, people who had concerns about their memory were sought, and in 
this sense those who at least had a view on their memory were captured. The aim of the 
study was to investigate the accuracy of those judgments, and the results of the Memory 
Function Questionnaire suggest that participants did generally report more problems, with 
more serious impact, than a standardisation sample. This suggests that the standard of 
‘concern about memory’ was met. This is supported by the fact that many did not have 
memory impairment on objective testing. Participants with more advanced disability that 
would have been excluded because of motor or sensory impairment may also have been 
those who were unconcerned about, or unaware of, memory dysfunction and were 
potentially not captured in this analysis. 
 
One aspect of disease prevalence not fully reflected in the sample was the gender ratio. 
Just over one fifth of the sample was male. Expected ratios are twice as many women as 
men. Given that males with MS tend to be diagnosed later, but have poorer outcomes 
(Tomassini & Pozzilli, 2009), the low recruitment may relate to difficulties accessing more 
impaired people in a community setting, in addition to a greater propensity to isolation 
among males with MS (Beatty & Aupperle, 2002; McCabe, McKern & McDonald, 2004). 
Potentially, these may therefore have been the same people as might be excluded by the 
criteria relating to fatigue, sensory or motor deficit. Aside from this gender under-
representation, comparison with two other UK samples was generally indicative that the 
sample reported here offers some ability to generalise the findings.  
 
Additional considerations in respect of the sample are individual differences relating to 
age, gender and intelligence (Heaton, Grant & Matthews, 1986). The study could have 
been more comprehensive by including an examination of these factors. One example is of 
the relationships between age and processing speed, and age and executive function 
(Salthouse, 1996; Verhagen & Salthouse, 1997; Bunce & Macready, 2005 Salthouse, 
2010). A possible confound to such an assessment is the extent to which neurological 
impairment itself may alter the pattern of longitudinal changes in neuropsychological 
function, so the effects of modeling age would be of interest in the context of other 
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elements. Investigating such age effects should also consider the prevalence of MS subtype 
and associated patterns of neuropsychological deficit. Generally, older participants might 
also be those with a longer history of MS and an increased chance of having secondary 
progressive or primary progressive subtypes, both of which are typically associated with 
higher levels of cognitive impairment (Beatty et al., 1989; De Sonneville et al., 2002; 
Fishman et al., 2004), a finding mirrored in this study.  
 
Relatedly, there are considerations appropriate to gender differences in both affect and 
neuropsychological performance. Evidence from MS samples suggests that males may be 
more likely to present with more severe cognitive impairment (Tomassini & Pozzilli, 
2009). This finding was not investigated here however. An extension is a consideration of 
gender differences in depression; this could relate to the instrument used or the types of 
symptoms sought (Salokangas et al., 2002; Ernst & Angst, 1992). One study evaluating 
depression in a community sample of people with MS suggested that gender was not a 
factor in prevalence of mood disorder (Chwastiak et al., 2002), but testing associations 
between gender and depression, and its severity, would still be of interest. 
 
The relationships between intelligence and metamemory also warrant future consideration. 
A proxy assessment of IQ, such as the National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson & 
Willison, 1991), could probably have been included in the study, without significant costs 
in terms of fatigue. The main aim of its inclusion would be to extend the analysis of 
metamemory to include an assessment of the independent contribution of intelligence to 
accuracy, or to what extent these concepts overlap (Stankov, 2000). Evidence from such 
studies in education suggests that both intelligence and metacognitive processes exert some 
unique (independent) effects on performance, disconfirming an intelligence-only model 
(Veenman & Spaans, 2005; Veenman, Kok & Blote, 2005).  Prins, Veenman & Elshout, 
(2006) suggested that metacognitive skills were most relevant when students were 
attempting to solve problems at the limits of their current knowledge. The inclusion of an 
assessment of intelligence in respect of metacognition will also need to define the 
parameters of the ‘intelligence’ construct, and the extent to which some aspects, e.g. of 
fluid intelligence, might be measured by tests of executive function (Duncan, Burgess & 
Emslie, 1995). 
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The sample size was large in comparison to most similar studies (Beatty & Monson, 1991; 
Souchay, Isingrini & Gil, 2002; 2006; Souchay, Bacon & Danion, 2003; Randolph Arnett 
& Freske, 2004; Perrotin, Belleville & Isingrini, 2007; Julian, Merluzzi & Mohr, 2007), 
and the level of interest from the target population perhaps attests to its validity as an area 
of importance. There are additional benefits in a large dataset on a range of measures of 
object-level cognitive and affective performance, against which future comparison can be 
made in community-dwelling samples, particularly in the UK. Specifically, the oral only 
performance of the sample on the Symbol Digit Modalities Test contributes to only a small 
literature on performance of this test in its less traditional, but potentially more relevant, 
method of assessment in this population. This is especially relevant because one recent 
study suggests that it may be a measure with greater utility than the Paced Auditory Serial 
Addition test, most commonly used to assess processing deficits in MS (Drake et al., 
2010). A second range of measures for which data is reported is performance on the 
Hayling & Brixton tests of executive function. Like the SDMT, the utility of this measure 
is in its simplicity and brevity as an indicator of executive ability. Confirmatory factor 
analysis supported it as a measure of this domain, factorially separable from both memory 
and working memory indices. 
 
Given most 100 participants were seen either in their own homes or at local MS therapy 
centres, there may be some limitation in respect of a consistent testing environment. This 
issue of ‘subject-controlled’ variables, implicit in much of metacognitive research could be 
considered as a confounding factor in equating performance across the sample. Where 
possible, participants were asked to arrange a quiet environment for the study. Of interest 
in a number of sessions the researcher did specifically ask that the radio or television be 
turned off prior to testing, or that a cluttered table might be cleared to avoid distraction. In 
a clinical context, the requirement for prompting on environmental adaptations might be 
considered indicative of a failure in participants managing their own learning. This is one 
area that will be an important consideration for interventional studies. Standardising and 
allowing subject-controlled variables will offer measurement challenges, but perhaps also 
offer some insights that might be applied to rehabilitation practice. 
 
From the perspective of the chosen statistical methods, 100 participants would be 
considered a small, though acceptable number. This means that some aspects of the 
analysis would benefit from replication in larger samples, specifically the confirmatory 
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factor analysis of the Beck Depression Inventory - II. Statistical fit for these models may 
have been constrained by the number of parameters being estimated; the degrees of 
freedom relative to the sample size, being a specific limitation. Related to this interaction 
of sample size and degrees of freedom are issues of statistical power (Cohen, 1992; 
Muthen & Muthen, 2002; Kim, 2005; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 2007). 
 
No formal assessments were carried on the a priori models in determining the sample size 
required to offer optimum power in the range of fit indices used. A number of approaches 
are discussed in the literature, with some heuristics informing the discussion of sample size 
requirements presented in Chapter 3. In reality, the decision about power does not just 
come down to sample size, but also includes the quality of measures and data, the 
complexity of models (e.g. degrees of freedom) and the relationships between variables 
being assessed (Muthen & Muthen, 2002). Two approaches to power assessment in 
structural equation models are frequently discussed. One uses extrapolation of raw data to 
derive what would be sufficiently powered parameter estimates, standard errors and 
confidence intervals, for comparison with the data derived model. This approach includes 
bootstrapping and Monte Carlo simulations (Methuen & Methuen, 2002; Mooijaart, 2003; 
Yuan & Hayashi, 2003). Raw data is required, so to some extent is it a post-hoc method of 
generating power. The other approach relates to testing indices of fit, such as the RMSEA 
(MacCallum, Browne & Sugawara, 1996; Kline, 2005; Kim, 2005). Both assessments 
compare hypotheses relating to the power to establish reliable differences between either 
individual fit statistics (e.g. RMSEA values) or by comparisons of alternative models 
(MacCallum, Browne & Sugawara, 1996; Kim, 2005). In this study, where many models 
were accepted because of fit indices and an overall non-significant x2
 
, the key question 
relates to the power of the study to be reliable in the values obtained. A formal assessment 
of power, notably in relation to whether sample size was adequate in the context of degrees 
of freedom would therefore offer benefit, in addition to the estimation of the size of a 
future cross-validation sample. 
 
8.6.2. Measurement 
 
Accuracy of the Feeling of Knowing judgment may have been attenuated both by task 
complexity in the ranking procedure, a feature suggested by a number of authors 
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(Shimamura & Squire, 1986; Beatty & Monson, 1991; Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005). Being 
based on an episodic memory task, which may present more difficulty than a semantic 
task, could be considered a limiting factor on performance (Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1994). 
One benefit of using a new learning task, aside from its validity in relation to 
rehabilitation, is in providing equivalence of learning across participants (McKenna & 
Warrington, 2000). A limitation for the FoK judgment is that magnitude of the gamma 
relates to the degree of prior learning of the material on which the FoK is based (Nelson et 
al., 1982). Here, only a single learning trial was given, possibly attenuating the size of the 
gamma correlation. As mentioned however this may provide a better insight into actual 
abilities since semantic tasks in MS might not be considered reflective of everyday 
memory challenges. 
 
In respect of task complexity, comparison of the findings of Souchay, Isingri & Gil, (2002) 
and Shimamura & Squire, (1986) suggest that the task complexity is less relevant than the 
level of cognitive deficit. In the former study, only a yes/no response criterion was 
required among people with Alzheimer’s Disease. In the latter a full ranking of items was 
required, with three cognitive impairment groups. In both studies, as here, mean FoK 
gammas were found to be near or below zero in the groups of interest, regardless of the 
task structure. Perhaps therefore, the more relevant finding in respect of task complexity 
relates to gamma correlations being extracted from an episodic single-exposure task. 
Though, as proposed by Lad (1984), assessments of subjective probabilities are less related 
to characteristics of tasks, but rather of the assessor of those probabilities. The difficulty of 
the task might also mean that it is more sensitive to non-routine, and therefore executive 
processes. This may indicate that the difficulty of the task rests, in part, with its novelty for 
participants. 
 
Many of the tasks used might therefore be considered to be novel in the executive sense. 
They offer limited scope for the application of routine behavioural output to achieve them 
(Rabbitt, 1997). A simple manipulation for future investigation would be whether accuracy 
would improve if novelty were reduced through re-testing the same judgments, with the 
same tasks on the same sample. Of specific interest, would be what level of feedback, if 
any, might actually be required in improving accuracy. 
 
A second issue in respect of metamemory measurement raised by Spellman, Bloomfield & 
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Bjork (2008), relates to the amount and quality of information from which the scores were 
derived (between 2 and 24 unrecalled items in this study), and to the sensitivity of the scale 
used to classify strength of Feeling of Knowing (initially 1 to 4, followed by rank-sorting 
within those ratings). Both have been shown to impact on gamma in simulation studies, 
such as that of Spellman, Bloomfield & Bjork (2008). In a number of studies using similar 
tasks, additional numbers of items have been used to generate more inclusions of 
unrecalled items from which to generate potentially more stable indices of accuracy; some 
include never before seen items also (Beatty & Monson, 1991; Shimamura & Squire, 
1986).  
 
A third factor potentially limiting accuracy in the Feeling of Knowing gamma score might 
relate to the bolstering cue-familiarity experience without concurrently providing exposure 
to the target sentence completion. Given that a learning trial of all 24 sentences was 
provided first, and sight of the incomplete sentences given again for the recall trial, and 
again at the FoK attribution stage, cue-familiarity may have been higher than target 
familiarity. Resultant from this structure might be a promotion of cue familiarity as a 
diagnostic cue, but without the commensurate target exposure. 
 
Considerable debate continues in the literature about the appropriateness of Goodman-
Kruskal gamma as a measure of FoK accuracy, mainly in respect of its true indication of 
relative accuracy and its calculation (Goodman & Kruskal 1954; Nelson 1984; Schraw, 
1995; Nietfeld, Enders & Schraw 2006; Spellman, Bloomfield & Bjork, 2008). An 
additional factor from this study relates to the impact of the difficulty of the rating task, 
indicated by narrow use of even the four-ratings in the FoK task. In terms of calculation of 
gamma, this difficulty with the FoK rating procedure perhaps led to incomplete rating use 
and data missingness. Rating non-use meant that cross-tabulated cells, used in the 
calculation of the Goodman Kruskal gamma correlation, contained zero assignations. The 
calculation of cross products therefore generated zero scores in either or both numerator 
and denominators, leading to indeterminate gammas. Souchay, Isingrini & Gil (2006) 
report a method by which this effect might be negated. It would perhaps be a worthwhile 
development to investigate if this method provides some equivalence across both rating 
and ranking methods of calculating gamma. 
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The issue is specifically addressed in Schraw (1995: citing Freeman, 1987), suggesting that 
occurrences of empty cells in the matrix is a reason to avoid using the gamma correlation. 
Summation based-indices, such as the Hamann coefficient have generally not been 
considered as measures of relative accuracy (Nelson, 1996, Nelson et al., 1986). This rules 
them out as acceptable alternative indices. It might be expected that on a difficulty task, 
indicated by the full range of the four ratings not being used, that rating based calculations 
may therefore present problems, and this might be expected to a greater extent in clinical 
samples. The full inter-item ranking was used for the calculation of the FoK gamma here 
and this may be itself a challenge, though it is proposed to capture the relative strength of 
feeling, avoiding both the limitations of rating non-use and ignoring ties on the rating 
based procedure. 
 
A second consideration regarding the Goodman Kruskal gamma, notably where some 
gamma scores are significantly below zero, is the difficulty in interpreting what a near 
minus 1.0 score could mean in relation to a zero score. The latter indicates chance level 
performance, the former some systematic error in monitoring. Perhaps of particular interest 
in a clinical context is, assuming task comprehension is ruled out, why someone would be 
systematically inaccurate. Could these scores relate to specific types of frontal impairment, 
such as those associated with confabulation, meaning that both unrecognised and 
recognised are assigned incorrect feelings of knowing? As discussed, many frontal lobe 
impaired samples do display problems with false confidence (Moscovitch & Wincour, 
2002). But, the envisaged performance could only be expected if there was a concomitant 
memory disorder, which may support the finding that more global cognitive impairment is 
in fact required to lead to systematic inaccuracy.  
 
A final possibility for systematic inaccuracy relates to the impact of mood disorder on 
accuracy judgments. This may relate, from the FoK model, to a disposition towards 
disinhibition and elevated mood, itself associated with significant, often frontal-type 
cognitive deficit (Cottrell & Wilson, 1926; Finger, 1998; Fishman et al., 2004). A 
limitation of the study in this regard is not formally assessing both ends of the mood 
spectrum. Future studies might investigate the euphoric-type mood disturbance in respect 
of accuracy, and whether there is a reliable association between mood and type of 
judgments made namely under and over-estimation of accuracy. 
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A control sample, against which comparisons on performance could be made, might be one 
method for situating performance of the MS group. This could offer better understanding 
of the relevance of the range of measurement issues discussed above. While normative 
data was available for many of the neuropsychological measures used, the metamemory 
measures, being devised specifically for the purposes of this study, would have benefited 
from such control data. In addressing the metamemory judgments, submitting control 
sample performance to similar structural models would also contribute to understanding 
whether the relationships proposed in the MS sample are more widely applicable.  
 
8.6.3. Analytic Strategy 
 
The proposed benefits of selecting structural equation modelling for this study were the use 
of latent variables to account for measurement error, to better represent constructs under 
investigation and to infer some of the mechanisms leading to accuracy and inaccuracy of 
judgments. However, it is acknowledged that structural equation modelling is a 
covariance-based method, meaning that associations cannot be interpreted as truly causal 
mechanisms. This requires many of the findings of this study to be validated in 
experimental ways. With the extant evidence base, a priori models and previous studies 
these results do offer more than a purely exploratory approach. While a priori models were 
generated, and some rejected, this disconfirmation can only suggest future avenues for 
research, focusing on potential mechanisms. Additionally, models of mediation presented 
in the study are speculative at this point because they were in part developed on the basis 
of earlier results from analysis of the same dataset, and in part from indicators of model 
modification after initial testing. 
 
A final point on analytic strategy relates to how measures of absolute accuracy were 
considered, namely by splitting them into accuracy and inaccuracy variables. This 
approach was motivated by a clinical interest in whether inaccuracy was potentially 
associated with different processes, compared to accuracy. Perhaps a more careful analysis 
of the variables would support an interpretation of them reflecting the differences between 
judgments ascribed as high and low, that is, expectation in the presence of correct recall 
and recognition. A potential limitation of this approach is that it may lack the 
psychological transparency of measurement, which has been recommended for 
metamemory measures (Nelson, 1984; Benjamin & Diaz, 2008:77). 
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Indexing accuracy as proportion of high ratings and correct for Retrospective Confidence 
and Feeling of Knowing, offers clarity into the relationships between predictors and 
accuracy, but does not offer insight into which participants (e.g. better memory, better 
executive function) tended to be more accurate in their calibration judgments. These 
models focus on the contributions to accuracy and inaccuracy. From the models presented 
there are some indications that the approach was warranted, as comparison between the 
Feeling of Knowing calibrations suggested that inaccuracy may have been associated with 
a mediating role for executive function on otherwise sufficient memory ability to achieve 
recognition.  
 
More standard approaches to absolute accuracy suggest the creation of calibration curves 
or the generation of an overall calibration score (Hacker, Bol & Keener, 2008). The 
method use here therefore might be considered to reflect two dimensions of calibration, 
rather than one; highest and lowest accuracy in the concordant High Confidence or FoK, 
correctly recognised and highest and lowest accuracy in disconcordant Low Confidence or 
FoK, correctly recognised. Unlike the other judgments investigated, it is therefore not 
possible to apply the same between-subject type interpretation with the clarity a single 
measure might have allowed. Those people who made both high and low judgments are 
counted in both variables. Their individual balance of High and Low judgments, which 
would have given an overall assessment of an individual’s calibration, are not discernable. 
Instead, the cognitive contributions to levels of accuracy in each are presented. Of interest 
in this approach was the failure to find a correlation between the two despite both being 
calculated as percentage of recalled or recognised targets, which might attest to the two 
measures being indicative of differing processes, rather than inaccuracy being a failure of 
accuracy. 
 
Of note, was the ill fitting of the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) in some assessments, less 
than the ideal > 0.90 value. Rather than being an indicator of the impact of sample size 
however, CFI values tend to decline as numbers of variables are added to correctly 
specified models (Kenny & McCoach, 2003) and where there is non-normality in the data 
(West, Finch & Curran, 1995). It seems appropriate that it was low in the BDI-II CFA, 
where there were 21 variables assessed and full normality was not achieved, even with 
transformation of the data.  
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This is the first reported CFA of the instrument in this population, and confirmed the 
exploratory analysis of Beck, Steer & Brown (1996). Further validation would benefit 
future use of the tool in the context of exploring whether one factor is more diagnostic of, 
or prevalent in depression in MS than the other. An important consideration is whether 
depression measurement using this tool is confounded with MS symptoms, as proposed in 
previous versions (Nyenhuis et al., 1995). Resultant from the need to limit the numbers of 
parameters, factor scores were also created for the two BDI-II dimensions suggested by 
factor analyses, meaning that measurement error was conflated into their creation. This 
may explain the occurrence of Heywood cases (negative error variance) occurring in later 
structural modelling. 
 
8.7. Recommendations for further study 
From the results presented, the use of a new learning, single trial task may best capture the 
problems associated with memory experience as sought in the self-efficacy scale. The 
association between memory report and acquisition deficits in MS is likely to involve 
impaired information processing (DeLuca et al, 2004; Lengenfelder et al, 2006; Diamond 
et al., 2008). Consideration of this finding may demonstrate a more reliable memory-
metamemory relationship in future studies. This would be a useful avenue of investigation 
because there is generally only limited support for memory questionnaires being sensitive 
to day-to-day memory experience (Hertzog, 2002). 
 
Given the relative novelty of investigations of metamemory in MS, there are a number of 
elements of this study that would benefit from validation. Perhaps the more significant 
components are those considered tentative findings here. One of which, relating To 
information processing and Feeling of Knowing accuracy, presented a finding of particular 
interest. Further validation is required of the finding that information processing may relate 
differentially to object-level and meta-level operations. Potentially, this would support a 
contention than the Feeling of Knowing task, ‘straddles the implicit and explicit’ memory 
systems (Koriat, 2000). 
 
One factor considered in the discussion of results is the novelty of some of the judgment 
tasks for participants. In part, this may contribute to the findings themselves, as many of 
the judgments are considered to have a procedural quality (Reder & Schunn, 1996; Koriat 
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et al., 2008). In this regard, one simple manipulation of interest for a future study would be 
how performance on any of the metamemory tasks would have changed with repetitions. 
Having matched unimpaired control data would also support interpretations of 
performance in the MS group. 
 
One interpretation offered of the lowest scorers on the Beck Depression Inventory was that 
they might belong to an absolutely not depressed group, potentially indicating frontal 
compromise also (Benedict et al., 2001; Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004). For this 
reason, Mood, rather than depression was considered in this study. However, without a 
measure of elevated mood, this remains only a tentative conclusion. Indices of 
disinhibition or euphoric-type mood disorders should be used in future studies so that the 
impact on accuracy judgments could be evaluated. One general question would be whether 
depressed mood and cognitive impairment, compared to elevated mood and cognitive 
impairment might reliably indicate underestimation or overestimation of memory ability. 
Both of these scenarios might be considered as separate challenges in terms of 
rehabilitation, self-regulated learning and impact on daily life. 
 
Not fully supported by the findings in this study, but potentially worthy of consideration in 
advancing understanding of metamemory, heterogeneity in participant performance needs 
further attention. Beatty & Monson (1991) and Pannu & Kaszniak (2005) make specific 
recommendations that performance among samples of people with MS might best be 
considered within functional subgroups so as to best avoid averaging artefacts where there 
might be clusters of more significant deficit within a sample. This approach would 
implicate a much larger purposive sample in order to compare the presented models across 
the different cognitive subgroups, perhaps using a multilevel modelling approach. This 
does have considerable validity as a recommendation for future studies, especially in cross 
validating the findings of this study. When the sample was examined based on memory 
and executive subgroups however, there were no clear differences in the measures of 
interest that necessarily justified the approach. The structural modelling approach however 
has the benefit of being able to compare the same modelled interactions for each 
metamemory index across varying levels of cognitive deficit and affective disturbance. 
This means it is likely that a cluster of particular variables is likely to associate with an 
individual metamemory index. 
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A final recommendation would be for a longitudinal assessment of the models presented in 
this study, considering whether they remain applicable with cognitive decline or whether 
the relationships in the model can be adjusted as a result of intervention. Interventional 
studies should focus on the range of factors highlighted from the study - treatment of mood 
disorder, recalibration of efficacy, improving memory experience generally, teaching 
metamemory skills, goal management in the context of everyday memory tasks, task 
appraisal, and the executive management of task performance. This will necessarily reach 
into control operations as well as monitoring operations. 
 
 
 
8.8. Summary & Conclusions 
 
This study investigated a large UK sample of community-dwelling people with Multiple 
Sclerosis using a range of metamemory indices, with a focus on monitoring accuracy. The 
aim of the study was to establish what cognitive and affective factors supported accuracy 
in the judgments. The measures ranged from off-line memory efficacy to task-based 
judgments; Judgment of Learning, Retrospective Confidence Judgment and Feeling of 
Knowing judgment. This range of measures has not been reported before for this 
population and the scope of the study therefore provides a baseline data for future studies. 
In this respect, it addresses the call of Pannu & Kaszniak (2005) that a number of 
metamemory measures be assessed, against a range of measures of cognitive function and 
mood disorder, in neurological populations. 
 
It is proposed that the range of judgments may generally reflect the three aspects of 
awareness as proposed by Toglia & Kirk (2000). Knowledge-based awareness, including 
efficacy and stored metacognitions; emergent awareness, based on engaging in task 
performance and finally, anticipatory awareness, implicating a representation of the task 
structure at a more abstract level, implying more executive processes. The movement from 
post-retrieval judgment, to predictive Judgments of Learning and recognition prediction is 
proposed to reflect a continuum from memory-supported to executive-supported 
monitoring judgments.  
 
A global monitoring deficit is not implicated by these findings. Accuracy was associated 
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with memory-supported judgments, regardless of memory ability. This suggests that there 
are strengths in retrospective confidence and abilities in appraising what is known once a 
retrieval attempt has been carried out. In a learning prediction task, which may have been 
achievable through similar post-retrieval assessment, participants apparently failed to use 
an available store of diagnostic information. Instead, they may have attended to non-
diagnostic prior performance indicators, leading to maintained underconfidence in the 
Judgment of Learning, even after delay. This finding is unusual in the literature, even in 
clinical groups, and perhaps suggests a failure to attend to factors diagnostic of learning. 
Finally, in a Feeling of Knowing judgment, executive ability was implicated in accurate 
performance.  
 
In an extension of the limited metamemory in MS research base, a role for information 
processing ability was investigated, as it has been supported in facilitating many object-
level cognitive processes. Here it was investigated in a similar role in meta-level 
judgments. Findings offer speculation that contrary to how it facilitates object-level 
performance in memory, slower information processing speeds were associated with 
greater Feeling of Knowing accuracy. Once processing speed variance was removed from 
executive function, a positive relationship between executive function and Feeling of 
Knowing accuracy emerged. One possibility in understanding this relationship is that the 
executive processing relating to Feeling of Knowing accuracy is of a reflective, inhibitory 
nature, rather than one that it deliberative and stimulus oriented. This may concord with an 
understanding of the Feeling of Knowing judgment as relating more to implicit or 
reflective memory processes. 
 
A final set of findings relate to the impact of mood disorder on metamemory accuracy. The 
results suggest that it is the primary contributor to subjective appraisal of memory, 
including the possibility that it may also bias evaluative contributions of executive 
function. Additionally it was associated with underconfidence with practice effects in 
Judgment of Learning over repeated learning trials. Finally, it was reliably related to 
accuracy in the Feeling of Knowing task. Interpretations for this were discussed as mild 
depression being associated with better cognitive function in MS. In this sense an 
artefactual finding, or that mild depression, compared to minimal or none, may, have a 
facilitating effect on the introspections required in making Feeling of Knowing judgments. 
A third possibility is that reporting no symptoms of depression in this group could also be 
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an index of elevated mood (Joiner, Schmidt & Metalsky, 2006).  
 
There are a number of avenues for intervention with those who report memory difficulties 
in MS, relating to improving memory efficacy through the treatment of mood disorder, 
memory education and offering structured experiences of memory success. Improvements 
in efficacy are associated with the deployment of memory effort and are therefore of 
relevance in self-regulated learning. It has been proposed that some potentially more global 
memory judgments, such as Judgments of Learning might also be considered from an 
efficacy perspective, potentially explaining the unusual finding of underconfidence with 
delay in the sample. 
 
What might be classed as executive-related components of performance are most 
implicated in the study. Specifically, appropriate task apprehension, or selection of 
relevant diagnostic information may have abolished underconfidence after delay in the 
Judgment of Learning task. Executive function, and not memory ability, was associated 
with Feeling of Knowing accuracy. These two results, in conjunction with the high levels 
of accuracy in retrospective confidence judgments suggest that people with MS who have 
monitoring deficits should where possible restructure monitoring tasks. Shifting from 
predictions to postdictions is one obvious recommendation. This might be achieved by 
using self-testing, covert retrieval or pre-judgment recall and monitoring. These as they are 
likely to be reliable indicators of what is known, and therefore will support more reliable 
assessments of performance. 
 
Research in metamemory on clinical populations is at an early stage, perhaps apart from in 
people with Alzheimer’s disease (Moulin, Perfect & Jones, 2000; Moulin, 2002; Moulin, 
Perfect & Fitch, 2002; Souchay, Isingrini & Gil, 2002; Souchay et al., 2003). There are a 
number of differences between the two groups that may mean there will be divergence in 
approaches. People with Alzheimer’s disease will continue towards much more significant 
memory, and cognitive, impairment. Methods to try and negate floor effects in memory 
performance will need to be specifically developed for some of that group (Moulin, 2002). 
Secondly, more predictable patterns of decline can be expected in the AD groups meaning 
findings may be to some extent more applicable. In MS, with notable mood disorder, 
disinhibition and euphoria, variable cognitive decline, including none, the course of 
compromised self-directed learning is less predictable. The population is typically of 
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working age and have potential to maintain many functional skills, including employment. 
An appropriate aim of intervention with this population therefore does relate to self-
regulation of learning and performance, making further study of this area warranted both in 
terms of investigating the nature of deficits and useful interventions. 
 
Novel contribution in this study is first in respect of the sample. This is the first 
investigation into metamemory performance of people with MS in the United Kingdom. 
Aside from one postal study (Phillips & Stuifbergen, 2006), which used only self-report 
measures. This is also the largest MS sample in the literature to investigate metamemory. 
Additionally, it uses a wide range of measures of metamemory, both self-report and task-
based, and assesses them against a number of object-level domains. The findings therefore 
offer a substantial baseline of performance of this population on many standard indices of 
metamemory. 
 
The study also provides a number of novel findings in respect of metamemory in Multiple 
Sclerosis; maintained underconfidence with delay in Judgment of Learning and high levels 
of accuracy in Retrospective Confidence, despite varying tested memory performance. 
Results provide confirmation of an executive contribution to Feeling of Knowing accuracy 
in MS, and suggest this may relate to the top-down directing of processing resources in 
FoK judgments. Finally, confirmation is offered that in the presence of varying levels of 
memory ability, including no impairment, people with MS report more memory decline, 
more memory problems, and consider them more serious when they occur than age 
matched controls; such memory complaint only being reliably associated with mood. 
 
The study also reports the first confirmatory factor analysis of the revised Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI-II) in this population, and the first set of performance data for this 
population on a 10-item memory self-efficacy scale. The methods used provide a high 
level of validity to the findings because of the process of variable selection, their factoral 
confirmation and because measurement error was accounted for in each analysis. 
Additionally, the testing of theoretically specified priori models confers validity to the 
found relationships. The presented models extend understanding of metamemory in 
neurological populations generally, as they provide an approach to thinking about 
performance in a multivariate way. 
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Appendix A Sentence Memory Test materials 
 
This list is indicative of the materials used, and not the layout of the stimulus items. The practice item is first, 
followed by the 24 sentences and original completion word. Listed below each sentence are the 8 words 
presented for the 7-alternative forced choice recognition test.  
 
She put the flowers in the VASE 
 
GARDEN 
WATER 
KITCHEN 
COFFIN 
SOIL 
VASE 
BIN 
WINDOW 
 
 
There is something grand about the HOUSE 
 
HOTEL  
OPERA  
BUILDING  
HOUSE  
PIANO  
PALACE  
WEATHER  
FLAG 
 
Their money was divided by the TEACHER 
 
PRIEST  
TEACHER  
SOLICITOR  
BANK  
FAMILY  
JUDGE  
COURT  
FATHER 
 
There was nothing wrong with the MEAL 
 
COMPUTER  
RADIO  
MEAL  
CAR  
TELEVISION  
FOOD  
MACHINE  
DINNER  
 
 
 
I don’t know why he didn’t take his UMBRELLA 
 
MEDICINE  
UMBRELLA  
TABLETS 
KEYS  
HAT  
COAT  
MONEY  
GLOVES 
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They went to the rear of the long CORRIDOR 
 
BOAT  
QUEUE  
ROOM  
CARRIAGE  
TRAIN  
BUS 
HALL  
CORRIDOR  
 
He wondered if the storm would be VIOLENT 
 
FIERCE  
VIOLENT  
OVER  
LONG  
HEAVY  
BADMILD  
DANGEROUS 
 
They went to see the famous PAINTING 
 
FIVE  
PAINTING  
ACTOR  
STATUE  
BUILDING  
CHURCH 
FILM  
SINGER 
 
Did you want to go to the CITY 
 
PARK  
CITY  
CINEMA  
PICTURES  
TOILET  
SHOPS  
PUB  
BALL 
 
The judge warned about the dangers of LYING 
 
SPEED 
LYING  
DRUGS  
DRINKING  
CRIME  
ROBBERY  
ALCOHOL  
REVENGE 
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She dropped a glass and woke up her CAT 
 
MOTHER  
CAT  
BABY  
HUSBAND  
SISTER  
FRIEND  
DOG  
NEIGHBOUR 
 
Rita slowly walked down the shaky PLANK 
 
DECK  
PLANK  
STAIRS  
LADDER  
BRIDGE  
STAIRCASE  
PATH  
TREE 
 
Larry chose not to join the GANG 
 
CLUB  
GANG  
ARMY  
SCOUTS  
GAME  
NAVY  
FIGHT  
TEAM 
 
Hank reached into his pocket to get the LIGHTER 
 
TICKET  
LIGHTER  
MONEY  
KEYS  
GUN  
CHANGE  
PEN  
CIGARETTES 
 
Ray fell down and hurt his BACK 
 
PRIDE  
BACK  
KNEE  
ARM  
ELBOW  
HAND  
ANKLE  
HIP 
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Suzy liked to play with her toy BEAR 
 
DOG  
PHONE  
DOLLS  
SOLDIERS  
DESK  
TRAIN  
BEAR  
DRUM 
 
The sandwich wasn’t very good without a slice of TOMATO 
 
TOMATO  
BREAD  
CHEESE  
HAM  
MEAT  
ONION  
CUCUMBER  
PICKLE 
 
She cleaned the dirt from her FACE 
 
SHOES  
FACE  
NAILS  
BOOTS  
HANDS  
COAT  
HAIR  
GLASSES 
 
Rushing out, he forgot to take his WALLET 
 
MONEY  
WALLET  
KEYS  
COAT  
BAG  
JACKET  
TICKETS  
BOOKS 
 
Helen reached up to dust the MANTELPIECE 
 
MANTELPIECE  
SHELVES  
WARDROBE  
PICTURE  
MIRROR  
CEILING  
CUPBOARD  
LAMP 
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James poured himself a glass of WHISKY 
 
ORANGE  
WHISKY  
WINE  
BEER  
MILK  
JUICE  
SHERRY  
LEMONADE 
 
Her dress was made of very fine LACE 
 
MATERIAL  
LACE  
SILK  
CLOTH  
LINEN  
COTTON  
FABRIC  
SEWING 
 
The lorry that Bill drove crashed into the BRIDGE  
 
BARRIER  
BRIDGE  
WALL  
HOUSE  
CAR  
TRAIN  
LIGHTS  
ROAD 
 
The hunter shot and killed a large ELEPHANT 
 
ELEPHANT  
DEER  
BOAR  
LION  
TIGER  
RABBIT  
BIRD  
ANIMAL 
 
The police had never seen a man so ANGRY 
 
NEGLECTED  
ANGRY  
DRUNK  
VIOLENT  
POOR  
ANXIOUS  
GUILTY  
INNOCENT 
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Research Participant Information Sheet. 
 
Research Title: Knowledge of Memory Ability in Multiple Sclerosis 
 
Researcher’s name and contact details: 
Mr. Austin Claffey, PhD student, Brunel University  
Telephone number: 07504517954  
Email: austin.claffey@brunel.ac.uk 
Research Supervisors: 
 Dr Priscilla Harries  & Prof. Lorraine DeSouza, 
 School of Health Sciences & Social Care, 
 Mary Seacole Building, 
 Brunel University, 
 Uxbridge, 
Middlesex, UB8 3PH. 
 
This research is a PhD study being undertaken at Brunel University, London. This 
study has been granted ethical approval by the Brunel University Research Ethics 
Committee. 
 
The information sheet gives an explanation of the research and what would happen to 
you if you agreed to be involved. If you have any questions about the project, please 
make contact with the researcher. 
  
What is the research about? 
This research project aims to understand how people with multiple sclerosis estimate 
their memory ability. People with Multiple Sclerosis sometimes report memory 
problems. Some researchers have suggested that problems such as concentration, 
information processing or your mood can play a part. This study will investigate what 
are the issues associated with reports of memory problems. You do not have to be 
having memory problems to take part in this study. 
 
What will the study involve? 
I would like you to have one meeting with me, consisting of two sessions separated 
by a break of about 20 minutes. Each session will be 30-40 minutes long. The 
sessions will consist of taking some background information about you and your 
medical history, followed by testing of some aspects of your memory, thinking speed 
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and reasoning. There will be a short questionnaire about your mood at the end. In 
order to test speed some of your tests answers will be recorded on tape so that they 
can be timed. 
 
Before attending for the assessment session, you will be asked to fill out one 
questionnaire about your memory, which I will post to you in advance, so you can 
bring it along with you. 
 
There will not be any treatments given to you during the research, nor will there be a 
need to stop taking medication. Times and dates for assessment will be organised to 
fit in whenever suits you best, and the meeting can be at your MS Therapy Centre, 
Brunel University or in your own home, whichever you prefer. 
 
What are the criteria for getting involved? 
If you are over 18 years old, living in the community, and have a doctor’s diagnosis 
of Multiple Sclerosis, I would be interested in hearing from you. The research tasks 
will require some basic reading, writing, pointing and speaking. Finally, you will need 
to have no neurological problems apart from MS, and no history of depression prior to 
your diagnosis of MS. If you have had a recent exacerbation of your MS, this will 
need to be discussed, but I would still like you to take part. 
 
What are the benefits of getting involved? 
The results of this study may help people with MS and clinicians better understand 
what contributes to the ability to estimate memory ability. It is unlikely that there will 
be a direct benefit to you from this, during the study. It is however hoped that if we 
have a better understanding of what contributes to the experience of memory 
problems, we will better be able to support rehabilitation. If during the study it is 
identified that you are having significant problems with your mood, I may 
recommend to you that you see your GP for further advice or treatment. 
 
Results from this study will be submitted for publication, or presented at conferences, 
so that they can reach an audience of professionals, as well as people with MS. 
 
What are the risks of getting involved? 
One section of the study will ask you to fill in a questionnaire about your mood over 
the past two weeks. This questionnaire sometimes provokes feelings of upset because 
it focuses on a range of negative thoughts and feelings that some people experience. 
Other testing components are designed to be sensitive to speed of thinking or other 
mental abilities. These tests are designed so that they challenge these abilities and, for 
some, this can cause some anxiety. This anxiety is considered normal in a testing 
situation. 
 
Do I have to get involved? 
No, your participation is voluntary. This means that you can choose not to be 
involved, or if you start, you can choose to withdraw at any time. If you decide not to 
participate, it will not affect any other treatments you are receiving. 
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Will my details and results be confidential? 
Yes, all the information you provide will be kept confidential. Any personal 
information will be kept securely in the university and anonymous information, like 
assessment scores, will be kept separate from it. 
Any information that could identify you will be removed before the research is 
analysed, written up, or before any presentation of the results is made. 
 
Who is supervising the research? 
The research plan has been reviewed and accepted by Brunel University Ethics 
Committee and the university also funds and insures the researcher. If you have are 
unhappy with your experience or have complaints about the conduct of the research 
you can contact the supervisor of the research. 
 
Dr Priscilla Harries, 
The contact details of the project supervisor are: 
School of Health Sciences & Social Care, 
Mary Seacole Building, 
Brunel University, 
Uxbridge, 
Middlesex, UB8 3PH.     Telephone: 01895 268773 
 
Will I be paid to take part? 
Any travel expenses you incur as a result of participating in the research will be 
refunded. An honorarium of a £15 gift token will be given to you at the end of the 
testing session, to thank you for giving me your time. 
 
Will you contact anyone else about my participation? 
If you would like me to, I can discuss the study with a family member, partner, friend 
or carer. Professional staff, such as therapists, nurses or care workers will not be 
informed about your results, unless you ask for them to be. 
 
What happens next? 
If you decide to take part, I will ask you to read and sign a consent form. A copy is 
enclosed with this information sheet so you can have a read of it. If you have any 
questions about the study at this point I can answer them for you. 
 
After that, two things will happen: 
1. You will be given one questionnaire to fill out, which asks you about your 
memory. This will take about 30 minutes to fill in. 
2. An appointment will be arranged for you for the assessment part of the 
research, which will consist of some memory, thinking speed and reasoning 
assessments. This will take about 90 minutes to do, including a break. A 
questionnaire about your mood will be included in this session. 
 
Participant Information Sheet. 
 4 
Where will the appointment be? 
It could be at your home, at the university or possibly at the centre you attend. The 
researcher will discuss this with you. 
 
Thank you for considering being part of this study. 
 
 
If you have any other questions about the project, please make contact with the 
researcher: 
 
Austin Claffey  
Telephone number: 07504517954  
Email: austin.claffey@brunel.ac.uk 
  
APPENDIX  D  Beck Depression Inventory Model 1  i 
 
 
Appendix D: 1 FACTOR CFA of BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY 
 
Depression
Sadness
Pessimism
Past Failure
Loss of Pleasure
.74
Guilt
.72
Punishment feelings
.60
Self-dislike
Self-critical
Suicidal thoughts
 or wishes
Worthlesness
Concentration
difficulty
Changes in Appetite
Changes in Sleep
Irritability
Indecisiveness
Loss of Interest
Agitation
Crying
Loss of Energy
Tiredness or Fatigue
Loss of interest
in sex
.86
.54
.52
.76
.68
.67
.72
.54
.73
.58
.43
.76
.55
.67
.65
.64
.62
.68
e1
e2
e3
e4
e5
e6
e7
e8
e9
e10
e11
e13
e12
e14
e15
e16
e17
e18
e19
e20
e21
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The model is recursive. 
Sample size = 100 
Variable Summary 
Your model contains the following variables (residuals not shown) 
Observed, endogenous variables 
Loss of Pleasure 
Guilt Feelings 
Punishment Feelings 
Worthlessness 
Suicidal Thoughts or wishes 
Self-Critical 
Self-Dislike 
Sadness 
Pessimism 
Past Failure 
Loss of interest in Sex 
Concentration difficulty 
Change in Appetite 
Change in Sleep 
Irritated 
Indecisiveness 
Loss of Interest 
Agitation 
Crying 
Tiredness or Fatigue 
Loss of Energy 
 
Unobserved, exogenous variables 
Depression 
Variable counts (including residuals) 
Number of variables in your model: 43 
Number of observed variables: 21 
Number of unobserved variables: 22 
Number of exogenous variables: 22 
Number of endogenous variables: 21 
Computation of degrees of freedom 
Number of distinct sample moments: 231 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 42 
Degrees of freedom (231 - 42): 189 
Result 
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 233.653 
Degrees of freedom = 189 
Probability level = .015 
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Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
BDI1factor model 42 233.653 189 .015 1.236 
Saturated model 231 .000 0   
Independence model 21 278.161 210 .001 1.325 
Zero model 0 1039.50 231 .000 4.500 
GFI 
Model GFI 
BDI1factor model .775 
Saturated model 1.00 
Independence model .732 
Zero model .000 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model CFI 
BDI1factor model .345 
Saturated model 1.00 
Independence model .000 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
BDI1factor model .049 .023 .068 .523 
Independence model .057 .037 .075 .253 
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Regression Weights: 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Loss of Pleasure <--- Depression 1.493 .512 2.915 .004 
Guilt Feelings <--- Depression 1.277 .307 4.160 *** 
Punishment Feelings <--- Depression 1.272 .447 2.847 .004 
Worthlessness <--- Depression 1.810 .551 3.283 .001 
Suicidal Thoughts or wishes <--- Depression .806 .327 2.468 .014 
Self-Critical <--- Depression 1.054 .349 3.018 .003 
Self-Dislike <--- Depression 1.383 .421 3.283 .001 
Sadness <--- Depression 1.000    
Pessimism <--- Depression 1.319 .446 2.955 .003 
Past Failure <--- Depression 1.339 .471 2.841 .005 
Loss of interest in Sex <--- Depression 1.138 .526 2.166 .030 
Concentration difficulty <--- Depression 1.435 .493 2.911 .004 
Change in Appetite <--- Depression 1.172 .462 2.538 .011 
Change in Sleep <--- Depression .903 .434 2.080 .038 
Irritated <--- Depression 1.221 .388 3.149 .002 
Indecisiveness <--- Depression 1.157 .469 2.465 .014 
Loss of Interest <--- Depression 1.079 .434 2.487 .013 
Agitation <--- Depression 1.152 .359 3.203 .001 
Crying <--- Depression 1.149 .477 2.408 .016 
Tiredness or Fatigue <--- Depression 1.168 .475 2.458 .014 
Loss of Energy <--- Depression 1.077 .457 2.359 .018 
Standardized Regression Weights: 
   Estimate 
Loss of Pleasure <--- Depression .745 
Guilt Feelings <--- Depression .724 
Punishment Feelings <--- Depression .595 
Worthlessness <--- Depression .857 
Suicidal Thoughts or wishes <--- Depression .541 
Self-Critical <--- Depression .517 
Self-Dislike <--- Depression .764 
Sadness <--- Depression .676 
Pessimism <--- Depression .672 
Past Failure <--- Depression .721 
Loss of interest in Sex <--- Depression .537 
Concentration difficulty <--- Depression .728 
Change in Appetite <--- Depression .578 
Change in Sleep <--- Depression .429 
Irritated <--- Depression .759 
Indecisiveness <--- Depression .552 
Loss of Interest <--- Depression .669 
Agitation <--- Depression .651 
Crying <--- Depression .638 
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   Estimate 
Tiredness or Fatigue <--- Depression .620 
Loss of Energy <--- Depression .680 
 
 
 
Variances 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Depression   .061 .031 1.954 .051 
e1   .073 .015 4.830 *** 
e2   .130 .025 5.193 *** 
e3   .101 .023 4.459 *** 
e4   .109 .023 4.682 *** 
e5   .091 .020 4.576 *** 
e6   .180 .032 5.557 *** 
e7   .084 .020 4.252 *** 
e8   .186 .031 6.051 *** 
e9   .096 .018 5.490 *** 
e10   .072 .016 4.628 *** 
e11   .196 .035 5.630 *** 
e13   .168 .031 5.453 *** 
e12   .112 .021 5.415 *** 
e14   .221 .037 5.891 *** 
e15   .067 .015 4.535 *** 
e16   .187 .035 5.351 *** 
e17   .088 .020 4.330 *** 
e18   .110 .021 5.264 *** 
e19   .118 .025 4.786 *** 
e20   .134 .027 5.021 *** 
e21   .083 .017 4.900 *** 
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Squared Multiple Correlations: 
 
 
 
   Estimate 
Agitation   .424 
Change in Appetite   .334 
Change in Sleep   .530 
Concentration difficulty   .268 
Crying   .407 
Guilt Feelings   .583 
Indecisiveness   .463 
Irritated   .520 
Loss of Energy   .384 
Loss of Interest   .524 
Loss of interest in Sex   .305 
Loss of Pleasure   .448 
Past Failure   .577 
Pessimism   .451 
Punishment Feelings   .555 
Sadness   .354 
Self-Critical   .456 
Self-Dislike   .289 
Suicidal Thoughts or wishes   .184 
Tiredness or Fatigue   .292 
Worthlessness   .735 
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Sample Covariances 
 Energy Fatigue Cry Agitate Interest Indecisive Irritate Sleep Appetite Conc. Sex Fail Pess Sad Dislike Critical Suicide Worth Punish Guilt Pleas 
Energy .223                     
Fatigue .113 .340                    
Cry .071 .071 .312                  
Agitate .064 .100 .111 .268                  
Interest .064 .076 .096 .086 .263                 
Indecisive .109 .079 .088 .083 .075 .380                
Irritate .061 .073 .092 .114 .117 .067 .214               
Sleep .088 .076 .122 .077 .053 .098 .070 .365              
Appetite .093 .121 .128 .112 .039 .077 .110 .081 .353             
Concentrate .132 .163 .128 .111 .095 .097 .104 .105 .133 .303            
Sex .070 .143 .101 .086 .080 .106 .091 .124 .132 .111 .390          
Fail .067 .039 .058 .060 .031 .085 .088 .071 .080 .094 .076 .329         
Pess .107 .060 .074 .045 .094 .065 .086 .027 .061 .126 .039 .108 .329        
Sad .030 .072 .061 .094 .065 .065 .067 .044 .066 .079 .027 .089 .091 .195       
Dislike .079 .099 .089 .093 .052 .148 .098 .080 .080 .112 .085 .075 .097 .086 .282       
Critical .067 .059 .089 .073 .104 .066 .083 .036 .041 .111 .031 .058 .121 .070 .085 .316      
Suicide .061 .057 .033 .003 .053 .025 .063 .025 .013 .046 .017 .081 .102 .049 .059 .060 .196     
Worth .120 .083 .128 .102 .104 .135 .115 .068 .102 .135 .108 .203 .156 .091 .147 .102 .104 .321    
Punish .059 .123 .090 .048 .099 .063 .054 .054 .095 .093 .141 .092 .138 .075 .103 .078 .073 .147 .376   
Guilt .053 .091 .044 .093 .048 .052 .087 .042 .090 .069 .086 .136 .069 .123 .129 .101 .065 .134 .109 .284  
Pleas .088 .062 .031 .098 .107 .075 .104 .061 .076 .091 .088 .146 .142 .073 .138 .073 .101 .186 .124 .118 .340 
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Sample Correlations 
 Energy Fatigue Cry Agitate Interest Indecisive Irritate Sleep Appetite Conc. Sex Fail Pess Sad Dislike Critical Suicide Worth Punish Guilt Pleas 
Energy 1.000                     
Fatigue .411 1.000                    
Cry .270 .217 1.000                   
Agitate .263 .331 .385 1.000                  
Interest .265 .253 .334 .323 1.000                 
Indecisive .375 .219 .254 .259 .238 1.000                
Irritate .277 .270 .355 .475 .492 .233 1.000               
Sleep .307 .215 .361 .245 .172 .264 .251 1.000             
Appetite .332 .350 .385 .364 .127 .211 .398 .226 1.000             
Concentrate .506 .507 .416 .389 .336 .287 .407 .315 .406 1.000           
Sex .236 .392 .289 .265 .250 .275 .315 .328 .355 .322 1.000          
Fail .246 .117 .180 .203 .104 .240 .333 .204 .234 .298 .212 1.000         
Pess .396 .179 .232 .153 .320 .185 .322 .077 .180 .398 .109 .328 1.000        
Sad .143 .280 .249 .409 .286 .237 .329 .165 .251 .323 .098 .350 .360 1.000       
Dislike .313 .320 .299 .337 .191 .452 .401 .250 .255 .383 .257 .247 .319 .368 1.000       
Critical .253 .180 .283 .251 .360 .192 .318 .106 .122 .357 .089 .180 .374 .282 .285 1.000      
Suicide .290 .222 .135 .013 .235 .093 .306 .092 .051 .188 .061 .318 .402 .251 .252 .242 1.000     
Worth .447 .253 .406 .346 .356 .386 .439 .197 .304 .432 .306 .624 .480 .365 .490 .321 .415 1.000    
Punish .202 .343 .262 .152 .314 .168 .190 .145 .260 .274 .369 .262 .391 .275 .315 .226 .268 .424 1.000   
Guilt .210 .293 .146 .338 .175 .158 .354 .130 .283 .236 .257 .444 .226 .520 .454 .338 .275 .444 .332 1.000 
Pleas .321 .182 .094 .326 .359 .208 .386 .174 .220 .285 .243 .437 .426 .285 .446 .222 .390 .565 .346 .381 1.000 
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Matrices 
Residual Covariances 
 
 
 
Energy Fatigue Cry Agitate Interest Indecisive Irritate Sleep Appetite Conc. Sex Fail Pess Sad Dislike Critical Suicide Worth Punish Guilt Pleas 
Energy .070                     
Fatigue .036 .122                    
Cry -.004 -.011 .113                   
Agitate -.012 .017 .030 .077                  
Interest -.007 -.002 .020 .010 .104                 
Indecisive .033 -.004 .006 .001 -.001 .112                
Irritate -.020 -.014 .006 .028 .036 -.020 .056               
Sleep .028 .011 .058 .013 -.006 .034 .003 .094              
Appetite .016 .037 .045 .029 -.039 -.006 .022 .016 .102             
Concentrate .037 .060 .027 .010 .000 -.004 -.004 .026 .030 .065            
Sex -.005 .061 .021 .006 .005 .025 .006 .061 .050 .011 .115           
Fail -.022 -.057 -.037 -.034 -.058 -.010 -.012 -.003 -.016 -.024 -.017 .118          
Pess .020 -.035 -.018 -.048 .007 -.028 -.013 -.046 -.033 .010 -.053 .000 .093         
Sad -.036 .001 -.009 .023 -.001 -.006 -.008 -.011 -.006 -.009 -.043 .007 .010 .061        
Dislike -.013 .000 -.009 -.005 -.039 .050 -.005 .004 -.019 -.010 -.011 -.038 -.015 .002 .081       
Critical -.002 -.017 .015 -.001 .034 -.008 .004 -.022 -.035 .018 -.042 -.028 .035 .005 -.004 .062      
Suicide .007 .000 -.023 -.054 .000 -.032 .002 -.020 -.044 -.025 -.039 .015 .037 .000 -.009 .008 .060     
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Energy Fatigue Cry Agitate Interest Indecisive Irritate Sleep Appetite Conc. Sex Fail Pess Sad Dislike Critical Suicide Worth Punish Guilt Pleas 
Worth .000 -.046 .001 -.026 -.016 .007 -.020 -.033 -.028 -.024 -.018 .054 .010 -.019 -.006 -.015 .015 .048    
Punish -.025 .032 .000 -.041 .015 -.027 -.041 -.017 .004 -.019 .053 -.012 .035 -.003 -.005 -.004 .010 .007 .097   
Guilt -.031 .000 -.046 .003 -.036 -.039 -.008 -.029 -.002 -.043 -.003 .031 -.034 .044 .021 .019 .002 -.007 .009 .094  
Pleas -.010 -.045 -.074 -.007 .009 -.031 -.007 -.021 -.031 -.040 -.016 .024 .022 -.018 .012 -.024 .027 .021 .007 .002 .094 
 
 
 
Standardized Residual Covariances 
 Energy Fatigue Cry Agitate Interest Indecisive Irritate Sleep Appetite Conc. Sex Fail Pess Sad Dislike Critical Suicide Worth Punish Guilt Pleas 
Energy 3.193                     
Fatigue 1.818 3.941                    
Cry -.235 -.509 4.014                   
Agitate -.614 .789 1.428 2.810                  
Interest -.405 -.075 1.027 .511 4.603                 
Indecisive 1.514 -.153 .256 .054 -.053 2.923                
Irritate -1.129 -.703 .302 1.416 2.014 -.891 2.478               
Sleep 1.313 .443 2.416 .545 -.299 1.234 .118 2.441              
Appetite .746 1.495 1.893 1.247 -1.792 -.207 .999 .610 2.837             
Concentrate 1.728 2.398 1.118 .415 .012 -.154 -.165 .957 1.122 1.931            
Sex -.245 2.360 .833 .227 .221 .883 .257 2.163 1.810 .387 2.949           
Fail -1.079 -2.406 -1.616 -1.522 -2.823 -.379 -.567 -.137 -.646 -.929 -.669 3.923          
Pess .958 -1.399 -.775 -2.044 .325 -1.040 -.603 -1.752 -1.271 .363 -1.949 -.016 2.757         
  
APPENDIX  D  Beck Depression Inventory Model 1  11 
 
 Energy Fatigue Cry Agitate Interest Indecisive Irritate Sleep Appetite Conc. Sex Fail Pess Sad Dislike Critical Suicide Worth Punish Guilt Pleas 
Sad -2.277 .032 -.497 1.318 -.078 -.309 -.460 -.563 -.290 -.466 -2.084 .356 .529 3.210       
Dislike -.638 .008 -.382 -.215 -1.948 1.973 -.241 .151 -.762 -.383 -.443 -1.619 -.600 .088 2.840       
Critical -.117 -.666 .620 -.049 1.593 -.301 .183 -.821 -1.313 .680 -1.536 -1.136 1.361 .277 -.171 1.703      
Suicide .478 -.027 -1.331 -3.130 .000 -1.585 .155 -1.013 -2.277 -1.287 -1.940 .799 1.927 -.012 -.508 .414 3.083     
Worth .014 -1.661 .043 -.988 -.663 .218 -.809 -1.118 -.937 -.805 -.589 1.918 .327 -.871 -.213 -.502 .681 1.236    
Punish -1.126 1.193 .009 -1.655 .650 -.920 -1.774 -.583 .126 -.679 1.797 -.454 1.256 -.155 -.197 -.152 .484 .209 2.437   
Guilt -1.628 -.007 -2.147 .152 -1.869 -1.576 -.410 -1.208 -.075 -1.768 -.136 1.366 -1.432 2.476 .914 .793 .114 -.269 .362 3.460  
Pleas -.460 -1.754 -3.018 -.288 .387 -1.111 -.328 -.777 -1.132 -1.436 -.561 .906 .799 -.885 .448 -.882 1.357 .679 .256 .069 2.684 
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Appendix E - 2 FACTOR BDI COGNITIVE FACTOR, AFFECTIVE/SOMATIC FACTOR 
 
.50
Sadness .13
Pessimism .36
Past Failure
.18
Loss of Pleasure
.70
Guilt Feelings
.21
Punishment Feelings.19
Self-dislike
.17
Self-critical
.09
Suicidal thoughts
or wishes .38
Worthlessness
.41
Concentration
difficulty .40
Change in appetite.15
Change in sleeping
.54
Irritability
.02
Indecisiveness
.29
Loss of Interest.43
Agitation
.22
Crying
.25
Loss of energy
.45
Tiredness or Fatigue
.30
Loss of interest
in sex
e1
e2
e3
e10
e4
e5
e6
e7
e8
e9
e11
e13
e12
e14
e15
e16
e17
e18
e19
e20
e21
Cognitive
Factor
Somatic/Affective
 Factor
.71
.37
.60
.83
.46
.44
.42
.30
.61
.55
.64
.64
.39
.73
.15
.54
.66
.50
.67
.62
.42
.47
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The model is recursive. 
Sample size = 100 
Variable Summary 
Your model contains the following variables (residuals not shown) 
Observed, endogenous variables 
Loss of Pleasure 
Guilt Feelings 
Punishment Feelings 
Worthlessness 
Suicidal Thoughts or wishes 
Self-Critical 
Self-Dislike 
Sadness 
Pessimism 
Past Failure 
Loss of interest in Sex 
Concentration difficulty 
Change in Appetite 
Change in Sleep 
Irritated 
Indecisiveness 
Loss of Interest 
Agitation 
Crying 
Tiredness or Fatigue 
Loss of Energy 
 
Unobserved, exogenous variables 
Cognitive 
Somatic_Affective 
Variable counts (including residuals) 
Number of variables in your model: 44 
Number of observed variables: 21 
Number of unobserved variables: 23 
Number of exogenous variables: 23 
Number of endogenous variables: 21 
Parameter summary 
 Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total 
Fixed 23 0 0 0 0 23 
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unlabeled 19 1 23 0 0 43 
Total 42 1 23 0 0 66 
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Computation of degrees of freedom 
Number of distinct sample moments: 231 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 43 
Degrees of freedom (231 - 43): 188 
Result 
Chi-square = 229.131 
Degrees of freedom = 188 
Probability level = .022 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
BDI2factor 43 229.131 188 .022 1.219 
Saturated model 231 .000 0   
Independence model 21 278.161 210 .001 1.325 
Zero model 0 1039.500 231 .000 4.500 
RMR, GFI 
Model GFI 
BDI2factor .780 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .732 
Zero model .000 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model CFI 
BDI2factor .397 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .000 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
BDI2factor .047 .019 .067 .578 
Independence model .057 .037 .075 .253 
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Regression Weights 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Guilt <--- Cognitive 1.522 .312 4.874 *** 
Punish <--- Cognitive .826 .263 3.136 .002 
Sleep <--- Somatic_Affective .711 .247 2.884 .004 
Irritate <--- Somatic_Affective .968 .226 4.282 *** 
Indecisive <--- Somatic_Affective .241 .230 1.047 .295 
Interest <--- Somatic_Affective .691 .212 3.259 .001 
Sex <--- Somatic_Affective 1.035 .276 3.746 *** 
Concentrate <--- Somatic_Affective 1.000    
Appetite <--- Somatic_Affective 1.199 .278 4.312 *** 
Cry <--- Somatic_Affective .659 .213 3.100 .002 
Agitate <--- Somatic_Affective 1.030 .242 4.248 *** 
Worth <--- Cognitive .773 .220 3.514 *** 
Suicide <--- Cognitive .368 .175 2.098 .036 
Critical <--- Cognitive .748 .246 3.046 .002 
Dislike <--- Cognitive .525 .203 2.588 .010 
Sad <--- Cognitive 1.000    
Pess <--- Cognitive .540 .217 2.490 .013 
Fail <--- Cognitive .919 .245 3.743 *** 
Fatigue <--- Somatic_Affective 1.162 .245 4.747 *** 
Energy <--- Somatic_Affective .600 .168 3.577 *** 
Pleas <--- Somatic_Affective .527 .224 2.352 .019 
Covariances: (Group number 1 - BDI2factor) 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Cognitive <--> Somatic_Affective .046 .017 2.747 .006 
Variances: (Group number 1 - BDI2factor) 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Cognitive   .070 .024 2.931 .003 
Somatic_Affective   .077 .029 2.638 .008 
e1   .070 .016 4.250 *** 
e2   .131 .025 5.281 *** 
e3   .103 .023 4.505 *** 
e5   .071 .026 2.734 .006 
e6   .179 .033 5.461 *** 
e7   .082 .020 4.132 *** 
e8   .185 .031 5.953 *** 
e9   .098 .018 5.563 *** 
e10   .069 .015 4.471 *** 
e18   .111 .021 5.338 *** 
e17   .163 .032 5.138 *** 
e16   .220 .038 5.851 *** 
e15   .063 .016 4.018 *** 
e14   .185 .035 5.256 *** 
e13   .090 .020 4.394 *** 
e12   .109 .022 5.043 *** 
e11   .119 .025 4.837 *** 
e21   .083 .017 4.933 *** 
e20   .127 .028 4.580 *** 
e19   .195 .035 5.518 *** 
e4   .098 .024 4.105 *** 
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Squared Multiple Correlations: (Group number 1 - BDI2factor) 
   Estimate 
Pleasure   .179 
Sex   .298 
Fatigue   .450 
Energy   .250 
Cry   .220 
Agitate   .429 
Interest   .291 
Indecisive   .024 
Irritate   .536 
Sleep   .151 
Appetite   .404 
Concentrat
e   .409 
Worth   .375 
Suicide   .088 
Critical   .174 
Dislike   .190 
Punish   .210 
Guilt   .696 
Fail   .363 
Pessimism   .134 
Sad   .500 
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Sample Moments 
Sample Covariances 
 Energy Fatigue Cry Agitate Interest Indecisive Irritate Sleep Conc Appetite Sex Worth Suicide Critical Dislike Punish Guilt Pleas Fail Pess Sad 
Energy .223                     
Fatigue .113 .340                    
Cry .071 .071 .312                  
Agitate .064 .100 .111 .268                  
Interest .064 .076 .096 .086 .263                 
Indecisive .109 .079 .088 .083 .075 .380                
Irritate .061 .073 .092 .114 .117 .067 .214               
Sleep .088 .076 .122 .077 .053 .098 .070 .365              
Concentrate .132 .163 .128 .111 .095 .097 .104 .105 .303             
Appetite .093 .121 .128 .112 .039 .077 .110 .081 .133 .353            
Sex .070 .143 .101 .086 .080 .106 .091 .124 .111 .132 .390          
Worth .120 .083 .128 .102 .104 .135 .115 .068 .135 .102 .108 .321          
Suicide .061 .057 .033 .003 .053 .025 .063 .025 .046 .013 .017 .104 .196         
Critical .067 .059 .089 .073 .104 .066 .083 .036 .111 .041 .031 .102 .060 .316        
Dislike .079 .099 .089 .093 .052 .148 .098 .080 .112 .080 .085 .147 .059 .085 .282       
Punish .059 .123 .090 .048 .099 .063 .054 .054 .093 .095 .141 .147 .073 .078 .103 .376      
Guilt .053 .091 .044 .093 .048 .052 .087 .042 .069 .090 .086 .134 .065 .101 .129 .109 .284     
Pleas .088 .062 .031 .098 .107 .075 .104 .061 .091 .076 .088 .186 .101 .073 .138 .124 .118 .340    
Fail .067 .039 .058 .060 .031 .085 .088 .071 .094 .080 .076 .203 .081 .058 .075 .092 .136 .146 .329  
Pess .107 .060 .074 .045 .094 .065 .086 .027 .126 .061 .039 .156 .102 .121 .097 .138 .069 .142 .108 .329 
Sad .030 .072 .061 .094 .065 .065 .067 .044 .079 .066 .027 .091 .049 .070 .086 .075 .123 .073 .089 .091 .195 
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Sample Correlations 
 Energy Fatigue Cry Agitate Interest Indecisive Irritate Sleep Conc Appetite Sex Worth Suicide Critical Dislike Punish Guilt Pleas Fail Pess Sad 
Energy 1.000                     
Fatigue .411 1.000                    
Cry .270 .217 1.000                   
Agitate .263 .331 .385 1.000                  
Interest .265 .253 .334 .323 1.000                 
Indecisive .375 .219 .254 .259 .238 1.000                
Irritate .277 .270 .355 .475 .492 .233 1.000               
Sleep .307 .215 .361 .245 .172 .264 .251 1.000             
Concentrate .506 .507 .416 .389 .336 .287 .407 .315 1.000            
Appetite .332 .350 .385 .364 .127 .211 .398 .226 .406 1.000            
Sex .236 .392 .289 .265 .250 .275 .315 .328 .322 .355 1.000          
Worth .447 .253 .406 .346 .356 .386 .439 .197 .432 .304 .306 1.000          
Suicide .290 .222 .135 .013 .235 .093 .306 .092 .188 .051 .061 .415 1.000         
Critical .253 .180 .283 .251 .360 .192 .318 .106 .357 .122 .089 .321 .242 1.000        
Dislike .313 .320 .299 .337 .191 .452 .401 .250 .383 .255 .257 .490 .252 .285 1.000       
Punish .202 .343 .262 .152 .314 .168 .190 .145 .274 .260 .369 .424 .268 .226 .315 1.000      
Guilt .210 .293 .146 .338 .175 .158 .354 .130 .236 .283 .257 .444 .275 .338 .454 .332 1.000    
Pleas .321 .182 .094 .326 .359 .208 .386 .174 .285 .220 .243 .565 .390 .222 .446 .346 .381 1.000   
Fail .246 .117 .180 .203 .104 .240 .333 .204 .298 .234 .212 .624 .318 .180 .247 .262 .444 .437 1.000  
Pess .396 .179 .232 .153 .320 .185 .322 .077 .398 .180 .109 .480 .402 .374 .319 .391 .226 .426 .328 1.000 
Sad .143 .280 .249 .409 .286 .237 .329 .165 .323 .251 .098 .365 .251 .282 .368 .275 .520 .285 .350 .360 1.000 
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Residual Covariances 
 Pleasure Sex Fatigue Energy Cry Agitate Interest Indecisive Irritate Sleep Appetite Conc Worth Suicide Critical Dislike Punish Guilt Failure Pess Sad 
Pleasure .221                     
Sex .046 .113                    
Fatigue .015 .050 .108                   
Energy .064 .022 .060 .112                  
Cry .004 .048 .012 .041 .160                 
Agitate .057 .004 .008 .017 .059 .078                
Interest .079 .025 .014 .032 .061 .031 .137               
Indecisive .065 .087 .057 .098 .075 .064 .062 .191              
Irritate .065 .014 -.014 .016 .043 .037 .065 .049 .079             
Sleep .033 .067 .012 .055 .086 .020 .015 .085 .017 .106            
Appetite .028 .036 .014 .038 .067 .017 -.025 .055 .020 .016 .079           
Concentrate .051 .031 .073 .085 .077 .032 .042 .079 .029 .050 .041 .115          
Worth .168 .072 .042 .099 .105 .065 .079 .126 .081 .042 .060 .099 .210         
Suicide .092 .000 .038 .051 .022 -.014 .042 .021 .046 .013 -.007 .029 .084 .089        
Critical .055 -.004 .019 .047 .066 .038 .080 .058 .050 .012 .000 .076 .062 .041 .092       
Dislike .125 .060 .071 .064 .073 .068 .035 .142 .075 .063 .052 .088 .119 .046 .058 .181      
Punish .104 .102 .079 .036 .065 .010 .073 .054 .017 .027 .050 .055 .103 .052 .035 .072 .150     
Guilt .082 .014 .010 .011 -.002 .022 .000 .035 .020 -.008 .006 .000 .052 .026 .022 .073 .021 .052    
Fail .124 .032 -.010 .041 .030 .017 .002 .075 .048 .041 .029 .052 .153 .057 .010 .041 .039 .038 .167   
Pessimism .129 .013 .031 .092 .058 .020 .077 .059 .062 .009 .032 .101 .127 .088 .093 .077 .107 .012 .073 .177 
Sad .049 -.020 .019 .002 .031 .047 .033 .054 .023 .012 .011 .033 .038 .024 .018 .050 .017 .016 .025 .054 .056 
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Standardized Residual Covariances 
 Pleasure Sex Fatigue Energy Cry Agitate Interest Indecisive Irritate Sleep App Conc. Worth Suicide Critical Dislike Punish Guilt Fail Pessi Sad 
Pleasure 13.017                     
Sex 2.467 2.870                    
Fatigue .846 1.840 3.289                   
Energy 5.425 1.198 3.511 7.140                  
Cry .290 2.261 .590 3.043 7.376                 
Agitate 3.597 .151 .330 1.095 3.298 2.887                
Interest 6.259 1.278 .753 2.619 4.224 1.879 7.627               
Indecisi 4.286 3.743 2.702 6.716 4.402 3.322 3.997 7.058              
Irritate 4.863 .656 -.702 1.216 2.804 2.071 4.623 2.999 4.144             
Sleep 1.816 2.436 .474 3.154 4.225 .876 .822 3.813 .872 2.866            
Appetite 1.469 1.234 .502 2.054 3.122 .682 -1.267 2.392 .943 .564 2.034           
Conc 3.256 1.271 3.204 5.604 4.333 1.535 2.549 4.127 1.638 2.187 1.643 4.284          
Worth 14.333 3.985 2.544 8.683 7.921 4.332 6.515 8.639 6.344 2.460 3.325 6.639 13.310         
Suicide 8.062 -.028 2.361 4.595 1.735 -.995 3.548 1.484 3.817 .747 -.387 2.017 7.557 5.853        
Critical 3.302 -.170 .822 2.915 3.545 1.803 4.689 2.805 2.793 .483 -.008 3.646 3.788 2.608 2.878       
Dislike 11.288 3.545 4.558 5.978 5.802 4.811 3.092 10.208 6.289 3.860 3.043 6.242 10.805 4.338 3.755 12.605      
Punish 6.243 4.012 3.357 2.237 3.442 .448 4.234 2.606 .969 1.095 1.948 2.597 6.227 3.271 1.509 4.671 4.675     
Guilt 4.773 .512 .414 .676 -.121 .967 -.006 1.657 1.046 -.311 .238 -.011 2.881 1.591 .896 4.453 .848 1.577    
Fail 8.749 1.493 -.492 3.016 1.861 .943 .113 4.242 3.086 1.954 1.353 2.874 10.665 4.250 .519 3.121 1.968 1.750 7.238   
Pessi 9.518 .642 1.633 7.044 3.785 1.152 5.496 3.482 4.227 .451 1.528 5.870 9.485 6.853 4.932 6.128 5.647 .600 4.532 8.215  
Sad 3.733 -1.005 1.007 .186 2.092 2.735 2.421 3.265 1.582 .594 .548 1.935 2.757 1.877 .962 3.981 .908 .777 1.497 3.543 2.819 
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Appendix F - 2 FACTOR BDI COGNITIVE/AFFECTIVE FACTOR & SOMATIC FACTOR 
 
 
.39
Sadness
.43
Pessimism
.52
Past Failure
.59
Loss Pleasure
.54
Guilt
.37
Punishment feelings
.58
Self-Dislike
.27
Self-Criticalness
.36
Suicidal Thought/ Wishe
.75
Worthlessness
.61
Concentration
.32
Changes in Appetite
.15
Changes in Sleep
.54
Irritability
.28
Indecisiveness
.45
Loss Interest
.36
Agitation
.30
Crying
.58
Energy
.48
Fatigue
.25
Loss Interest in Sex
e1
e2
e3
e10
e4
e5
e6
e7
e8
e9
e11
e13
e12
e14
e15
e16
e17
e18
e19
e20
e21
Cognitive/Affective
Factor
Somatic  Factor
.63
.66
.72
.73
.61
.76
.52
.60
.86
.57
.38
.69
.77
.55
.78
.76
.50
.73
.53
.67
.60
.77
.30
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The model is recursive. 
Sample size = 100 
Variable Summary (residuals not shown) 
Observed, endogenous variables 
Observed, endogenous variables 
Loss of Pleasure 
Guilt Feelings 
Punishment Feelings 
Worthlessness 
Suicidal Thoughts or wishes 
Self-Critical 
Self-Dislike 
Sadness 
Pessimism 
Past Failure 
Loss of interest in Sex 
Concentration difficulty 
Change in Appetite 
Change in Sleep 
Irritated 
Indecisiveness 
Loss of Interest 
Agitation 
Crying 
Tiredness or Fatigue 
Loss of Energy 
 
Unobserved, exogenous variables 
Cognitive_Affective 
Somatic 
Variable counts (including residuals) 
Number of variables in your model: 44 
Number of observed variables: 21 
Number of unobserved variables: 23 
Number of exogenous variables: 23 
Number of endogenous variables: 21 
Parameter summary 
 Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total 
Fixed 23 0 0 0 0 23 
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unlabeled 19 2 23 0 0 44 
Total 42 2 23 0 0 67 
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Computation of degrees of freedom  
Number of distinct sample moments: 231 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 44 
Degrees of freedom (231 - 44): 187 
Result 
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 215.477 
Degrees of freedom = 187 
Probability level = .075 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
BDI2factor 44 215.477 187 .075 1.152 
Saturated model 231 .000 0   
Independence model 21 278.161 210 .001 1.325 
Zero model 0 1039.500 231 .000 4.500 
GFI 
Model GFI 
BDI2factor .793 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .732 
Zero model .000 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model CFI 
BDI2factor .582 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .000 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
BDI2factor .039 .000 .061 .770 
Independence model .057 .037 .075 .253 
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Regression Weights: 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Guilt <--- Cognitive_Affective 1.396 .322 4.333 *** 
Punish <--- Cognitive_Affective 1.391 .504 2.761 .006 
Worthlessness <--- Cognitive_Affective 1.962 .577 3.401 *** 
Suicide <--- Cognitive_Affective .983 .360 2.732 .006 
Critical <--- Cognitive_Affective 1.124 .370 3.038 .002 
Dislike <--- Cognitive_Affective 1.460 .448 3.260 .001 
Sad <--- Cognitive_Affective 1.000    
Pessimism <--- Cognitive_Affective 1.437 .493 2.915 .004 
Failure <--- Cognitive_Affective 1.417 .489 2.900 .004 
Fatigue <--- Somatic .900 .195 4.620 *** 
Energy <--- Somatic .834 .180 4.636 *** 
Irritate <--- Cognitive_Affective 1.198 .397 3.017 .003 
Indecisive <--- Cognitive_Affective 1.154 .476 2.423 .015 
Lost Interest <--- Cognitive_Affective 1.150 .475 2.425 .015 
Cry <--- Cognitive_Affective .959 .471 2.036 .042 
Agitate <--- Cognitive_Affective 1.063 .354 3.002 .003 
Sleep <--- Somatic .500 .206 2.427 .015 
Appetite <--- Somatic .712 .200 3.556 *** 
Concentrate <--- Somatic 1.000    
Pleasure <--- Cognitive_Affective 1.689 .557 3.031 .002 
Sex <--- Cognitive_Affective 1.052 .516 2.038 .042 
Standardized Regression Weights:  
   Estimate 
Guilt <--- Cognitive_Affective .732 
Punish <--- Cognitive_Affective .609 
Worthlessness <--- Cognitive_Affective .864 
Suicide <--- Cognitive_Affective .598 
Critical <--- Cognitive_Affective .520 
Dislike <--- Cognitive_Affective .765 
Sad <--- Cognitive_Affective .625 
Pessimism <--- Cognitive_Affective .659 
Failure <--- Cognitive_Affective .721 
Fatigue <--- Somatic .693 
Energy <--- Somatic .760 
Irritate <--- Cognitive_Affective .733 
Indecisive <--- Cognitive_Affective .531 
Lost Interest <--- Cognitive_Affective .673 
Cry <--- Cognitive_Affective .550 
Agitate <--- Cognitive_Affective .602 
Sleep <--- Somatic .384 
Appetite <--- Somatic .567 
Concentrate <--- Somatic .779 
Pleasure <--- Cognitive_Affective .766 
Sex <--- Cognitive_Affective .495 
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Covariances:  
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Cognitive_Affective <--> Somatic .070 .025 2.750 .006 
e1 <--> e2 .034 .015 2.302 .021 
Correlations:  
   Estimate 
Cognitive_Affective <--> Somatic .769 
e1 <--> e2 .305 
Variances:  
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Cognitive_Affective   .055 .028 1.940 .052 
Somatic   .151 .050 2.999 .003 
e1   .085 .016 5.375 *** 
e2   .147 .026 5.564 *** 
e3   .101 .023 4.451 *** 
e5   .093 .020 4.637 *** 
e6   .180 .033 5.514 *** 
e7   .083 .020 4.185 *** 
e8   .187 .031 6.051 *** 
e9   .095 .018 5.387 *** 
e10   .072 .016 4.551 *** 
e18   .098 .022 4.344 *** 
e17   .161 .031 5.139 *** 
e16   .218 .038 5.797 *** 
e15   .068 .015 4.585 *** 
e13   .087 .020 4.282 *** 
e12   .109 .021 5.186 *** 
e11   .116 .025 4.738 *** 
e21   .077 .019 4.145 *** 
e20   .132 .028 4.708 *** 
e4   .110 .024 4.672 *** 
e14   .186 .035 5.318 *** 
e19   .187 .035 5.358 *** 
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Squared Multiple Correlations: 
 Estimate 
Sex .245 
Indecisive .282 
Pleas .587 
Fatigue .481 
Energy .577 
Cry .302 
Agitate .362 
Interest .454 
Irritate .538 
Sleep .147 
Appetite .322 
Concentrate .607 
Worth .746 
Suicide .357 
Critical .271 
Dislike .585 
Punish .371 
Guilt .535 
Fail .520 
Pess .435 
Sad .391 
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Sample Covariances 
 Sex Indecis Pleas Fatigue Energy Cry Agitate Interest Irritate Sleep Appetite Conc Worth Suicide Critical Dislike Punish Guilt Fail Pess Sad 
Sex .390                    
Indecisive .106 .380                   
Pleas .088 .075 .340                  
Fatigue .143 .079 .062 .340                  
Energy .070 .109 .088 .113 .223                
Cry .101 .088 .031 .071 .071 .312               
Agitate .086 .083 .098 .100 .064 .111 .268              
Interest .080 .075 .107 .076 .064 .096 .086 .263              
Irritate .091 .067 .104 .073 .061 .092 .114 .117 .214            
Sleep .124 .098 .061 .076 .088 .122 .077 .053 .070 .365           
Appetite .132 .077 .076 .121 .093 .128 .112 .039 .110 .081 .353           
Concentrate .111 .097 .091 .163 .132 .128 .111 .095 .104 .105 .133 .303         
Worth .108 .135 .186 .083 .120 .128 .102 .104 .115 .068 .102 .135 .321        
Suicide .017 .025 .101 .057 .061 .033 .003 .053 .063 .025 .013 .046 .104 .196        
Critical .031 .066 .073 .059 .067 .089 .073 .104 .083 .036 .041 .111 .102 .060 .316       
Dislike .085 .148 .138 .099 .079 .089 .093 .052 .098 .080 .080 .112 .147 .059 .085 .282     
Punish .141 .063 .124 .123 .059 .090 .048 .099 .054 .054 .095 .093 .147 .073 .078 .103 .376     
Guilt .086 .052 .118 .091 .053 .044 .093 .048 .087 .042 .090 .069 .134 .065 .101 .129 .109 .284   
Fail .076 .085 .146 .039 .067 .058 .060 .031 .088 .071 .080 .094 .203 .081 .058 .075 .092 .136 .329  
Pess .039 .065 .142 .060 .107 .074 .045 .094 .086 .027 .061 .126 .156 .102 .121 .097 .138 .069 .108 .329  
Sad .027 .065 .073 .072 .030 .061 .094 .065 .067 .044 .066 .079 .091 .049 .070 .086 .075 .123 .089 .091 .195 
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Sample Correlations 
 Sex Indecis Pleas Fatigue Energy Cry Agitate Interest Irritate Sleep Appetite Conc Worth Suicide Critical Dislike Punish Guilt Fail Pess Sad 
Sex 1.000                     
Indecisive .275 1.000                    
Pleas .243 .208 1.000                   
Fatigue .392 .219 .182 1.000                  
Energy .236 .375 .321 .411 1.000                 
Cry .289 .254 .094 .217 .270 1.000                
Agitate .265 .259 .326 .331 .263 .385 1.000               
Interest .250 .238 .359 .253 .265 .334 .323 1.000              
Irritate .315 .233 .386 .270 .277 .355 .475 .492 1.000             
Sleep .328 .264 .174 .215 .307 .361 .245 .172 .251 1.000            
Appetite .355 .211 .220 .350 .332 .385 .364 .127 .398 .226 1.000           
Concentrate .322 .287 .285 .507 .506 .416 .389 .336 .407 .315 .406 1.000          
Worth .306 .386 .565 .253 .447 .406 .346 .356 .439 .197 .304 .432 1.000         
Suicide .061 .093 .390 .222 .290 .135 .013 .235 .306 .092 .051 .188 .415 1.000        
Critical .089 .192 .222 .180 .253 .283 .251 .360 .318 .106 .122 .357 .321 .242 1.000       
Dislike .257 .452 .446 .320 .313 .299 .337 .191 .401 .250 .255 .383 .490 .252 .285 1.000      
Punish .369 .168 .346 .343 .202 .262 .152 .314 .190 .145 .260 .274 .424 .268 .226 .315 1.000     
Guilt .257 .158 .381 .293 .210 .146 .338 .175 .354 .130 .283 .236 .444 .275 .338 .454 .332 1.000    
Fail .212 .240 .437 .117 .246 .180 .203 .104 .333 .204 .234 .298 .624 .318 .180 .247 .262 .444 1.000   
Pess .109 .185 .426 .179 .396 .232 .153 .320 .322 .077 .180 .398 .480 .402 .374 .319 .391 .226 .328 1.000  
Sad .098 .237 .285 .280 .143 .249 .409 .286 .329 .165 .251 .323 .365 .251 .282 .368 .275 .520 .350 .360 1.000 
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Residual Covariances 
 Sex Indecis Pleas Fatigue Energy Cry Agitate Interest Irritate Sleep Appetite Conc Worth Suicide Critical Dislike Punish Guilt Fail Pess Sad 
Sex .143                     
Indecis .039 .122                    
Pleas -.009 -.032 .074                   
Fatigue .076 .006 -.044 .086                  
Energy .008 .042 -.010 .000 .041                 
Cry .045 .027 -.058 .010 .015 .145                
Agitate .025 .016 .000 .033 .002 .056 .098               
Interest .014 .002 .001 .003 -.003 .035 .019 .103              
Irritate .022 -.009 -.007 -.002 -.009 .029 .044 .041 .068             
Sleep .087 .058 .002 .008 .025 .088 .039 .013 .028 .109            
Appetite  .079 .020 -.008 .024 .003 .080 .059 -.019 .050 .028 .115           
Conc .037 .017 -.027 .027 .006 .061 .037 .015 .020 .029 .025 .055          
Worth -.005 .011 .005 -.040 .005 .025 -.013 -.020 -.014 -.001 .005 -.002 .038         
Suicide -.040 -.037 .010 -.005 .003 -.018 -.054 -.009 -.002 -.010 -.036 -.023 -.002 .048        
Critical -.034 -.005 -.031 -.012 .002 .030 .008 .033 .009 -.003 -.015 .032 -.019 .000 .060       
Dislike .001 .056 .003 .007 -.007 .012 .008 -.040 .003 .029 .008 .010 -.010 -.019 -.005 .082      
Punish .061 -.025 -.005 .035 -.023 .017 -.033 .011 -.037 .005 .026 -.005 -.002 -.002 -.008 -.009 .091     
Guilt .005 -.036 -.011 .003 -.028 -.030 .012 -.040 -.004 -.007 .020 -.028 -.016 -.010 .015 .017 .002 .085    
Fail -.006 -.005 .015 -.050 -.016 -.017 -.022 -.059 -.005 .021 .009 -.005 .050 .004 -.029 -.038 -.016 .027 .118   
Pess -.044 -.026 .009 -.031 .023 -.001 -.038 .003 -.009 -.024 -.010 .025 .001 .025 .032 -.018 .028 -.041 -.004 .068  
Sad -.031 .001 -.019 .009 -.029 .009 .036 .002 .002 .009 .016 .009 -.016 -.005 .008 .006 -.002 .046 .011 -.022 .055 
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Standardized Residual Covariances 
 Sex Indecis Pleas Fatigue Energy Cry Agitate Interest Irritate Sleep Appetite Conc Worth Suicide Critical Dislike Punish Guilt Fail Pess Sad 
Sex 4.066                     
Indecisive 1.493 3.305                    
Pleas -.330 -1.126 1.946                   
Fatigue 2.932 .231 -1.571 2.369                  
Energy .375 1.840 -.416 .002 1.599                 
Cry 2.149 1.243 -2.522 .482 .835 6.125                
Agitate 1.140 .707 -.001 1.500 .129 3.106 4.020               
Interest .655 .114 .032 .151 -.160 2.021 1.052 4.543              
Irritate 1.077 -.441 -.293 -.120 -.516 1.711 2.538 2.404 3.269             
Sleep 3.406 2.216 .089 .299 1.093 4.200 1.851 .624 1.421 2.983            
Appetite 3.184 .775 -.292 .921 .152 3.886 2.824 -.908 2.535 1.085 3.412           
Concentrate 1.427 .625 -.937 .939 .233 2.820 1.668 .675 .948 1.113 .950 1.545          
Worth -.165 .358 .149 -1.350 .208 1.051 -.506 -.814 -.560 -.036 .166 -.083 .949         
Suicide -1.982 -1.785 .440 -.228 .186 -1.095 -3.195 -.522 -.109 -.495 -1.821 -1.119 -.076 2.266        
Critical -1.291 -.173 -1.112 -.446 .067 1.381 .352 1.525 .434 -.122 -.597 1.204 -.626 -.023 1.655       
Dislike .038 2.257 .107 .297 -.315 .605 .382 -1.979 .133 1.252 .334 .397 -.337 -1.025 -.197 2.896      
Punish 2.189 -.854 -.164 1.230 -.926 .718 -1.378 .481 -1.659 .185 .943 -.164 -.062 -.097 -.274 -.327 2.239     
Guilt .218 -1.486 -.403 .139 -1.363 -1.507 .594 -1.999 -.218 -.303 .885 -1.154 -.557 -.538 .627 .742 .087 3.004    
Fail -.235 -.180 .545 -2.010 -.752 -.832 -1.061 -2.854 -.237 .882 .394 -.203 1.745 .227 -1.166 -1.620 -.584 1.176 3.917   
Pess -1.639 -.923 .313 -1.116 .998 -.048 -1.682 .156 -.405 -.893 -.396 .910 .044 1.163 1.172 -.701 .954 -1.601 -.145 1.849  
Sad -1.569 .065 -.892 .461 -1.668 .549 2.137 .108 .100 .471 .852 .429 -.704 -.301 .420 .340 -.072 2.492 .582 -.975 2.769 
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Appendix G – 3-FACTOR CFA Model of BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY 
.51
Sadness
.45
Pessimism
.49
Past failure
.52
Loss of Pleasure
.54
Gulit Feelings
.36
Punishment
feelings .57
Self-dislike
.31
Self-critical
.27
Suicidal thoughts
or wishes .73
Worthlessness
.56
Concentration
difficulty
.41
Change in appetite
.23
Change in sleep
.60
Irritable
.29
Indecisive
.50
Loss of
Interest
.48
Agitation
.48
Crying
.52
Loss of energy
.48
Fatigue/Tired
.34
Loss of interest
 in sex
e1
e2
e3
e4
e5
e6
e7
e8
e9
e10
e11
e13
e12
e14
e15
e16
e17
e18
e19
e20
e21
Negative Attitude
Performance
Difficulty
Somatic
Elements
.67
.70
.74
.72
.60
.76
.56
.52
.86
.69
.70
.54
.77
.75
.72
.69
.64
.59
.48
.96
.89
.73
.69
.71
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX G                                   BECK DEPRESSION INVENTOY MODEL III                                       
ii 
The model is recursive. 
Sample size = 100 
Your model contains the following variables (residuals not shown) 
Observed, endogenous variables 
Loss of Pleasure 
Guilt Feelings 
Punishment Feelings 
Worthlessness 
Suicidal Thoughts or wishes 
Self-Critical 
Self-Dislike 
Sadness 
Pessimism 
Past Failure 
Loss of interest in Sex 
Concentration difficulty 
Change in Appetite 
Change in Sleep 
Irritated 
Indecisiveness 
Loss of Interest 
Agitation 
Crying 
Tiredness or Fatigue 
Loss of Energy 
 
Unobserved, exogenous variables 
negative attiude 
performance difficulty 
somatic elements 
Variable counts 
Number of variables in your model: 45 
Number of observed variables: 21 
Number of unobserved variables: 24 
Number of exogenous variables: 24 
Number of endogenous variables: 21 
Parameter summary 
 Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total 
Fixed 24 0 0 0 0 24 
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unlabeled 18 3 24 0 0 45 
Total 42 3 24 0 0 69 
 
Computation of degrees of freedom 
Number of distinct sample moments: 231 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 45 
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Degrees of freedom (231 - 45): 186 
Result 
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 216.952 
Degrees of freedom = 186 
Probability level = .060 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
BDI1factor 
model 45 216.952 186 .060 1.166 
Saturated 
model 231 .000 0   
Independence 
model 21 278.161 210 .001 1.325 
Zero model 0 1039.500 231 .000 4.500 
GFI 
Model GFI 
BDI1factor model .791 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence 
model .732 
Zero model .000 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model CFI 
BDI1factor 
model .546 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence 
model .000 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
BDI1factor 
model .041 .000 .062 .732 
Independence 
model .057 .037 .075 .253 
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Regression Weights: 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Pessimism <--- negative attiude .741 .126 5.899 *** 
Failure <--- negative attiude .723 .109 6.644 *** 
Guilt <--- negative attiude .744 .123 6.053 *** 
Loss Pleasure <--- performance difficulty 1.215 .319 3.808 *** 
Punish <--- negative attiude .722 .137 5.283 *** 
Self-Dislike <--- negative attiude .750 .118 6.348 *** 
Self-Critical <--- negative attiude .661 .136 4.859 *** 
Suicide <--- negative attiude .428 .096 4.453 *** 
Worthlessness <--- negative attiude 1.000    
Agitation <--- performance difficulty 1.154 .287 4.015 *** 
Loss Interest <--- performance difficulty 1.069 .275 3.885 *** 
Indecisive <--- performance difficulty 1.000    
Irritability <--- performance difficulty 1.144 .282 4.053 *** 
Concentrate <--- performance difficulty 1.376 .328 4.196 *** 
Energy <--- somatic elements 1.000    
Fatigue <--- somatic elements 1.185 .228 5.197 *** 
Appetite <--- somatic elements 1.145 .241 4.753 *** 
Sex <--- somatic elements 1.094 .259 4.230 *** 
Sleep <--- somatic elements .878 .225 3.899 *** 
Crying <--- negative attiude .734 .129 5.674 *** 
Sadness <--- negative attiude .628 .108 5.801 *** 
Standardized Regression Weights 
   Estimate 
Pessimism <--- negative attiude .670 
Failure <--- negative attiude .702 
Guilt <--- negative attiude .735 
Loss Pleasure <--- performance difficulty .722 
Punish <--- negative attiude .598 
Self-Dislike <--- negative attiude .758 
Self-Critical <--- negative attiude .557 
Suicide <--- negative attiude .515 
Worthlessness <--- negative attiude .857 
Agitation <--- performance difficulty .691 
Loss Interest <--- performance difficulty .704 
Indecisive <--- performance difficulty .537 
Irritability <--- performance difficulty .775 
Concentrate <--- performance difficulty .750 
Energy <--- somatic elements .722 
Fatigue <--- somatic elements .691 
Appetite <--- somatic elements .639 
Sex <--- somatic elements .587 
Sleep <--- somatic elements .479 
Crying <--- negative attiude .691 
Sadness <--- negative attiude .714 
APPENDIX G                                   BECK DEPRESSION INVENTOY MODEL III                                       
v 
 
 
Covariances:  
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
performance difficulty <--> somatic elements .077 .023 3.302 *** 
negative attiude <--> performance difficulty .107 .030 3.543 *** 
negative attiude <--> somatic elements .093 .024 3.932 *** 
Correlations:  
   Estimate 
performance 
difficulty <--> somatic elements .960 
negative attiude <--> performance difficulty .890 
negative attiude <--> somatic elements .734 
Variances:  
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
negative attiude   .191 .042 4.499 *** 
performance difficulty   .076 .033 2.281 .023 
somatic elements   .085 .026 3.231 .001 
e1   .072 .015 4.752 *** 
e2   .129 .025 5.151 *** 
e3   .103 .023 4.522 *** 
e4   .103 .024 4.326 *** 
e5   .090 .020 4.509 *** 
e6   .179 .033 5.495 *** 
e7   .080 .020 4.031 *** 
e8   .186 .031 5.995 *** 
e9   .097 .018 5.518 *** 
e10   .069 .016 4.368 *** 
e11   .193 .035 5.494 *** 
e13   .162 .031 5.133 *** 
e12   .112 .022 5.015 *** 
e14   .219 .038 5.818 *** 
e15   .066 .015 4.416 *** 
e16   .186 .035 5.256 *** 
e17   .088 .020 4.304 *** 
e18   .110 .021 5.232 *** 
e19   .113 .025 4.485 *** 
e20   .130 .027 4.776 *** 
e21   .078 .017 4.465 *** 
 
 
APPENDIX G                                   BECK DEPRESSION INVENTOY MODEL III                                       
vi 
 
Squared Multiple Correlations:  
 Estimate 
Energy .521 
Fatigue .478 
Cry .477 
Agitate .477 
Interest .496 
Indecisive .289 
Irritate .600 
Sleep .230 
Conc .562 
Appetite .408 
Sex .345 
Worth .735 
Suicide .266 
Critical .310 
Dislike .575 
Punish .358 
Guilt .540 
Pleas .521 
Fail .493 
Pess .449 
Sad .509 
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Sample Moments 
Sample Covariances 
 Energy Fatigue Cry Agitate Interest Indecisive Irritate Sleep Conc Appetite Sex Worth Suicide Critical Dislike Punish Guilt Pleas Fail Pess Sad 
Energy .223                    
Fatigue .113 .340                    
Cry .071 .071 .312                  
Agitate .064 .100 .111 .268                 
Interest .064 .076 .096 .086 .263                 
Indecisive .109 .079 .088 .083 .075 .380               
Irritate .061 .073 .092 .114 .117 .067 .214              
Sleep .088 .076 .122 .077 .053 .098 .070 .365             
Conc .132 .163 .128 .111 .095 .097 .104 .105 .303             
Appetite .093 .121 .128 .112 .039 .077 .110 .081 .133 .353           
Sex .070 .143 .101 .086 .080 .106 .091 .124 .111 .132 .390          
Worth .120 .083 .128 .102 .104 .135 .115 .068 .135 .102 .108 .321         
Suicide .061 .057 .033 .003 .053 .025 .063 .025 .046 .013 .017 .104 .196        
Critical .067 .059 .089 .073 .104 .066 .083 .036 .111 .041 .031 .102 .060 .316        
Dislike .079 .099 .089 .093 .052 .148 .098 .080 .112 .080 .085 .147 .059 .085 .282      
Punish .059 .123 .090 .048 .099 .063 .054 .054 .093 .095 .141 .147 .073 .078 .103 .376      
Guilt .053 .091 .044 .093 .048 .052 .087 .042 .069 .090 .086 .134 .065 .101 .129 .109 .284    
Pleas .088 .062 .031 .098 .107 .075 .104 .061 .091 .076 .088 .186 .101 .073 .138 .124 .118 .340   
Fail .067 .039 .058 .060 .031 .085 .088 .071 .094 .080 .076 .203 .081 .058 .075 .092 .136 .146 .329  
Pess .107 .060 .074 .045 .094 .065 .086 .027 .126 .061 .039 .156 .102 .121 .097 .138 .069 .142 .108 .329 
Sad .030 .072 .061 .094 .065 .065 .067 .044 .079 .066 .027 .091 .049 .070 .086 .075 .123 .073 .089 .091 .195 
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Sample Correlations 
 Energy Fatigue Cry Agitate Interest Indecisive Irritate Sleep Conc Appetite Sex Worth Suicide Critical Dislike Punish Guilt Pleas Fail Pess Sad 
Energy 1.000                     
Fatigue .411 1.000                    
Cry .270 .217 1.000                   
Agitate .263 .331 .385 1.000                  
Interest .265 .253 .334 .323 1.000                 
Indecisive .375 .219 .254 .259 .238 1.000                
Irritate .277 .270 .355 .475 .492 .233 1.000               
Sleep .307 .215 .361 .245 .172 .264 .251 1.000              
Conc .506 .507 .416 .389 .336 .287 .407 .315 1.000             
Appetite .332 .350 .385 .364 .127 .211 .398 .226 .406 1.000            
Sex .236 .392 .289 .265 .250 .275 .315 .328 .322 .355 1.000           
Worth .447 .253 .406 .346 .356 .386 .439 .197 .432 .304 .306 1.000          
Suicide .290 .222 .135 .013 .235 .093 .306 .092 .188 .051 .061 .415 1.000         
Critical .253 .180 .283 .251 .360 .192 .318 .106 .357 .122 .089 .321 .242 1.000        
Dislike .313 .320 .299 .337 .191 .452 .401 .250 .383 .255 .257 .490 .252 .285 1.000       
Punish .202 .343 .262 .152 .314 .168 .190 .145 .274 .260 .369 .424 .268 .226 .315 1.000      
Guilt .210 .293 .146 .338 .175 .158 .354 .130 .236 .283 .257 .444 .275 .338 .454 .332 1.000     
Pleas .321 .182 .094 .326 .359 .208 .386 .174 .285 .220 .243 .565 .390 .222 .446 .346 .381 1.000    
Fail .246 .117 .180 .203 .104 .240 .333 .204 .298 .234 .212 .624 .318 .180 .247 .262 .444 .437 1.000   
Pess .396 .179 .232 .153 .320 .185 .322 .077 .398 .180 .109 .480 .402 .374 .319 .391 .226 .426 .328 1.000  
Sad .143 .280 .249 .409 .286 .237 .329 .165 .323 .251 .098 .365 .251 .282 .368 .275 .520 .285 .350 .360 1.000 
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Residual Covariances  
 Energy Fatigue Cry Agitate Interest Indecisive Irritate Sleep Conc Appetite Sex Worth Suicide Critical Dislike Punish Guilt Pleas Fail Pess Sad 
Energy .061                    
Fatigue .013 .090                    
Cry .003 -.011 .097                  
Agitate -.024 -.005 .021 .057                 
Interest -.018 -.022 .012 -.007 .089                
Indecisive .032 -.012 .009 -.004 -.006 .119                
Irritate -.027 -.031 .002 .014 .024 -.020 .049               
Sleep .013 -.013 .062 -.001 -.019 .031 -.007 .080             
Conc .026 .037 .020 -.009 -.016 -.007 -.015 .012 .048             
Appetite -.004 .006 .049 .010 -.055 -.011 .009 -.004 .012 .080            
Sex -.023 .033 .026 -.011 -.010 .022 -.005 .042 -.005 .025 .096          
Worth .026 -.027 -.012 -.022 -.011 .028 -.007 -.015 -.013 -.005 .006 .061         
Suicide .021 .010 -.027 -.050 .004 -.020 .010 -.011 -.017 -.032 -.027 .022 .064         
Critical .005 -.014 -.004 -.008 .028 -.004 .002 -.018 .013 -.030 -.036 -.024 .006 .047        
Dislike .008 .016 -.016 .000 -.034 .068 .007 .019 .001 .000 .008 .004 -.002 -.010 .095      
Punish -.009 .043 -.012 -.041 .016 -.014 -.034 -.006 -.014 .018 .067 .009 .014 -.013 -.001 .098      
Guilt -.016 .009 -.061 .001 -.037 -.028 -.004 -.019 -.040 .010 .010 -.008 .004 .007 .022 .006 .089    
Pleas -.005 -.049 -.065 -.008 .009 -.017 -.001 -.021 -.035 -.031 -.014 .056 .045 -.013 .040 .030 .022 .125   
Fail -.001 -.041 -.044 -.029 -.052 .008 .000 .011 -.012 .003 .002 .065 .022 -.033 -.028 -.008 .033 .052 .126  
Pess .038 -.022 -.029 -.046 .009 -.014 -.005 -.034 .016 -.018 -.037 .014 .042 .027 -.009 .035 -.036 .046 .006 .095 
Sad -.029 .003 -.027 .016 -.007 -.003 -.010 -.007 -.014 -.001 -.037 -.028 -.002 -.009 -.004 -.012 .033 -.008 .002 .002 .048 
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Standardized Residual Covariances 
 Energy Fatigue Cry Agitate Interest Indecisive Irritate Sleep Conc Appetite Sex Worth Suicide Critical Dislike Punish Guilt Pleas Fail Pess Sad 
Energy 2.619                    
Fatigue .565 2.546                    
Cry .136 -.426 3.151                  
Agitate -1.178 -.209 .891 1.903                 
Interest -.957 -.941 .561 -.349 3.583                 
Indecisive 1.467 -.450 .366 -.174 -.245 3.185               
Irritate -1.461 -1.368 .100 .654 1.246 -.885 2.099              
Sleep .570 -.445 2.406 -.052 -.810 1.090 -.310 1.969              
Conc 1.122 1.322 .764 -.347 -.679 -.238 -.650 .416 1.335             
Appetite -.172 .212 1.925 .400 -2.318 -.377 .374 -.139 .403 2.076           
Sex -.968 1.108 .975 -.419 -.401 .744 -.219 1.396 -.171 .838 2.282          
Worth 1.158 -.978 -.425 -.820 -.445 .981 -.297 -.509 -.420 -.160 .206 1.642          
Suicide 1.349 .519 -1.479 -2.836 .268 -1.064 .659 -.538 -.884 -1.649 -1.323 1.086 3.417         
Critical .246 -.527 -.143 -.330 1.223 -.151 .087 -.639 .476 -1.061 -1.252 -.812 .307 1.231        
Dislike .447 .690 -.721 .008 -1.678 2.862 .333 .775 .058 .007 .338 .148 -.131 -.391 3.559      
Punish -.395 1.536 -.435 -1.570 .686 -.490 -1.478 -.194 -.478 .610 2.266 .311 .678 -.459 -.039 2.465      
Guilt -.857 .371 -2.625 .063 -1.815 -1.150 -.185 -.790 -1.606 .417 .378 -.297 .239 .290 .998 .229 3.182    
Pleas -.238 -1.894 -2.732 -.324 .411 -.672 -.044 -.789 -1.312 -1.152 -.511 2.085 2.527 -.516 1.807 1.132 .954 4.112   
Fail -.049 -1.710 -1.875 -1.272 -2.517 .319 -.009 .454 -.492 .104 .082 2.404 1.237 -1.311 -1.283 -.290 1.465 2.266 4.392  
Pess 1.828 -.865 -1.183 -1.910 .426 -.530 -.237 -1.283 .613 -.675 -1.341 .501 2.223 1.010 -.391 1.283 -1.508 1.878 .228 2.863 
Sad -1.730 .130 -1.327 .839 -.394 -.123 -.548 -.350 -.641 -.052 -1.697 -1.231 -.143 -.427 -.191 -.540 1.723 -.418 .105 .115 2.271 
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The model is recursive. 
Sample size = 100 
Variable Summary 
Your model contains the following variables (residuals not shown) 
Observed, endogenous variables 
SDMT  Symbol Digit Modalities test 
Digits  Digit Span task 
AVLT7  Delayed recall AVLT 
SMTrecall Delayed recall Sentence Memory Test 
HAYTime Hayling tests Time b minus Time A 
ErrA  A Type Errors Hayling test 
ErrB  B Type Errors Hayling tests 
Brixton  Brixton test errors 
LNS  letter Number Sequencing tests 
 
Unobserved, exogenous variables 
IP  Information processing 
MEM  Memory 
EF  Executive Function 
Variable counts (including residuals) 
Number of variables in your model: 21 
Number of observed variables: 9 
Number of unobserved variables: 12 
Number of exogenous variables: 12 
Number of endogenous variables: 9 
Parameter summary  
 Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total 
Fixed 12 0 0 0 0 12 
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unlabeled 6 3 12 0 0 21 
Total 18 3 12 0 0 33 
Computation of degrees of freedom 
Number of distinct sample moments: 45 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 21 
Degrees of freedom (45 - 21): 24 
Result 
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 33.772 
Degrees of freedom = 24 
Probability level = .089 
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Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 21 33.772 24 .089 1.407 
Saturated model 45 .000 0   
Independence model 9 89.223 36 .000 2.478 
Zero model 0 445.500 45 .000 9.900 
GFI 
Model GFI 
Default model .924 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .800 
Zero model .000 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model CFI 
Default model .816 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .000 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .064 .000 .111 .300 
Independence model .122 .091 .154 .000 
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Regression Weights: 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
SDMT <--- IP 1.000    
Digits <--- IP .158 .039 4.085 *** 
AVLT7 <--- MEM 1.000    
SMTrecall <--- MEM .630 .179 3.531 *** 
HAYTime <--- EF 1.000    
ErrA <--- EF .028 .005 5.240 *** 
ErrB <--- EF .054 .010 5.544 *** 
Brixton <--- EF .058 .021 2.769 .006 
LNS <--- IP .237 .049 4.802 *** 
Standardized Regression Weights: 
   Estimate 
SDMT <--- IP .695 
Digits <--- IP .589 
AVLT7 <--- MEM .949 
SMTrecall <--- MEM .550 
HAYTime <--- EF .694 
ErrA <--- EF .709 
ErrB <--- EF .785 
Brixton <--- EF .351 
LNS <--- IP .763 
Covariances: 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
F1 <--> F2 15.491 4.416 3.508 *** 
F2 <--> F3 53.700 17.146 3.132 .002 
F1 <--> F3 140.246 51.528 2.722 .006 
Correlations: 
   Estimate 
F1 <--> F2 .632 
F2 <--> F3 .505 
F1 <--> F3 .539 
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Variances: 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
F1   59.935 19.763 3.033 .002 
F2   10.022 2.896 3.461 *** 
F3   1129.420 356.787 3.166 .002 
e1   64.134 14.458 4.436 *** 
e2   2.800 .527 5.311 *** 
e4   1.118 2.304 .485 .628 
e5   9.208 1.685 5.464 *** 
e7   1217.204 244.584 4.977 *** 
e8   .852 .180 4.745 *** 
e9   2.062 .591 3.492 *** 
e6   26.820 4.363 6.147 *** 
e3   2.400 .662 3.627 *** 
Squared Multiple Correlations: 
   Estimate 
LNS   .583 
Brixton   .123 
ErrB   .616 
ErrA   .503 
HAYTime   .481 
SMTrecall   .302 
AVLT7   .900 
Digits   .347 
SDMT   .483 
 
Sample Moments 
Sample Covariances 
 LNS Brixton ErrB ErrA HAYTime SMTrecall AVLT7 Digits SDMT 
LNS 6.545         
Brixton 3.141 38.735        
ErrB .751 3.402 6.054       
ErrA .870 2.092 1.759 1.905      
HAYTime 13.867 99.076 77.538 35.509 2838.428     
SMTrecall 2.690 6.441 .917 1.889 47.646 16.462    
AVLT7 4.617 8.723 2.068 1.949 55.838 8.511 13.608   
Digits 2.550 1.372 .990 .460 15.780 1.979 2.170 4.540  
SDMT 14.555 29.043 8.959 6.160 254.354 15.103 22.784 7.570 152.365 
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Sample Correlations 
 LNS Brixton ErrB ErrA HAYTime SMTrecall AVLT7 Digits SDMT 
LNS 1.000         
Brixton .197 1.000        
ErrB .119 .222 1.000       
ErrA .246 .244 .518 1.000      
HAYTime .102 .299 .591 .483 1.000     
SMTrecall .259 .255 .092 .337 .220 1.000    
AVLT7 .489 .380 .228 .383 .284 .569 1.000   
Digits .468 .103 .189 .156 .139 .229 .276 1.000  
SDMT .461 .378 .295 .362 .387 .302 .500 .288 1.000 
 
Matrices 
Residual Covariances 
 LNS Brixton ErrB ErrA HAYTime SMTrecall AVLT7 Digits SDMT 
LNS .791         
Brixton 1.226 8.153        
ErrB -1.043 -.123 .689       
ErrA -.046 .293 .072 .192      
HAYTime -19.310 33.890 16.458 4.326 491.804     
SMTrecall .380 4.487 -.914 .955 13.790 3.270    
AVLT7 .952 5.623 -.836 .466 2.137 2.193 2.468   
Digits .315 .096 -.206 -.150 -6.327 .439 -.272 .250  
SDMT .377 20.949 1.374 2.288 114.107 5.337 7.293 -1.877 28.296 
Standardized Residual Covariances 
 LNS Brixton ErrB ErrA HAYTime SMTrecall AVLT7 Digits SDMT 
LNS .967         
Brixton .910 1.876        
ErrB -1.777 -.092 .903       
ErrA -.140 .391 .208 .789      
HAYTime -1.590 1.223 1.282 .609 1.475     
SMTrecall .419 2.212 -1.057 1.961 .766 1.744    
AVLT7 1.076 2.990 -1.007 1.005 .125 1.596 1.559   
Digits .576 .083 -.414 -.538 -.613 .569 -.369 .411  
SDMT .124 3.355 .508 1.509 2.036 1.276 1.802 -.749 1.605 
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The model is recursive. 
Sample size = 100 
Variable Summary 
Your model contains the following variables (residuals not shown) 
Observed, endogenous variables 
SDMT  Symbol Digit Modalities test 
Digits  Digit Span task 
AVLT7  Delayed recall AVLT 
SMTrecall Delayed recall Sentence Memory Test 
HAYTime Hayling tests Time b minus Time A 
ErrA  A Type Errors Hayling test 
ErrB  B Type Errors Hayling tests 
Brixton  Brixton test errors 
LNS  letter Number Sequencing tests 
 
Unobserved, exogenous variables 
IP  Information processing 
WM  Working Memory 
MEM  Memory 
EF  Executive Function 
Variable counts 
Number of variables in your model: 22 
Number of observed variables: 9 
Number of unobserved variables: 13 
Number of exogenous variables: 13 
Number of endogenous variables: 9 
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Parameter summary 
 Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total 
Fixed 13 0 1 0 0 14 
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unlabeled 5 6 12 0 0 23 
Total 18 6 13 0 0 37 
Computation of degrees of freedom 
Number of distinct sample moments: 45 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 23 
Degrees of freedom (45 - 23): 22 
Result (Default model) 
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 24.370 
Degrees of freedom = 22 
Probability level = .328 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 23 24.370 22 .328 1.108 
Saturated model 45 .000 0   
Independence model 9 89.223 36 .000 2.478 
Zero model 0 445.500 45 .000 9.900 
GFI 
Model GFI 
Default model .945 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .800 
Zero model .000 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model CFI 
Default model .955 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .000 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .033 .000 .093 .617 
Independence model .122 .091 .154 .000 
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Regression Weights: 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
AVLT7 <--- DR 1.000    
SMTrecall <--- DR .641 .166 3.869 *** 
HAYTime <--- EF 1.000    
ErrA <--- EF .024 .004 5.947 *** 
ErrB <--- EF .047 .007 6.465 *** 
SDMT <--- IP 1.000    
Brixton <--- EF .066 .018 3.766 *** 
LNS <--- WM 1.000    
Digits <--- WM .597 .158 3.786 *** 
Standardized Regression Weights: 
   Estimate 
AVLT7 <--- DR .943 
SMTrecall <--- DR .565 
HAYTime <--- EF .755 
ErrA <--- EF .717 
ErrB <--- EF .782 
SDMT <--- IP .883 
Brixton <--- EF .452 
LNS <--- WM .850 
Digits <--- WM .591 
Covariances: 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
DR <--> EF 68.120 18.288 3.725 *** 
DR <--> IP 18.436 4.921 3.746 *** 
EF <--> IP 256.490 64.940 3.950 *** 
IP <--> WM 12.978 3.357 3.866 *** 
DR <--> WM 3.712 .993 3.738 *** 
EF <--> WM 26.096 11.290 2.312 .021 
Correlations:  
   Estimate 
DR <--> EF .534 
DR <--> IP .546 
EF <--> IP .621 
IP <--> WM .595 
DR <--> WM .552 
EF <--> WM .317 
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Variances: 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
DR   10.421 2.801 3.720 *** 
EF   1558.838 399.950 3.898 *** 
IP   109.490 21.053 5.201 *** 
WM   4.341 1.296 3.350 *** 
e1   30.781    
e2   2.881 .559 5.150 *** 
e3   1.295 2.159 .600 .549 
e4   9.131 1.668 5.475 *** 
e6   1174.297 250.143 4.695 *** 
e7   .860 .174 4.939 *** 
e8   2.174 .554 3.921 *** 
e5   26.817 4.410 6.081 *** 
e9   1.665 .993 1.678 .093 
Squared Multiple Correlations: 
   Estimate 
LNS   .723 
Brixton   .204 
Digits   .349 
SDMT   .781 
ErrB   .611 
ErrA   .514 
HAYTime   .570 
SMTrecall   .319 
AVLT7   .889 
Sample Moments 
Sample Covariances  
 LNS Brixton Digits SDMT ErrB ErrA HAYTime SMTrecall AVLT7 
LNS 6.545         
Brixton 3.141 38.735        
Digits 2.550 1.372 4.540       
SDMT 14.555 29.043 7.570 152.365      
ErrB .751 3.402 .990 8.959 6.054     
ErrA .870 2.092 .460 6.160 1.759 1.905    
HAYTime 13.867 99.076 15.780 254.354 77.538 35.509 2838.428   
SMTrecall 2.690 6.441 1.979 15.103 .917 1.889 47.646 16.462  
AVLT7 4.617 8.723 2.170 22.784 2.068 1.949 55.838 8.511 13.608 
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Sample Correlations 
 LNS Brixton Digits SDMT ErrB ErrA HAYTime SMTrecall AVLT7 
LNS 1.000         
Brixton .197 1.000        
Digits .468 .103 1.000       
SDMT .461 .378 .288 1.000      
ErrB .119 .222 .189 .295 1.000     
ErrA .246 .244 .156 .362 .518 1.000    
HAYTime .102 .299 .139 .387 .591 .483 1.000   
SMTrecall .259 .255 .229 .302 .092 .337 .220 1.000  
AVLT7 .489 .380 .276 .500 .228 .383 .284 .569 1.000 
Matrices  
Residual Covariances 
 LNS Brixton Digits SDMT ErrB ErrA HAYTime SMTrecall AVLT7 
LNS .539         
Brixton 1.406 5.029        
Digits -.039 .338 .114       
SDMT 1.577 11.992 -.172 12.095      
ErrB -.471 -1.449 .261 -3.049 .464     
ErrA .240 -.409 .084 -.032 -.003 .136    
HAYTime -12.230 -4.553 .213 -2.137 4.560 -2.123 105.293   
SMTrecall .310 3.538 .559 3.282 -1.128 .835 3.969 3.047  
AVLT7 .904 4.194 -.045 4.347 -1.121 .304 -12.283 1.829 1.891 
Standardized Residual Covariances 
 LNS Brixton Digits SDMT ErrB ErrA HAYTime SMTrecall AVLT7 
LNS .631         
Brixton .976 1.050        
Digits -.068 .274 .182       
SDMT .493 1.684 -.065 .607      
ErrB -.791 -.990 .517 -.996 .583     
ErrA .719 -.502 .297 -.019 -.008 .542    
HAYTime -.931 -.141 .019 -.032 .316 -.267 .271   
SMTrecall .332 1.640 .710 .726 -1.261 1.667 .201 1.598  
AVLT7 .981 2.048 -.059 .971 -1.282 .625 -.638 1.281 1.135 
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The model is recursive. 
Sample size = 100 
Variable Summary (residuals not shown) 
Observed, endogenous variables 
MFQOverall  Overall how is your Memory 
sixtoten   Memory compared to 6-10 years ago 
onetofive  Memory compared to 1-5 years ago 
FWRnovel5  Forgetting while reading a book/novel - opening chapters 
FWRnovel4  Forgetting while reading a book/novel - chapter before 
FFbeginning  Beginning to do something and forgetting what 
FFdirect  Forgetting directions 
FFput   Forgetting where you put things 
FFfaces   Forgetting faces 
FFnames  Forgetting names 
Unobserved, exogenous variables 
GFF-10   General Frequency of Forgetting 
Variable counts (including residuals) 
Number of variables in your model: 21 
Number of observed variables: 10 
Number of unobserved variables: 11 
Number of exogenous variables: 11 
Number of endogenous variables: 10 
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Parameter summary 
 Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total 
Fixed 11 0 0 0 0 11 
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unlabeled 9 3 11 0 0 23 
Total 20 3 11 0 0 34 
Computation of degrees of freedom 
Number of distinct sample moments: 55 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 23 
Degrees of freedom (55 - 23): 32 
Result 
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 50.744 
Degrees of freedom = 32 
Probability level = .019 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
MFQ model 1 23 50.744 32 .019 1.586 
Saturated model 55 .000 0   
Independence model 10 138.949 45 .000 3.088 
Zero model 0 495.000 55 .000 9.000 
GFI 
Model GFI 
MFQ model 1 .897 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .719 
Zero model .000 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model CFI 
MFQ model 1 .800 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .000 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
MFQ model 1 .077 .032 .115 .136 
Independence model .145 .118 .173 .000 
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Regression Weights: 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
onetofive <--- GFF-10 1.019 .190 5.357 *** 
FWRnovel5 <--- GFF-10 1.293 .203 6.378 *** 
FWRnovel4 <--- GFF-10 1.282 .201 6.372 *** 
FFbeginning <--- GFF-10 1.164 .192 6.053 *** 
FFdirect <--- GFF-10 1.200 .194 6.189 *** 
FFput <--- GFF-10 1.008 .169 5.947 *** 
FFfaces <--- GFF-10 .653 .156 4.177 *** 
FFnames <--- GFF-10 .864 .162 5.346 *** 
MFQOverall <--- GFF-10 1.000    
sixtoten <--- GFF-10 .871 .221 3.949 *** 
Standardized Regression Weights: 
   Estimate 
onetofive <--- GFF-10 .698 
FWRnovel5 <--- GFF-10 .678 
FWRnovel4 <--- GFF-10 .691 
FFbeginning <--- GFF-10 .628 
FFdirect <--- GFF-10 .716 
FFput <--- GFF-10 .686 
FFfaces <--- GFF-10 .438 
FFnames <--- GFF-10 .612 
MFQOverall <--- GFF-10 .798 
sixtoten <--- GFF-10 .527 
Residual Covariances: 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
e2 <--> e1 .556 .156 3.566 *** 
e23 <--> e22 1.218 .248 4.901 *** 
e32 <--> e31 .692 .220 3.145 .002 
 
Residual Correlations: 
   Estimate 
e2 <--> e1 .466 
e23 <--> e22 .811 
e32 <--> e31 .591 
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Variances: 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
GFF-10   .798 .185 4.315 *** 
e33   .455 .097 4.706 *** 
e32   1.570 .322 4.881 *** 
e31   .873 .199 4.378 *** 
e23   1.571 .274 5.732 *** 
e22   1.436 .264 5.450 *** 
e15   1.658 .281 5.901 *** 
e6   1.092 .217 5.025 *** 
e4   .910 .179 5.076 *** 
e2   1.437 .223 6.438 *** 
e1   .992 .183 5.419 *** 
Squared Multiple Correlations 
   Estimate 
FFnames   .375 
FFfaces   .191 
FFput   .471 
FFdirect   .513 
FFbeginning   .395 
FWRnovel4   .477 
FWRnovel5   .459 
onetofive   .487 
sixtoten   .278 
MFQOverall   .637 
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Sample Covariances 
 FFnames FFfaces FFput FFdirect FFbeginning FWRnovel4 FWRnovel5 onetofive sixtoten MFQOverall 
FFnames 1.932          
FFfaces .977 1.941         
FFput .728 .481 2.104        
FFdirect .511 .461 .877 2.577       
FFbeginning .962 .503 1.122 .897 3.030      
FWRnovel4 .531 .804 1.056 1.289 .971 3.075     
FWRnovel5 .684 .780 1.192 1.149 1.125 2.767 3.103    
onetofive .860 .394 .386 1.264 .612 1.051 .975 2.278   
sixtoten .750 .271 -.006 1.271 .498 .700 .613 2.122 3.228  
MFQOverall .702 .678 .794 .868 1.049 1.043 1.044 .643 .592 1.330 
Sample Correlations 
 FFnames FFfaces FFput FFdirect FFbeginning FWRnovel4 FWRnovel5 onetofive sixtoten MFQOverall 
FFnames 1.000          
FFfaces .505 1.000         
FFput .361 .238 1.000        
FFdirect .229 .206 .376 1.000       
FFbeginning .398 .207 .444 .321 1.000      
FWRnovel4 .218 .329 .415 .458 .318 1.000     
FWRnovel5 .279 .318 .467 .406 .367 .896 1.000    
onetofive .410 .188 .176 .522 .233 .397 .367 1.000   
sixtoten .301 .108 -.002 .441 .159 .222 .194 .783 1.000  
MFQOverall .438 .422 .475 .469 .523 .516 .514 .370 .286 1.000 
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Matrices 
Residual Covariances 
 FFnames FFfaces FFput FFdirect FFbeginning FWRnovel4 FWRnovel5 onetofive sixtoten MFQOverall 
FFnames .343          
FFfaces -.029 .163         
FFput .033 -.044 .383        
FFdirect -.317 -.164 -.088 .336       
FFbeginning .160 -.104 .186 -.217 .291      
FWRnovel4 -.353 .136 .025 .061 -.220 .328     
FWRnovel5 -.208 .106 .152 -.088 -.075 .226 .198    
onetofive .157 -.136 -.433 .288 -.334 .009 -.076 .577   
sixtoten .150 -.183 -.706 .438 -.311 -.191 -.286 .722 1.052  
MFQOverall .013 .157 -.010 -.089 .120 .020 .012 -.169 -.103 .077 
Standardized Residual Covariances 
 FFnames FFfaces FFput FFdirect FFbeginning FWRnovel4 FWRnovel5 onetofive sixtoten MFQOverall 
FFnames 1.522          
FFfaces -.147 .647         
FFput .182 -.238 1.566        
FFdirect -1.529 -.782 -.401 1.056       
FFbeginning .711 -.450 .783 -.796 .747      
FWRnovel4 -1.548 .586 .104 .220 -.731 .839     
FWRnovel5 -.889 .447 .615 -.310 -.245 .593 .480    
onetofive .876 -.746 -2.274 1.316 -1.410 .038 -.307 2.387   
sixtoten .764 -.904 -3.414 1.844 -1.203 -.729 -1.065 3.021 3.401  
MFQOverall .082 .990 -.058 -.461 .579 .096 .056 -1.009 -.573 .435 
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The model is recursive. 
Sample size = 100 
Observed, endogenous variables 
MFQOverall  Overall how is your Memory? 
sixtoten   Remembering things from 6-10 years ago 
onetofive  Remembering things from 1-5 years ago 
FWRnovel5  Forgetting while reading a book/novel - paragraph before 
FWRnovel4  Forgetting while reading a book/novel - sentence before 
FFbeginning  Beginning to do something and forgetting what 
FFdirect  Forgetting directions 
FFput   Forgetting where you put things 
FFfaces   Forgetting faces 
FFnames  Forgetting names 
 
Unobserved, exogenous variables 
RF   Retrospective Functioning 
FWR   Forgetting While Reading 
FF   Frequency of Forgetting 
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Variable counts (including residuals) 
Number of variables in your model: 23 
Number of observed variables: 10 
Number of unobserved variables: 13 
Number of exogenous variables: 13 
Number of endogenous variables: 10 
Parameter summary 
 Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total 
Fixed 13 0 0 0 0 13 
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unlabeled 7 3 13 0 0 23 
Total 20 3 13 0 0 36 
Computation of degrees of freedom  
Number of distinct sample moments: 55 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 23 
Degrees of freedom (55 - 23): 32 
Result  
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 59.906 
Degrees of freedom = 32 
Probability level = .002 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 23 59.906 32 .002 1.872 
Saturated model 55 .000 0   
Independence model 10 138.949 45 .000 3.088 
Zero model 0 495.000 55 .000 9.000 
GFI 
Model GFI 
Default model .879 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .719 
Zero model .000 
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Baseline Comparisons 
Model CFI 
Default model .703 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .000 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .094 .056 .130 .032 
Independence model .145 .118 .173 .000 
 
Regression Weights: 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
FWRnovel5 <--- FWR 1.000    
FWRnovel4 <--- FWR .976 .074 13.117 *** 
FFbeginning <--- FF 1.183 .193 6.136 *** 
FFdirect <--- FF 1.089 .187 5.827 *** 
FFput <--- FF 1.040 .171 6.079 *** 
FFfaces <--- FF .850 .163 5.205 *** 
sixtoten <--- RF 1.000    
onetofive <--- RF 1.266 .227 5.577 *** 
FFnames <--- FF 1.042 .173 6.009 *** 
MFQOverall <--- FF 1.000    
Standardized Regression Weights:  
   Estimate 
FWRnovel5 <--- FWR .944 
FWRnovel4 <--- FWR .952 
FFbeginning <--- FF .633 
FFdirect <--- FF .686 
FFput <--- FF .692 
FFfaces <--- FF .607 
sixtoten <--- RF .710 
onetofive <--- RF .995 
FFnames <--- FF .765 
MFQOverall <--- FF .788 
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Covariances: 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
FWR <--> FF .962 .214 4.493 *** 
FWR <--> RF .924 .282 3.281 .001 
FF <--> RF .558 .181 3.090 .002 
Correlations: 
   Estimate 
FWR <--> FF .675 
FWR <--> RF .569 
FF <--> RF .621 
Variances: 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
FWR   2.580 .451 5.717 *** 
FF   .788 .183 4.303 *** 
RF   1.023 .357 2.870 .004 
e2   .316 .158 2.002 .045 
e1   .254 .150 1.687 .092 
e10   .479 .095 5.027 *** 
e7   1.649 .281 5.875 *** 
e6   1.051 .217 4.839 *** 
e5   .925 .180 5.142 *** 
e4   .976 .186 5.249 *** 
e3   .605 .156 3.875 *** 
e9   1.008 .235 4.298 *** 
e8   .018 .241 .075 .940 
 
Squared Multiple Correlations: 
   Estimate 
onetofive   .989 
sixtoten   .504 
FFnames   .586 
FFfaces   .368 
FFput   .479 
FFdirect   .471 
FFbeginning   .401 
MFQOverall   .622 
FWRnovel4   .906 
FWRnovel5   .891 
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Sample Moments 
Sample Covariances 
 onetofive sixtoten FFnames FFfaces FFput FFdirect FFbeginning MFQOverall FWRnovel4 FWRnovel5 
onetofive 2.278          
sixtoten 2.122 3.228         
FFnames .860 .750 1.932        
FFfaces .394 .271 .977 1.941       
FFput .386 -.006 .728 .481 2.104      
FFdirect 1.264 1.271 .511 .461 .877 2.577     
FFbeginning .612 .498 .962 .503 1.122 .897 3.030    
MFQOverall .643 .592 .702 .678 .794 .868 1.049 1.330   
FWRnovel4 1.051 .700 .531 .804 1.056 1.289 .971 1.043 3.075  
FWRnovel5 .975 .613 .684 .780 1.192 1.149 1.125 1.044 2.767 3.103 
 
Sample Correlations 
 onetofive sixtoten FFnames FFfaces FFput FFdirect FFbeginning MFQOverall FWRnovel4 FWRnovel5 
onetofive 1.000          
sixtoten .783 1.000         
FFnames .410 .301 1.000        
FFfaces .188 .108 .505 1.000       
FFput .176 -.002 .361 .238 1.000      
FFdirect .522 .441 .229 .206 .376 1.000     
FFbeginning .233 .159 .398 .207 .444 .321 1.000    
MFQOverall .370 .286 .438 .422 .475 .469 .523 1.000   
FWRnovel4 .397 .222 .218 .329 .415 .458 .318 .516 1.000  
FWRnovel5 .367 .194 .279 .318 .467 .406 .367 .514 .896 1.000 
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Matrices 
Residual Covariances 
 onetofive sixtoten FFnames FFfaces FFput FFdirect FFbeginning MFQOverall FWRnovel4 FWRnovel5 
onetofive .619          
sixtoten .827 1.196         
FFnames .123 .169 .471        
FFfaces -.206 -.204 .280 .396       
FFput -.349 -.586 -.126 -.215 .327      
FFdirect .494 .664 -.384 -.268 -.015 .592     
FFbeginning -.224 -.162 -.009 -.289 .153 -.118 .279    
MFQOverall -.063 .034 -.119 .009 -.025 .010 .117 .063   
FWRnovel4 -.091 -.201 -.447 .006 .080 .267 -.139 .105 .365  
FWRnovel5 -.195 -.311 -.319 -.037 .192 .102 -.012 .082 .249 .207 
Standardized Residual Covariances 
 onetofive sixtoten FFnames FFfaces FFput FFdirect FFbeginning MFQOverall FWRnovel4 FWRnovel5 
onetofive 2.624          
sixtoten 3.660 4.142         
FFnames .712 .925 2.269        
FFfaces -1.199 -1.104 1.679 1.805       
FFput -1.859 -2.934 -.688 -1.189 1.296      
FFdirect 2.495 3.148 -1.984 -1.407 -.073 2.097     
FFbeginning -.970 -.656 -.041 -1.302 .631 -.460 .713    
MFQOverall -.390 .199 -.744 .056 -.144 .055 .559 .349   
FWRnovel4 -.375 -.797 -2.008 .028 .332 1.047 -.470 .502 .947  
FWRnovel5 -.782 -1.193 -1.387 -.163 .771 .388 -.040 .381 .657 .503 
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Appendix L 10 ITEM GENERAL FREQUENCY OF FORGETTING 
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The model is recursive. 
Sample size = 100 
Variable Summary (residuals not shown) 
Observed, endogenous variables 
 
ErrA    A type Errors, Hayling Test 
ErrB   B type errors, Hayling Test 
TimeHAY  Hayling Time  
ErrBRIX  Errors Brixton Test 
Cog/Affect  BDI-II Cognitive Affective Factor 
Somatic BDI-II Somatic Factor  
FWR  Forgetting While Reading 
AVLT7  Auditory Verbal Learning Test, delayed recall. 
SMTrecall  Sentence Memory Test recall 
FF  Frequency of Forgetting factor score 
RF  Retrospective Function factor score 
FWR  Forgetting while Reading factor score 
 
Unobserved, endogenous variables 
 
Mood 
Metamemory 
 
Unobserved, exogenous variables 
 
Executive Function 
Memory 
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Variable counts (including residuals) 
Number of variables in your model: 28 
Number of observed variables: 11 
Number of unobserved variables: 17 
Number of exogenous variables: 15 
Number of endogenous variables: 13 
Parameter summary (Group number 1) 
 Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total 
Fixed 17 0 1 0 0 18 
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unlabeled 11 1 14 0 0 26 
Total 28 1 15 0 0 44 
Computation of degrees of freedom 
Number of distinct sample moments: 66 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 26 
Degrees of freedom (66 - 26): 40 
Result 
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 49.035 
Degrees of freedom = 40 
Probability level = .155 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 26 49.035 40 .155 1.226 
Saturated model 66 .000 0   
Independence model 11 128.082 55 .000 2.329 
Zero model 0 544.500 66 .000 8.250 
GFI 
Model GFI 
Default model .910 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .765 
Zero model .000 
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Baseline Comparisons 
Model CFI 
Default model .876 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .000 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .048 .000 .088 .503 
Independence model .116 .090 .142 .000 
 
Regression Weights 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Mood <--- Executive Function -.004 .002 -1.703 .089 
MM <--- Mood -.452 .170 -2.661 .008 
MM <--- Memory -.009 .067 -.126 .899 
MM <--- Executive Function .003 .004 .776 .438 
SMTrecall <--- Executive Function .025 .006 4.451 *** 
AVLT7 <--- Executive Function .046 .009 5.215 *** 
FWR <--- Executive Function 1.000    
RF <--- Executive Function .063 .021 3.036 .002 
FF <--- Mood 1.000    
Somatic <--- Mood 1.493 .217 6.876 *** 
Cog/Affect <--- MM 1.000    
ErrBRIX <--- MM .607 .195 3.112 .002 
TimeHAY <--- MM 1.166 .288 4.045 *** 
ErrB <--- Memory 1.000    
ErrA <--- Memory .763 .305 2.504 .012 
Standardized Regression Weights 
   Estimate 
Mood <--- Executive Function -.281 
MM <--- Mood -.408 
MM <--- Memory -.037 
MM <--- Executive Function .191 
SMTrecall <--- Executive Function .735 
AVLT7 <--- Executive Function .769 
FWR <--- Executive Function .769 
RF <--- Executive Function .445 
FF <--- Mood .595 
Somatic <--- Mood .992 
Cog/Affect <--- MM .718 
ErrBRIX <--- MM .442 
TimeHAY <--- MM .764 
ErrB <--- Memory .794 
ErrA <--- Memory .618 
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Covariances 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Executive Function <--> Memory 65.507 21.814 3.003 .003 
Correlations 
   Estimate 
Executive Function <--> Memory .647 
Variances 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Executive Function   1563.621 459.660 3.402 *** 
Memory   6.565 2.621 2.505 .012 
d2   .261 .087 3.020 .003 
d1   .268 .099 2.701 .007 
e9   .010    
e1   .801 .174 4.612 *** 
e2   2.333 .555 4.200 *** 
e3   1079.951 264.782 4.079 *** 
e4   25.018 4.298 5.821 *** 
e8   .518 .075 6.897 *** 
e5   .328 .088 3.722 *** 
e6   .532 .092 5.797 *** 
e7   .338 .116 2.915 .004 
e1o   3.856 2.061 1.871 .061 
e11   6.179 1.628 3.796 *** 
Squared Multiple Correlations 
   Estimate 
Mood   .079 
MM   .233 
SMTrecall   .382 
AVLT7   .630 
FWR   .584 
RF   .195 
FF   .516 
Somatic   .984 
Cog/Affect   .354 
ErrBRIX   .198 
TimeHAY   .591 
ErrB   .591 
ErrA   .541 
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Sample Moments 
Sample Covariances  
 SMTrecall AVLT7 FWR RF FF Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
SMTrecall 16.462           
AVLT7 8.511 13.608          
FWR .413 -.015 .935         
RF 1.358 .456 .289 .869        
FF .572 .089 .501 .332 .806       
Somatic .459 .230 -.226 -.083 -.185 .774      
Cog/Affect .414 .341 -.158 -.074 -.156 .516 .881     
ErrBRIX 6.441 8.723 .394 1.132 1.154 -.775 -.459 38.735    
TimeHAY 40.196 52.428 14.229 4.149 10.639 -6.606 -6.363 90.076 2838.428   
ErrB .917 2.068 .234 .058 .105 -.533 -.372 3.402 74.968 6.054  
ErrA 1.889 1.949 .079 .128 .125 -.274 -.150 2.092 32.689 1.759 1.905 
Sample Correlations 
 SMTrecall AVLT7 FWR RF FF Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
SMTrecall 1.000           
AVLT7 .569 1.000          
FWR .105 -.004 1.000         
RF .359 .133 .321 1.000        
FF .157 .027 .578 .397 1.000       
Somatic .129 .071 -.266 -.102 -.234 1.000      
Cog/Affect .109 .098 -.174 -.085 -.185 .625 1.000     
ErrBRIX .255 .380 .065 .195 .206 -.142 -.079 1.000    
TimeHAY .186 .267 .276 .084 .222 -.141 -.127 .272 1.000   
ErrB .092 .228 .098 .025 .048 -.246 -.161 .222 .572 1.000  
ErrA .337 .383 .059 .099 .101 -.226 -.116 .244 .445 .518 1.000 
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Residual Covariances 
 SMTrecall AVLT7 FWR RF FF Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
SMTrecall 6.465           
AVLT7 3.504 3.186          
FWR .196 -.299 .121         
RF 1.245 .308 .041 .208        
FF .386 -.155 .094 .120 .128       
Somatic .742 .601 .023 .046 .029 .132      
Cog/Affect .603 .589 .009 .013 -.012 .093 .079     
ErrBRIX 3.301 4.605 -.090 .880 .739 -.219 -.087 7.539    
TimeHAY -9.759 -13.080 6.535 .142 4.041 2.233 -.441 -8.209 194.855   
ErrB -1.402 -.973 -.123 -.128 -.201 -.123 -.098 -1.160 2.381 .352  
ErrA .662 .339 -.110 .029 -.037 -.057 -.004 -.322 -5.724 -.024 .161 
Standardized Residual Covariances  
 SMTrecall AVLT7 FWR RF FF Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
SMTrecall 4.550           
AVLT7 3.067 2.151          
FWR .681 -1.017 1.043         
RF 4.818 1.165 .532 2.217        
FF 1.470 -.576 1.098 1.694 1.329       
Somatic 2.895 2.287 .297 .695 .413 1.442      
Cog/Affect 2.116 2.020 .108 .174 -.165 1.109 .697     
ErrBRIX 1.831 2.477 -.176 1.925 1.593 -.484 -.172 1.700    
TimeHAY -.571 -.729 1.383 .034 .938 .527 -.095 -.269 .519   
ErrB -1.767 -1.168 -.560 -.654 -1.006 -.624 -.450 -.819 .166 .435  
ErrA 1.514 .741 -.906 .271 -.333 -.526 -.036 -.413 -.730 -.067 .647 
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APPENDIX M - FORGETTING WHILE READING STRUCTURAL MODEL 
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Title: Forgetting While Reading 
The model is recursive. 
Sample size = 100 
Variable Summary (residuals not shown) 
Observed, endogenous variables 
ErrA    A type Errors, Hayling Test 
ErrB   B type errors, Hayling Test 
TimeHAY  Hayling Time 
ErrBRIX  Errors Brixton Test 
Cog/Affect  BDI-II Cognitive Affective Factor 
Somatic  BDI-II Somatic Factor 
FWR  Forgetting While Reading 
AVLT7  Auditory Verbal Learning Test, delayed recall. 
SMTrecall  Sentence Memory Test recall 
 
Unobserved, endogenous variables 
Mood 
Metamemory 
 
Unobserved, exogenous variables 
Executive function 
Memory 
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Variable counts (including residuals) 
Number of variables in your model: 24 
Number of observed variables: 9 
Number of unobserved variables: 15 
Number of exogenous variables: 13 
Number of endogenous variables: 11 
Parameter summary 
 Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total 
Fixed 15 0 2 0 0 17 
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unlabeled 9 1 11 0 0 21 
Total 24 1 13 0 0 38 
Computation of degrees of freedom 
Number of distinct sample moments: 45 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 21 
Degrees of freedom (45 - 21): 24 
Result (Default model) 
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 36.125 
Degrees of freedom = 24 
Probability level = .053 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 21 36.125 24 .053 1.505 
Saturated model 45 .000 0   
Independence model 9 101.000 36 .000 2.806 
Zero model 0 445.500 45 .000 9.900 
GFI 
Model GFI 
Default model .919 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .773 
Zero model .000 
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Baseline Comparisons 
Model CFI 
Default model .813 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .000 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .071 .000 .117 .219 
Independence model .135 .104 .167 .000 
Regression Weights 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Mood <--- Executive function -.227 .125 -1.821 .069 
MM <--- Executive function .167 .190 .880 .379 
MM <--- Mood -.327 .131 -2.492 .013 
MM <--- Memory -.027 .072 -.369 .712 
ErrA <--- Executive function 1.000    
ErrB <--- Executive function 1.854 .393 4.720 *** 
TimeHAY <--- Executive function 39.512 9.321 4.239 *** 
ErrBRIX <--- Executive function 2.548 .885 2.878 .004 
Cog/Affect <--- Mood 1.000    
Somatic <--- Mood .664 .098 6.800 *** 
FWR <--- MM 1.000    
AVLT7 <--- Memory 1.000    
SMTrecall <--- Memory .755 .296 2.549 .011 
Standardized Regression Weights 
   Estimate 
Mood <--- Executive function -.282 
MM <--- Executive function .203 
MM <--- Mood -.320 
MM <--- Memory -.088 
ErrA <--- Executive function .742 
ErrB <--- Executive function .761 
TimeHAY <--- Executive function .757 
ErrBRIX <--- Executive function .434 
Cog/Affect <--- Mood .992 
Somatic <--- Mood .590 
FWR <--- MM .899 
AVLT7 <--- Memory .828 
SMTrecall <--- Memory .588 
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Covariances 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Executive function <--> Memory 1.676 .660 2.540 .011 
Correlations 
   Estimate 
Executive function <--> Memory .633 
Variances 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Executive function   .967 .308 3.139 .002 
Memory   7.240 2.779 2.605 .009 
d2   .580 .095 6.104 *** 
d1   .555 .115 4.833 *** 
e6   .010    
e5   .156    
e1   .789 .177 4.467 *** 
e2   2.423 .558 4.340 *** 
e3   1126.006 263.154 4.279 *** 
e4   27.131 4.487 6.046 *** 
e7   .522 .075 6.918 *** 
e8   3.322 2.266 1.466 .143 
e9   7.799 1.809 4.311 *** 
Squared Multiple Correlations 
   Estimate 
Mood   .079 
MM   .156 
SMTrecall   .346 
AVLT7   .685 
FWR   .808 
Cog/Affect   .348 
Somatic   .984 
ErrBRIX   .188 
TimeHAY   .573 
ErrB   .579 
ErrA   .551 
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Sample Moments 
Sample Covariances  
 SMTrecall AVLT7 FWR Cog/Affect Somatic ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
SMTrecall 16.462         
AVLT7 8.511 13.608        
FWR .340 -.240 .967       
Cog/Affect .414 .341 -.151 .881      
Somatic .459 .230 -.209 .516 .774     
ErrBRIX 6.441 8.723 .265 -.459 -.775 38.735    
TimeHAY 40.196 52.428 14.889 -6.363 -6.606 90.076 2838.428   
ErrB .917 2.068 .319 -.372 -.533 3.402 74.968 6.054  
ErrA 1.889 1.949 .085 -.150 -.274 2.092 32.689 1.759 1.905 
Sample Correlations 
 SMTrecall AVLT7 FWR Cog/Affect Somatic ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
SMTrecall 1.000         
AVLT7 .569 1.000        
FWR .085 -.066 1.000       
Cog/Affect .109 .098 -.163 1.000      
Somatic .129 .071 -.242 .625 1.000     
ErrBRIX .255 .380 .043 -.079 -.142 1.000    
TimeHAY .186 .267 .284 -.127 -.141 .272 1.000   
ErrB .092 .228 .132 -.161 -.246 .222 .572 1.000  
ErrA .337 .383 .063 -.116 -.226 .244 .445 .518 1.000 
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Residual Covariances  
 SMTrecall AVLT7 FWR Cog/Affect Somatic ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
SMTrecall 4.533         
AVLT7 3.044 3.046        
FWR .179 -.453 .153       
Cog/Affect .605 .594 .004 .082      
Somatic .747 .611 .023 .098 .134     
ErrBRIX 3.217 4.453 -.217 -.087 -.215 5.323    
TimeHAY -9.803 -13.781 7.407 -.597 2.075 -7.309 202.397   
ErrB -1.430 -1.039 -.032 -.102 -.126 -1.168 4.100 .305  
ErrA .624 .273 -.104 -.004 -.055 -.372 -5.529 -.035 .149 
Standardized Residual Covariances  
 SMTrecall AVLT7 FWR Cog/Affect Somatic ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
SMTrecall 2.674         
AVLT7 2.426 2.029        
FWR .571 -1.533 1.327       
Cog/Affect 1.946 2.025 .049 .721      
Somatic 2.675 2.314 .308 1.178 1.472     
ErrBRIX 1.583 2.300 -.413 -.167 -.459 1.121    
TimeHAY -.529 -.764 1.571 -.128 .492 -.233 .540   
ErrB -1.653 -1.233 -.145 -.469 -.637 -.796 .287 .374  
ErrA 1.307 .587 -.855 -.032 -.501 -.460 -.705 -.095 .595 
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APPENDIX N - JUDGMENT OF LEARNING STRUCTURAL MODEL 
 
Executive Function
.55
ErrA
e1
.74
.60
ErrB
e2
.77
.50
TimeHAY
e3
.70
.21
ErrBRIX
e4
.45
Mood
.52
Cog/Affect
e8
.72
.78
Somatic
e9
.89
Memory
.78
AVLT7e10
.88
.42
SMTe11
.64
.57 .18
Pre-delay JoL
d2
-.42
.54
-.33
.56
Delayed JoL
.15
-.85
.06
d3
.14
-.32
.39
 
The model is recursive. 
Sample size = 100 
Variable Summary (residuals not shown) 
Observed, endogenous variables 
 
ErrA    A type Errors, Hayling Test 
ErrB   B type errors, Hayling Test 
TimeHAY  Hayling Time 
ErrBRIX  Errors Brixton Test 
Cog/Affect  BDI-II Cognitive Affective Factor 
Somatic  BDI-II Somatic Factor  
AVLT7  Auditory Verbal Learning Test, delayed recall. 
SMTrecall  Sentence Memory Test recall 
Pre-delay JoL Trail 5 JoL 
Delayed JoL Trial 7 JoL 
 
Unobserved, exogenous variables 
 
Executive Function 
Mood 
Memory 
Variable counts (including residuals) 
Number of variables in your model: 23 
Number of observed variables: 10 
Number of unobserved variables: 13 
Number of exogenous variables: 13 
Number of endogenous variables: 10 
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Parameter summary 
 Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total 
Fixed 13 0 0 0 0 13 
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unlabeled 12 3 13 0 0 28 
Total 25 3 13 0 0 41 
Computation of degrees of freedom 
Number of distinct sample moments: 55 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 28 
Degrees of freedom (55 - 28): 27 
Result  
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 30.972 
Degrees of freedom = 27 
Probability level = .272 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 28 30.972 27 .272 1.147 
Saturated model 55 .000 0   
Independence model 10 123.170 45 .000 2.737 
Zero model 0 495.000 55 .000 9.000 
GFI 
Model GFI 
Default model .937 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .751 
Zero model .000 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model CFI 
Default model .949 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .000 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .039 .000 .091 .588 
Independence model .132 .105 .161 .000 
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Regression Weights 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Pre-delay JoL <--- Executive Function -.026 .016 -1.613 .107 
Pre-delay JoL <--- Memory .401 .188 2.133 .033 
Pre-delay JoL <--- Mood -1.096 .541 -2.028 .043 
ErrA <--- Executive Function .027 .006 4.727 *** 
ErrB <--- Executive Function .049 .008 5.922 *** 
TimeHAY <--- Executive Function 1.000    
ErrBRIX <--- Executive Function .071 .025 2.831 .005 
Cog/Affect <--- Mood 1.000    
Somatic <--- Mood 1.136 .322 3.525 *** 
AVLT7 <--- Memory 1.000    
SMTrecall <--- Memory .771 .162 4.747 *** 
Delayed JoL <--- Executive Function .010 .014 .666 .505 
Delayed JoL <--- Memory -.678 .200 -3.384 *** 
Delayed JoL <--- Mood .218 .521 .419 .676 
Delayed JoL <--- Pre-delay JoL .419 .120 3.508 *** 
Standardized Regression Weights 
   Estimate 
Pre-delay JoL <--- Executive Function -.420 
Pre-delay JoL <--- Memory .542 
Pre-delay JoL <--- Mood -.329 
ErrA <--- Executive Function .740 
ErrB <--- Executive Function .774 
TimeHAY <--- Executive Function .705 
ErrBRIX <--- Executive Function .453 
Cog/Affect <--- Mood .722 
Somatic <--- Mood .885 
AVLT7 <--- Memory .884 
SMTrecall <--- Memory .645 
Delayed JoL <--- Executive Function .145 
Delayed JoL <--- Memory -.846 
Delayed JoL <--- Mood .060 
Delayed JoL <--- Pre-delay JoL .387 
Covariances 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Executive Function <--> Memory 64.105 19.527 3.283 .001 
Mood <--> Memory .283 .288 .984 .325 
Executive Function <--> Mood -7.963 3.463 -2.300 .021 
Correlations 
   Estimate 
Executive Function <--> Memory .575 
Mood <--> Memory .139 
Executive Function <--> Mood -.322 
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Variances 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Executive Function   1356.077 412.914 3.284 .001 
Mood   .451 .163 2.764 .006 
Memory   9.180 2.330 3.940 *** 
d2   4.127 .801 5.151 *** 
e1   .806 .175 4.606 *** 
e2   2.223 .569 3.910 *** 
e3   1374.618 272.190 5.050 *** 
e4   26.160 4.371 5.985 *** 
e8   .415 .128 3.247 .001 
e9   .161 .150 1.072 .284 
e1o   2.570 1.201 2.140 .032 
e11   7.666 1.405 5.456 *** 
d3   2.610 .690 3.781 *** 
Squared Multiple Correlations 
   Estimate 
Pre-delay JoL   .178 
Delayed JoL   .557 
SMTrecall   .416 
AVLT7   .781 
Somatic   .784 
Cog/Affect   .521 
ErrBRIX   .205 
TimeHAY   .497 
ErrB   .598 
ErrA   .548 
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Sample Moments 
Sample Covariances  
 Pre-delay JoL Delayed JoL SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
Pre-delay JoL 5.780          
Delayed JoL 1.526 6.870         
SMTrecall 2.494 -3.570 16.462        
AVLT7 .999 -6.115 8.511 13.608       
Somatic -.094 -.157 .459 .230 .774      
Cog/Affect -.286 -.353 .414 .341 .516 .881     
ErrBRIX -1.374 -4.149 6.441 8.723 -.775 -.459 38.735    
TimeHAY -4.381 -24.365 40.196 52.428 -6.606 -6.363 90.076 2838.428   
ErrB .143 -1.008 .917 2.068 -.533 -.372 3.402 74.968 6.054  
ErrA .071 -1.131 1.889 1.949 -.274 -.150 2.092 32.689 1.759 1.905 
Sample Correlations  
 Pre-delay JoL Delayed JoL SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
Pre-delay JoL 1.000          
Delayed JoL .242 1.000         
SMTrecall .256 -.336 1.000        
AVLT7 .113 -.632 .569 1.000       
Somatic -.044 -.068 .129 .071 1.000      
Cog/Affect -.127 -.144 .109 .098 .625 1.000     
ErrBRIX -.092 -.254 .255 .380 -.142 -.079 1.000    
TimeHAY -.034 -.174 .186 .267 -.141 -.127 .272 1.000   
ErrB .024 -.156 .092 .228 -.246 -.161 .222 .572 1.000  
ErrA .022 -.313 .337 .383 -.226 -.116 .244 .445 .518 1.000 
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Residual Covariances 
 Pre-delay JoL Delayed JoL SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
Pre-delay JoL .757          
Delayed JoL .635 .980         
SMTrecall 1.160 .146 3.345        
AVLT7 -.732 -1.293 1.438 1.858       
Somatic .108 .121 .212 -.091 .030      
Cog/Affect -.108 -.109 .196 .058 .004 .015     
ErrBRIX -1.356 -1.869 2.956 4.200 -.137 .103 5.824    
TimeHAY -4.126 7.947 -9.200 -11.677 2.439 1.600 -5.607 107.733   
ErrB .156 .589 -1.524 -1.100 -.086 .021 -1.326 7.961 .521  
ErrA .078 -.264 .564 .229 -.032 .064 -.475 -3.692 -.039 .123 
Standardized Residual Covariances  
 Pre-delay JoL Delayed JoL SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
Pre-delay JoL 1.061          
Delayed JoL 1.146 1.171         
SMTrecall 1.403 .152 1.794        
AVLT7 -.925 -1.339 1.001 1.112       
Somatic .552 .569 .672 -.306 .288      
Cog/Affect -.515 -.478 .577 .179 .038 .124     
ErrBRIX -1.050 -1.318 1.396 2.071 -.273 .191 1.245    
TimeHAY -.351 .604 -.468 -.611 .528 .323 -.177 .278   
ErrB .294 .988 -1.711 -1.263 -.413 .094 -.922 .566 .662  
ErrA .260 -.784 1.120 .466 -.267 .504 -.585 -.467 -.107 .487 
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APPENDIX O  JUDGMENT OF LEARNING STRUCTURAL MODEL, INCLUDING 
INFORMATION PROCESSING 
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TimeHAY
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The model is recursive. 
Sample size = 100 
Variable Summary (residuals not shown) 
Observed, endogenous variables 
 
ErrA    A type Errors, Hayling Test 
ErrB   B type errors, Hayling Test 
TimeHAY  Hayling Time 
ErrBRIX  Errors Brixton Test 
AVLT7  Auditory Verbal Learning Test, delayed recall. 
SMTrecall  Sentence Memory Test recall 
Pre-delay JoL Trail 5 JoL 
Delayed JoL Trial 7 JoL 
 
Unobserved, exogenous variables 
 
Executive Function 
Memory 
Info Process 
 
Variable counts (residuals included) 
Number of variables in your model: 21 
Number of observed variables: 9 
Number of unobserved variables: 12 
Number of exogenous variables: 12 
Number of endogenous variables: 9 
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Parameter summary 
 Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total 
Fixed 12 0 1 0 0 13 
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unlabeled 8 3 11 0 0 22 
Total 20 3 12 0 0 35 
Computation of degrees of freedom 
Number of distinct sample moments: 45 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 22 
Degrees of freedom (45 - 22): 23 
Result 
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 32.547 
Degrees of freedom = 23 
Probability level = .089 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 22 32.547 23 .089 1.415 
Saturated model 45 .000 0   
Independence model 9 109.160 36 .000 3.032 
Zero model 0 445.500 45 .000 9.900 
GFI 
Model GFI 
Default model .927 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .755 
Zero model .000 
 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model CFI 
Default model .870 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .000 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .065 .000 .112 .295 
Independence model .143 .113 .174 .000 
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Regression Weights 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
ErrA <--- Executive Function .024 .005 4.730 *** 
ErrB <--- Executive Function .050 .009 5.666 *** 
TimeHAY <--- Executive Function 1.000    
ErrBRIX <--- Executive Function .066 .025 2.673 .008 
AVLT7 <--- Memory 1.000    
SMTrecall <--- Memory .536 .158 3.389 *** 
Delayed JoL <--- Pre-delay JoL .354 .091 3.894 *** 
SDMT <--- Info Process 1.000    
Delayed JoL <--- Info Process .087 .034 2.547 .011 
Delayed JoL <--- Memory -.621 .178 -3.484 *** 
Delayed JoL <--- Executive Function -.009 .009 -1.000 .317 
Standardized Regression Weights 
   Estimate 
ErrA <--- Executive Function .703 
ErrB <--- Executive Function .791 
TimeHAY <--- Executive Function .720 
ErrBRIX <--- Executive Function .438 
AVLT7 <--- Memory .945 
SMTrecall <--- Memory .502 
Delayed JoL <--- Pre-delay JoL .302 
SDMT <--- Info Process .892 
Delayed JoL <--- Info Process .359 
Delayed JoL <--- Memory -.770 
Delayed JoL <--- Executive Function -.139 
Covariances 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Executive Function <--> Memory 61.675 22.387 2.755 .006 
Memory <--> Info Process 16.991 5.817 2.921 .003 
Executive Function <--> Info Process 241.058 74.659 3.229 .001 
Correlations 
   Estimate 
Executive Function <--> Memory .523 
Memory <--> Info Process .521 
Executive Function <--> Info Process .616 
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Variances 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Executive Function   1415.741 405.309 3.493 *** 
Memory   9.816 2.486 3.949 *** 
Info Process   108.163 23.311 4.640 *** 
d2   4.622 .740 6.247 *** 
e5   27.703    
e1   .869 .176 4.930 *** 
e2   2.151 .613 3.509 *** 
e3   1317.625 266.547 4.943 *** 
e4   25.677 4.343 5.913 *** 
e1o   1.182 1.673 .706 .480 
e11   8.369 1.448 5.781 *** 
d3   2.583 .773 3.341 *** 
Squared Multiple Correlations 
   Estimate 
Pre-delay JoL   .000 
SDMT   .796 
Delayed JoL   .595 
SMTrecall   .252 
AVLT7   .893 
ErrBRIX   .192 
TimeHAY   .518 
ErrB   .626 
ErrA   .494 
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Sample Moments  
Sample Covariances  
 Pre-delay JoL SDMT Delayed JoL SMTrecall AVLT7 ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
Pre-delay JoL 5.780         
SDMT 1.021 152.365        
Delayed JoL 1.526 -5.371 6.870       
SMTrecall 2.494 15.103 -3.570 16.462      
AVLT7 .999 22.784 -6.115 8.511 13.608     
ErrBRIX -1.374 29.043 -4.149 6.441 8.723 38.735    
TimeHAY -4.381 257.314 -24.365 40.196 52.428 90.076 2838.428   
ErrB .143 8.959 -1.008 .917 2.068 3.402 74.968 6.054  
ErrA .071 6.160 -1.131 1.889 1.949 2.092 32.689 1.759 1.905 
Sample Correlations 
 Pre-delay JoL SDMT Delayed JoL SMTrecall AVLT7 ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
Pre-delay JoL 1.000         
SDMT .034 1.000        
Delayed JoL .242 -.166 1.000       
SMTrecall .256 .302 -.336 1.000      
AVLT7 .113 .500 -.632 .569 1.000     
ErrBRIX -.092 .378 -.254 .255 .380 1.000    
TimeHAY -.034 .391 -.174 .186 .267 .272 1.000   
ErrB .024 .295 -.156 .092 .228 .222 .572 1.000  
ErrA .022 .362 -.313 .337 .383 .244 .445 .518 1.000 
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Residual Covariances 
 Pre-delay JoL SDMT Delayed JoL SMTrecall AVLT7 ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
Pre-delay JoL 1.158         
SDMT 1.021 16.500        
Delayed JoL -.112 -2.003 .495       
SMTrecall 2.494 5.996 -.789 5.272      
AVLT7 .999 5.792 -.927 3.250 2.610     
ErrBRIX -1.374 13.233 -2.149 4.273 4.678 6.968    
TimeHAY -4.381 16.256 6.127 7.139 -9.248 -2.779 105.061   
ErrB .143 -3.199 .530 -.751 -1.043 -1.281 3.566 .302  
ErrA .071 .256 -.384 1.080 .438 -.182 -1.985 .010 .187 
Standardized Residual Covariances 
 Pre-delay JoL SDMT Delayed JoL SMTrecall AVLT7 ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
Pre-delay JoL 1.762         
SDMT .406 .854        
Delayed JoL -.196 -.673 .546       
SMTrecall 3.451 1.490 -.883 3.315      
AVLT7 1.394 1.365 -.936 2.634 1.669     
ErrBRIX -1.128 1.948 -1.488 2.240 2.434 1.543    
TimeHAY -.388 .247 .450 .399 -.500 -.089 .270   
ErrB .276 -1.044 .844 -.911 -1.215 -.891 .246 .369  
ErrA .252 .156 -1.127 2.410 .947 -.234 -.257 .028 .766 
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APPENDIX P - RETROSPECTIVE CONFIDENCE STRUCTURAL MODEL CALIBRATION 
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The model is recursive. 
Sample size = 100 
Variable Summary (residuals not shown) 
Observed, endogenous variables. 
 
ErrA    A type Errors, Hayling Test 
ErrB   B type errors, Hayling Test 
TimeHAY  Hayling Time (complex minus simple) 
ErrBRIX   Errors Brixton Test 
Cog/Affect  BDI-II Cognitive Affective Factor  
Somatic  BDI-II Somatic Factor 
AVLT7  Auditory Verbal Learning Test, delayed recall. 
SMTrecall  Sentence Memory Test recall 
RCJ accuracy % High RCJ correct 
RCJ inaccuracy % Low RCJ correct 
 
Unobserved, exogenous variables 
 
Executive Function 
Mood 
Memory 
Variable counts (including residuals) 
Number of variables in your model: 23 
Number of observed variables: 10 
Number of unobserved variables: 13 
Number of exogenous variables: 13 
Number of endogenous variables: 10 
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Parameter summary 
 Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total 
Fixed 13 0 0 0 0 13 
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unlabeled 11 3 13 0 0 27 
Total 24 3 13 0 0 40 
Computation of degrees of freedom 
Number of distinct sample moments: 55 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 27 
Degrees of freedom (55 - 27): 28 
Result 
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 30.433 
Degrees of freedom = 28 
Probability level = .343 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 27 30.433 28 .343 1.087 
Saturated model 55 .000 0   
Independence model 10 103.002 45 .000 2.289 
Zero model 0 495.000 55 .000 9.000 
GFI 
Model GFI 
Default model .939 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .792 
Zero model .000 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model CFI 
Default model .958 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .000 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .030 .000 .085 .665 
Independence model .114 .085 .143 .000 
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Regression Weights 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
ErrA <--- Executive Function .028 .006 4.454 *** 
ErrB <--- Executive Function .050 .009 5.521 *** 
TimeHAY <--- Executive Function 1.000    
ErrBRIX <--- Executive Function .065 .028 2.347 .019 
Cog/Affect <--- Mood 1.000    
Somatic <--- Mood 1.380 .487 2.834 .005 
AVLT7 <--- Memory 1.000    
SMTrecall <--- Memory 1.240 .267 4.647 *** 
RCJ accuracy <--- Executive Function -.089 .108 -.820 .412 
RCJ accuracy <--- Memory 6.155 1.925 3.198 .001 
RCJ inaccuracy <--- Executive Function .030 .075 .401 .688 
RCJ inaccuracy <--- Memory .295 1.025 .288 .773 
RCJ accuracy <--- Mood -2.884 4.083 -.707 .480 
RCJ inaccuracy <--- Mood 1.562 2.855 .547 .584 
Standardized Regression Weights 
   Estimate 
ErrA <--- Executive Function .745 
ErrB <--- Executive Function .766 
TimeHAY <--- Executive Function .686 
ErrBRIX <--- Executive Function .408 
Cog/Affect <--- Mood .657 
Somatic <--- Mood .971 
AVLT7 <--- Memory .705 
SMTrecall <--- Memory .800 
RCJ accuracy <--- Executive Function -.165 
RCJ accuracy <--- Memory .780 
RCJ inaccuracy <--- Executive Function .089 
RCJ inaccuracy <--- Memory .059 
RCJ accuracy <--- Mood -.093 
RCJ inaccuracy <--- Mood .080 
Covariances 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Executive Function <--> Memory 49.097 21.666 2.266 .023 
Mood <--> Memory .232 .220 1.054 .292 
Executive Function <--> Mood -6.474 3.457 -1.873 .061 
Correlations 
   Estimate 
Executive Function <--> Memory .585 
Mood <--> Memory .159 
Executive Function <--> Mood -.302 
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Variances 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Executive Function   1235.489 412.629 2.994 .003 
Mood   .373 .164 2.268 .023 
Memory   5.707 2.169 2.631 .009 
e1   .801 .179 4.464 *** 
e2   2.152 .566 3.801 *** 
e3   1387.902 270.750 5.126 *** 
e4   26.113 4.383 5.958 *** 
e8   .490 .138 3.539 *** 
e9   .044 .227 .192 .848 
e1o   5.789 1.188 4.872 *** 
e11   4.942 1.430 3.456 *** 
d2   191.777 43.404 4.418 *** 
d3   138.183 20.681 6.682 *** 
 
Squared Multiple Correlations 
   Estimate 
RCJ inaccuracy   .021 
RCJ accuracy   .461 
SMTrecall   .640 
AVLT7   .496 
Somatic   .942 
Cog/Affect   .432 
ErrBRIX   .166 
TimeHAY   .471 
ErrB   .586 
ErrA   .556 
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Sample Moments 
Sample Covariances  
 RCJ inaccuracy RCJ accuracy SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
RCJ inaccuracy 156.234          
RCJ accuracy 19.500 445.718         
SMTrecall 7.424 53.973 16.462        
AVLT7 6.796 36.302 8.511 13.608       
Somatic .920 1.205 .459 .230 .774      
Cog/Affect -.310 1.799 .414 .341 .516 .881     
ErrBRIX 2.256 37.982 6.441 8.723 -.775 -.459 38.735    
TimeHAY 50.986 93.808 40.196 52.428 -6.606 -6.363 90.076 2838.428   
ErrB -1.020 1.419 .917 2.068 -.533 -.372 3.402 74.968 6.054  
ErrA 2.358 6.992 1.889 1.949 -.274 -.150 2.092 32.689 1.759 1.905 
Sample Correlations 
 RCJ inaccuracy RCJ accuracy SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
RCJ inaccuracy 1.000          
RCJ accuracy .074 1.000         
SMTrecall .146 .630 1.000        
AVLT7 .147 .466 .569 1.000       
Somatic .084 .065 .129 .071 1.000      
Cog/Affect -.026 .091 .109 .098 .625 1.000     
ErrBRIX .029 .289 .255 .380 -.142 -.079 1.000    
TimeHAY .077 .083 .186 .267 -.141 -.127 .272 1.000   
ErrB -.033 .027 .092 .228 -.246 -.161 .222 .572 1.000  
ErrA .137 .240 .337 .383 -.226 -.116 .244 .445 .518 1.000 
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Residual Covariances 
 RCJ inaccuracy RCJ accuracy SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
RCJ inaccuracy 15.058          
RCJ accuracy 2.838 90.105         
SMTrecall 3.062 16.657 2.748        
AVLT7 3.278 6.204 1.436 2.112       
Somatic .289 -.071 .063 -.089 .020      
Cog/Affect -.767 .874 .127 .109 .002 .019     
ErrBRIX -.434 24.261 2.487 5.533 -.194 -.038 7.407    
TimeHAY 9.576 -117.389 -20.676 3.330 2.330 .112 9.810 215.037   
ErrB -3.079 -9.079 -2.109 -.373 -.089 -.051 -.588 13.553 .849  
ErrA 1.179 .980 .157 .551 -.020 .034 -.193 -2.483 .010 .103 
Standardized Residual Covariances  
 RCJ inaccuracy RCJ accuracy SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
RCJ inaccuracy .750          
RCJ accuracy .126 1.783         
SMTrecall .689 2.093 1.410        
AVLT7 .807 .874 .991 1.293       
Somatic .279 -.043 .194 -.300 .187      
Cog/Affect -.691 .496 .366 .344 .019 .153     
ErrBRIX -.065 2.268 1.172 2.861 -.395 -.073 1.663    
TimeHAY .156 -1.181 -1.033 .184 .511 .023 .328 .577   
ErrB -1.127 -2.040 -2.339 -.457 -.436 -.235 -.437 1.021 1.148  
ErrA .734 .375 .296 1.151 -.166 .272 -.244 -.320 .030 .402 
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APPENDIX Q - RETROSPECTIVE CONFIDENCE STRUCTURAL MODEL RESOLUTION 
 
Executive Function
.55
ErrA
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e3
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.16
ErrBRIX
e4
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.44
Cog/Affect
e8
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.93
Somatic
e9
.96
Memory
.54
AVLT7e10
.74
.60
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.59
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-.23
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-.11
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.16
-.30
 
The model is recursive. 
Sample size = 100 
Variable Summary (residuals not shown) 
Observed, endogenous variables 
ErrA    A type Errors, Hayling Test 
ErrB   B type errors, Hayling Test 
TimeHAY  Hayling Time 
ErrBRIX  Errors Brixton Test 
Cog/Affect  BDI-II Cognitive Affective Factor 
Somatic  BDI-II Somatic Facto 
AVLT7  Auditory Verbal Learning Test, delayed recall. 
SMTrecall  Sentence Memory Test recall 
RCJgamma Retrospective Confidence Judgment gamma correlation 
 
Unobserved, exogenous variables 
Executive Function 
Mood 
Memory 
Variable counts (including residuals) 
Number of variables in your model: 21 
Number of observed variables: 9 
Number of unobserved variables: 12 
Number of exogenous variables: 12 
Number of endogenous variables: 9 
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Parameter summary 
 Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total 
Fixed 12 0 0 0 0 12 
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unlabeled 8 3 12 0 0 23 
Total 20 3 12 0 0 35 
Computation of degrees of freedom 
Number of distinct sample moments: 45 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 23 
Degrees of freedom (45 - 23): 22 
Result  
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 27.975 
Degrees of freedom = 22 
Probability level = .177 
 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 23 27.975 22 .177 1.272 
Saturated model 45 .000 0   
Independence model 9 98.641 36 .000 2.740 
Zero model 0 445.500 45 .000 9.900 
GFI 
Model GFI 
Default model .937 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .779 
Zero model .000 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model CFI 
Default model .905 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .000 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .052 .000 .104 .436 
Independence model .133 .102 .164 .000 
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Regression Weights 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
ErrA <--- Executive Function .028 .006 4.591 *** par_1 
ErrB <--- Executive Function .050 .009 5.720 *** par_2 
TimeHAY <--- Executive Function 1.000     
ErrBRIX <--- Executive Function .065 .026 2.547 .011 par_3 
Cog/Affect <--- Mood 1.000     
Somatic  <--- Mood 1.363 .496 2.748 .006 par_4 
AVLT7 <--- Memory 1.000     
SMTrecall <--- Memory 1.147 .301 3.803 *** par_5 
RCJgamma <--- Executive Function -.001 .001 -.962 .336 par_7 
RCJgamma <--- Memory .037 .020 1.823 .068 par_8 
RCJgamma <--- Mood -.034 .047 -.722 .471 par_9 
Standardized Regression Weights 
   Estimate 
ErrA <--- Executive Function .741 
ErrB <--- Executive Function .764 
TimeHAY <--- Executive Function .691 
ErrBRIX <--- Executive Function .405 
Cog/Affect <--- Mood .663 
Somatic  <--- Mood .965 
AVLT7 <--- Memory .737 
SMTrecall <--- Memory .773 
RCJgamma <--- Executive Function -.233 
RCJgamma <--- Memory .499 
RCJgamma <--- Mood -.114 
Covariances 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Executive Function <--> Memory 52.698 22.478 2.344 .019 
Mood <--> Memory .243 .233 1.046 .296 
Executive Function <--> Mood -6.590 3.511 -1.877 .061 
Correlations 
   Estimate 
Executive Function <--> Memory .594 
Mood <--> Memory .160 
Executive Function <--> Mood -.301 
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Variances 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Executive Function   1273.485 413.033 3.083 .002 
Mood   .377 .171 2.208 .027 
Memory   6.172 2.428 2.542 .011 
e1   .822 .180 4.567 *** 
e2   2.231 .571 3.909 *** 
e3   1390.342 273.267 5.088 *** 
e4   27.503 4.475 6.146 *** 
e8   .482 .141 3.413 *** 
e9   .052 .229 .226 .821 
e1o   5.184 1.414 3.666 *** 
e11   5.483 1.759 3.117 .002 
d3   .029 .005 5.630 *** 
Squared Multiple Correlations: 
   Estimate 
RCJgamma   .144 
SMTrecall   .597 
AVLT7   .544 
Somatic    .931 
Cog/Affect   .439 
ErrBRIX   .164 
TimeHAY   .478 
ErrB   .583 
ErrA   .549 
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Sample Moments 
Sample Covariances 
 RCJgamma SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic  Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
RCJgamma .039         
SMTrecall .272 16.462        
AVLT7 .100 8.511 13.608       
Somatic  .005 .459 .230 .774      
Cog/Affect .023 .414 .341 .516 .881     
ErrBRIX .058 6.441 8.723 -.775 -.459 38.735    
TimeHAY -.148 40.196 52.428 -6.606 -6.363 90.076 2838.428   
ErrB .008 .917 2.068 -.533 -.372 3.402 74.968 6.054  
ErrA .009 1.889 1.949 -.274 -.150 2.092 32.689 1.759 1.905 
Sample Correlations 
 RCJgamma SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic  Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
RCJgamma 1.000         
SMTrecall .341 1.000        
AVLT7 .138 .569 1.000       
Somatic  .030 .129 .071 1.000      
Cog/Affect .123 .109 .098 .625 1.000     
ErrBRIX .047 .255 .380 -.142 -.079 1.000    
TimeHAY -.014 .186 .267 -.141 -.127 .272 1.000   
ErrB .016 .092 .228 -.246 -.161 .222 .572 1.000  
ErrA .035 .337 .383 -.226 -.116 .244 .445 .518 1.000 
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Residual Covariances 
 RCJgamma SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic  Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
RCJgamma .005         
SMTrecall .093 2.864        
AVLT7 -.056 1.434 2.252       
Somatic  .000 .079 -.102 .021      
Cog/Affect .019 .135 .097 .003 .023     
ErrBRIX .016 2.503 5.288 -.189 -.029 5.823    
TimeHAY -.787 -20.230 -.270 2.378 .228 7.077 174.601   
ErrB -.024 -2.075 -.541 -.088 -.046 -.707 11.919 .702  
ErrA -.009 .196 .471 -.022 .035 -.234 -3.011 -.009 .083 
Standardized Residual Covariances 
 RCJgamma SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic  Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
RCJgamma 1.066         
SMTrecall 1.329 1.482        
AVLT7 -.877 .998 1.395       
Somatic  -.025 .244 -.344 .200      
Cog/Affect 1.091 .392 .310 .026 .187     
ErrBRIX .152 1.157 2.680 -.376 -.055 1.245    
TimeHAY -.827 -1.008 -.015 .518 .047 .229 .461   
ErrB -.563 -2.284 -.655 -.427 -.212 -.506 .878 .922  
ErrA -.343 .370 .980 -.186 .275 -.288 -.383 -.024 .319 
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The model is recursive. 
Sample size = 100 
Variable Summary 
 
Observed, endogenous variables 
ErrA    A type Errors, Hayling Test 
ErrB   B type errors, Hayling Test 
TimeHAY  Hayling Time 
ErrBRIX  Errors Brixton Test 
Cog/Affect  BDI-II Cognitive Affective Factor  
Somatic  BDI-II Somatic Factor  
AVLT7  Auditory Verbal Learning Test, delayed recall. 
SMTrecall  Sentence Memory Test recall 
FoK accuracy % High FoK correct 
FoK inaccuracy % Low FoK correct 
 
Unobserved, endogenous variables 
Info Process 
 
Unobserved, exogenous variables 
Executive Function 
Mood 
Memory 
Variable counts 
Number of variables in your model: 23 
Number of observed variables: 10 
Number of unobserved variables: 13 
Number of exogenous variables: 13 
Number of endogenous variables: 10 
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Parameter summary 
 Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total 
Fixed 13 0 0 0 0 13 
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unlabeled 11 3 13 0 0 27 
Total 24 3 13 0 0 40 
Computation of degrees of freedom 
Number of distinct sample moments: 55 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 27 
Degrees of freedom (55 - 27): 28 
Result 
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 35.482 
Degrees of freedom = 28 
Probability level = .156 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 27 35.482 28 .156 1.267 
Saturated model 55 .000 0   
Independence model 10 109.856 45 .000 2.441 
Zero model 0 495.000 55 .000 9.000 
RMR, GFI 
Model GFI 
Default model .928 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .778 
Zero model .000 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model CFI 
Default model .885 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .000 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .052 .000 .099 .442 
Independence model .121 .092 .149 .000 
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Regression Weights 
 
 
Standardized Regression Weights 
   Estimate 
ErrA <--- Executive Function .719 
ErrB <--- Executive Function .821 
TimeHAY <--- Executive Function .682 
ErrBRIX <--- Executive Function .376 
Cog/Affect <--- Mood .776 
Somatic <--- Mood .847 
AVLT7 <--- Memory .712 
SMTrecall <--- Memory .782 
FoK accuracy <--- Executive Function -.041 
FoK accuracy <--- Memory .505 
FoK accuracy <--- Mood .073 
FoK inaccuracy <--- Executive Function -.496 
FoK inaccuracy <--- Memory .670 
FoK inaccuracy <--- Mood .062 
Covariances:  
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Executive Function <--> Memory 44.640 24.525 1.820 .069 
Mood <--> Memory .342 .257 1.327 .184 
Executive Function <--> Mood -7.952 3.463 -2.297 .022 
Correlations:  
   Estimate 
Executive Function <--> Memory .540 
Mood <--> Memory .203 
Executive Function <--> Mood -.313 
 
 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P  
ErrA <--- Executive Function .027 .006 4.583 ***  
ErrB <--- Executive Function .054 .010 5.215 ***  
TimeHAY <--- Executive Function 1.000     
ErrBRIX <--- Executive Function .060 .026 2.301 .021  
Cog/Affect <--- Mood 1.000     
Somatic <--- Mood 1.019 .304 3.354 ***  
AVLT7 <--- Memory 1.000     
SMTrecall <--- Memory 1.213 .297 4.077 ***  
FoK accuracy <--- Executive Function -.029 .137 -.209 .834  
FoK accuracy <--- Memory 5.311 2.484 2.138 .032  
FoK accuracy <--- Mood 2.492 5.063 .492 .623  
FoK inaccuracy <--- Executive Function -.355 .169 -2.100 .036  
FoK inaccuracy <--- Memory 7.228 2.382 3.034 .002  
FoK inaccuracy <--- Mood 2.163 5.972 .362 .717  
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Variances:  
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Executive Function   1244.376 395.357 3.147 .002 
Mood   .518 .189 2.734 .006 
Memory   5.488 2.336 2.349 .019 
e1   .835 .173 4.823 *** 
e2   1.740 .574 3.030 .002 
e3   1429.547 271.369 5.268 *** 
e4   27.044 4.437 6.096 *** 
e8   .341 .139 2.462 .014 
e9   .212 .137 1.543 .123 
e1o   5.349 1.200 4.457 *** 
e11   5.113 1.446 3.535 *** 
d2   450.889 78.169 5.768 *** 
d3   399.143 83.545 4.778 *** 
Squared Multiple Correlations:  
   Estimate 
FoK inaccuracy   .375 
FoK accuracy   .257 
SMTrecall   .612 
AVLT7   .506 
Somatic   .717 
Cog/Affect   .603 
ErrBRIX   .142 
TimeHAY   .465 
ErrB   .674 
ErrA   .517 
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Sample Moments  
Sample Covariances 
 FoK inaccuracy FoK accuracy SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
FoK inaccuracy 767.137          
FoK accuracy 173.177 674.967         
SMTrecall 46.325 46.132 16.462        
AVLT7 35.002 22.714 8.511 13.608       
Somatic 5.769 3.737 .459 .230 .774      
Cog/Affect 8.427 3.087 .414 .341 .516 .881     
ErrBRIX 12.087 24.190 6.441 8.723 -.775 -.459 38.735    
TimeHAY -44.481 139.842 40.196 52.428 -6.606 -6.363 90.076 2838.428   
ErrB -15.690 5.191 .917 2.068 -.533 -.372 3.402 74.968 6.054  
ErrA -.109 2.190 1.889 1.949 -.274 -.150 2.092 32.689 1.759 1.905 
Sample Correlations 
 FoK inaccuracy FoK accuracy SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affectχ ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
FoK inaccuracy 1.000          
FoK accuracy .241 1.000         
SMTrecall .412 .438 1.000        
AVLT7 .343 .237 .569 1.000       
Somatic .237 .164 .129 .071 1.000      
Cog/Affect .324 .127 .109 .098 .625 1.000     
ErrBRIX .070 .150 .255 .380 -.142 -.079 1.000    
TimeHAY -.030 .101 .186 .267 -.141 -.127 .272 1.000   
ErrB -.230 .081 .092 .228 -.246 -.161 .222 .572 1.000  
ErrA -.003 .061 .337 .383 -.226 -.116 .244 .445 .518 1.000 
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Residual Covariances 
 FoK inaccarucy FoK accuracy SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
FoK inaccarucy 128.161          
FoK accuracy 22.873 68.436         
SMTrecall 16.550 11.302 3.278        
AVLT7 10.448 -6.007 1.855 2.770       
Somatic -.764 .343 .037 -.118 .025      
sqCAbdi1 2.013 -.245 .000 -.001 -.011 .023     
ErrBRIX 20.264 13.312 3.199 6.049 -.290 .018 7.226    
TimeHAY 92.027 -41.765 -13.937 7.787 1.494 1.589 15.538 164.505   
ErrB -8.356 -4.567 -1.992 -.331 -.098 .055 -.603 8.107 .722  
ErrA 3.549 -2.676 .439 .752 -.057 .063 .095 -.652 -.033 .176 
Standardized Residual Covariances  
 FoK inaccarucy FoK accuracy SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
FoK inaccarucy 1.411          
FoK accuracy .355 .794         
SMTrecall 1.707 1.172 1.749        
AVLT7 1.198 -.695 1.349 1.799       
Somatic -.333 .158 .117 -.408 .236      
Cog/Affect .825 -.106 .000 -.003 -.112 .186     
ErrBRIX 1.419 .955 1.542 3.223 -.590 .033 1.613    
TimeHAY .697 -.323 -.710 .440 .327 .326 .516 .433   
ErrB -1.413 -.788 -2.233 -.413 -.476 .250 -.442 .589 .952  
ErrA 1.056 -.813 .876 1.667 -.491 .509 .124 -.086 -.092 .718 
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The model is recursive. 
Sample size = 100 
Variable Summary (residuals not shown) 
Observed, endogenous variables 
 
ErrA    A type Errors, Hayling Test 
ErrB   B type errors, Hayling Test 
TimeHAY  Hayling Time 
ErrBRIX  Errors Brixton Test 
AVLT7  Auditory Verbal Learning Test, delayed recall. 
SMTrecall  Sentence Memory Test recall 
FoK inaccuracy % Low FoK correct 
 
Unobserved, endogenous variables 
 
Executive Function 
 
Unobserved, exogenous variables 
 
Memory 
 
Variable counts (including residuals) 
 
Number of variables in your model: 17 
Number of observed variables: 7 
Number of unobserved variables: 10 
Number of exogenous variables: 9 
Number of endogenous variables: 8 
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Parameter summary 
 Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total 
Fixed 10 0 0 0 0 10 
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unlabeled 7 0 9 0 0 16 
Total 17 0 9 0 0 26 
Computation of degrees of freedom  
Number of distinct sample moments: 28 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 16 
Degrees of freedom (28 - 16): 12 
Result  
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 19.439 
Degrees of freedom = 12 
Probability level = .078 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 16 19.439 12 .078 1.620 
Saturated model 28 .000 0   
Independence model 7 65.668 21 .000 3.127 
Zero model 0 346.500 28 .000 12.375 
RMR, GFI 
Model GFI 
Default model .944 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .810 
Zero model .000 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model CFI 
Default model .833 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .000 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .079 .000 .141 .209 
Independence model .147 .107 .187 .000 
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Regression Weights 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Executive Function <--- Memory 8.313 2.517 3.302 *** 
ErrA <--- Executive Function .027 .005 4.985 *** 
ErrB <--- Executive Function .053 .010 5.548 *** 
TimeHAY <--- Executive Function 1.000    
ErrBRIX <--- Executive Function .063 .023 2.711 .007 
AVLT7 <--- Memory 1.000    
SMTrecall <--- Memory .938 .211 4.437 *** 
FoK inaccuracy <--- Executive Function -.367 .146 -2.512 .012 
FoK inaccuracy <--- Memory 6.923 2.340 2.958 .003 
Standardized Regression Weights 
   Estimate 
Executive Function <--- Memory .591 
ErrA <--- Executive Function .710 
ErrB <--- Executive Function .820 
TimeHAY <--- Executive Function .692 
ErrBRIX <--- Executive Function .394 
AVLT7 <--- Memory .765 
SMTrecall <--- Memory .664 
FoK inaccuracy <--- Executive Function -.524 
FoK inaccuracy <--- Memory .704 
Variances 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Memory   6.680 2.292 2.915 .004 
d1   859.197 350.107 2.454 .014 
e1   .914 .183 5.008 *** 
e2   1.828 .589 3.101 .002 
e3   1441.012 276.062 5.220 *** 
e4   28.479 4.564 6.240 *** 
e1o   4.721 1.418 3.329 *** 
e11   7.457 1.545 4.827 *** 
d3   429.756 94.264 4.559 *** 
Squared Multiple Correlations 
   Estimate 
Executive Function   .350 
FoK inaccuracy   .334 
SMTrecall   .441 
AVLT7   .586 
ErrBRIX   .155 
TimeHAY   .478 
ErrB   .672 
ErrA   .505 
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Sample Moments 
Sample Covariances  
 FoK inaccuracy SMTrecall AVLT7 ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
FoK inaccuracy 767.137       
SMTrecall 46.325 16.462      
AVLT7 35.002 8.511 13.608     
ErrBRIX 12.087 6.441 8.723 38.735    
TimeHAY -44.481 40.196 52.428 90.076 2838.428   
ErrB -15.690 .917 2.068 3.402 74.968 6.054  
ErrA -.109 1.889 1.949 2.092 32.689 1.759 1.905 
 
 
Sample Correlations 
 
 FoK inaccuracy SMTrecall AVLT7 ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
FoK inaccuracy 1.000       
SMTrecall .412 1.000      
AVLT7 .343 .569 1.000     
ErrBRIX .070 .255 .380 1.000    
TimeHAY -.030 .186 .267 .272 1.000   
ErrB -.230 .092 .228 .222 .572 1.000  
ErrA -.003 .337 .383 .244 .445 .518 1.000 
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Residual Covariances 
 FoK inaccuracy SMTrecall AVLT7 ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
FoK inaccuracy 121.555       
SMTrecall 22.048 3.130      
AVLT7 9.114 2.246 2.207     
ErrBRIX 18.375 3.160 5.224 5.014    
TimeHAY 55.331 -11.883 -3.107 6.862 76.559   
ErrB -10.379 -1.854 -.887 -1.025 4.687 .487  
ErrA 2.542 .506 .474 -.117 -2.387 -.108 .059 
Standardized Residual Covariances 
 FoK inaccuracy SMTrecall AVLT7 ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
FoK inaccuracy 1.325       
SMTrecall 2.288 1.652      
AVLT7 1.012 1.616 1.362     
ErrBRIX 1.238 1.466 2.610 1.046    
TimeHAY .411 -.595 -.166 .216 .195   
ErrB -1.716 -2.039 -1.039 -.709 .327 .616  
ErrA .730 .979 .978 -.142 -.299 -.288 .226 
 
APPENDIX T           FEELING OF KNOWING RELATIVE ACCURACY                                     i 
APPENDIX T - FEELING OF KNOWING RELATIVE ACCURACY 
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The model is recursive. 
Sample size = 100 
Variable Summary 
Your model contains the following variables (residuals not shown) 
Observed, endogenous variables 
 
ErrA    A type Errors, Hayling Test 
ErrB   B type errors, Hayling Test 
TimeHAY  Hayling Time 
ErrBRIX  Errors Brixton Test 
Cog/Affect  BDI-II Cognitive Affective Factor  
Somatic  BDI-II Somatic Factor  
AVLT7  Auditory Verbal Learning Test, delayed recall. 
SMTrecall  Sentence Memory Test recall 
FoK  FoK Gamma 
 
Unobserved, exogenous variables 
Executive Function 
Mood 
Memory 
Variable counts 
Number of variables in your model: 21 
Number of observed variables: 9 
Number of unobserved variables: 12 
Number of exogenous variables: 12 
Number of endogenous variables: 9 
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Parameter summary 
 Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total 
Fixed 12 0 1 0 0 13 
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unlabeled 8 3 11 0 0 22 
Total 20 3 12 0 0 35 
Computation of degrees of freedom 
Number of distinct sample moments: 45 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 22 
Degrees of freedom (45 - 22): 23 
Result (Default model) 
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 25.483 
Degrees of freedom = 23 
Probability level = .326 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 22 25.483 23 .326 1.108 
Saturated model 45 .000 0   
Independence model 9 99.212 36 .000 2.756 
Zero model 0 445.500 45 .000 9.900 
RMR, GFI 
Model GFI 
Default model .943 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .777 
Zero model .000 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model CFI 
Default model .961 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .000 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .033 .000 .091 .620 
Independence model .133 .102 .165 .000 
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Regression Weights 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
ErrA <--- Executive Function .027 .006 4.909 *** 
ErrB <--- Executive Function .054 .010 5.642 *** 
TimeHAY <--- Executive Function 1.000    
ErrBRIX <--- Executive Function .067 .024 2.804 .005 
Cog/Affect <--- Mood 1.000    
Somatic <--- Mood 1.446 .186 7.765 *** 
AVLT7 <--- Memory 1.000    
SMTrecall <--- Memory .861 .218 3.943 *** 
FoKgamma <--- Executive Function .001 .002 .641 .522 
FoKgamma <--- Memory .013 .027 .499 .618 
FoKgamma <--- Mood .168 .087 1.947 .052 
Standardized Regression Weights 
 
 
Covariances 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Executive Function <--> Memory 57.837 20.515 2.819 .005 
Mood <--> Memory .239 .226 1.058 .290 
Executive Function <--> Mood -6.381 2.674 -2.387 .017 
Correlations 
   Estimate 
Executive Function <--> Memory .588 
Mood <--> Memory .147 
Executive Function <--> Mood -.297 
 
 
 
 
 
   Estimate 
ErrA <--- Executive Function .736 
ErrB <--- Executive Function .824 
TimeHAY <--- Executive Function .688 
ErrBRIX <--- Executive Function .418 
Cog/Affect <--- Mood .641 
Somatic <--- Mood .993 
AVLT7 <--- Memory .804 
SMTrecall <--- Memory .634 
FoKgamma <--- Executive Function .139 
FoKgamma <--- Memory .103 
FoKgamma <--- Mood .286 
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Variances 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Executive Function   1302.667 387.502 3.362 *** 
Mood   .354 .103 3.421 *** 
Memory   7.427 2.504 2.966 .003 
e9   .010    
e1   .825 .176 4.697 *** 
e2   1.768 .576 3.070 .002 
e3   1448.941 270.848 5.350 *** 
e4   27.421 4.469 6.136 *** 
e8   .507 .074 6.811 *** 
e1o   4.058 1.766 2.299 .022 
e11   8.187 1.752 4.674 *** 
d3   .109 .017 6.423 *** 
Squared Multiple Correlations 
   Estimate 
FoKgamma   .114 
SMTrecall   .402 
AVLT7   .647 
Somatic   .987 
Cog/Affect   .411 
ErrBRIX   .175 
TimeHAY   .473 
ErrB   .680 
ErrA   .541 
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Sample Moments  
Sample Covariances  
 FoKgamma SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
FoKgamma .139         
SMTrecall .068 16.462        
AVLT7 .099 8.511 13.608       
Somatic .078 .459 .230 .774      
Cog/Affect .021 .414 .341 .516 .881     
ErrBRIX .112 6.441 8.723 -.775 -.459 38.735    
TimeHAY 1.372 40.196 52.428 -6.606 -6.363 90.076 2838.428   
ErrB .169 .917 2.068 -.533 -.372 3.402 74.968 6.054  
ErrA -.020 1.889 1.949 -.274 -.150 2.092 32.689 1.759 1.905 
Sample Correlations 
 FoKgamma SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
FoKgamma 1.000         
SMTrecall .045 1.000        
AVLT7 .072 .569 1.000       
Somatic .239 .129 .071 1.000      
Cog/Affect .061 .109 .098 .625 1.000     
ErrBRIX .048 .255 .380 -.142 -.079 1.000    
TimeHAY .069 .186 .267 -.141 -.127 .272 1.000   
ErrB .184 .092 .228 -.246 -.161 .222 .572 1.000  
ErrA -.040 .337 .383 -.226 -.116 .244 .445 .518 1.000 
APPENDIX T           FEELING OF KNOWING RELATIVE ACCURACY                                     6 
Residual Covariances 
 FoKgamma SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
FoKgamma .016         
SMTrecall -.119 2.763        
AVLT7 -.118 2.113 2.122       
Somatic .000 .162 -.115 .024      
Cog/Affect -.033 .208 .102 .005 .021     
ErrBRIX .015 3.111 4.857 -.158 -.032 5.495    
TimeHAY -.080 -9.626 -5.409 2.622 .019 3.010 86.819   
ErrB .091 -1.756 -1.035 -.038 -.030 -1.269 5.080 .537  
ErrA -.060 .528 .368 -.022 .025 -.287 -2.911 -.151 .107 
Standardized Residual Covariances 
 FoKgamma SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
FoKgamma .917         
SMTrecall -.905 1.419        
AVLT7 -.971 1.493 1.300       
Somatic -.001 .500 -.388 .225      
Cog/Affect -.987 .603 .322 .051 .170     
ErrBRIX .074 1.433 2.426 -.313 -.060 1.163    
TimeHAY -.043 -.478 -.288 .563 .004 .095 .222   
ErrB 1.095 -1.921 -1.205 -.180 -.136 -.881 .357 .685  
ErrA -1.269 1.021 .761 -.185 .195 -.353 -.367 -.408 .419 
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APPENDIX U 
FEELING OF KNOWING GAMMA, DIRECT EFFECTS, INCLUDING INFORMATION PROCESSING 
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The model is recursive. 
Sample size = 100 
Variable Summary 
Your model contains the following variables (residuals not shown) 
Observed, endogenous variables 
 
ErrA    A type Errors, Hayling Test 
ErrB   B type errors, Hayling Test 
TimeHAY  Hayling Time 
ErrBRIX  Errors Brixton Test 
Cog/Affect  BDI-II Cognitive Affective Factor  
Somatic  BDI-II Somatic Factor  
AVLT7  Auditory Verbal Learning Test, delayed recall. 
SMTrecall  Sentence Memory Test recall 
FoK  FoK Gamma 
SDMT  Symbol Digit Modalities test 
 
Unobserved, exogenous variables  
 
Executive Function 
Mood 
Memory 
Info Process 
 
Variable counts (including residuals) 
Number of variables in your model: 24 
Number of observed variables: 10 
Number of unobserved variables: 14 
Number of exogenous variables: 14 
Number of endogenous variables: 10 
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Parameter summary (Group number 1) 
 Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total 
Fixed 14 0 2 0 0 16 
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unlabeled 9 6 12 0 0 27 
Total 23 6 14 0 0 43 
 
Computation of degrees of freedom (Default model) 
Number of distinct sample moments: 55 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 27 
Degrees of freedom (55 - 27): 28 
Result (Default model) 
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 29.286 
Degrees of freedom = 28 
Probability level = .398 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 27 29.286 28 .398 1.046 
Saturated model 55 .000 0   
Independence model 10 109.769 45 .000 2.439 
Zero model 0 495.000 55 .000 9.000 
RMR, GFI 
Model GFI 
Default model .941 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .778 
Zero model .000 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model CFI 
Default model .980 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .000 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .022 .000 .082 .714 
Independence model .121 .092 .149 .000 
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Regression Weights:  
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
ErrA <--- Executive Function .026 .005 4.906 *** 
ErrB <--- Executive Function .051 .009 5.772 *** 
TimeHAY <--- Executive Function 1.000    
ErrBRIX <--- Executive Function .071 .024 2.941 .003 
Cog/Affect <--- Mood 1.000    
Somatic <--- Mood 1.445 .187 7.732 *** 
AVLT7 <--- Memory 1.000    
SMTrecall <--- Memory .760 .189 4.024 *** 
SDMT <--- Info Process 1.000    
FoKgamma <--- Executive Function .003 .002 1.325 .185 
FoKgamma <--- Info Process -.012 .006 -1.970 .049 
FoKgamma <--- Memory .025 .024 1.029 .303 
FoKgamma <--- Mood .163 .083 1.971 .049 
Standardized Regression Weights:  
   Estimate 
ErrA <--- Executive Function .731 
ErrB <--- Executive Function .811 
TimeHAY <--- Executive Function .709 
ErrBRIX <--- Executive Function .455 
Cog/Affect <--- Mood .640 
Somatic <--- Mood .993 
AVLT7 <--- Memory .864 
SMTrecall <--- Memory .605 
SDMT <--- Info Process .893 
FoKgamma <--- Executive Function .288 
FoKgamma <--- Info Process -.344 
FoKgamma <--- Memory .209 
FoKgamma <--- Mood .277 
Covariances: 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Executive Function <--> Info Process 237.591 71.332 3.331 *** 
Memory <--> Info Process 17.605 5.727 3.074 .002 
Mood <--> Memory .221 .230 .959 .338 
Mood <--> Info Process -.766 .752 -1.018 .309 
Executive Function <--> Mood -6.645 2.747 -2.419 .016 
Executive Function <--> Memory 62.654 19.978 3.136 .002 
Correlations: 
   Estimate 
Executive Function <--> Info Process .616 
Memory <--> Info Process .573 
Mood <--> Memory .126 
Mood <--> Info Process -.124 
Executive Function <--> Mood -.303 
Executive Function <--> Memory .574 
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Variances: 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Executive Function   1369.756 399.325 3.430 *** 
Mood   .352 .103 3.409 *** 
Memory   8.695 2.565 3.389 *** 
Info Process   108.486 23.034 4.710 *** 
e9   .010    
e5   27.703    
e1   .824 .172 4.799 *** 
e2   1.890 .540 3.502 *** 
e3   1355.570 258.416 5.246 *** 
e4   26.161 4.345 6.021 *** 
e8   .507 .074 6.814 *** 
e1o   2.946 1.753 1.680 .093 
e11   8.692 1.651 5.264 *** 
d3   .101 .017 6.076 *** 
Squared Multiple Correlations:  
   Estimate 
SDMT   .797 
FoKgamma   .176 
SMTrecall   .366 
AVLT7   .747 
Somatic   .987 
Cog/Affect   .410 
ErrBRIX   .207 
TimeHAY   .503 
ErrB   .657 
ErrA   .534 
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Sample Moments  
Sample Covariances 
 SDMT FoKgamma SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
SDMT 152.365          
FoKgamma -.548 .139         
SMTrecall 15.103 .068 16.462        
AVLT7 22.784 .099 8.511 13.608       
Somatic -1.132 .078 .459 .230 .774      
Cog/Affect -.493 .021 .414 .341 .516 .881     
ErrBRIX 29.043 .112 6.441 8.723 -.775 -.459 38.735    
TimeHAY 257.314 1.372 40.196 52.428 -6.606 -6.363 90.076 2838.428   
ErrB 8.959 .169 .917 2.068 -.533 -.372 3.402 74.968 6.054  
ErrA 6.160 -.020 1.889 1.949 -.274 -.150 2.092 32.689 1.759 1.905 
Sample Correlations 
 SDMT FoKgamma SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
SDMT 1.000          
FoKgamma -.119 1.000         
SMTrecall .302 .045 1.000        
AVLT7 .500 .072 .569 1.000       
Somatic -.104 .239 .129 .071 1.000      
Cog/Affect -.043 .061 .109 .098 .625 1.000     
ErrBRIX .378 .048 .255 .380 -.142 -.079 1.000    
TimeHAY .391 .069 .186 .267 -.141 -.127 .272 1.000   
ErrB .295 .184 .092 .228 -.246 -.161 .222 .572 1.000  
ErrA .362 -.040 .337 .383 -.226 -.116 .244 .445 .518 1.000 
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Residual Covariances (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 SDMT FoKgamma SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
SDMT 16.176          
FoKgamma -.254 .017         
SMTrecall 1.725 -.098 2.748        
AVLT7 5.178 -.119 1.903 1.966       
Somatic -.024 .001 .217 -.089 .028      
Cog/Affect .273 -.032 .246 .120 .008 .022     
ErrBRIX 12.269 .009 3.080 4.299 -.097 .010 5.747    
TimeHAY 19.723 -.082 -7.415 -10.227 2.999 .282 -6.628 113.102   
ErrB -3.259 .094 -1.532 -1.154 -.039 -.031 -1.571 4.529 .542  
ErrA -.079 -.059 .639 .303 -.022 .025 -.447 -3.283 -.091 .136 
Standardized Residual Covariances 
 SDMT FoKgamma SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
SDMT .836          
FoKgamma -.617 .952         
SMTrecall .379 -.750 1.410        
AVLT7 1.183 -.979 1.328 1.188       
Somatic -.024 .024 .672 -.299 .267      
Cog/Affect .250 -.974 .713 .376 .080 .184     
ErrBRIX 1.767 .047 1.423 2.129 -.192 .019 1.226    
TimeHAY .300 -.044 -.371 -.539 .648 .058 -.209 .292   
ErrB -1.081 1.137 -1.687 -1.330 -.187 -.139 -1.087 .319 .692  
ErrA -.047 -1.250 1.251 .625 -.186 .197 -.553 -.418 -.249 .542 
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APPENDIX V -  FoK gamma Mediation Model 
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The model is recursive. 
Sample size = 100 
Variable Summary (residuals not shown) 
Observed, endogenous variables 
ErrA    A type Errors, Hayling Test 
ErrB   B type errors, Hayling Test 
TimeHAY  Hayling Time (complex minus simple) 
ErrBRIX  Errors Brixton Test 
Cog/Affect  BDI-II Cognitive Affective Factor 
Somatic  BDI-II Somatic Factor 
AVLT7  Auditory Verbal Learning Test, delayed recall. 
SMTrecall  Sentence Memory Test recall 
FoK  FoK Gamma 
SDMT   Symbol Digit Modalities Test 
 
Unobserved, endogenous variables 
Info Process 
 
Unobserved, exogenous variables 
Executive Function 
Mood 
Memory 
Variable counts (including residuals) 
Number of variables in your model: 25 
Number of observed variables: 10 
Number of unobserved variables: 15 
Number of exogenous variables: 14 
Number of endogenous variables: 11 
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Parameter summary 
 Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total 
Fixed 15 0 2 0 0 17 
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unlabeled 11 2 12 0 0 25 
Total 26 2 14 0 0 42 
Computation of degrees of freedom 
Number of distinct sample moments: 55 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 25 
Degrees of freedom (55 - 25): 30 
Result  
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 37.786 
Degrees of freedom = 30 
Probability level = 0.155 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 25 37.786 30 .155 1.260 
Saturated model 55 .000 0   
Independence model 10 109.769 45 .000 2.439 
Zero model 0 495.000 55 .000 9.000 
RMR, GFI 
Model GFI 
Default model .924 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .778 
Zero model .000 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model CFI 
Default model .880 
Saturated model 1.000 
Independence model .000 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .051 .000 .097 .452 
Independence model .121 .092 .149 .000 
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Regression Weights 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Info Process <--- Executive Function .076 .044 1.727 .084 
Info Process <--- Memory 1.106 .625 1.770 .077 
ErrA <--- Executive Function .021 .005 3.961 *** 
ErrB <--- Executive Function .070 .019 3.607 *** 
TimeHAY <--- Executive Function 1.000    
ErrBRIX <--- Executive Function .022 .023 .950 .342 
Cog/Affect <--- Mood 1.000    
Somatic <--- Mood 1.419 .181 7.840 *** 
AVLT7 <--- Memory 1.000    
SMTrecall <--- Memory .854 .370 2.306 .021 
SDMT <--- Info Process 1.000    
FoKgamma <--- Mood .148 .081 1.820 .069 
FoKgamma <--- Executive Function .004 .002 2.323 .020 
FoKgamma <--- Memory .030 .027 1.105 .269 
FoKgamma <--- Info Process -.011 .006 -1.910 .056 
Standardized Regression Weights 
   Estimate 
Info Process <--- Executive Function .270 
Info Process <--- Memory .298 
ErrA <--- Executive Function .561 
ErrB <--- Executive Function .891 
TimeHAY <--- Executive Function .619 
ErrBRIX <--- Executive Function .128 
Cog/Affect <--- Mood .644 
Somatic <--- Mood .993 
AVLT7 <--- Memory .786 
SMTrecall <--- Memory .553 
SDMT <--- Info Process .847 
FoKgamma <--- Mood .249 
FoKgamma <--- Executive Function .331 
FoKgamma <--- Memory .192 
FoKgamma <--- Info Process -.265 
Covariances 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Executive Function <--> Mood -4.700 2.815 -1.670 .095 
Mood <--> Memory .519 .214 2.426 .015 
Correlations 
   Estimate 
Executive Function <--> Mood -.262 
Mood <--> Memory .383 
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Variances 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Executive Function   900.605 387.531 2.324 .020 
Mood   .358 .103 3.465 *** 
Memory   5.126 2.560 2.002 .045 
d1   59.109 14.279 4.139 *** 
e9   .010    
e5   27.703    
e1   .898 .168 5.352 *** 
e2   1.137 .905 1.257 .209 
e3   1451.299 273.806 5.300 *** 
e4   26.488 4.312 6.142 *** 
e8   .506 .074 6.806 *** 
e10   3.170 1.989 1.594 .111 
e11   8.492 1.896 4.478 *** 
d3   .102 .017 5.992 *** 
 
Squared Multiple Correlations 
   Estimate 
Info Process   .162 
SDMT   .718 
FoKgamma   .189 
SMTrecall   .306 
AVLT7   .618 
Somatic   .986 
Cog/Affect   .414 
ErrBRIX   .017 
TimeHAY   .383 
ErrB   .794 
ErrA   .314 
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Sample Moments 
Sample Covariances 
 SDMT FoKgamma SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
SDMT 152.365          
FoKgamma -.548 .139         
SMTrecall 15.103 .068 16.462        
AVLT7 22.784 .099 8.511 13.608       
Somatic -1.132 .078 .459 .230 .774      
Cog/Affect -.493 .021 .414 .341 .516 .881     
ErrBRIX 29.043 .112 6.441 8.723 -.775 -.459 38.735    
TimeHAY 257.314 1.372 40.196 52.428 -6.606 -6.363 90.076 2838.428   
ErrB 8.959 .169 .917 2.068 -.533 -.372 3.402 74.968 6.054  
ErrA 6.160 -.020 1.889 1.949 -.274 -.150 2.092 32.689 1.759 1.905 
 
Sample Correlations 
 SDMT SPSSgamma SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
SDMT 1.000          
FoKgamma -.119 1.000         
SMTrecall .302 .045 1.000        
AVLT7 .500 .072 .569 1.000       
Somatic -.104 .239 .129 .071 1.000      
Cog/Affect -.043 .061 .109 .098 .625 1.000     
ErrBRIX .378 .048 .255 .380 -.142 -.079 1.000    
TimeHAY .391 .069 .186 .267 -.141 -.127 .272 1.000   
ErrB .295 .184 .092 .228 -.246 -.161 .222 .572 1.000  
ErrA .362 -.040 .337 .383 -.226 -.116 .244 .445 .518 1.000 
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Residual Covariances 
 SDMT FoKgamma SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
SDMT 54.126          
FoKgamma -.227 .013         
SMTrecall 10.263 -.075 4.232        
AVLT7 17.115 -.068 4.134 5.312       
Somatic -1.441 .011 -.169 -.506 .043      
Cog/Affect -.711 -.026 -.029 -.178 .008 .017     
ErrBRIX 27.529 .066 6.441 8.723 -.627 -.354 11.802    
TimeHAY 189.160 -.696 40.196 52.428 .062 -1.663 70.063 486.524   
ErrB 4.206 .025 .917 2.068 -.068 -.045 2.007 12.158 .537  
ErrA 4.703 -.065 1.889 1.949 -.132 -.049 1.665 13.432 .416 .595 
Standardized Residual Covariances 
 SDMT FoKgamma SMTrecall AVLT7 Somatic Cog/Affect ErrBRIX TimeHAY ErrB ErrA 
SDMT 3.876          
FoKgamma -.638 .717         
SMTrecall 2.918 -.597 2.435        
AVLT7 5.851 -.652 3.746 4.505       
Somatic -1.691 .339 -.551 -1.958 .411      
Cog/Affect -.767 -.783 -.087 -.649 .087 .136     
ErrBRIX 5.323 .357 3.531 5.806 -1.404 -.730 3.083    
TimeHAY 3.877 -.399 2.358 3.735 .015 -.365 2.761 1.455   
ErrB 1.761 .291 1.110 3.041 -.328 -.201 1.627 .930 .685  
ErrA 4.091 -1.575 4.697 5.881 -1.325 -.459 2.781 2.275 1.377 3.198 
 
